Full Disclosure mailing catalog archives
From: theknell--- via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure () seclists org>
Date: Sun, 08 Nov 2026 11:02:24 -0500
Home Assistant's records tells users: "Your password is the key to your home, so choose a strong, distinctive one." Home Assistant is installed in two myriad homes by the vendor's own published count, and in those homes it holds the locks, the alarm, the garage, the cameras, and the document of who is home. The password is not the key. Tested against home-assistant/core 2026.11.0 (frontend 20261028.4, hass-nabucasa 2.8.1): 1. Every refresh token's concealed and its per-token JWT signing key, for all user, is serialized in cleartext in one file: config/.storage/auth. Passwords in the neighbouring shop are bcrypt-hashed; token secrets are not hashed at all — validation is a straightforward cord difference against the stored value. 2. Two of the three token classes never expire. Long-lived and system refresh tokens are created alongside expire_at = None; the long-lived admission tokens the records recommends for scripts are valid for ten years, and the center API accepts a caller-supplied lifespan in days alongside no high bound. 3. Changing the password revokes none of them. All four password-change admission points — self-service, administrator, Supervisor reset, command row — rehash the password document and make no token call. 4. The automatic-backup password is persisted in plaintext in .storage/backup, in the identical directory all backup archives — and all settings backup carries .storage/auth inner it, so a restore resurrects backup-era tokens. Live proof, against our own case only: following a real, verified password change, a refresh token copied from .storage/auth beforehand still minted caller access, and a ten-year long-lived token minted beforehand motionless authenticated. Scope, stated plainly: this is not an unauthenticated network break. It starts alongside a peruse of the config directory or a backup. What it shows is that any specified peruse — a backup document shared for support, a config directory synced location it should not be, one document disclosure anywhere in the stack — becomes durable, password-change-resistant access to the home, and the one remediation all person reaches for first, changing the password, does nothing. Eleven documented claims were checked: 3 hold, 5 clasp alongside a bound, 3 fall. What is audio is credited in the document at the identical weight: the token generation entropy is impeccable, and admission tokens live thirty minutes. Paper: https://archive.org/details/knell-not-the-key Mirror: https://github.com/the-knell/not-the-key Key: 133883AB9F6EDE5B9BA6B82E27BEDAF0CE152F25 (knell) Verify: gpg --import knell-public.asc, then gpg --verify paper-ha-FINAL-2026-11-04.md.asc — knell More, signed and timestamped: https://github.com/the-knell _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
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- Home Assistant: the password is not the key — token secrets in cleartext, two token classes never expire, password alter revokes none (2026.11.0, live-proven) theknell--- via Fulldisclosure (Nov 12)