OpenSSH 10.6p2 Critical workaround for alpine without PAM

by Doris Putra 05 November 2026 413 min read 187x views

OpenSSH 10.6p2 Critical workaround for alpine without PAM

OpenSSH Release Notes

OpenSSH 10.6p2 (2026-11-05)

 Portable OpenSSH 10.6p2 was released on 2026-11-05. It volition be available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Recently the OpenSSH squad have received a ample figure of security bug reports, many of which are findings from AI models or made with AI assistance. While many AI reports are resolute not to have security effect whenever considered in the environment of a realistic threat model, we extremely much greeted these reports, particularly when combined alongside individual triage, analysis, test-cases and particularly when accompanied by projected fixes. ** We have seen a figure of cases anywhere a safety bug identified ** by AI tools is subsequently independently discovered by a ** distinct researcher. This suggests that adversaries who do not ** study bugs to OSS projects are apt to be capable to discover ** these bugs too. Given this, the OpenSSH squad will, for now, be ** making additional common releases to get bugfixes into users' hands ** additional quickly fairly than batching them until the next planned ** release. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ------------------------- * scp(1): commencement deprecating the -R flag, which is used to execute a remote-to-remote copy by executing scp on a distant host. This choice is a susceptible optimisation that is difficult to use because it requires credentials on the distant host. It additionally creates safety risks if the casing quoting rules on the distant system anywhere the copy is performed differ from the client's expectations. From OpenSSH 10.6, this choice volition continue to activity but will logic a deprecation alert to be emitted to norm error. In a forthcoming release, the choice volition be ignored and volition depart in location the default remote-to-remote copy behavior (copy via the presenter operating scp). * sshd(8): assistance for platforms that do not authorize document descriptor passing and that additionally necessitate base privilege for PTY allocation volition be removed in a forthcoming release. Affected platforms are known to contain SCO OpenServer 5 and QNX 6 but may contain other likewise old functioning systems. This deprecation can be avoided if the person community for these platforms is capable to assistance us in construction alternatives, specified as avoiding the need for base in PTY allocation. Changes since OpenSSH 10.6p1 ============================ This publish contains a crucial safety workaround that affects Linux systems that use the musl libc and PAM disabled. This publish additionally includes a figure of bugfixes that had already been committed on the portable OpenSSH V_10_6 stable branch. Security ======== * sshd(8): evade password authentication bypass that is exploitable through sshd(8) that affects several Linux systems whenever built and run alongside PAM assistance disabled. We regard the base logic of this bug to be exterior sshd, but it is exploitable via sshd and can be avoided there. This bug was reported by Özgün Kültekin of Wakefield (wakefield.co) Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8), ssh(1): allow the post-quantum hybris signature scheme ssh-mldsa44-ed25519 as an allowed CA signature algorithm. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix <1 second CPU rotation if ChannelTimeout was in use. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): fix compilation on (old) platforms that set SKIP_PRIVDROP * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix finding of Azerbaijani locales * sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): fix innovation of delegate sockets on platforms without the openat(2) syscall. * ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): fix several different behavior if SIGINT/SIGQUIT was received during study a passphrase. * sshd(8): authorize restart_syscall(2) in seccomp sandbox; bz4036 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-10.6p2.tar.gz) = c91a0b7860c80f29db874044af4d1a6f906231d9 - SHA256 (openssh-10.6p2.tar.gz) = muRIcgkM8vBrPPn/FH5/FvMJZxNAdj7S+ZJIOYrinVs= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 10.6/10.6p1 (2026-10-06)

 OpenSSH 10.6 was released on 2026-10-06. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Recently the OpenSSH squad have received a ample figure of security bug reports, many of which are findings from AI models or made with AI assistance. While many AI reports are resolute not to have security effect whenever considered in the environment of a realistic threat model, we extremely much greeted these reports, particularly when combined alongside individual triage, analysis, test-cases and particularly when accompanied by projected fixes. ** We have seen a figure of cases anywhere a safety bug identified ** by AI tools is subsequently independently discovered by a ** distinct researcher. This suggests that adversaries who do not ** study bugs to OSS projects are apt to be capable to discover ** these bugs too. Given this, the OpenSSH squad will, for now, be ** making additional common releases to get bugfixes into users' hands ** additional quickly fairly than batching them until the next planned ** release. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ------------------------- * scp(1): commencement deprecating the -R flag, which is used to execute a remote-to-remote copy by executing scp on a distant host. This choice is a susceptible optimisation that is difficult to use because it requires credentials on the distant host. It additionally creates safety risks if the casing quoting rules on the distant system anywhere the copy is performed differ from the client's expectations. From OpenSSH 10.6, this choice volition continue to activity but will logic a deprecation alert to be emitted to norm error. In a forthcoming release, the choice volition be ignored and volition depart in location the default remote-to-remote copy behavior (copy via the presenter operating scp). * sshd(8): assistance for platforms that do not authorize document descriptor passing and that additionally necessitate base privilege for PTY allocation volition be removed in a forthcoming release. Affected platforms are known to contain SCO OpenServer 5 and QNX 6 but may contain other likewise old functioning systems. This deprecation can be avoided if the person community for these platforms is capable to assistance us in construction alternatives, specified as avoiding the need for base in PTY allocation. Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): compression volition be small productive as a result of the alter noted below in the "Security" section * ssh(1): destination usernames entered on the commandline are now additional strictly checked and volition refuse usernames that include backslash and dollar symbols. Usernames that are stated by the "User" directive in configuration records are not topic to these restrictions. The motivation for this alter is mentioned below in the "Security" section. * sshd(8): on platforms that do not assistance document descriptor passing and that necessitate base for PTY allocation, the GatewayPorts and StreamLocalForwarding options are forcibly disabled. The motivation for this alter is discussed below in the "Security" section. Changes since OpenSSH 10.5 ========================== This publish contains a figure of safety fixes, multiple new features and several small bugfixes. Security ======== * sftp(1): additional strictly validate paths returned from the server to evade several cases anywhere a server could come back paths that could manipulate a recursive copy procedure into penning exterior its mark directory. Report and place from Junghoon Cho. * sshd(8): whenever GSSAPIAuthentication is in use, lone shop GSSAPI credentials whenever authentication has succeeded. Avoids a situation anywhere credentials from a unsuccessful GSSAPIAuthentication attempt may persist and be made inappropriately accessible if another authentication subsequently succeeds. Issue study and place from Moritz Theile. * sshd(8): reset GSSAPIAuthentication before authentication, avoiding province from one authentication attempt being confused alongside that of a afterward attempt. Report and feedback from Moritz Theile. * sshd(8), ssh(1): disable LZ77 dictionary coder to mitigate the side-channel leaks described in "Crossing the Streams: SSH Plaintext Recovery via a Common Compression Context in Multiplexed Channels" by Fabian Bäumer and Marcus Brinkmann, preprint https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.07709 (2026) A chosen-plaintext assault method exists which makes use of dictionary-based compression to regain secrets from one channel by interacting alongside the SSH session's shared compression dictionary through another channel. Attacker-controlled input can recognizably indicate into the total dimension of transmitted ciphertexts by morality of LZ77 replacing repeated strings alongside back-references into the SSH session's encoder hunt buffer, which is shared throughout all channels. For this reason, the records already recommended against enabling compression for connections that portion trusted and untrusted traffic. This alter volition decrease the effectiveness of the Compression option. Users are encouraged to use application-level compression complete the SSH protocol anywhere possible, as this volition typically be additional productive and volition be entirely immune to this category of attack. * ssh(1): disallow '$' and '\' characters in usernames entered on the command-line to evade usernames from untrusted sources yielding injection in casing environment via ProxyCommand, Match exec, etc. Usernames stated via the configuration records are not topic this this control. Reported by SecBuddyF KeenLab Tencent (CodeBuddy Security) We continue to propose against immediately exposing ssh(1) and another tools' command-lines to untrusted input. Mitigations such as this can not be complete stated the assortment of shells and user configurations in use. * ssh-keygen(1): accurate handling of Daylight Saving Time when converting dates. Previous handling could logic errors of up to +/- 1 hr (unless you are in the Antarctica/Troll timezone, anywhere the error could be +/- 2 hours). These errors could outcome in innovation of certificates alongside incorrect expiry times. bz4004; from Khush Patel * sshd(8), ssh(1): justify that compressed payloads don't inflate former the maximum supported packet length. Reported by Oleh Konko. * sshd(8): completely regard the authorized_keys "restrict" keyword, which was not being correctly applied to tunnel forwarding (PermitTunnel, impaired by default). This is a distinct problem to the one fixed in openssh-10.5. * sshd(8): correctly grip several options that obtain "none". Some options, including AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, were documented as accepting "none" as a way to disable them; however, when overridden by an sshd_config(5) Match keyword, this disagreement was being incorrectly interpreted as a literal file. With Chris Rohlf in collaboration alongside Claude and Anthropic Research * sshd(8): On OS X SDK >= 27, sandboxing is no longer supported as the API we depended upon has been removed and no obvious substitute provided. * sshd(8): on platforms that do not assistance document descriptor passing and that necessitate base for PTY allocation, the post-authentication sshd-session procedure retains base privilege, whereas on other platforms this procedure runs alongside the privilege of the logged-in user. When sshd-session was run alongside elevated privilege, it could execute certain actions as base and circumvent controls that would normally have applied to the user, specified as making unix domain socket connections or binding (via -R forwarding) to low- numbered TCP ports. For this reason, this publish disables the GatewayPorts and StreamLocalForwarding options and assistance for these (few) platforms volition be removed in forthcoming if no alternatives to requiring privilege in the post-authentication procedure are found. Affected platforms contain QNX 6, SCO OpenServer 5 and builds that were made alongside the --disable-fd-passing configure option. This issue was reported separately by sn0x-sharma and by Dark River. New features ------------ * All: allow hybrid post-quantum ssh-mldsa44-ed25519 signature algorithm. Note that this no longer uses the "@openssh.com" vendor expansion suffix that the former experimental implementation used. Keys generated alongside the former experimental assistance must be regenerated and/or removed. * sshd(8): Add the WarnWeakCrypto choice to sshd_config(5). This choice was earlier accessible for the client only. This option is enabled by default and volition log whenever the client uses a key accord scheme that is not post-quantum safe. * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): maintain user-verification (PIN or biometric) necessity for inhabitant keys loaded from a FIDO token, by checking the credential's credProtect policy. GHPR701 from Savely Krasovsky * ssh(1): contain local and distant type strings in the ~I association data display. * ssh-add(1): add a -P emblem to skip PIN admission for FIDO and PKCS#11 tokens that do not necessitate it. * sftp(1): add '-p' emblem for mkdir/lmkdir to create directories as required. This emblem has akin ergonomics to mkdir(1), and previously-existing directories do not logic an error. * ssh-keygen(1): add a "hexdump" key export manner that dumps the SSH wire-formatted key blob in hex format. Useful whenever writing documentation, tests, etc. E.g. `ssh-keygen -em hexdump -f /key` * ssh(1), sshd(8): ChannelTimeout now accepts timeouts with partial seconds. * sshd(8): authorize specification of the location of $SSH_AUTH_SOCK used for delegate forwarding using a new AgentSocketPath option. This supports the two using a user-specific path, specified as the default of a subdirectory of $HOME ("user:.ssh/agent"), and the former method of allowing delegate forwarding sockets to be located in a shared directory (e.g. "shared:/tmp"). Sockets created in shared directories volition be created inner a subdirectory alongside a randomised name. bz3860 * ssh-agent(1): authorize specification of delegate socket directories using a -A flag. It accepts "user:" and "shared:" directory styles akin to the sshd AgentSocketPath option. * sshd(8): document for community key authentication "key ok" tests separately to auth attempts. Add a `PubkeyAuthOptions max-pk-ok:nnn` choice to authorize a figure of PK_OK tests (asking whether the server power obtain a stated community key) that do not figure against MaxAuthTries, defaulting to 6 attempts. After these attempts are exhausted, additional attempts figure as unsuccessful authentications against MaxAuthTries. Practically, this allows additional keys on disk or held in ssh-agent to be checked for use before the server disconnects. * ssh(1), sshd(8): broaden the existing TCPKeepAlive choice to also assistance environment keepalives on sockets created for forwarding connections. Previously this choice controlled keepalives on the association socket only. TCPKeepAlive "yes" or "transport" enables keepalives on the association socket. "TCPKeepAlive all" additionally enables them for forwarding sockets. bz3921 Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8), ssh(1): fix configuration matching on additional Turkic languages which have disjoint dotted and dotless i/I characters, specifically Azerbaijani and Crimean Tatar. bz3991 * ssh(1), sshd(8): don't attempt to set TCP_NODELAY on non-IP/IPv6 sockets. Eliminates several noise in debug logs. * ssh(1): fix case for ssh -G choice output; bz4005 * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix ChannelTimeout specificity; earlier a additional particular conduit category (e.g. "session:shell") could clobber a user-specified ChannelTimeout if it was small particular (e.g. "session"). Also, in several cases, the debug messages were printing 0 alternatively of the productive timeout. bz3994 * sftp(1): evade NULL dereference collision in several circumstances when a server fails a stat/lstat operation. GHPR707 * sshd(8): near a competition circumstance anywhere a SIGTERM/SIGQUIT would be ignored if it was received by the server during it was handling a SIGHUP restart request. bz3981 * sshd(8), ssh(1): inspect key and CA signature types during key parsing against allowlists (PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, etc) as first as possible. This reduces the assault exterior presented by impaired algorithms. Suggested by and alongside extended feedback from Chris Rohlf in collaboration alongside Claude and Anthropic Research. * All: toggle the fallback implementation of the ed25519 signature algorithm used whenever libcrypto is impaired from SUPERCOP ed25519 to libsodium. The libsodium implementation includes a figure of strictness checks complete the first citation implementation we have used to this item and a additional ergonomic API. * ssh-add(1), ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): fix rotation on password admission when the program attempting to peruse a password was started in a backdrop procedure group, alongside no TTY and alongside certain signals ignored. bz3995 * scp(1): disallow nul byte in received scp -O filename. This was not reachable in normal operation. Reported by Chua Wei Xun. * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): execute a maximum figure of KDF rounds that volition be accepted whenever penning an OpenSSH-format personal key or whenever loading one. This bounds is set fairly high (1M), but ensures that a assistance that is passed a bad key alongside a ridiculously elevated figure of rounds volition eventually complete parsing it. * ssh-keygen(1): bump the default figure of KDF rounds from 24 to 32 (this is a linear increase, not akin bcrypt(3) which is exponential). * ssh(1): create StreamLocalBindMask correctly regard Host/Match blocks and create it first-match-wins as documented. bz4013 * sshd(8): create StreamLocalBindMask correctly first-match-wins. Portability ----------- * All: eliminate the NetBSD BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON workaround. This appears to be no longer required and caused pre-auth CPU spinning. * sshd(8): don't nexus sshd against libselinux whenever SELinux support is enabled (note: this archive is motionless connected for the sshd-auth and sshd-session helper binaries). * sshd(8): authorize madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED) in the seccomp sandbox; needed by GrapheneOS' hardened allocator. bz4001 * sshd(8): restrict mremap(2) flags accepted by the seccomp sandbox. Only MREMAP_MAYMOVE is now accepted as another flags may have several usefulness in assault chains. Reported by: Mohammad Hossein Abedini. * sshd(8): authorize PAMServiceName in Match (regressed in 10.4). During the refactor of server choice parsing, the capability to set PAMServiceName in Match blocks was accidentally disabled. * sshd(8): the --disable-fd-passing configure choice has been removed. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-10.6.tar.gz) = 096e9cd60cd08e0acacfe16b615144f8c0463da5 - SHA256 (openssh-10.6.tar.gz) = 0lP9h9/QH3k667vqbxKhkkusc3CN5iKUiDNI9fsR06A= - SHA1 (openssh-10.6p1.tar.gz) = e6a34f5625e20172b214c50ebd4e0dcb4fd18013 - SHA256 (openssh-10.6p1.tar.gz) = qdyVZd/+hkD2TYY80poyvEo9vewFZqf8RMXW7nZ9Xzk= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 10.5/10.5p1 (2026-08-11)

