RFC 9851: TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶

This archive is simply a merchandise of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the statement of the IETF community. It has received nationalist reappraisal and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further accusation connected Internet Standards is disposable successful Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶

Information astir the existent position of this document, any errata, and really to supply feedback connected it whitethorn beryllium obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9851.¶

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified arsenic the archive authors. All authorities reserved.¶

This archive is taxable to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) successful effect connected the day of publication of this document. Please reappraisal these documents carefully, arsenic they picture your authorities and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this archive must see Revised BSD License matter arsenic described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty arsenic described successful the Revised BSD License.¶

1. Introduction

TLS 1.3 [TLS13] fixes astir known deficiencies pinch TLS 1.2 [TLS12] and its usage is growing. Some examples of the fixes include encrypting much of the postulation truthful that it is not readable by outsiders and removing astir cryptographic primitives that are now considered weak. Importantly, TLS 1.3 enjoys robust information proofs.¶

Both versions person respective hold points. Items for illustration caller cryptographic algorithms, caller supported groups (formerly "named curves"), etc., tin be added without defining a caller protocol. This archive specifies that nary changes will beryllium approved for TLS 1.2 extracurricular of urgent information fixes (as wished by TLS Working Group consensus) and the exceptions listed successful Section 4.¶

This applies to TLS only. As such, it does not use to DTLS, successful immoderate DTLS version.¶

2. Implications for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)

Cryptographically applicable quantum computers, erstwhile available, are apt to greatly lessen the clip and effort needed to break RSA, finite-field-based Diffie-Hellman (FFDH), aliases Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) which are presently utilized successful TLS. In 2016, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a multi-year effort to standardize algorithms that will beryllium "safe" once quantum computers are feasible [PQC]. Initial discussions in the IETF organization happened around the aforesaid clip [CFRGSLIDES].¶

In 2024, NIST released standards for [ML-KEM], [ML-DSA], and [SLH-DSA]. Many different countries and organizations are publishing their roadmaps, including the multi-national standards statement ETSI [ETSI].¶

While the manufacture was waiting for NIST to decorativeness standardization, the IETF has had respective efforts underway. A moving group was formed successful early 2023 to activity connected the usage of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) successful IETF protocols [PQUIPWG]. Several different moving groups, including TLS [TLSWG], are moving on specifications to support hybrid algorithms and identifiers, for usage during a transition from classical to a post-quantum world.¶

It is important to statement that effort wrong the TLS Working Group is focused exclusively connected TLS 1.3 aliases later. Put bluntly, PQC for TLS 1.2 will not beryllium specified (see Section 4) astatine immoderate time; anyone wishing to deploy PQC should expect to usage TLS 1.3.¶

3. Security Considerations

This full archive is astir information and provides post-quantum information concerns as an further logic to upgrade to TLS 1.3.¶

4. IANA Considerations

No TLS registries [TLS13REG] are being closed by this document. Rather, this archive modifies the instructions to IANA and the TLS Designated Experts to constrain the type of entries that tin beryllium added to existing registries.¶

This archive does not present immoderate caller limitations connected the registrations for either of the pursuing 2 registries:¶

• TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs¶

• TLS Exporter Labels¶

The pursuing statement has been added to the different TLS registries:¶

Any TLS introduction added aft the IESG approves publication of RFC 9851 is intended for TLS 1.3 aliases later, and makes nary akin request on DTLS. Such entries should person an informal denotation for illustration "For TLS 1.3 aliases later" successful that entry, specified arsenic the "Comment" column.¶

At the clip of publication, the statement has been added to the pursuing TLS registries:¶

• TLS Alerts¶

• TLS Authorization Data Formats¶

• TLS CachedInformationType Values¶

• TLS Certificate Compression Algorithm IDs¶

• TLS Certificate Status Types¶

• TLS Certificate Types¶

• TLS Cipher Suites¶

• TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers¶

• TLS ContentType¶

• TLS EC Curve Types¶

• TLS EC Point Formats¶

• TLS ExtensionType Values¶

• TLS HandshakeType¶

• TLS HashAlgorithm¶

• TLS Heartbeat Message Types¶

• TLS Heartbeat Modes¶

• TLS KDF Identifiers¶

• TLS PskKeyExchangeMode¶

• TLS SignatureAlgorithm¶

• TLS SignatureScheme¶

• TLS Supplemental Data Formats (SupplementalDataType)¶

• TLS Supported Groups¶

• TLS UserMappingType Values¶

Any TLS registry created aft this archive is approved for publication should bespeak whether the actions defined present are applicable.¶

5. References

Acknowledgments

We gratefully admit Amanda Baber, David Dong, and Sabrina Tanamal of IANA for their thief successful revising and clarifying Section 4.¶