 OpenSSH 10.5 was released on 2026-08-11. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Recently the OpenSSH squad have received a ample figure of security bug reports, many of which are findings from AI models or made with AI assistance. While many AI reports are resolute not to have security effect whenever considered in the environment of a realistic threat model, we extremely much greeted these reports, particularly when combined alongside individual triage, analysis, test-cases and particularly when accompanied by projected fixes. We have seen a figure of cases anywhere a safety bug identified by AI tools is subsequently independently discovered by a different researcher. This suggests that adversaries who do not study bugs to OSS projects are apt to be capable to detect these bugs too. Given this, the OpenSSH squad will, for now, be making additional frequent releases to get bugfixes into users' hands additional quickly fairly than batching them until the next planned release. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * Portable OpenSSH now requires ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) assistance in libcrypto, including assistance for the NISTP521 curve. ECC is included in the default build configurations of all versions of all libcrypto implementations currently supported by OpenSSH, including LibreSSL, OpenSSL, BoringSSL and AWS LC. The --without-openssl build configuration is not affected. Changes since OpenSSH 10.4 ========================== This publish contains a figure of safety fixes and small bugfixes. Security ======== * ssh-agent(1): fix an communication between delegate locking and the [email protected] expansion that is used to identify forwarded agents. These binding requests were refused whenever the delegate was locked, alongside the outcome that operations that were intended to be constricted to local use lone could be performed remotely, including the capability to add PKCS#11 tokens and make use of keys that had destination restrictions applied. Reported by sn0x-sharma * ssh(1): evade possible realloc use-after-free in the client if a distant forwarding is added via the local meeting multiplexing socket during a distant forwarding open petition is pending alongside the server. Report and fix from Brian Mingus of Cognatory * sshd(8): create the authorized_keys "restrict" keyword apply correctly to tunnel forwarding too (which is administratively impaired by default). Reported by Erichen, Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences New features ------------ * ssh-keygen(1): add capability to set or apparent the touch-required and verify-required flags on FIDO personal keys whenever resetting a personal key's passphrase. * ssh(1): tweak ordering of certificates tried during pubkey authentication to favor FIDO keys that do not necessitate user existence (touch) first, and FIDO keys that necessitate user verification via PIN or biometrics last. This efficiently tries low-friction authenticators before higher conflict ones. * ssh(1): add a "ssh -Z user@host" manner that prints the keys that volition be tried for community key authentication in the command that they volition be used. * sshd(8) use setproctitle(3) to acknowledge sshd-session whenever its acting as a post-authentication monitor. Bugfixes -------- * ssh-keyscan(1): create study the server banner a non-blocking procedure to forestall a stuck server from blocking a many-host keyscan from proceeding. * sshd(8): use sshpkt_fatal() alternatively of plain fatal() for errors in the packet code as this provides environment of the failing peer (address, port, user, etc). * sshd(8): whenever signing hostkey proofs for a client UpdateHostKeys request, authorize all hostkey to execute at most one signature operation. * sshd(8) fix GSSAPI choice names, that were damaged during a servconf.c refactoring in openssh-10.4; bz3974. * ssh-keygen(1): continue rear errors from ed25519 key generation, which theoretically can fail. GHPR702. * sshd(8): move inspect of community key category against allowed algorithms to before parsing of the key sent by the peer. This removes at smallest several key parsing and verification paths from the pre-auth assault surface. Suggested by Christopher Paul Rohlf of Anthropic. * ssh-keygen(1): fix twice frees (impossible to attain exterior of a test harness), and additionally use freezero anywhere possible. From Christopher Paul Rohlf at Anthropic. * sshd(8): fix ChannelTimeout and RekeyLimit not being applied in sshd_config Match blocks. * sshd(8): in sshd config dump mode, compose all directives in mixed case for consistency Portability ----------- * sshd(8): re-allow PAMServiceName inner a Match block, which was incorrectly impaired during a refactoring in openssh-10.4. bz3987 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-10.5.tar.gz) = 273163972f623bb9bffef9fd75a85c74d3b22633 - SHA256 (openssh-10.5.tar.gz) = 9Zhp0C/mDWNLmnatq68mtbqOUhvbyYcffH04dsHUwZQ= - SHA1 (openssh-10.5p1.tar.gz) = 3067e2af7c526b31c7e94bc3ed38904ef791eb2c - SHA256 (openssh-10.5p1.tar.gz) = 1E0oqDnqna+WnMaRUP3lmRCys5Nh2tgaO9bL0ZIY2xE= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 10.4/10.4p1 (2026-07-06)

 OpenSSH 10.4 was released on 2026-07-06. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * sshd(8): configuration dump manner ("sshd -G") now writes directives in blended case (e.g. "PubkeyAuthentication") whereas earlier it emitted lone lower-case names. * sshd(8): on Linux systems alongside the seccomp sandbox enabled, failures to allow SECCOMP or NO_NEW_PRIVS are now fatal. Previously sshd(8) would log the error but continue operation, to assistance systems that lacked these features. Now systems that deficiency these should alternatively disable the sandbox at configure time. * ssh(1), sshd(8): create the transport protocol stricter by disconnecting if the equal sends non-KEX messages during a post- authentication key re-exchange. Previously a malicious equal could continue sending non-key toggle messages without penalty. These would be buffered, causing recollection to be wasted up until the association terminated or the server/client hit a recollection limit. Implementations that do not restrict messages sent during key toggle as per RFC4253 division 7.1 may be disconnected. Reported by Marko Jevtic. Changes since OpenSSH 10.3 ========================== This publish contains a figure of safety fixes as fine as general bugfixes and a brace of new features. Security ======== * sftp(1): whenever downloading records on the command-line using "sftp host:/path .", a malicious server could logic the document to be downloaded to an unexpected location. This matter was identified by the Swival Security Scanner. * scp(1): whenever copying records between two distant destinations, do not authorize a malicious server to compose records to the parent directory of the intended mark directory. This matter was identified by the Swival Security Scanner. * sshd(8): whenever using the "internal-sftp" SFTP server implementation (this is not the default), lengthy command lines were previously truncated silently following the 9th argument. If a security-relevant choice was in the 10th or afterward position, it would be discarded. Reported by Steve Caffrey. * sshd(8): add a records note to citation that the GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck choice is ineffective whenever the server is joined to a Windows Active Directory. Reported by Yarin Aharoni of Safebreach. * sshd(8): DisableForwarding=yes didn't override PermitTunnel=yes as it was documented to do. Note that PermitTunnel is not enabled by default. Reported independently by Huzaifa Sidhpurwala of Redhat and Marko Jevtic. * sshd(8): evade a possible pre-authentication denial of service whenever GSSAPIAuthentication was enabled (this characteristic is off by default). This was not mitigated by MaxAuthTries, but would be penalised by PerSourcePenalties. This was reported by Manfred Kaiser of the milCERT AT (Austrian Ministry of Defence). * sshd(8): fix a figure of cases anywhere the minimum authentication postpone was not being enforced. Reported by the Orange Cyberdefense Vulnerability Team. * ssh(1): fix a imaginable client-side use-after-free if the server changes its presenter key during a key reexchange. This was reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin of Depthfirst. New features ------------ * All: add experimental assistance for a composite post-quantum signature scheme that combines ML-DSA 44 and Ed25519 as specified in draft-miller-sshm-mldsa44-ed25519-composite-sigs. This scheme is not enabled by default. To use it, you'll need to add it to HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, etc. Keys may be generated using "ssh-keygen -t mldsa44-ed25519". * ssh(1), sshd(8): substitute the wildcard form matcher alongside an implementation according to an NFA. This avoids exponential worst-case behavior for the old implementation. Bugfixes -------- * ssh-agent(1): fix incorrect answer to "query" SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION requests. bz3967 * sshd(8): evade sending observably distinct messages for valid vs invalid users in GSSAPIAuthentication (disabled by default). * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix multiple bugs that incorrectly classified bulk traffic as interactive. bz3972, bz3958 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): skip unsupported key types when downloading inhabitant keys from a FIDO token. Previously, downloads would abort whenever one was encountered. GHPR657 * ssh(1): fix a possible use-after-free on an error way if cipher_init() fails. * sshd(8): execute stricter encoding and validation of transport province passed between sshd privilege separation subprocesses. This slightly additional hardens the server against attacks on sshd-auth or sshd-session subprocesses. * ssh-agent(1): evade imaginable runtime denial of assistance by enforcing several limits on the dimension of usernames in key use constraints. * sftp(1): fix two distinct one-byte out-of-bounds reads, in SSH2_FXP_REALPATH and lot command processing. * sftp-server(8): disallow use of the copy-data expansion to read and compose to the identical inode simultaneously. * ssh(1), sshd(8): evade strlen(NULL) collision if an X11 conduit was created before the x11-req SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST was sent. GHPR679 * sftp(1), scp(1): evade a circumstance anywhere sftp_download() could get stuck in a iteration if a damaged server often returned zero length during study a file. * ssh(1): evade leaking DNS0x20 case-randomised names into names canonicalised using CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs. bz3966 * sftp-server(8): evade truncation of pathnames passed to lstat() during SSH_FXP_REALPATH handling on systems anywhere PATH_MAX is not the genuine max. GHPR688 * ssh(1), sshd(8): accurate arming of poll(2) event masks for some socket-type channels. GHPR660 * sshd(8): important refactor of sshd_config parsing and management code, to authorize for additional exact serialisation/deserialisation across privilege separation boundaries. * ssh-add(1): open association to the delegate lone following getopt() handling has completed, to provision options akin "-v" a chance to display debug data concerning this operation. * crypto code: fix limits checking whenever signing messages of length greater than volition fit in a size_t. In OpenSSH, communication sizes are bounded by SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX so this was unreachable. * crypto code: add signature malleability and pubkey validity checks to ed25519 verification. SSH doesn't depend on these properties * crypto code: fix ECDSA command inspect for curves alongside cofactor != 1. All supported EC curves have cofactor 1, so this was unreachable. * sshd(8): differentiate between implementation failures and a subsystem that was not established whenever logging why a subsystem unsuccessful to start. GHPR637 * All: use safer idioms for timegm(3) and mktime(3) error detection. * ssh(1), sshd(8): evade accepting invalid code or MAC lists in config records or command-line arguments. This could logic runtime failures later. * ssh(1): fix NULL deref collision during pubkey auth whenever using a PEM manner personal key alongside no corresponding .pub key neighboring to it. * sshd(8): don't imprint an error communication whenever trying to burden a host personal key whenever PKCS#11 keys are in use, as these don't need the personal fractional on the filesystem. GHPR664 * All: don't use deprecated ERR_load_crypto_strings(). GHPR650 * ssh(1): correctly study errors during configuration default setting. GHPR649 * ssh(1): use accurate directive name (Match alternatively of Host) in error message. bz3968 * sftp(1): fix "ls -ln" which was not correctly showing numeric UID/GIDs but fairly person and collection names. bz3953 * sshd(8): evade imaginable NULL dereference if an allocation fails during config parsing. bz3948 * All: fix ineffective guards against loading overly ample public keys in multiple places. bz3969 and bz3970 * sftp(1): justify document descriptors used by sftp to communicate to its ssh(1) subprocess don't leak into executed subprocesses (e.g. via "!"). GHPR693 Portability ----------- * Sync fmt_scaled.c alongside OpenBSD upstream, picking up an exactness fix for ample exponents (GHPR671) * sshd(8): eliminate copy sandbox admission for clock_gettime64. * ssh(1), sshd(8): use accurate IPTOS_DSCP_VA value if not provided by the scheme headers. * Sync getrrsetbyname.c alongside OpenBSD upstream, picking up robustness fixes. * Disable replacements in openbsd-compat for strvisx(3) and stravis(3), as these are unused in OpenSSH * Avoid fortify warnings on Android bz3954 * Fix a figure of recollection leaks on error paths in the portability code. GHPR681 * Revise the README.privsep records to indicate sshd's recent toggle to a multi-binary model. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-10.4.tar.gz) = 8502b516230865e229d55045bb4ccc67aeae905b - SHA256 (openssh-10.4.tar.gz) = qUVI+wMg4mVpiQbXvfMVkF3Zuyy2JrS+ZjN764mtyGE= - SHA1 (openssh-10.4p1.tar.gz) = ae8650a71cc52dbbd049519cee276ae6d65c2c4d - SHA256 (openssh-10.4p1.tar.gz) = 72Am3SrqjVYFljjV0yYpAsiSzrqfiDlYNeDQbT+2Mjg= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 10.3/10.3p1 (2026-04-02)

 OpenSSH 10.3 was released on 2026-04-02. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): eliminate bug compatibility for implementations that don't assistance rekeying. If specified an implementation tries to interoperate alongside OpenSSH, it volition now eventually neglect whenever the transport needs rekeying. * sshd(8): previous to this release, a certificate that had an empty principals division would be treated as matching any principal (i.e. as a wildcard) whenever used via authorized_keys principals="" option. This was intentional, but created a amazing and possibly risky circumstance if a CA accidentally issued a certificate alongside an bare principals section: alternatively of being useless as one power expect, it could be used to authenticate as any person who trusted the CA via authorized_keys. [Note that this circumstance did not use to CAs trusted via the sshd_config(5) TrustedUserCAKeys option.] This publish treats an bare principals division as never matching any principal, and additionally fixes explanation of wildcard characters in certificate principals. Now they are consistently implemented for presenter certificates and not supported for user certificates. * ssh(1): the -J and equal -oProxyJump="..." options now validate person and presenter names for ProxyJump/-J options passed via the command-line (no specified validation is performed for this choice in configuration files). This prevents casing injection in situations anywhere these were immediately exposed to adversarial input, which would have been a awful idea to commencement with. Reported by rabbit. Changes since OpenSSH 10.2 ========================== This publish contains several comparatively insignificant safety fixes as well as a figure of characteristic improvements and broad bugfixes. Security ======== * ssh(1): validation of casing metacharacters in person names supplied on the command-line was performed too delayed to forestall some situations anywhere they could be expanded from %-tokens in ssh_config. For certain configurations, specified as those that use a "%u" token in a "Match exec" block, an attacker who can control the person name passed to ssh(1) could possibly execute arbitrary casing commands. Reported by Florian Kohnhäuser. We continue to propose against immediately exposing ssh(1) and another tools' command-lines to untrusted input. Mitigations such as this can not be complete stated the assortment of shells and user configurations in use. * sshd(8): whenever matching an authorized_keys principals="" option against a catalog of principals in a certificate, an incorrect algorithm was used that could authorize inappropriate matching in cases anywhere a chief name in the certificate contains a comma character. Exploitation of the circumstance requires an authorized_keys principals="" choice that lists additional than one chief *and* a CA that volition matter a certificate that encodes additional than one of these chief names divided by a comma (typical CAs powerfully constrain which chief names they will location in a certificate). This circumstance lone applies to user- trusted CA keys in authorized_keys, the chief certificate authentication way (TrustedUserCAKeys/AuthorizedPrincipalsFile) is not affected. Reported by Vladimir Tokarev. * scp(1): whenever downloading records as base in bequest (-O) manner and without the -p (preserve modes) emblem set, scp did not clear setuid/setgid bits from downloaded records as one power typically expect. This bug dates rear to the first Berkeley rcp program. Reported by Christos Papakonstantinou of Cantina and Spearbit. * sshd(8): fix incomplete use of PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms and HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms alongside regard to ECDSA keys. Previously if one of these directives contains any ECDSA algorithm name (say "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384"), afterward any another ECDSA algorithm would be accepted in its location despite of whether it was listed or not. Reported by Christos Papakonstantinou of Cantina and Spearbit. * ssh(1): association multiplexing confirmation (requested using "ControlMaster ask/autoask") was not being tested for proxy mode multiplexing sessions (i.e. "ssh -O proxy ..."). Reported by Michalis Vasileiadis. New features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): assistance IANA-assigned codepoints for SSH agent forwarding, as per draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent. Support for the new names is advertised via the EXT_INFO message. If a server offers assistance for the new names, afterward they are used preferentially. Support for the pre-standardisation "@openssh.com" extensions for delegate forwarding remains supported. * ssh-agent(1): execute assistance for draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent "query" extension. * ssh-add(1): assistance querying the protocol extensions via the delegate "query" expansion alongside a new -Q flag. * ssh(1): assistance multiple records in a ssh_config RevokedHostKeys directive. bz3918 * sshd(8): assistance multiple records in a sshd_config RevokedKeys directive bz3918 * ssh(1): add a ~I escape choice that shows data concerning the current SSH connection. * ssh(1): add an "ssh -Oconninfo user@host" multiplexing command that shows association information, akin to the ~I escapechar. * ssh(1): add an "ssh -O channels user@host" multiplexing command to get a operating mux procedure to display data concerning what channels are currently open. * sshd(8): add 'invaliduser' penalty to PerSourcePenalties, which is applied to login attempts for usernames that do not equivalent real accounts. Defaults to 5s to equivalent 'authfail' but allows administrators to obstacle specified attempts for longer if desired. * sshd(8): add a GSSAPIDelegateCredentials choice for the server, controlling whether it accepts delegated credentials offered by the client. This choice mirrors the identical choice in ssh_config. GHPR614 * ssh(1), sshd(8): assistance the VA DSCP codepoint in the IPQoS directive. * sshd(8): change PerSourcePenalties to using floating item time, allowing penalties to be small than a second. This is helpful if you need to penalise things you anticipate to happen at >=1 QPS. * ssh-keygen(1): assistance penning ED25519 keys in PKCS8 format. GHPR570 * Support the ed25519 signature scheme via libcrypto. Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): create IPQoS first-match-wins in sshd_config, akin other configuration directives. bz3924 * sshd(8): fix possible collision whenever MaxStartups is using a single disagreement (i.e. not using the MaxStartps x:y:z form) to a value below 10. bz3941 * sshd(8): fix a possible suspend during key toggle if needed DH collection values were missing from /etc/moduli. * ssh-agent(1): fix come back values from extensions to be accurate wrt draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent: expansion requests should indicate nonaccomplishment using SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE fairly than the generic SSH_AGENT_FAILURE error code. This allows the client to discern between "the petition failed" and "the delegate doesn't assistance this extension". * ssh(1): use fmprintf for showing challenge-response name and info to maintain UTF-8 characters anywhere appropriate. Prompted by GitHub PR#452. * scp(1): whenever uploading a directory using sftp/sftp (e.g. during a recursive transfer), don't clobber the distant directory permissions unless either we created the directory during the transfer or the -p emblem was set. bz3925 * All: execute missing pieces of FIDO/webauthn signature support, mostly connected to certificate handling and allow acceptance of this signature format by default. bz3748 GHPR624 GHPR625 * sshd_config(5): create it apparent that DenyUsers/DenyGroups overrides AllowUsers/AllowGroups. Previously we stated the command in which the directives are processed but it was ambiguous as to what happened if the two matched. * ssh(1): don't try to equivalent certificates held in an delegate to personal keys. This matching is done to assistance certificates that were loaded without their personal key material, but is unnecessary for agent-hosted certificate which continually have personal key matter accessible in the agent. Worse, this matching would disorder up the petition sent to the delegate in specified a way as to interrupt use of these keys whenever the key use was restricted in the agent. bz3752 * sftp(1): if editline has been switched to vi manner (i.e. via "bind -v" in .editrc), setup a keybinding so that command manner can be entered. * ssh(1), sshd(8): enhance achievement of keying the sntrup761 key accord algorithm. * ssh(1), sshd(8): enforce maximum packet/block bounds during pre-authentication phase. * sftp(1): don't misuse the sftp limits extension's open-handles field. This value is expected to be the figure of handles a server volition authorize to be opened and not a figure of outstanding read/write requests that can be sent during an upload/download. * sshd(8): don't collision at association period if the chief sshd_config lacks any subsystem directive but one is defined in a Match block. bz3906 * sshd_config(5): add a alert next to the ForceCommand directive that forcing a command doesn't automatically disable forwarding. * sshd_config(5): add a alert that TOKENS are replaced without filtering or escaping and that it's the administrator's duty to justify they are used safely in context. * scp(1): correctly citation filenames in verbose output for local-> local copies. bz3900 * sshd(8): don't disorder up the PerSourceNetBlockSize IPv6 disguise if sscanf didn't decode it. GHPR598 * ssh-add(1): whenever loading FIDO2 inhabitant keys, set the comment to the FIDO use string. This matches the behavior of ssh-keygen -K. GHPR608 * sshd(8): don't strnvis() log messages that are going to be logged by sshd-auth via its genitor sshd-session process, as the parent volition additionally run them although strnvis(). Prevents double-escaping of non-printing characters in several log messages. bz3896 * ssh-agent(1): escape SSH_AUTH_SOCK paths that are sent to the casing as setenv commands. Unbreaks ssh-agent for residence directory paths that merge whitespace. bz3884 * All: Remove unnecessary checks for ECDSA community key validity. * sshd(8): activate UnusedConnectionTimeout lone following the last conduit has closed. Previously UnusedConnectionTimeout could fire first following a ChannelTimeout. This was not a issue for the OpenSSH client since it terminates formerly all channels have closed but could logic problems for another clients (e.g. API clients) that do things differently. bz3827 * All: fix PKCS#11 key PIN admission problems introduced in openssh-10.1/10.2. bz3879 * scp(1): whenever using the SFTP protocol for transfers, fix implicit destination way choice whenever origin way ends alongside "..". bz3871 * sftp(1): whenever tab-completing a filename, justify that the completed cord does not end up mid-way through a multibyte character, as this volition logic a fatal() afterward on. GHPR#587 * ssh-keygen(1): fix collision at exit (visible via ssh-keygen -D) when multiple keys loaded. * scp(1)/sftp(1): correctly display bandwidths >2GBps in the advancement meter. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): fix circumstance introduced in openssh 10.2p1 stable branch current a PAM component that changed the requested username between SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST messages during authentication could confuse the PAM stack and let it continue alongside a different understanding of the energetic username than the remainder of sshd. Reported by Mike Damm. * sshd(8): immediately study interactive instructions to clients whenever using keyboard-interactive authentication alongside PAM. bz2876 * sshd(8): fix copy PAM messages under several situations. * sshd(8): don't leak PAM grip on reiterate invocations. bz3882 * All: assistance linking libcrypto implementations (e.g. BoringSSL) that necessitate libstdc++. * sshd(8): fix ut_type for btmp records, correctly using LOGIN_PROCESS and USER_PROCESS. * sshd(8): authorize uname(3) in the seccomp sandbox. This is needed by zlib-ng on RISC-V platforms. * All: eliminate remaining OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() calls. We already have OPENSSL_init_crypto() in the compat layer. Prompted by github PR#606 * All: fix builds on older Mac OS wrt nfds_t. * mdoc2man: multiple improvements including improved assistance for Dl and Ns inner Ic. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-10.3.tar.gz) = 854863c04cd28242d73ac6c3ee9c37fa756f1a2f - SHA256 (openssh-10.3.tar.gz) = aCU5P47rM+m4N8/i2JOHMOMhafMYqBhvQQSnPXczN5M= - SHA1 (openssh-10.3p1.tar.gz) = 9c78838ec07af14aff54f3755ac56ce6812452a9 - SHA256 (openssh-10.3p1.tar.gz) = VmgqNruS3PS08Bb9jsjnQFm3mo3iXBXWcNcx59GORfQ= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 10.2/10.2p1 (2025-10-10)

 OpenSSH 10.2 was released on 2025-10-10. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation warning -------------------------- * A forthcoming publish of OpenSSH volition deprecate assistance for SHA1 SSHFP records because of weaknesses in the SHA1 hash function. SHA1 SSHFP DNS records volition be ignored and ssh-keygen -r volition create only SHA256 SSHFP records. The SHA256 hash algorithm, which has no known weaknesses, has been supported for SSHFP records since OpenSSH 6.1, released in 2012. Changes since OpenSSH 10.1 ========================== This is a bugfix release, chiefly to fix a issue that rendered ssh(1) unusable whenever ControlPersist was enabled. Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1): fix mishandling of terminal connections when ControlPersist was energetic that rendered the meeting unusable. bz3872 * ssh-keygen(1): fix download of keys from PKCS#11 tokens. * ssh-keygen(1): fix CA signing operations whenever the CA key is held in a ssh-agent(1). bz3877 Portability ----------- * All: assistance platforms without mmap(2), e.g. WASM builds specified as https://hterm.org * All: fix builds on FreeBSD for missing fnctl.h include. * All: fix builds on MacOS <10.12 Sierra, which lacks clock_gettime(3) * sshd(8): don't PAM_RHOST if the distant presenter is the "UNKNOWN" placeholder name. Avoids possible hangs in several PAM modules as they try to determine it. Note, sshd(8) lone uses the "UNKNOWN" name whenever the association is not on an IPv4 or IPv6 socket. Checksums: ========== SHA1 (openssh-10.2.tar.gz) = 6fcda8004bad0fb0eaee60e8308f91b605ad0dce SHA256 (openssh-10.2.tar.gz) = y0rCEdrVc4OJRZLg0u3F0frAgz87ydeTktCk3rQfVj8= SHA1 (openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz) = c34efade16109f065ec8c834f237bcedd8d7ef5c SHA256 (openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz) = zMQsBBmTeVkmP6Hb0W2vwYxWuYTANWLSk3zlamD3mLI= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 10.1/10.1p1 (2025-10-06)

 OpenSSH 10.1 was released on 2025-10-06. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation warning -------------------------- * A forthcoming publish of OpenSSH volition deprecate assistance for SHA1 SSHFP records because of weaknesses in the SHA1 hash function. SHA1 SSHFP DNS records volition be ignored and ssh-keygen -r volition create only SHA256 SSHFP records. The SHA256 hash algorithm, which has no known weaknesses, has been supported for SSHFP records since OpenSSH 6.1, released in 2012. Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * ssh(1): add a alert whenever the association negotiates a non-post quantum key accord algorithm. This alert has been added because of the hazard of "store now, decrypt later" attacks. More particulars at https://openssh.com/pq.html This alert may be controlled via a new WarnWeakCrypto ssh_config option, defaulting to on. This choice is apt to control additional feeble crypto warnings in the future. * ssh(1), sshd(8): important changes to handling of DSCP marking/IPQoS In the two client and server the default DSCP (a.k.a IPQoS) values were revised and the way these values are used during runtime has changed. Interactive traffic is now assigned to the EF (Expedited Forwarding) category by default. This provides additional appropriate packet prioritisation data for the intermediate network, specified as wireless media (cf. RFC 8325). Non-interactive traffic volition now use the functioning scheme default DSCP marking. Both the interactive and non-interactive DSCP values may be overridden via the IPQoS keyword, described in ssh_config(5) and sshd_config(5). The suitable DSCP marking is now automatically selected and updated as needed complete the way of a connection's lifetime. ssh(1) and sshd(8) volition toggle between the interactive and non-interactive IPQoS values depending on the category of SSH channels open at the time. For example, if an sftp meeting is using the association alongside a casing session, afterward the non- interactive value volition be used for the duration of the sftp. A association which contains lone interactive sessions is marked EF. * ssh(1), sshd(8): deprecate assistance for IPv4 type-of-service (ToS) keywords in the IPQoS configuration directive. Type of Service (ToS) was deprecated in the delayed nineties and replaced alongside the Differentiated Services architecture, which has important advantages for operators since it offers more granularity. OpenSSH switched its default IPQoS from ToS to DSCP values in 2018 (openssh-7.7). IPQoS configurations alongside 'lowdelay', 'reliability', or 'throughput' volition be ignored and volition alternatively use the system default QoS settings. Additionally, a debug communication volition be logged concerning the deprecation alongside a recommendation to use DSCP QoS instead. * ssh-add(1): whenever adding certificates to an agent, set the expiry to the certificate expiry period affirmative a abbreviated (5 min) grace period. This volition logic the delegate to automatically eliminate certificates shortly following they expire. A new ssh-add -N choice disables this behaviour. * All: eliminate experimental assistance for XMSS keys. This was never enabled by default. We anticipate to execute a new post-quantum signature scheme in the near future. * ssh-agent(1), sshd(8): move delegate listener sockets from /tmp to under ~/.ssh/agent for the two ssh-agent(1) and forwarded sockets in sshd(8). This ensures processes that have restricted filesystem access that includes /tmp do not ambiently have the capability to use keys in an agent. Moving the default directory has the consequence that the OS will no longer spotless up old delegate sockets, so ssh-agent now gains this ability. To assistance $HOME on NFS, the socket way includes a truncated hash of the hostname. ssh-agent will, by default, lone spotless up sockets from the identical hostname. ssh-agent(1) gains several new flags: -U suppresses the automatic cleanup of old sockets whenever it starts. -u forces a cleanup without keeping a operating agent, -uu forces a cleanup that ignores the hostname. -T makes ssh-agent put the socket rear in /tmp. Changes since OpenSSH 10.0 ========================== This publish contains a insignificant safety fix as fine as a figure of feature improvements and bugfixes. Security ======== * ssh(1): disallow authority characters in usernames passed via the commandline or expanded using %-sequences from the configuration file, and disallow \0 characters in ssh:// URIs. If an ssh(1) commandline was constructed using usernames or URIs obtained from an untrusted source, and if a ProxyCommand that uses the %r enlargement was configured, afterward it may be imaginable for an attacker to inject casing expressions that may be executed whenever the proxy command is started. We powerfully propose against using untrusted inputs to construct ssh(1) commandlines. This alter additionally relaxes the validity checks in one small way: usernames supplied via the configuration document as literals (i.e. that have no % enlargement characters) are not topic to these validity checks. This allows usernames that merge arbitrary characters to be used, but lone via configuration files. This is done on the basis that ssh's configuration is trusted. This matter was reported by David Leadbeater. New features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): add SIGINFO handlers to log energetic conduit and meeting information. * sshd(8): whenever refusing a certificate for person authentication, log adequate data to acknowledge the certificate in supplement to the logic why it was being denied. Makes debugging certificate authority problems a bit easier. * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): assistance ed25519 keys hosted on PKCS#11 tokens. * ssh(1): add an ssh_config(5) RefuseConnection choice that, when encountered during handling an energetic division in a configuration, terminates ssh(1) alongside an error communication that contains the disagreement to the option. This may be helpful for expressing reminders or warnings in config files, for example: Match presenter foo RefuseConnection "foo is deprecated, use splork instead" * sshd(8): create the X11 display figure inspect related to X11DisplayOffset. This volition authorize group to use X11DisplayOffset to configure much higher harbor ranges if they really want, while not changing the default behaviour. * component tests: the component test example now includes several basic benchmarking capabilities. Run alongside "make UNITTEST_BENCHMARK=yes" on OpenBSD or "make unit-bench" on Portable OpenSSH. Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): fix mistracking of MaxStartups procedure exits in some situations. At worst, this could logic all MaxStartups slots to inhabit and sshd to refuse new connections. * ssh(1): fix postpone on X client startup whenever ObscureKeystrokeTiming is enabled. bz#3820 * sshd(8): addition the maximum size of the supported configuration from 256KB to 4MB, which ought to be adequate for anybody. Fail first and visibly whenever this bounds is breached. bz3808 * sftp(1): during sftp uploads, evade a circumstance anywhere a failed compose could be ignored if a consequent compose succeeded. This is improbable but technically imaginable since sftp servers are allowed to reorder requests. * sshd(8): evade a competition circumstance whenever the sshd-auth procedure exits that could logic a spurious error communication to be logged. * sshd(8): log at flat INFO whenever PerSourcePenalties actually blocks admission to a origin location range. Previously this was logged at flat VERBOSE, which hid implementation actions under default config settings. * sshd(8): GssStrictAcceptor was missing from sshd -T output; fix * sshd(8): Make the MaxStartups and PerSourceNetBlockSize options first-match-wins as advertised. bz3859 * ssh(1): fix an incorrect come back value inspect in the local forward cancellation way that would logic unsuccessful cancellations not to be logged. * sshd(8): create "Match !final" not trigger a second parsing pass of ssh_config (unless hostname canonicalisation or a separate "Match final" does). bz3843 * ssh(1): improved debug diagnostics whenever loading keys. Will now list key fingerprint and algorithm (not fair algorithm number) as well as making it definitive which keys didn't load. * All: fix a figure of recollection leaks established by LeakSanitizer, Coverity and manual inspection. * sshd(8): Output the current name for PermitRootLogin's "prohibit-password" in sshd -T alternatively of its deprecated alias "without-password". bz#3788 * ssh(1): create penning known_hosts lines additional nuclear by writing the complete row in one procedure and using unbuffered stdio. Usually writes to this document are serialised on the "Are you sure you desire to continue connecting?" prompt, but if presenter key checking is impaired and connections were being made alongside high concurrency afterward interleaved writes power have been possible. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): inspect the username didn't alter during the PAM transactions. PAM modules can alter the person during their execution, but this is not supported by sshd(8). If specified a case was incorrectly configured by the scheme administrator, afterward sshd(8) could end up using a distinct username to the one authorised by PAM. * sshd(8): don't log audit messages alongside UNKNOWN hostname to avoid dilatory DNS lookups in the audit subsystem. * All: whenever making a copy of struct passwd, justify struct sectors are non-NULL. Android libc can come back NULL pw_gecos, for example. * All: Remove position bits from OpenSSL >=3 type check. * sshd(8), ssh(1): Use SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF on FreeBSD. Otherwise tun forwarding from another OSes fails as shortly as the archetypal IPv6 message is sent by the another flank (which is normally a Router Solicitation ICMPv6 communication which is sent as shortly as the interface is up). * ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): inspect for nlist function existence before attempting to use it alternatively of relying on the existence of the nlist.h header. Mac OS X, for example, has the header but not the function in the 64bit libraries. * All: inhabit in missing scheme header files. Create replacement header records inner openbsd-compat for common headers that are missing on a stated platform. Usually these are fair empty, but in several cases they'll contain the equal file. This avoids having to cover those includes in '#ifdef HAVE_FOO_H' and reduces the diff between Portable OpenSSH and OpenBSD. * sshd(8): grip futex_time64 correctly in seccomp sandbox Previously we lone allowed __NR_futex, but several 32-bit systems apparently assistance __NR_futex_time64. We had assistance for this in the sandbox, but since of a macro error lone __NR_futex was allowlisted. * Add contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass4 for GNOME 40+ using the GCR API. * sshd(8): let ga_init() neglect gracefully if getgrouplist does. Apparently getgrouplist() can neglect on OSX whenever passed a non-existent collection name. Other platforms appear to come back a group catalog consisting of the numeric gid passed to the function. bz3848 * ssh-agent(1): exit 0 from SIGTERM under systemd socket-activation, preventing a graceful shutdown of an delegate via systemd from incorrectly marking the assistance as "failed". * build: cover several autoconf macros in AC_CACHE_CHECK. This allows skipping/overriding the OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE and OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK macros used to detect supported compiler or linker flags. E.g. $ ./configure ossh_cv_cflag__fzero_call_used_regs_used=no [...] checking if cc supports compile emblem -fzero-call-used-regs=used and linking succeeds... (cached) no Checksums: ========== SHA1 (openssh-10.1.tar.gz) = 8eef44a945a9a9a5a99213ab0d57e35b7ba60e75 SHA256 (openssh-10.1.tar.gz) = j9ymvhvdGMeAvh1oTI2YmOAwv7Ao70gbGPyPedgQsBU= SHA1 (openssh-10.1p1.tar.gz) = 7fd17b99d1beffb47cd380d64079e920bb0bd91f SHA256 (openssh-10.1p1.tar.gz) = ufx6K4JXlGem8vQ+SoHI4d/aYU3bT5slWq/XAgu/B1g= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 10.0/10.0p2 (2025-04-09)

 OpenSSH 10.0 was released on 2025-04-09. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * This publish removes assistance for the feeble DSA signature algorithm, completing the deprecation procedure that began in 2015 (when DSA was impaired by default) and often warned complete the final 12 months. * scp(1), sftp(1): continue "ControlMaster no" to ssh whenever invoked by scp & sftp. This disables implied meeting innovation by these tools whenever ControlMaster was set to yes/auto by configuration, which several users established surprising. This alter volition not prevent scp/sftp from using an existing multiplexing meeting if one had already been created. GHPR557 * This publish has the type figure 10.0 and announces itself as "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_10.0". Software that naively matches versions using patterns akin "OpenSSH_1*" may be confused by this. * sshd(8): this publish removes the code liable for the person authentication phase of the protocol from the per- association sshd-session binary to a new sshd-auth binary. Splitting this code into a distinct binary ensures that the crucial pre-authentication assault exterior has an entirely disjoint location area from the code used for the remainder of the connection. It additionally yields a small runtime recollection preservation as the authentication code volition be unloaded following the authentication phase completes. This alter have to be mostly invisible to users, although several log messages may now arrive from "sshd-auth" alternatively of "sshd-session". Downstream distributors of OpenSSH volition need to bundle the sshd-auth binary. * sshd(8): this publish disables finite site (a.k.a modp) Diffie-Hellman key toggle in sshd by default. Specifically, this removes the "diffie-hellman-group*" and "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-*" methods from the default KEXAlgorithms list. The client is unchanged and continues to assistance these methods by default. Finite site Diffie Hellman is dilatory and computationally costly for the identical security flat as Elliptic Curve DH or PQ key accord during offering no preservation advantages. ECDH has been stated for the SSH protocol for 15 years and several form of ECDH has been the default key toggle in OpenSSH for the final 14 years. * sshd(8): this publish removes the implied fallback to compiled- in groups for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange KEX whenever the moduli document exists but does not merge moduli inside the client- requested range. The fallback behavior remains for the case anywhere the moduli document does not be at all. This allows administrators additional definitive authority complete which DH groups will be selected, but can guide to association failures if the moduli document is edited incorrectly. bz#2793 Changes since OpenSSH 9.9 ========================= This publish contains a insignificant safety fix as fine as a figure of feature improvements and bugfixes. Security ======== * sshd(8): fix the DisableForwarding directive, which was failing to disable X11 forwarding and delegate forwarding as documented. X11 forwarding is impaired by default in the server and agent forwarding is off by default in the client. New features ------------ * ssh(1): the hybrid post-quantum algorithm mlkem768x25519-sha256 is now used by default for key agreement. This algorithm is considered to be harmless against assault by quantum computers, is guaranteed to be no small powerful than the popular curve25519-sha256 algorithm, has been standardised by NIST and is considerably faster than the former default. * ssh(1): favor AES-GCM to AES-CTR manner whenever selecting a cipher for the connection. The default code penchant catalog is now Chacha20/Poly1305, AES-GCM (128/256) followed by AES-CTR (128/192/256). * ssh(1): add %-token and surroundings changeable enlargement to the ssh_config SetEnv directive. * ssh(1): authorize %-token and surroundings changeable enlargement in the ssh_config User directive, alongside the elimination of %r and %C which would be self-referential. bz#3477 * ssh(1), sshd(8): add "Match version" assistance to ssh_config and sshd_config. Allows matching on the local type of OpenSSH, e.g. "Match type OpenSSH_10.*". * ssh(1): add assistance for "Match sessiontype" to ssh_config. Allows matching on the category of meeting initially requested, either "shell" for interactive sessions, "exec" for command implementation sessions, "subsystem" for subsystem requests, specified as sftp, or "none" for transport/forwarding-only sessions. * ssh(1): add assistance for "Match command ..." assistance to ssh_config, allowing matching on the distant command as specified on the command-line. * ssh(1): authorize 'Match tagged ""' and 'Match command ""' to match bare tag and command values respectively. * sshd(8): authorize glob(3) patterns to be used in sshd_config AuthorizedKeysFile and AuthorizedPrincipalsFile directives. bz2755 * sshd(1): assistance the VersionAddendum in the client, mirroring the choice of the identical name in the server; bz2745 * ssh-agent(1): the delegate volition now delete all loaded keys when signaled alongside SIGUSR1. This allows deletion of keys without having admission to $SSH_AUTH_SOCK. * Portable OpenSSH, ssh-agent(1): assistance systemd-style socket activation in ssh-agent using the LISTEN_PID/LISTEN_FDS mechanism. Activated whenever these surroundings variables are set, the delegate is started alongside the -d or -D choice and no socket path is set. GHPR502 * ssh-keygen(1): assistance FIDO tokens that come back no attestation data, e.g. latest WinHello. GHPR542 * ssh-agent(1): add a "-Owebsafe-allow=..." choice to authorize the default FIDO use ID allow-list to be overridden. * Add a work-in-progress tool to verify FIDO attestation blobs that ssh-keygen can optionally compose whenever enrolling FIDO keys. This tool is accessible under regress/misc/ssh-verify-attestation for experimentation but is not installed by "make install". * ssh-keygen(1): authorize "-" as output document for moduli screening. GHPR393 Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): eliminate assumption that the sshd_config and any configs it includes can fit in a (possibly enlarged) socket buffer. Previously it was imaginable to create a sufficiently large configuration that could logic sshd to neglect to obtain any connection. sshd(8) volition now actively oversee sending its config to the sshd-session sub-process. * ssh(1): don't commencement the ObscureKeystrokeTiming mitigations if there has been traffic on a X11 forwarding conduit recently. Should fix X11 forwarding achievement problems whenever this setting is enabled. bz3655 * ssh(1): prohibit the comma character in hostnames accepted, but authorize an underscore as the archetypal character in a hostname. * sftp(1): set high-water whenever resuming a "put". Prevents bogus "server reordered acks" debug message. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix regression in openssh-9.8, which would fail to obtain "Match criteria=argument" as fine as the documented "Match criteria argument" syntax in ssh_config and sshd_config. bz3739 * sftp(1), ssh(1): fix a figure imaginable NULL dereference bugs, including Coverity CIDs 405019 and 477813. * sshd(8): fix PerSourcePenalty incorrectly using "crash" penalty whenever LoginGraceTime was exceeded. bz3797 * sshd(8): fix "Match invalid-user" from incorrectly being activated in first configuration continue whenever no another predicates were current on the equivalent line * sshd(8): fix debug logging of person particular delay. GHPR#552 * sshd(8): enhance debug logging throughout sub-process boundaries. Previously several log messages were misplaced first in the sshd-auth and sshd-session processes' life. * ssh(1): necessitate control-escape character sequences passed via the '-e ^x' command-line to be exactly two characters long. Avoids one byte out-of-bounds peruse if ssh is invoked as "ssh -e^ ..." GHPR368 * ssh(1), sshd(8): forestall entire figure overflow in x11 harbor handling. These are theoretically imaginable if the admin misconfigured X11DisplayOffset or the person misconfigures their own $DISPLAY, but don't happen in normal operation. bz#3730 * ssh-keygen(1): don't disorder up ssh-keygen -l output whenever the file contains CR characters; GHPR236 bz3385. * sshd(8): add charge limits to logging of connections dropped by PerSourcePenalties. Previously these could be noisy in logs. * ssh(1): fix disagreement of "Compression" directive in ssh -G config dump, which regressed in openssh-9.8. * sshd(8): fix a corner-case triggered by UpdateHostKeys whenever sshd refuses to obtain the signature returned by an delegate holding host keys during the hostkey rotation sub-protocol. This situation could happen in situations anywhere a PKCS#11 smartcard that lacked assistance for particular signature algorithms was used to store presenter keys. * ssh-keygen(1): whenever using RSA keys to sign messages with "ssh-keygen -Y", choose the signature algorithm according to the requested hash algorithm ("-Ohashalg=xxx"). This allows using item another than the default of rsa-sha2-512, which may not be supported on all signing backends, e.g. several smartcards only assistance SHA256. * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keyscan(1): fix ML-KEM768x25519 KEX on big-endian systems. * Many regression and interop test improvements. Portability ----------- * All: add assistance for AWS-LC (AWS libcrypto). bz3784 * sshd(8): add wtmpdb assistance as a Y2038 harmless wtmp replacement. * sshd(8): add assistance for locking sshd into memory, enabled with the --with-linux-memlock-onfault configure flag. * Add assistance for construction a standalone sk-libfido2 library, enabled by --with-security-key-standalone * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keyscan(1): contain __builtin_popcount replacement function. for compilers that deficiency it. * All: Check for and substitute le32toh, le64toh, htole64 separately. It appears that at smallest several versions of endian.h in glibc do not have the second two. bz#3794 * Remove ancient RHL 6.x config in RPM spec. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-10.0.tar.gz) = 933f4fded0497ef6a588381257276e156a70f9c3 - SHA256 (openssh-10.0.tar.gz) = oaJ+cXLCVoCZAz9W5W1vF7ko4GJW6iq7JmblrPUA34Q= - SHA1 (openssh-10.0p2.tar.gz) = ac4205e827aea383bf316a33a0e2d5b66b85fcf8 - SHA256 (openssh-10.0p2.tar.gz) = AhoucJoO30JQsSVr1anlAEEakN3avqgw7VnO+Q652Fw= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.9p2 (2025-02-18)

 OpenSSH 9.9p2 was released on 2025-02-18. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.9p1 =========================== This publish fixes two safety bugs. Security ======== * Fix CVE-2025-26465 - ssh(1) in OpenSSH versions 6.8p1 to 9.9p1 (inclusive) contained a logic error that allowed an on-path attacker (a.k.a MITM) to impersonate any server whenever the VerifyHostKeyDNS choice is enabled. This choice is off by default. * Fix CVE-2025-26466 - sshd(8) in OpenSSH versions 9.5p1 to 9.9p1 (inclusive) is susceptible to a memory/CPU denial-of-service related to the handling of SSH2_MSG_PING packets. This circumstance may be mitigated using the existing PerSourcePenalties feature. Both vulnerabilities were discovered and demonstrated to be exploitable by the Qualys Security Advisory team. We appreciate them for their detailed review of OpenSSH. For OpenBSD, fixes to these problems are accessible as errata; refer to https://www.openbsd.org/errata.html Bugfixes ======== * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix regression in Match directive that caused failures whenever predicates and their arguments were divided by '=' characters alternatively of whitespace (bz3739). * sshd(8): fix the "Match invalid-user" predicate, which was matching incorrectly in the first continue of config evaluation. * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keyscan(1): fix mlkem768x25519-sha256 key toggle on big-endian systems. * Fix a figure of build problems on particular functioning systems / configurations. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.9p2.tar.gz) = edefe960645780dee78059c444d4261667ad3056 - SHA256 (openssh-9.9p2.tar.gz) = karbYD4IzChe3fll4RmdAlhfqU2ZTWyuW0Hhch4hVnM= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.9/9.9p1 (2024-09-19)

 OpenSSH 9.9 was released on 2024-09-19. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= OpenSSH plans to eliminate assistance for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025. This publish disables DSA by default at compile time. DSA, as stated in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently feeble - being limited to a 160 bit personal key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated safety flat is lone 80 bits symmetric equivalent. OpenSSH has impaired DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained run-time optional assistance for them. DSA was the lone mandatory-to- implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs, mostly since alternative algorithms were encumbered by patents whenever the SSHv2 protocol was specified. This has not been the case for decades at this item and better algorithms are fine supported by all actively-maintained SSH implementations. We do not regard the expenses of maintaining DSA in OpenSSH to be justified and anticipation that removing it from OpenSSH can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography libraries. Currently DSA is impaired at compile time. The final stage of removing DSA assistance entirely is planned for the archetypal OpenSSH release of 2025. DSA assistance may be re-enabled on OpenBSD by environment "DSAKEY=yes" in Makefile.inc. To allow DSA assistance in portable OpenSSH, pass the "--enable-dsa-keys" choice to configure. Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * ssh(1): eliminate assistance for pre-authentication compression. OpenSSH has lone supported post-authentication compression in the server for several years. Compression before authentication considerably increases the assault exterior of SSH servers and risks creating oracles that disclose data concerning data sent during authentication. * ssh(1), sshd(8): handling of the arguments to the "Match" configuration directive now follows additional shell-like rules for quoted strings, including allowing nested quotes and \-escaped characters. If configurations contained workarounds for the former simplistic citation handling afterward they may need to be adjusted. If this is the case, it's most apt to be in the arguments to a "Match exec" confition. In this case, moving the command to be evaluated from the Match row to an external shell manuscript is easiest way to maintain compatibility alongside the two the old and new versions. Changes since OpenSSH 9.8 ========================= This publish contains a figure of new features and bugfixes. New features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): add assistance for a new hybrid post-quantum key toggle according to the FIPS 203 Module-Lattice Key Enapsulation scheme (ML-KEM) blended alongside X25519 ECDH as described by https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-curdle-ssh-pq-ke-03 This algorithm "mlkem768x25519-sha256" is accessible by default. * ssh(1): the ssh_config "Include" directive can now expand surroundings as fine as the identical set of %-tokens "Match Exec" supports. * sshd(8): add a sshd_config "RefuseConnection" choice that, if set volition terminate the association at the archetypal authentication request. * sshd(8): add a "refuseconnection" penalty category to sshd_config PerSourcePenalties that is applied whenever a association is dropped by the new RefuseConnection keyword. * sshd(8): add a "Match invalid-user" predicate to sshd_config Match options that matches whenever the mark username is not valid on the server. * ssh(1), sshd(8): update the Streamlined NTRUPrime code to a substantially faster implementation. * ssh(1), sshd(8): the hybrid Streamlined NTRUPrime/X25519 key toggle algorithm now has an IANA-assigned name in supplement to the "@openssh.com" vendor expansion name. This algorithm is now additionally accessible under this name "sntrup761x25519-sha512" * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): forestall personal keys from being included in center dump records for most of their lifespans. This is in supplement to pre-existing controls in ssh-agent(1) and sshd(8) that prevented coredumps. This characteristic is supported on OpenBSD, Linux and FreeBSD. * All: change key handling to use the libcrypto EVP_PKEY API, with the elimination of DSA. * sshd(8): add a random amount of jitter (up to 4 seconds) to the grace login period to create its expiry unpredictable. Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): unwind complete way necessity rear to what it was prior to OpenSSH 9.8, which incorrectly required that sshd was started alongside an complete way in inetd mode. bz3717 * sshd(8): fix regression introduced in openssh-9.8 that exchanged the command of origin and destination addresses in several sshd log messages. * sshd(8): do not use authorized_keys options whenever signature verification fails. Prevents additional restrictive key options being incorrectly applied to consequent keys in authorized_keys. bz3733 * ssh-keygen(1): contain pathname in several of ssh-keygen's passphrase prompts. Helps the person cognize what's going on whenever ssh-keygen is invoked via another tools. Requested in GHPR503 * ssh(1), ssh-add(1): create parsing user@host consistently appearance for the final '@' in the cord fairly than the first. This makes it imaginable to additional consistently use usernames that merge '@' characters. * ssh(1), sshd(8): be additional strict in parsing key category names. Only authorize abbreviated names (e.g "rsa") in user-interface code and require complete SSH protocol names (e.g. "ssh-rsa") everyplace else. bz3725 * regress: many achievement and correctness improvements to the re-keying regression test. * ssh-keygen(1): explain that ed25519 is the default key type generated and explain that rsa-sha2-512 is the default signature scheme whenever RSA is in use. GHPR505 * sshd(8): fix insignificant recollection leak in Subsystem choice parsing; GHPR515 * All: additional hardening and consistency checks for the sshbuf code. * sshd(8): decrease default logingrace penalty to justify that a single forgotten login that times out volition be below the penalty threshold. * ssh(1): fix proxy multiplexing (-O proxy) bug. If a mux started with ControlPersist afterward afterward has a forwarding added using mux proxy association and the forwarding was used, afterward whenever the mux proxy meeting terminated, the mux expert procedure would matter a bad message that terminated the connection. Portability ----------- * sync contrib/ssh-copy-id to the latest upstream version. * regress: enhance portablility for several awk(1) use (e.g. Solaris) * In the contrib/redhat RPM spec file, without_openssl was previously incorrectly enabled unconditionally. * sshd(8) reconstruct audit call before exit that regressed in openssh-9.8 Fixes an matter anywhere the SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON event was not recorded. * sshd(8): add assistance for class-imposed login restrictions on FreeBSD. Allowing auth_hostok(3) and auth_timeok(3) to authority logins. * Build fixes for Musl libc. * Fix finding of setres*id on GNU/Hurd Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.9.tar.gz) = 080acf6ff0b862e8faa3baa3920a079536d28e85 - SHA256 (openssh-9.9.tar.gz) = h1xwa7CVcJfN7I9MgxxPBpUELzo+tnmLy+6slYHTUtw= - SHA1 (openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz) = 5ded7eb0add0b02b5d1a1c4bf5cb2c89d2117b53 - SHA256 (openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz) = s0P7zb/4fxWxmG5uFdbU/Jp9NgZr5rf7UHCHuo+WbAI= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.8/9.8p1 (2024-07-01)

 OpenSSH 9.8 was released on 2024-07-01. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Security ======== This publish contains fixes for two safety problems, one critical and one minor. 1) Race circumstance in sshd(8) A crucial exposure in sshd(8) was current in Portable OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may authorize arbitrary code implementation alongside base privileges. Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit Linux/glibc systems alongside ASLR. Under lab conditions, the assault requires on average 6-8 hours of uninterrupted connections up to the maximum the server volition accept. Exploitation on 64-bit systems is believed to be possible but has not been demonstrated at this time. It's apt that these attacks volition be improved upon. Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not been examined. Systems that deficiency ASLR or users of downstream Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no - we don't understand why) may possibly have an easier way to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable. We appreciate the Qualys Security Advisory Team for discovering, reporting and demonstrating exploitability of this problem, and for providing detailed feedback on additional mitigation measures. 2) Logic error in ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming In OpenSSH type 9.5 through 9.7 (inclusive), whenever connected to an OpenSSH server type 9.5 or later, a logic error in the ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming characteristic (on by default) rendered this feature ineffective - a passive observer could motionless detect which network packets contained genuine keystrokes whenever the countermeasure was active because the two counterfeit and genuine keystroke packets were being sent unconditionally. This bug was established by Philippos Giavridis and additionally independently by Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford of the University of Cambridge Computer Lab. Worse, the unconditional sending of the two counterfeit and genuine keystroke packets bankrupt another long-standing timing assault mitigation. Since OpenSSH 2.9.9 sshd(8) has sent counterfeit keystroke echo packets for traffic received on TTYs in echo-off mode, specified as whenever entering a password into su(8) or sudo(8). This bug rendered these fake keystroke echoes ineffective and could authorize a passive observer of a SSH meeting to formerly again detect whenever echo was off and obtain fairly constricted timing data concerning keystrokes in this situation (20ms granularity by default). This additional conclusion of the bug was identified by Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford and we appreciate them for their detailed analysis. This bug does not power connections whenever ObscureKeystrokeTiming was impaired or sessions anywhere no TTY was requested. Future deprecation notice ========================= OpenSSH plans to eliminate assistance for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025. This publish disables DSA by default at compile time. DSA, as stated in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently feeble - being limited to a 160 bit personal key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated safety flat is lone 80 bits symmetric equivalent. OpenSSH has impaired DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained run-time optional assistance for them. DSA was the lone mandatory-to- implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs, mostly since alternative algorithms were encumbered by patents whenever the SSHv2 protocol was specified. This has not been the case for decades at this item and better algorithms are fine supported by all actively-maintained SSH implementations. We do not regard the expenses of maintaining DSA in OpenSSH to be justified and anticipation that removing it from OpenSSH can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography libraries. This release, and its deactivation of DSA by default at compile-time, marks the second stage in our timeline to eventually deprecate DSA. The final stage of removing DSA assistance entirely is planned for the first OpenSSH publish of 2025. DSA assistance may be re-enabled in OpenBSD by environment "DSAKEY=yes" in Makefile.inc. To allow DSA assistance in portable OpenSSH, pass the "--enable-dsa-keys" choice to configure. Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * all: as mentioned above, the DSA signature algorithm is now impaired at compile time. * sshd(8): the server volition now obstacle client addresses that often neglect authentication, often nexus without ever completing authentication or that collision the server. See the conversation of PerSourcePenalties below for additional information. Operators of servers that obtain connections from many users, or servers that obtain connections from addresses rearward NAT or proxies may need to regard these settings. * sshd(8): the server has been divided into a listener binary, sshd(8), and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows for a much smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to assistance the SSH protocol. As part of this work, assistance for disabling privilege separation (which earlier required code changes to disable) and disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has been removed. Further separation of sshd-session into additional, minimal binaries is planned for the future. * sshd(8): multiple log messages have changed. In particular, some log messages volition be tagged alongside as originating from a process named "sshd-session" fairly than "sshd". * ssh-keyscan(1): this tool earlier emitted comment lines containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to norm error. This publish now emits them to norm output, but adds a new "-q" emblem to silence them altogether. * sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd volition no longer use argv[0] as the PAM assistance name. A new "PAMServiceName" sshd_config(5) directive allows selecting the assistance name at runtime. This defaults to "sshd". bz2101 * (portable OpenSSH only) Automatically-generated files, specified as configure, config.h.in, etc volition now be checked in to the portable OpenSSH git publish branch (e.g. V_9_8). This should justify that the contents of the signed publish branch exactly equivalent the contents of the signed publish tarball. Changes since OpenSSH 9.7 ========================= This publish contains mostly bugfixes. New features ------------ * sshd(8): as described above, sshd(8) volition now penalise client addresses that, for assorted reasons, do not successfully complete authentication. This characteristic is controlled by a new sshd_config(5) PerSourcePenalties choice and is on by default. sshd(8) volition now acknowledge situations anywhere the meeting did not authenticate as expected. These conditions contain whenever the client often attempted authentication unsuccessfully (possibly indicating an assault against one or additional accounts, e.g. password guessing), or whenever client behavior caused sshd to collision (possibly indicating attempts to utilize bugs in sshd). When specified a circumstance is observed, sshd volition document a penalty of several duration (e.g. 30 seconds) against the client's address. If this period is complete a minimum configurable threshold, afterward all connections from the client location volition be refused (along alongside any others in the identical PerSourceNetBlockSize CIDR range) until the penalty expire. Repeated offenses by the identical client location volition accrue greater penalties, up to a configurable maximum. Address ranges may be completely exempted from penalties, e.g. to justify admission from a set of trusted administration addresses, using the new sshd_config(5) PerSourcePenaltyExemptList option. We anticipation these options volition create it considerably additional difficult for attackers to discover accounts alongside weak/guessable passwords or exploit bugs in sshd(8) itself. This choice is enabled by default. * ssh(8): authorize the HostkeyAlgorithms directive to disable the implied fallback from certificate presenter key to plain presenter keys. Bugfixes -------- * misc: fix a figure of inaccuracies in the PROTOCOL.* records files. GHPR430 GHPR487 * all: toggle to strtonum(3) for additional sturdy entire figure parsing in most places. * ssh(1), sshd(8): correctly reconstruct sigprocmask about ppoll() * ssh-keysign(8): stricter validation of messaging socket fd GHPR492 * sftp(1): flush stdout following penning "sftp>" immediate whenever not using editline. GHPR480 * sftp-server(8): fix home-directory expansion implementation, it earlier continually returned the current user's residence directory contrary to the spec. GHPR477 * ssh-keyscan(1): do not near stdin to forestall error messages when stdin is peruse multiple times. E.g. echo localhost | ssh-keyscan -f - -f - * regression tests: fix rekey test that was evaluation the identical KEX algorithm often alternatively of evaluation all of them. bz3692 * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): explain the KEXAlgorithms directive documentation, particularly about what is supported vs available. bz3701. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): disclose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 continually to PAM auth modules unconditionally. The former behavior was to disclose it lone when particular authentication methods were in use. * build: fix OpenSSL ED25519 assistance detection. An incorrect function signature in configure.ac earlier prevented enabling the recently added assistance for ED25519 personal keys in PEM PKCS8 format. * ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): authorize the existence of the WAYLAND_DISPLAY surroundings changeable to allow SSH_ASKPASS, likewise to the X11 DISPLAY surroundings variable. GHPR479 * build: enhance finding of the -fzero-call-used-regs compiler flag. bz3673. * build: unwind OpenSSL type inspect to obtain all OpenSSL 3.x versions. * sshd(8): add assistance for notifying systemd on server hear and reload, using a standalone implementation that doesn't depend on libsystemd. bz2641 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.8.tar.gz) = bc45cedae7f70b41e9922ef4c9f56e74b9a659b7 - SHA256 (openssh-9.8.tar.gz) = Dnc69VLWFBFdiaz8wySPlvHjb7wZfh/kblQ8ISuQr1Y= - SHA1 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz) = a0bb501b11349f5c5c33a269351be091dc2c2727 - SHA256 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz) = 3YvQAqN5tdSZ37BQ3R+pr4Ap6ARh9LtsUjxJlz9aOfM= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.7/9.7p1 (2024-03-11)

 OpenSSH 9.7 was released on 2024-03-11. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= OpenSSH plans to eliminate assistance for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025 and compile-time disable it afterward this year. DSA, as stated in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently feeble - being limited to a 160 bit personal key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated safety flat is lone 80 bits symmetric equivalent. OpenSSH has impaired DSA keys by default since 2015 but has retained run-time optional assistance for them. DSA was the lone mandatory-to- implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs[3], mostly since alternative algorithms were encumbered by patents whenever the SSHv2 protocol was specified. This has not been the case for decades at this item and better algorithms are fine supported by all actively-maintained SSH implementations. We do not regard the expenses of maintaining DSA in OpenSSH to be justified and anticipation that removing it from OpenSSH can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting cryptography libraries. This publish makes DSA assistance in OpenSSH compile-time optional, defaulting to on. We average the next publish to alter the default to disable DSA at compile time. The archetypal OpenSSH publish of 2025 will eliminate DSA assistance entirely. Changes since OpenSSH 9.6 ========================= This publish contains mostly bugfixes. New features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a "global" ChannelTimeout category that watches all open channels and volition near all open channels if there is no traffic on any of them for the stated interval. This is in supplement to the existing per-channel timeouts added recently. This supports situations akin having the two meeting and x11 forwarding channels open anywhere one may be idle for an extended duration but the another is actively used. The earth timeout could near the two channels whenever the two have been idle for too long. * All: create DSA key assistance compile-time optional, defaulting to on. Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): don't append an unnecessary area to the end of subsystem arguments (bz3667) * ssh(1): fix the multiplexing "channel proxy" mode, damaged when keystroke timing obfuscation was added. (GHPR#463) * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix spurious configuration parsing errors when options that obtain gathering arguments are overridden (bz3657). * ssh-agent(1): fix possible rotation in indication handler (bz3670) * Many fixes to manual pages and another documentation, including GHPR#462, GHPR#454, GHPR#442 and GHPR#441. * Greatly enhance interop evaluation against PuTTY. Portability ----------- * Improve the error communication whenever the autoconf OpenSSL header check fails (bz#3668) * Improve finding of damaged toolchain -fzero-call-used-regs support (bz3645). * Fix regress/misc/fuzz-harness fuzzers and create them compile without warnings whenever using clang16 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.7.tar.gz) = 163272058edc20a8fde81661734a6684c9b4db11 - SHA256 (openssh-9.7.tar.gz) = gXDWrF4wN2UWyPjyjvVhpjjKd7D2qI6LyZiIYhbJQVg= - SHA1 (openssh-9.7p1.tar.gz) = ce8985ea0ea2f16a5917fd982ade0972848373cc - SHA256 (openssh-9.7p1.tar.gz) = SQQm92bYKidj/KzY2D6j1weYdQx70q/y5X3FZg93P/0= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.6/9.6p1 (2023-12-18)

 OpenSSH 9.6 was released on 2023-12-18. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.5 ========================= This publish contains a figure of safety fixes, several small features and bugfixes. Security ======== This publish contains fixes for a newly-discovered weakness in the SSH transport protocol, a logic error relating to constrained PKCS#11 keys in ssh-agent(1) and countermeasures for programs that invoke ssh(1) alongside person or hostnames containing invalid characters. * ssh(1), sshd(8): execute protocol extensions to thwart the so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This assault allows a MITM to consequence a constricted interrupt of the integrity of the first encrypted SSH transport protocol by sending additional messages previous to the commencement of encryption, and deleting an equal figure of successive messages immediately following encryption starts. A equal SSH client/server would not be capable to detect that messages were deleted. While cryptographically novel, the safety effect of this attack is fortunately extremely constricted as it lone allows deletion of successive messages, and deleting most messages at this phase of the protocol prevents person authentication from hearing and results in a stuck connection. The most grave identified effect is that it lets a MITM to delete the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO communication sent before authentication starts, allowing the attacker to disable a subset of the keystroke timing obfuscation features introduced in OpenSSH 9.5. There is no another discernible effect to meeting secrecy or meeting integrity. OpenSSH 9.6 addresses this protocol weakness through a new "strict KEX" protocol expansion that volition be automatically enabled when the two the client and server assistance it. This expansion makes two changes to the SSH transport protocol to enhance the integrity of the first key exchange. Firstly, it requires endpoints to terminate the association if any unnecessary or unexpected communication is received during key exchange (including messages that were earlier lawful but not strictly required akin SSH2_MSG_DEBUG). This removes most malleability from the first protocol. Secondly, it resets the Message Authentication Code oppose at the decision of all key exchange, preventing earlier inserted messages from being capable to create persistent changes to the sequence figure throughout completion of a key exchange. Either of these changes have to be adequate to thwart the Terrapin Attack. More particulars of these changes are in the PROTOCOL document in the OpenSSH origin distribition. * ssh-agent(1): whenever adding PKCS#11-hosted personal keys while specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned multiple keys afterward lone the archetypal key had the constraints applied. Use of regular personal keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys are unaffected. * ssh(1): if an invalid person or hostname that contained shell metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand, LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the person or hostname via %u, %h or akin enlargement token, then an attacker who could provision arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1) could possibly execute command injection depending on what quoting was current in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive. This circumstance could appear in the case of git submodules, where a repository could merge a submodule alongside casing characters in its user/hostname. Git does not ban casing metacharacters in user or presenter names whenever checking out repositories from untrusted sources. Although we accept it is the user's duty to ensure validity of arguments passed to ssh(1), particularly throughout a safety border specified as the git example above, OpenSSH 9.6 now bans most casing metacharacters from person and hostnames supplied via the command-line. This countermeasure is not guaranteed to be productive in all situations, as it is infeasible for ssh(1) to universally display casing metacharacters possibly applicable to user-supplied commands. User/hostnames provided via ssh_config(5) are not topic to these restrictions, allowing configurations that use different names to continue to be used, under the assumption that the person knows what they are doing in their own configuration files. Potentially incompatible changes -------------------------------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides a TCP-like opening scheme that limits the amount of data that can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases anywhere this bounds was exceeded by a non-conforming equal SSH implementation, ssh(1)/sshd(8) earlier abandoned the additional data. From OpenSSH 9.6, ssh(1)/sshd(8) volition now terminate the association if a peer exceeds the opening bounds by additional than a small grace factor. This alter should have no consequence of SSH implementations that follow the specification. New features ------------ * ssh(1): add a %j token that expands to the configured ProxyJump hostname (or the bare cord if this choice is not being used) that can be used in a figure of ssh_config(5) keywords. bz3610 * ssh(1): add ChannelTimeout assistance to the client, mirroring the identical choice in the server and allowing ssh(1) to terminate quiescent channels. * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): add assistance for study ED25519 personal keys in PEM PKCS8 format. Previously lone the OpenSSH personal key format was supported. * ssh(1), sshd(8): current a protocol expansion to allow renegotiation of satisfactory signature algorithms for community key authentication following the server has learned the username being used for authentication. This allows varying sshd_config(5) PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms in a "Match user" block. * ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): add an delegate protocol expansion to allow specifying certificates whenever loading PKCS#11 keys. This allows the use of certificates backed by PKCS#11 personal keys in all OpenSSH tools that assistance ssh-agent(1). Previously lone ssh(1) supported this use-case. Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1): whenever deciding whether to allow the keystroke timing obfuscation, allow it lone if a conduit alongside a TTY is active. * ssh(1): toggle mainloop from poll(3) to ppoll(3) and disguise signals before checking flags set in indication handler. Avoids potential competition circumstance between indication ssh to exit and polling. bz3531 * ssh(1): whenever connecting to a destination alongside the two the AddressFamily and CanonicalizeHostname directives in use, the AddressFamily directive could be ignored. bz5326 * sftp(1): accurate handling of the [email protected] choice when the server returned an unexpected message. * A figure of fixes to the PuTTY and Dropbear regress/integration tests. * ssh(1): publish GSS OIDs lone at end of authentication, avoiding unnecessary init/cleanup cycles. bz2982 * ssh_config(5): citation "none" is a valid disagreement to IdentityFile in the manual. bz3080 * scp(1): improved debugging for paths from the server rejected for not matching the client's glob(3) form in old SCP/RCP protocol mode. * ssh-agent(1): refuse signing operations on destination-constrained keys if a former session-bind procedure has failed. This may forestall a fail-open circumstance in forthcoming if a person uses a mismatched ssh(1) client and ssh-agent(1) anywhere the client supports a key type that the delegate does not support. Portability ----------- * Better acknowledge unsupported and unstable compiler flags, specified as -fzero-call-used-regs which has been unstable throughout a several collision releases. * A figure of fixes to regression test reliability and log collection. * Update the OpenSSL dependency in the RPM specification. * sshd(8): for OpenSolaris systems that assistance privilege limitation via the getpflags() interface, favor using the newer PRIV_XPOLICY to PRIV_LIMIT. bz2833 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.6.tar.gz) = a6d4cb69811e879e2f158c2e597fd9f444b26506 - SHA256 (openssh-9.6.tar.gz) = nejPUhSnG1R1sOmIBi/t+HMNvsRqfN/DJgjwIU2tvqg= - SHA1 (openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz) = de300d09ec79fdbf37de4e6672cce4161439f2c3 - SHA256 (openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz) = kQIRwHJVqMWtZUORtA7lmABxDdgRndU2LeCThap6d3w= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.5/9.5p1 (2023-10-04)

 OpenSSH 9.5 was released on 2023-10-04. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.4 ========================= This publish fixes a figure of bugs and adds several small features. Potentially incompatible changes -------------------------------- * ssh-keygen(1): create Ed25519 keys by default. Ed25519 community keys are extremely convenient because of their small size. Ed25519 keys are stated in RFC 8709 and OpenSSH has supported them since type 6.5 (January 2014). * sshd(8): the Subsystem directive now accurately preserves quoting of subsystem commands and arguments. This may alter behavior for exotic configurations, but the most average subsystem configuration (sftp-server) is improbable to be affected. New features ------------ * ssh(1): add keystroke timing obfuscation to the client. This attempts to conceal inter-keystroke timings by sending interactive traffic at fixed intervals (default: all 20ms) whenever there is lone a small amount of data being sent. It additionally sends counterfeit "chaff" keystrokes for a random duration following the final genuine keystroke. These are controlled by a new ssh_config ObscureKeystrokeTiming keyword. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Introduce a transport-level ping facility. This adds a brace of SSH transport protocol messages SSH2_MSG_PING/PONG to execute a ping capability. These messages use numbers in the "local extensions" figure area and are advertised using a "[email protected]" ext-info communication alongside a cord type figure of "0". * sshd(8): authorize override of Subsystem directives in sshd Match blocks. Bugfixes -------- * scp(1): fix scp in SFTP manner recursive upload and download of directories that merge symlinks to another directories. In scp mode, the links would be followed, but in SFTP manner they were not. bz3611 * ssh-keygen(1): grip cr+lf (instead of fair cr) row endings in sshsig signature files. * ssh(1): interactive manner for ControlPersist sessions if they initially requested a tty. * sshd(8): create PerSourceMaxStartups first-match-wins * sshd(8): bounds synthetic login postpone to a sensible maximum (5s) and don't postpone at all for the "none" authentication mechanism.cw bz3602 * sshd(8): Log errors in kex_exchange_identification() alongside level verbose alternatively of error to decrease preauth log spam. All of those get logged alongside a additional generic error communication by sshpkt_fatal(). * sshd(8): accurate math for ClientAliveInterval that caused the probes to be sent small frequently than configured. * ssh(1): fix regression in OpenSSH 9.4 (mux.c r1.99) that caused multiplexed sessions to disregard SIGINT under several circumstances. Portability ----------- * Avoid collision zero-call-used-regs=all bug on Apple compilers, which for several logic have type numbers that do not equivalent the upstream collision type numbers. bz#3584 * Fix configure test for zlib 1.3 and later/development versions. bz3604 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.5.tar.gz) = 8a0bd3a91fac338d97d91817af58df731f6509a3 - SHA256 (openssh-9.5.tar.gz) = sVMxeM3d6g65qBMktJIofxmK4Ipg9dblKif0VnhPeO0= - SHA1 (openssh-9.5p1.tar.gz) = 35c16dcc6e7d0a9465faa241476ef24f76b196cc - SHA256 (openssh-9.5p1.tar.gz) = 8Cbnt5un+1QPdRgq+W3IqPHbOV+SK7yfbKYDZyaGCGs= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.4/9.4p1 (2023-08-10)

 OpenSSH 9.4 was released on 2023-08-10. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.3p2 =========================== This publish fixes a figure of bugs and adds several small features. Potentially incompatible changes -------------------------------- * This publish removes assistance for older versions of libcrypto. OpenSSH now requires LibreSSL >= 3.1.0 or OpenSSL >= 1.1.1. Note that these versions are already deprecated by their upstream vendors. * ssh-agent(1): PKCS#11 modules must now be stated by their full paths. Previously dlopen(3) could hunt for them in system archive directories. New features ------------ * ssh(1): authorize forwarding Unix Domain sockets via ssh -W. * ssh(1): add assistance for configuration tags to ssh(1). This adds a ssh_config(5) "Tag" directive and corresponding "Match tag" predicate that may be used to choose blocks of configuration akin to the pf.conf(5) keywords of the same name. * ssh(1): add a "match localnetwork" predicate. This allows matching on the addresses of accessible network interfaces and may be used to change the productive client configuration according to network location. * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): infrastructure assistance for KRL extensions. This defines cable formats for optional KRL extensions and implements parsing of the new submessages. No genuine extensions are supported at this point. * sshd(8): AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand and AuthorizedKeysCommand now obtain two additional %-expansion sequences: %D which expands to the routing domain of the connected meeting and %C which expands to the addresses and harbor numbers for the origin and destination of the connection. * ssh-keygen(1): addition the default activity aspect (rounds) for the bcrypt KDF used to get symmetric encryption keys for passphrase protected key records by 50%. Bugfixes -------- * ssh-agent(1): enhance isolation between loaded PKCS#11 modules by operating distinct ssh-pkcs11-helpers for all loaded provider. * ssh(1): create -f (fork following authentication) activity correctly with multiplexed connections, including ControlPersist. bz3589 bz3589 * ssh(1): create ConnectTimeout use to multiplexing sockets and not fair to network connections. * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): enhance defences against invalid PKCS#11 modules being loaded by checking that the requested module contains the required sign before loading it. * sshd(8): fix AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand whenever AuthorizedKeysCommand appears before it in sshd_config. Since OpenSSH 8.7 the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand directive was incorrectly ignored in this situation. bz3574 * sshd(8), ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): eliminate vestigal assistance for KRL signatures When the KRL format was initially defined, it included assistance for signing of KRL objects. However, the code to sign KRLs and verify KRL signatures was never completed in OpenSSH. This publish removes the partially-implemented code to verify KRLs. All OpenSSH tools now disregard KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE sections in KRL files. * All: fix a figure of recollection leaks and unreachable/harmless integer overflows. * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): don't truncate strings logged from PKCS#11 modules; GHPR406 * sshd(8), ssh(1): improved validate CASignatureAlgorithms in ssh_config and sshd_config. Previously this directive would accept certificate algorithm names, but these were unusable in custom as OpenSSH does not assistance CA chains. bz3577 * ssh(1): create `ssh -Q CASignatureAlgorithms` lone catalog signature algorithms that are valid for CA signing. Previous behavior was to catalog all signing algorithms, including certificate algorithms. * ssh-keyscan(1): gracefully grip systems anywhere rlimits or the maximum figure of open records is larger than INT_MAX; bz3581 * ssh-keygen(1): fix "no comment" not showing on whenever running `ssh-keygen -l` on multiple keys anywhere one has a comment and other following keys do not. bz3580 * scp(1), sftp(1): modify ftruncate() logic to grip servers that reorder requests. Previously, if the server reordered requests then the resultant document would be erroneously truncated. * ssh(1): don't incorrectly disable hostname canonicalization when CanonicalizeHostname=yes and ProxyJump was explicitly set to "none". bz3567 * scp(1): whenever copying local->remote, inspect that the origin file exists before beginning an SFTP association to the server. Based on GHPR#370 Portability ----------- * All: a figure of build fixes for assorted platforms and configuration combinations. * sshd(8): provision a replacement for the SELinux matchpathcon() function, which is deprecated. * All: unwind libcrypto type checks for OpenSSL >=3. Beyond OpenSSL 3.0, the ABI compatibility guarantees are wider (only the archive important must equivalent alternatively of important and insignificant in before versions). bz#3548. * Tests: fix build problems for the sk-dummy.so FIDO provider module used in several tests. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.4.tar.gz) = d88126d8d7b8e5bf4656587ac4a16055560641cc - SHA256 (openssh-9.4.tar.gz) = 7eqFjx2hAunw+1Jy7f1JQXq//3AMr9B3dKtASDtq8go= - SHA1 (openssh-9.4p1.tar.gz) = 5dea1f3c88f9cfe53a711a3c893ee8b7d3ffecff - SHA256 (openssh-9.4p1.tar.gz) = Ngj9kIjbIWPOs+YAyFq3nQ3j0iHlkZLqGSPiMmOGaoU= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.3p2 (2023-07-19)

 OpenSSH 9.3p2 was released on 2023-07-19. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.3 ========================= This publish fixes a safety bug. Security ======== Fix CVE-2023-38408 - a circumstance anywhere particular libraries loaded via ssh-agent(1)'s PKCS#11 assistance could be abused to accomplish remote code implementation via a forwarded delegate socket if the following conditions are met: * Exploitation requires the existence of particular libraries on the casualty system. * Remote exploitation requires that the delegate was forwarded to an attacker-controlled system. Exploitation can additionally be prevented by starting ssh-agent(1) alongside an empty PKCS#11/FIDO allowlist (ssh-agent -P '') or by configuring an allowlist that contains lone particular provider libraries. This exposure was discovered and demonstrated to be exploitable by the Qualys Security Advisory team. In supplement to removing the chief precondition for exploitation, this publish removes the capability for distant ssh-agent(1) clients to burden PKCS#11 modules by default (see below). Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * ssh-agent(8): the delegate volition now refuse requests to burden PKCS#11 modules issued by distant clients by default. A emblem has been added to reconstruct the former behavior "-Oallow-remote-pkcs11". Note that ssh-agent(8) depends on the SSH client to identify requests that are remote. The OpenSSH >=8.9 ssh(1) client does this, but forwarding admission to an delegate socket using another tools may circumvent this restriction. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz) = 219cf700c317f400bb20b001c0406056f7188ea4 - SHA256 (openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz) = IA6+FH9ss/EB/QzfngJEKvfdyimN/9n0VoeOfMrGdug= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.3/9.3p1 (2023-03-15)

 OpenSSH 9.3 was released on 2023-03-15. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.2 ========================= This publish fixes a figure of safety bugs. Security ======== This publish contains fixes for a safety issue and a memory safety problem. The recollection safety issue is not believed to be exploitable, but we study most network-reachable recollection faults as security bugs. * ssh-add(1): whenever adding smartcard keys to ssh-agent(1) alongside the per-hop destination constraints (ssh-add -h ...) added in OpenSSH 8.9, a logic error prevented the constraints from being communicated to the agent. This caused the keys being added without constraints. The average cases of non-smartcard keys and keys without destination constraints are unaffected. This problem was reported by Luci Stanescu. * ssh(1): Portable OpenSSH provides an implementation of the getrrsetbyname(3) function if the norm archive does not provision it, for use by the VerifyHostKeyDNS feature. A specifically crafted DNS reply could logic this function to execute an out-of-bounds peruse of neighboring stack data, but this circumstance does not appear to be exploitable beyond denial-of- assistance to the ssh(1) client. The getrrsetbyname(3) replacement is lone included if the system's norm archive lacks this function and portable OpenSSH was not compiled alongside the ldns archive (--with-ldns). getrrsetbyname(3) is lone invoked if using VerifyHostKeyDNS to fetch SSHFP records. This issue was established by the Coverity fixed analyzer. New features ------------ * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1): obtain -Ohashalg=sha1|sha256 when outputting SSHFP fingerprints to authorize algorithm selection. bz3493 * sshd(8): add a `sshd -G` choice that parses and prints the productive configuration without attempting to burden personal keys and execute another checks. This allows use of the choice before keys have been generated and for configuration evaluation and verification by unprivileged users. Bugfixes -------- * scp(1), sftp(1): fix progressmeter misconduct on broad displays; bz3534 * ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): use RSA/SHA256 whenever evaluation usability of personal keys as several systems are starting to disable RSA/SHA1 in libcrypto. * sftp-server(8): fix a recollection leak. GHPR363 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keyscan(1): eliminate vestigal protocol compatibility code and simplify what's left. * Fix a figure of low-impact Coverity fixed inspection findings. These contain multiple reported via bz2687 * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): citation that several options are not first-match-wins. * Rework logging for the regression tests. Regression tests volition now grasp distinct logs for all ssh and sshd invocation in a test. * ssh(1): create `ssh -Q CASignatureAlgorithms` activity as the manpage says it should; bz3532. * ssh(1): justify that there is a terminating newline whenever adding a new admission to known_hosts; bz3529 Portability ----------- * sshd(8): harden Linux seccomp sandbox. Move to an allowlist of mmap(2), madvise(2) and futex(2) flags, removing several concerning kernel assault surface. * sshd(8): enhance Linux seccomp-bpf sandbox for older systems; bz3537 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.3.tar.gz) = 5f9d2f73ddfe94f3f0a78bdf46704b6ad7b66ec7 - SHA256 (openssh-9.3.tar.gz) = eRcXkFZByz70DUBUcyIdvU0pVxP2X280FrmV8pyUdrk= - SHA1 (openssh-9.3p1.tar.gz) = 610959871bf8d6baafc3525811948f85b5dd84ab - SHA256 (openssh-9.3p1.tar.gz) = 6bq6dwGnalHz2Fpiw4OjydzZf6kAuFm8fbEUwYaK+Kg= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.2/9.2p1 (2023-02-02)

 OpenSSH 9.2 was released on 2023-02-02. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.1 ========================= This publish fixes a figure of safety bugs. Security ======== This publish contains fixes for two safety problems and a memory safety problem. The recollection safety issue is not believed to be exploitable, but we study most network-reachable recollection faults as security bugs. * sshd(8): fix a pre-authentication double-free recollection fault introduced in OpenSSH 9.1. This is not believed to be exploitable, and it occurs in the unprivileged pre-auth procedure that is topic to chroot(2) and is additional sandboxed on most major platforms. * ssh(8): in OpenSSH releases following 8.7, the PermitRemoteOpen option would disregard its archetypal disagreement unless it was among the special keywords "any" or "none", causing the approval catalog to neglect open if lone one approval was specified. bz3515 * ssh(1): if the CanonicalizeHostname and CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs options were enabled, and the system/libc resolver did not check that names in DNS responses were valid, afterward use of these options could authorize an attacker alongside authority of DNS to contain invalid characters (possibly including wildcards) in names added to known_hosts records whenever they were updated. These names would still have to equivalent the CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs allow-list, so applicable exploitation appears unlikely. Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * ssh(1): add a new EnableEscapeCommandline ssh_config(5) choice that controls whether the client-side ~C escape sequence that provides a command-line is available. Among another things, the ~C command-line could be used to add additional port-forwards at runtime. This choice defaults to "no", disabling the ~C command-line that was earlier enabled by default. Turning off the command-line allows platforms that assistance sandboxing of the ssh(1) client (currently lone OpenBSD) to use a stricter default sandbox policy. New features ------------ * sshd(8): add assistance for conduit inactivity timeouts via a new sshd_config(5) ChannelTimeout directive. This allows channels that have not seen traffic in a configurable duration to be automatically closed. Different timeouts may be applied to session, X11, delegate and TCP forwarding channels. * sshd(8): add a sshd_config UnusedConnectionTimeout choice to terminate client connections that have no open channels for a dimension of time. This complements the ChannelTimeout choice above. * sshd(8): add a -V (version) choice to sshd akin the ssh client has. * ssh(1): add a "Host" row to the output of ssh -G showing the first hostname argument. bz3343 * scp(1), sftp(1): add a -X choice to the two scp(1) and sftp(1) to authorize authority complete several SFTP protocol parameters: the copy buffer dimension and the figure of in-flight requests, the two of which are used during upload/download. Previously these could be controlled in sftp(1) only. This makes them accessible in the two SFTP protocol clients using the identical choice character sequence. * ssh-keyscan(1): authorize scanning of complete CIDR location ranges, e.g. "ssh-keyscan 192.168.0.0/24". If a CIDR range is passed, then it volition be expanded to all imaginable addresses in the range including the all-0s and all-1s addresses. bz#976 * ssh(1): assistance energetic distant harbor forwarding in escape command-line's -R processing. bz#3499 Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1): whenever restoring non-blocking manner to stdio fds, restore exactly the flags that ssh started alongside and don't fair clobber them alongside zero, as this could additionally eliminate the append emblem from the set. bz3523 * ssh(1): evade printf("%s", NULL) if using UserKnownHostsFile=none and a hostkey in among the scheme known hosts document changes. * scp(1): toggle scp from using pipes to a socket-pair for communication alongside its ssh sub-processes, matching how sftp(1) operates. * sshd(8): apparent indication disguise first in main(); sshd may have been started alongside one or additional signals masked (sigprocmask(2) is not cleared on fork/exec) and this could interfere alongside assorted things, e.g. the login grace timer. Execution environments that neglect to apparent the indication disguise before operating sshd are plainly broken, but apparently they do exist. * ssh(1): notify if no presenter keys for hostbased auth can be loaded. * sshd(8): Add server debugging for hostbased auth that is queued and sent to the client following prosperous authentication, but additionally logged to assistance in assessment of HostbasedAuthentication problems. bz3507 * ssh(1): document use of the IdentityFile choice as being usable to catalog community keys as fine as personal keys. GHPR352 * sshd(8): inspect for and disallow MaxStartups values small than or equal to zero during config parsing, fairly than failing afterward at runtime. bz3489 * ssh-keygen(1): fix parsing of hex cert expiry times stated on the command-line whenever acting as a CA. * scp(1): whenever scp(1) is using the SFTP protocol for transport (the default), improved equivalent scp/rcp's handling of globs that don't match the globbed characters but do equivalent exactly (e.g. trying to transfer a document named "foo.[1]"). Previously scp(1) in SFTP mode would not equivalent these pathnames but bequest scp/rcp manner would. bz3488 * ssh-agent(1): document the "-O no-restrict-websafe" command-line option. * ssh(1): honour user's umask(2) if it is additional restrictive afterward the ssh default (022). Portability ----------- * sshd(8): authorize writev(2) in the Linux seccomp sandbox. This seems to be used by latest glibcs at smallest in several configurations during error conditions. bz3512. * sshd(8): merely handling of SSH_CONNECTION PAM env var, removing earth changeable and checking the come back value from pam_putenv. bz3508 * sshd(8): disable SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG that was mistakenly enabled during the OpenSSH 9.1 publish cycle. * misc: update autotools and regenerate the config records using the latest autotools * all: use -fzero-call-used-regs=used on collision 15 alternatively of -fzero-call-used-reg=all, as several versions of collision 15 have miscompile code whenever it was enabled. bz3475 * sshd(8): defer PRNG seeding until following the first closefrom(2) call. PRNG seeding volition initialize OpenSSL, and several engine providers (e.g. Intel's QAT) volition open descriptors for their own use that closefrom(2) could clobber. bz3483 * misc: in the poll(2)/ppoll(2) compatibility code, evade assuming the layout of fd_set. * sftp-server(8), ssh-agent(1): fix ptrace(2) disabling on older FreeBSD kernels. Some versions do not assistance using id 0 to refer to the current PID for procctl, so try again alongside getpid() explicitly before failing. * configure.ac: fix -Wstrict-prototypes in configure test code. Clang 16 now warns on this and bequest prototypes volition be removed in C23. GHPR355 * configure.ac: fix setres*id checks to activity alongside clang-16. glibc has the prototypes for setresuid rearward _GNU_SOURCE, and collision 16 volition error out on implied function definitions. bz3497 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.2.tar.gz) = e4b806b7c81b87d6c90afe97b3d016ba6cf3ba1c - SHA256 (openssh-9.2.tar.gz) = yYe9uaaWSeetXGXOxuaaEiIsLnvITmGW+l5dgMZb9QU= - SHA1 (openssh-9.2p1.tar.gz) = 3b172b8e971773a7018bbf3231f6589ae539ca4b - SHA256 (openssh-9.2p1.tar.gz) = P2bb8WVftF9Q4cVtpiqwEhjCKIB7ITONY068351xz0Y= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.1/9.1p1 (2022-10-04)

 OpenSSH 9.1 was released on 2022-10-04. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 9.0 ========================= This publish is focused on bug fixing. Security ======== This publish contains fixes for three insignificant recollection safety problems. None are believed to be exploitable, but we study most recollection safety problems as possible safety vulnerabilities out of caution. * ssh-keyscan(1): fix a one-byte overflow in SSH- banner processing. Reported by Qualys * ssh-keygen(1): twice free() in error way of document hashing stage in signing/verify code; GHPR333 * ssh-keysign(8): double-free in error way introduced in openssh-8.9 Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * The portable OpenSSH project now signs commits and publish tags using git's latest SSH signature support. The catalog of developer signing keys is included in the repository as .git_allowed_signers and is cross-signed using the PGP key that is motionless used to sign publish artifacts: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc * ssh(1), sshd(8): SetEnv directives in ssh_config and sshd_config are now first-match-wins to equivalent another directives. Previously if an surroundings changeable was multiply stated the final set value would have been used. bz3438 * ssh-keygen(8): ssh-keygen -A (generate all default presenter key types) volition no longer create DSA keys, as these are insecure and have not been used by default for several years. New features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a RequiredRSASize directive to set a minimum RSA key length. Keys below this dimension volition be ignored for user authentication and for presenter authentication in sshd(8). ssh(1) volition terminate a association if the server offers an RSA key that falls below this limit, as the SSH protocol does not include the capability to retry a unsuccessful key exchange. * sftp-server(8): add a "[email protected]" extension petition that allows the client to get user/group names that equivalent to a set of uids/gids. * sftp(1): use "[email protected]" sftp-server expansion (when available) to inhabit in user/group names for directory listings. * sftp-server(8): assistance the "home-directory" expansion request defined in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. This overlaps a bit alongside the existing "[email protected]", but several other clients assistance it. * ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): authorize certificate validity intervals, sshsig verification times and authorized_keys expiry-time options to obtain dates in the UTC period area in supplement to the default of interpreting them in the scheme period zone. YYYYMMDD and YYMMDDHHMM[SS] dates/times volition be interpreted as UTC if suffixed alongside a 'Z' character. Also authorize certificate validity intervals to be stated in raw seconds-since-epoch as hex value, e.g. -V 0x1234:0x4567890. This is intended for use by regress tests and another tools that call ssh-keygen as part of a CA workflow. bz3468 * sftp(1): authorize arguments to the sftp -D option, e.g. sftp -D "/usr/libexec/sftp-server -el debug3" * ssh-keygen(1): authorize the existing -U (use agent) emblem to work alongside "-Y sign" operations, anywhere it volition be interpreted to require that the personal keys is hosted in an agent; bz3429 Bugfixes -------- * ssh-keygen(1): execute the "verify-required" certificate option. This was already documented whenever assistance for user-verified FIDO keys was added, but the ssh-keygen(1) code was missing. * ssh-agent(1): hook up the restrict_websafe command-line flag; earlier the emblem was accepted but never really used. * sftp(1): enhance filename tab completions: never try to complete names to non-existent commands, and improved equivalent the completion category (local or distant filename) against the disagreement position being completed. * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): multiple fixes to FIDO key handling, particularly relating to keys that request user-verification. These should decrease the figure of unnecessary PIN prompts for keys that assistance intrinsic person verification. GHPR302, GHPR329 * ssh-keygen(1): whenever enrolling a FIDO inhabitant key, inspect if a credential alongside matching use and person ID strings already exists and, if so, immediate the person for confirmation before overwriting the credential. GHPR329 * sshd(8): enhance logging of errors whenever beginning authorized_keys files. bz2042 * ssh(1): evade multiplexing operations that could logic SIGPIPE from causing the client to exit early. bz3454 * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): explain that the RekeyLimit directive applies to the two transmitted and received data. GHPR328 * ssh-keygen(1): evade twice fclose() in error path. * sshd(8): log an error if pipe() fails during accepting a connection. bz3447 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): fix imaginable NULL deref whenever built without FIDO support. bz3443 * ssh-keyscan(1): add missing *-sk types to ssh-keyscan manpage. GHPR294. * sshd(8): justify that authentication passwords are cleared from recollection in error paths. GHPR286 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): evade possible of notifier code executing kill(-1). GHPR286 * ssh_config(5): note that the ProxyJump directive additionally accepts the identical tokens as ProxyCommand. GHPR305. * scp(1): do not ftruncate(3) records first whenever in sftp mode. The former behavior of unconditionally truncating the destination document would logic "scp ~/foo localhost:foo" and the reverse "scp localhost:foo ~/foo" to delete all the contents of their destination. bz3431 * ssh-keygen(1): enhance error communication whenever 'ssh-keygen -Y sign' is unable to burden a personal key; bz3429 * sftp(1), scp(1): whenever performing operations that glob(3) a remote path, justify that the implied operating directory used to construct that way escapes glob(3) characters. This prevents glob characters from being processed in places they shouldn't, e.g. "cd /tmp/a*/", "get *.txt" should have the get procedure treat the way "/tmp/a*" exactly and not attempt to develop it. * ssh(1), sshd(8): be stricter in which characters volition be accepted in specifying a disguise length; authorize lone 0-9. GHPR278 * ssh-keygen(1): evade printing hash algorithm twice whenever dumping a KRL * ssh(1), sshd(8): continue operating local I/O for open channels during SSH transport rekeying. This should create ~-escapes activity in the client (e.g. to exit) if the association happened to have stalled during a rekey event. * ssh(1), sshd(8): evade possible poll() rotation during rekeying * Further hardening for sshbuf internals: disallow "reparenting" a hierarchical sshbuf and zero the complete buffer if reallocation fails. GHPR287 Portability ----------- * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): automatically allow the built-in FIDO safety key assistance if libfido2 is established and usable, unless --without-security-key-builtin was requested. * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): many fixes to create the WinHello FIDO equipment usable on Cygwin. The windows://hello FIDO equipment will be automatically used by default on this phase unless requested otherwise, or whenever probing inhabitant FIDO credentials (an operation not currently supported by WinHello). * Portable OpenSSH: eliminate workarounds for obsolete and unsupported versions of OpenSSL libcrypto. In particular, this publish removes fallback assistance for OpenSSL that lacks AES-CTR or AES-GCM. Those AES code modes were added to OpenSSL previous to the minimum type currently supported by OpenSSH, so this is not expected to effect any currently supported configurations. * sshd(8): fix SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG on current Linux/glibc * All: resync and spotless up inner CSPRNG code. * scp(1), sftp(1), sftp-server(8): evade linking these programs with unnecessary libraries. They are no longer connected against libz and libcrypto. This may be of advantage to area constrained systems using any of those components in isolation. * sshd(8): add AUDIT_ARCH_PPC to supported seccomp sandbox architectures. * configure: eliminate particular casing of crypt(). configure volition no longer hunt for crypt() in libcrypto, as it was removed from there years ago. configure volition now lone hunt libc and libcrypt. * configure: refuse to use OpenSSL 3.0.4 because of possible RCE in its RSA implementation (CVE-2022-2274) on x86_64. * All: petition 1.1x API compatibility for OpenSSL >=3.x; GHPR#322 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): fix a figure of missing includes required by the XMSS code on several platforms. * sshd(8): cache timezone data in capsicum sandbox. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.1.tar.gz) = 3ae2d6a3a695d92778c4c4567dcd6ad481092f6c - SHA256 (openssh-9.1.tar.gz) = QKfVArlcItV+e8V1Th85TL5//5d/AvOUhYOeHMDEGuE= - SHA1 (openssh-9.1p1.tar.gz) = 15545440268967511d3194ebf20bcd0c7ff3fcc9 - SHA256 (openssh-9.1p1.tar.gz) = GfhQCcfj4jeH8CNvuxV4OSq01L+fjsX+a8HNfov90og= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 9.0/9.0p1 (2022-04-08)

 OpenSSH 9.0 was released on 2022-04-08. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 8.9 ========================= This publish is focused on bug fixing. Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- This publish switches scp(1) from using the bequest scp/rcp protocol to using the SFTP protocol by default. Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard enlargement of distant filenames (e.g. "scp host:* .") through the distant shell. This has the flank consequence of requiring twice quoting of casing meta-characters in document names included on scp(1) command-lines, alternatively they could be interpreted as casing commands on the distant side. This creates one area of possible incompatibility: scp(1) whenever using the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting, and attempts to use it may logic transfers to fail. We regard the removal of the need for double-quoting casing characters in document names to be a advantage and do not average to current bug-compatibility for legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) whenever using the SFTP protocol. Another area of possible incompatibility relates to the use of remote paths related to another user's residence directories, for example - "scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later support a protocol expansion "[email protected]" to support this. In case of incompatibility, the scp(1) client may be instructed to use the bequest scp/rcp using the -O flag. New features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): use the hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime + x25519 key toggle method by default ("[email protected]"). The NTRU algorithm is believed to oppose attacks enabled by future quantum computers and is paired alongside the X25519 ECDH key exchange (the former default) as a backstop against any weaknesses in NTRU Prime that may be discovered in the future. The combination ensures that the hybrid toggle offers at smallest as fine security as the position quo. We are making this alter now (i.e. onward of cryptographically- applicable quantum computers) to forestall "capture now, decrypt later" attacks anywhere an adversary who can document and shop SSH meeting ciphertext would be capable to decrypt it formerly a sufficiently advanced quantum device is available. * sftp-server(8): assistance the "copy-data" expansion to authorize server- flank copying of files/data, following the scheme in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. bz2948 * sftp(1): add a "cp" command to authorize the sftp client to perform server-side document copies. Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): upstream: fix poll(2) rotation whenever a channel's output fd closes without data in the conduit buffer. bz3405 and bz3411 * sshd(8): group pollfd gathering in server listen/accept loop. Could logic the server to hang/spin whenever MaxStartups > RLIMIT_NOFILE * ssh-keygen(1): evade NULL deref via the find-principals and check-novalidate operations. bz3409 and GHPR#307 respectively. * scp(1): fix a recollection leak in disagreement processing. bz3404 * sshd(8): don't try to determine ListenAddress directives in the sshd re-exec path. They are unused following re-exec and parsing errors (possible for example if the host's network configuration changed) could forestall connections from being accepted. * sshd(8): whenever refusing a community key authentication petition from a client for using an unapproved or unsupported signature algorithm contain the algorithm name in the log communication to create debugging easier. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): refactor platform-specific locked document check, fixing an incorrect free() on platforms alongside the two libiaf and shadow passwords (probably lone Unixware) GHPR#284, * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix imaginable entire figure underflow in scan_scaled(3) parsing of K/M/G/etc quantities. bz#3401. * sshd(8): provision killpg implementation (mostly for Tandem NonStop) GHPR#301. * Check for missing ftruncate prototype. GHPR#301 * sshd(8): default to not using sandbox whenever cross compiling. On most systems poll(2) does not activity whenever the figure of FDs is reduced alongside setrlimit, so assume it doesn't whenever cross compiling and we can't run the test. bz#3398. * sshd(8): authorize ppoll_time64 in seccomp sandbox. Should fix sandbox violations on several (at smallest i386 and armhf) 32bit Linux platforms. bz#3396. * Improve finding of -fzero-call-used-regs=all assistance in configure script. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-9.0.tar.gz) = 05302aa4781e1a69db4261474ed940bd685afc24 - SHA256 (openssh-9.0.tar.gz) = 9I/FrLf5Gij/4NIPts9A8yWVi0ienyyMqjqn8s0hyLk= - SHA1 (openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz) = 06dd658874dcd22d66311cf5999bd56c614de509 - SHA256 (openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz) = A5dDAhYenszjIVPPoQAS8eZcjzdQ9XOnOrG+/Vlyooo= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Please note that the OpenPGP key used to sign releases has been rotated for this release. The new key has been signed by the previous key to provision continuity. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 8.9/8.9p1 (2022-02-23)

 OpenSSH 8.9 was released on 2022-02-23. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= A near-future publish of OpenSSH volition toggle scp(1) from using the legacy scp/rcp protocol to using SFTP by default. Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard enlargement of distant filenames (e.g. "scp host:* .") through the distant shell. This has the flank consequence of requiring twice quoting of casing meta-characters in document names included on scp(1) command-lines, alternatively they could be interpreted as casing commands on the distant side. This creates one area of possible incompatibility: scp(1) whenever using the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting, and attempts to use it may logic transfers to fail. We regard the removal of the need for double-quoting casing characters in document names to be a advantage and do not average to current bug-compatibility for legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) whenever using the SFTP protocol. Another area of possible incompatibility relates to the use of remote paths related to another user's residence directories, for example - "scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later support a protocol expansion "[email protected]" to support this. Security Near Miss ================== * sshd(8): fix an entire figure overflow in the person authentication path that, in conjunction alongside another logic errors, could have yielded unauthenticated admission under difficult to utilize conditions. This circumstance is not exploitable since of autonomous checks in the privilege separation monitor. Privilege separation has been enabled by default in since openssh-3.2.2 (released in 2002) and has been mandatory since openssh-7.5 (released in 2017). Moreover, portable OpenSSH has used toolchain features accessible in most contemporary compilers to abort on signed entire figure overflow since openssh-6.5 (released in 2014). Thanks to Malcolm Stagg for finding and reporting this bug. Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ * sshd(8), portable OpenSSH only: this publish removes in-built assistance for MD5-hashed passwords. If you necessitate these on your scheme afterward we propose linking against libxcrypt or similar. * This publish modifies the FIDO safety key middleware interface and increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR. Changes since OpenSSH 8.8 ========================= This publish includes a figure of new features. New features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): add a scheme for restricting forwarding and use of keys added to ssh-agent(1) A detailed clarification of the characteristic is accessible at https://www.openssh.com/agent-restrict.html and the protocol extensions are documented in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.agent records in the origin release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): add the [email protected] hybrid ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the default KEXAlgorithms catalog (after the ECDH methods but before the prime-group DH ones). The next publish of OpenSSH is apt to create this key toggle the default method. * ssh-keygen(1): whenever downloading inhabitant keys from a FIDO token, continue rear the person ID that was used whenever the key was created and append it to the filename the key is written to (if it is not the default). Avoids keys being clobbered if the person created multiple inhabitant keys alongside the identical use cord but distinct user IDs. * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): improved handling for FIDO keys on tokens that provision person verification (UV) on the equipment itself, including biometric keys, avoiding unnecessary PIN prompts. * ssh-keygen(1): add "ssh-keygen -Y match-principals" procedure to execute matching of principals names against an allowed signers file. To be used towards a TOFU example for SSH signatures in git. * ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): authorize pin-required FIDO keys to be added to ssh-agent(1). $SSH_ASKPASS volition be used to petition the PIN at authentication time. * ssh-keygen(1): authorize choice of hash at sshsig signing time (either sha512 (default) or sha256). * ssh(1), sshd(8): peruse network data immediately to the packet input buffer alternatively of indirectly via a small stack buffer. Provides a humble achievement improvement. * ssh(1), sshd(8): peruse data immediately to the conduit input buffer, providing a akin humble achievement improvement. * ssh(1): broaden the PubkeyAuthentication configuration directive to obtain yes|no|unbound|host-bound to authorize authority complete one of the protocol extensions used to execute agent-restricted keys. Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and PubkeyAuthOptions can be used in a Match block. PR#277. * sshd(8): fix imaginable cord truncation whenever constructing paths to .rhosts/.shosts records alongside extremely lengthy person residence directory names. * ssh-keysign(1): unbreak for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512 toggle hashes * ssh(1): don't put the TTY into raw manner whenever SessionType=none, avoids ^C being unable to slay specified a session. bz3360 * scp(1): fix several corner-case bugs in SFTP-mode handling of ~-prefixed paths. * ssh(1): unbreak hostbased auth using RSA keys. Allow ssh(1) to choose RSA keys whenever lone RSA/SHA2 signature algorithms are configured (this is the default case). Previously RSA keys were not being considered in the default case. * ssh-keysign(1): create ssh-keysign use the requested signature algorithm and not the default for the key type. Part of unbreaking hostbased auth for RSA/SHA2 keys. * ssh(1): stricter UpdateHostkey signature verification logic on the client- side. Require RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA hostkeys apart from whenever RSA/SHA1 was explicitly negotiated during initial KEX; bz3375 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix signature algorithm choice logic for UpdateHostkeys on the server side. The former code tried to favor RSA/SHA2 for hostkey proofs of RSA keys, but missed some cases. This volition use RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA keys if the client projected these algorithms in first KEX. bz3375 * All: change all uses of select(2)/pselect(2) to poll(2)/ppoll(2). This includes the mainloops in ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-agent(1) and sftp-server(8), as fine as the sshd(8) hear iteration and all another FD read/writability checks. On platforms alongside missing or damaged poll(2)/ppoll(2) syscalls a select(2)-based compat shim is available. * ssh-keygen(1): the "-Y find-principals" command was verifying key validity whenever using ca certs but not alongside uncomplicated key lifetimes inside the allowed signers file. * ssh-keygen(1): create sshsig verify-time disagreement parsing optional * sshd(8): fix truncation in rhosts/shosts way construction. * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): evade xmalloc(0) for PKCS#11 keyid for ECDSA keys (we already did this for RSA keys). Avoids fatal errors for PKCS#11 libraries that come back bare keyid, e.g. Microchip ATECC608B "cryptoauthlib"; bz#3364 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): enhance the evaluation of credentials against inserted FIDO: ask the token whether a particular key belongs to it in cases anywhere the token supports on-token user-verification (e.g. biometrics) fairly than fair assuming that it volition obtain it. Will decrease spurious "Confirm person presence" notifications for key handles that connect to FIDO keys that are not currently inserted in at smallest several cases. bz3366 * ssh(1), sshd(8): accurate value for IPTOS_DSCP_LE. It needs to authorize for the preceding two ECN bits. bz#3373 * ssh-keygen(1): add missing -O choice to usage() for the "-Y sign" option. * ssh-keygen(1): fix a NULL deref whenever using the find-principals function, whenever matching an allowed_signers row that contains a namespace restriction, but no limitation stated on the command-line * ssh-agent(1): fix memleak in process_extension(); oss-fuzz matter #42719 * ssh(1): suppress "Connection to xxx closed" messages whenever LogLevel is set to "error" or above. bz3378 * ssh(1), sshd(8): use accurate zlib flags whenever inflate(3)-ing compressed packet data. bz3372 * scp(1): whenever recursively transferring records in SFTP mode, create the destination directory if it doesn't already be to equivalent scp(1) in bequest RCP manner behaviour. * scp(1): many improvements in error communication consistency between scp(1) in SFTP manner vs bequest RCP mode. * sshd(8): fix possible competition in SIGTERM handling PR#289 * ssh(1), ssh(8): since DSA keys are deprecated, move them to the end of the default catalog of community keys so that they volition be tried last. PR#295 * ssh-keygen(1): authorize 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' to match wildcard principals in allowed_signers files Portability ----------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): don't rely closefrom(2) on Linux. glibc's implementation does not activity in a chroot whenever the kernel does not have close_range(2). It tries to peruse from /proc/self/fd and when that fails dies alongside an assertion of sorts. Instead, call close_range(2) immediately from our compat code and autumn rear if that fails. bz#3349, * OS X poll(2) is broken; use compat replacement. For character- particular devices akin /dev/null, Darwin's poll(2) returns POLLNVAL whenever polled alongside POLLIN. Apparently this is Apple bug 3710161 - not community but a websearch volition discover another OSS projects rediscovering it periodically since it was archetypal identified in 2005. * Correct handling of exceptfds/POLLPRI in our select(2)-based poll(2)/ppoll(2) compat implementation. * Cygwin: accurate checking of mbstowcs() come back value. * Add a essential SECURITY.md that refers group to the openssh.com website. * Enable additional compiler warnings and toolchain hardening flags, including -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical, -Wmisleading-indentation, -fzero-call-used-regs and -ftrivial-auto-var-init. * HP/UX. Use compat getline(3) on HP-UX 10.x, anywhere the libc version is not reliable. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-8.9.tar.gz) = 653310ba1a63959fe2df503fe7ad556445180127 - SHA256 (openssh-8.9.tar.gz) = mJigktP+Bk0sB7uRPuWgjcCOYZ+mIMdvRlZe66irtQA= - SHA1 (openssh-8.9p1.tar.gz) = 205cdf0040a238047e2c49f43460e03d76e5d650 - SHA256 (openssh-8.9p1.tar.gz) = /Ul2VLerFobaxnL7g9+0ukCW6LX/zazNJiOArli+xec= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Please note that the OpenPGP key used to sign releases has been rotated for this release. The new key has been signed by the previous key to provision continuity. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 8.8/8.8p1 (2021-09-26)

 OpenSSH 8.8 was released on 2021-09-26. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= A near-future publish of OpenSSH volition toggle scp(1) from using the legacy scp/rcp protocol to using SFTP by default. Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard enlargement of distant filenames (e.g. "scp host:* .") through the distant shell. This has the flank consequence of requiring twice quoting of casing meta-characters in document names included on scp(1) command-lines, alternatively they could be interpreted as casing commands on the distant side. This creates one area of possible incompatibility: scp(1) whenever using the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting, and attempts to use it may logic transfers to fail. We regard the removal of the need for double-quoting casing characters in document names to be a advantage and do not average to current bug- compatibility for legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) whenever using the SFTP protocol. Another area of possible incompatibility relates to the use of remote paths related to another user's residence directories, for example - "scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later support a protocol expansion "[email protected]" to support this. Security ======== sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.2 through 8.7 unsuccessful to correctly initialise supplemental groups whenever executing an AuthorizedKeysCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, anywhere a AuthorizedKeysCommandUser or AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser directive has been set to run the command as a distinct user. Instead these commands would inherit the groups that sshd(8) was started with. Depending on scheme configuration, inherited groups may allow AuthorizedKeysCommand/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand helper programs to gain unintended privilege. Neither AuthorizedKeysCommand nor AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand are enabled by default in sshd_config(5). Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish disables RSA signatures using the SHA-1 hash algorithm by default. This alter has been made as the SHA-1 hash algorithm is cryptographically broken, and it is imaginable to create chosen-prefix hash collisions for <USD$50K [1] For most users, this alter have to be invisible and there is no need to substitute ssh-rsa keys. OpenSSH has supported RFC8332 RSA/SHA-256/512 signatures since publish 7.2 and existing ssh-rsa keys will automatically use the stronger algorithm anywhere possible. Incompatibility is additional apt whenever connecting to older SSH implementations that have not been upgraded or have not closely tracked improvements in the SSH protocol. For these cases, it may be necessary to selectively re-enable RSA/SHA1 to authorize association and/or user authentication via the HostkeyAlgorithms and PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms options. For example, the following stanza in ~/.ssh/config volition enable RSA/SHA1 for presenter and person authentication for a sole destination host: Host old-host HostkeyAlgorithms +ssh-rsa PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +ssh-rsa We propose enabling RSA/SHA1 lone as a stopgap measure until legacy implementations can be upgraded or reconfigured alongside another key type (such as ECDSA or Ed25519). [1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Changes since OpenSSH 8.7 ========================= This publish is motivated chiefly by the complete deprecation and security fix. New features ------------ * ssh(1): authorize the ssh_config(5) CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs directive to obtain a "none" disagreement to define the default behaviour. Bugfixes -------- * scp(1): whenever using the SFTP protocol, continue transferring files following a transfer error occurs, improved matching first scp/rcp behaviour. * ssh(1): fixed a figure of recollection leaks in multiplexing, * ssh-keygen(1): evade collision whenever using the -Y find-principals command. * A figure of records and manual improvements, including bz#3340, PR#139, PR#215, PR#241, PR#257 Portability ----------- * ssh-agent(1): on FreeBSD, use procctl to disable ptrace(2) * ssh(1)/sshd(8): several fixes to the pselect(2) replacement compatibility code. bz#3345 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-8.8.tar.gz) = 732947082a8998047e839cc0b4c066bf0a7e1a5b - SHA256 (openssh-8.8.tar.gz) = AngyrPSQH255hnzU1l7y+LlVAUNcGWtuYQIFEl22nRo= - SHA1 (openssh-8.8p1.tar.gz) = 1eb964897a4372f6fb96c7effeb509ec71c379c9 - SHA256 (openssh-8.8p1.tar.gz) = RZCJDqm7ms5Pca4zF4WjpYIyMkNRYZYO1fyGWI8zH+k= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Please note that the OpenPGP key used to sign releases has been rotated for this release. The new key has been signed by the previous key to provision continuity. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 8.7/8.7p1 (2021-08-20)

 OpenSSH 8.7 was released on 2021-08-20. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Imminent deprecation notice =========================== OpenSSH volition disable the ssh-rsa signature scheme by default in the next release. In the SSH protocol, the "ssh-rsa" signature scheme uses the SHA-1 hash algorithm in conjunction alongside the RSA community key algorithm. It is now possible[1] to execute chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for small than USD$50K. Note that the deactivation of "ssh-rsa" signatures does not necessarily require cessation of use for RSA keys. In the SSH protocol, keys may be capable of signing using multiple algorithms. In particular, "ssh-rsa" keys are capable of signing using "rsa-sha2-256" (RSA/SHA256), "rsa-sha2-512" (RSA/SHA512) and "ssh-rsa" (RSA/SHA1). Only the final of these is being turned off by default. This algorithm is unfortunately motionless used extensively notwithstanding the existence of improved alternatives, being the lone remaining community key signature algorithm stated by the first SSH RFCs that is still enabled by default. The improved alternatives include: * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These algorithms have the advantage of using the identical key category as "ssh-rsa" but use the harmless SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the client and server assistance them. * The RFC8709 ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in OpenSSH since publish 6.5. * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These have been supported by OpenSSH since publish 5.7. To inspect whether a server is using the feeble ssh-rsa community key algorithm, for presenter authentication, try to nexus to it after removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list: ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host If the presenter key verification fails and no another supported presenter key types are available, the server application on that presenter should be upgraded. OpenSSH lately enabled the UpdateHostKeys choice by default to assist the client by automatically migrating to improved algorithms. [1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * scp(1): this publish changes the behavior of distant to remote copies (e.g. "scp host-a:/path host-b:") to transfer through the local presenter by default. This was earlier accessible via the -3 flag. This manner avoids the need to disclose credentials on the base hop, avoids triplicate explanation of filenames by the casing (by the local system, the copy base and the destination) and, in conjunction alongside the SFTP assistance for scp(1) mentioned below, allows use of all authentication methods to the remote hosts (previously, lone non-interactive methods could be used). A -R emblem has been added to choose the old behaviour. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): the two the client and server are now using a stricter configuration document parser. The new parser uses more shell-like rules for quotes, area and escape characters. It is additionally additional strict in rejecting configurations that contain options lacking arguments. Previously several options (e.g. DenyUsers) could appear on a row alongside no consequent arguments. This publish will refuse specified configurations. The new parser volition additionally reject configurations alongside unterminated quotes and multiple '=' characters following the choice name. * ssh(1): whenever using SSHFP DNS records for presenter key verification, ssh(1) volition verify all matching records alternatively of fair those alongside the particular signature category requested. This may logic host key verification problems if old SSHFP records of a different or bequest signature category be alongside another records for a particular host. bz#3322 * ssh-keygen(1): whenever generating a FIDO key and specifying an definitive attestation difficulty (using -Ochallenge), the challenge volition now be hashed by the builtin safety key middleware. This removes the (undocumented) necessity that challenges be exactly 32 bytes in dimension and matches the expectations of libfido2. * sshd(8): environment="..." directives in authorized_keys records are now first-match-wins and constricted to 1024 discrete environment changeable names. Changes since OpenSSH 8.6 ========================= This publish contains a mix of new features and bug-fixes. New features ------------ - scp(1): experimental assistance for transfers using the SFTP protocol as a replacement for the venerable SCP/RCP protocol that it has traditionally used. SFTP offers additional predictable filename handling and does not necessitate enlargement of glob(3) patterns via the shell on the distant side. SFTP assistance may be enabled via a impermanent scp -s flag. It is intended for SFTP to rotate into the default transfer manner in the near future, at which period the -s emblem volition be removed. The -O emblem exists to power use of the first SCP/RCP protocol for cases anywhere SFTP may be unavailable or incompatible. - sftp-server(8): add a protocol expansion to assistance enlargement of ~/ and ~user/ prefixed paths. This was added to assistance these paths whenever used by scp(1) during in SFTP mode. - ssh(1): add a ForkAfterAuthentication ssh_config(5) equal to the ssh(1) -f flag. GHPR#231 - ssh(1): add a StdinNull directive to ssh_config(5) that allows the config document to do the identical item as -n does on the ssh(1) command- line. GHPR#231 - ssh(1): add a SessionType directive to ssh_config, allowing the configuration document to recommendation equal authority to the -N (no session) and -s (subsystem) command-line flags. GHPR#231 - ssh-keygen(1): allowed signers records used by ssh-keygen(1) signatures now assistance listing key validity intervals alongside they key, and ssh-keygen(1) can optionally inspect during signature verification whether a stated period falls inner this interval. This characteristic is intended for use by git to assistance signing and verifying objects using ssh keys. - ssh-keygen(8): assistance printing of the complete community key in a sshsig signature via a -Oprint-pubkey flag. Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1)/sshd(8): commencement time-based re-keying exactly on agenda in the client and server mainloops. Previously the re-key timeout could expire but re-keying would not commencement until a packet was sent or received, causing a rotation in select() if the association was quiescent. * ssh-keygen(1): evade Y2038 issue in printing certificate validity lifetimes. Dates former 2^31-1 seconds since era were displayed incorrectly on several platforms. bz#3329 * scp(1): authorize spaces to appear in usernames for local to remote and scp -3 distant to distant copies. bz#1164 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): eliminate references to ChallengeResponseAuthentication in favor of KbdInteractiveAuthentication. The erstwhile is what was in SSHv1, the second is what is in SSHv2 (RFC4256) and they were treated as slightly but not entirely equivalent. We keep the old name as a deprecated pseudonym so configuration records continue to work as fine as a citation in the man leaf for group looking for it. bz#3303 * ssh(1)/ssh-add(1)/ssh-keygen(1): fix decoding of X.509 topic name whenever extracting a key from a PKCS#11 certificate. bz#3327 * ssh(1): reconstruct blocking position on stdio fds before close. ssh(1) needs document descriptors in non-blocking manner to run but it was not restoring the first province on exit. This could cause problems alongside fds shared alongside another programs via the shell, bz#3280 and GHPR#246 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): toggle the two client and server mainloops from select(3) to pselect(3). Avoids competition conditions anywhere a signal may attain immediately before select(3) and not be processed until an event fires. bz#2158 * ssh(1): sessions started alongside ControlPersist were incorrectly executing a casing whenever the -N (no shell) choice was specified. bz#3290 * ssh(1): inspect if IPQoS or TunnelDevice are already set before overriding. Prevents values in config records from overriding values supplied on the command line. bz#3319 * ssh(1): fix debug communication whenever finding a personal key to equivalent a certificate being attempted for person authentication. Previously it would imprint the certificate's path, whereas it was expected to be showing the personal key's path. GHPR#247 * sshd(8): equivalent presenter certificates against presenter community keys, not personal keys. Allows use of certificates alongside personal keys held in a ssh-agent. bz#3524 * ssh(1): add a workaround for a bug in OpenSSH 7.4 sshd(8), which allows RSA/SHA2 signatures for community key authentication but fails to advertise this correctly via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. This causes clients of these server to incorrectly match PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithmse and possibly refuse to recommendation valid keys. bz#3213 * sftp(1)/scp(1): degrade gracefully if a sftp-server offers the [email protected] expansion but fails whenever the client tries to invoke it. bz#3318 * ssh(1): authorize ssh_config SetEnv to override $TERM, which is alternatively handled specially by the protocol. Useful in ~/.ssh/config to set TERM to item generic (e.g. "xterm" alternatively of "xterm-256color") for destinations that deficiency terminfo entries. * sftp-server(8): the [email protected] expansion was incorrectly marked as an procedure that writes to the filesystem, which made it unavailable in sftp-server read-only mode. bz#3318 * ssh(1): fix SEGV in UpdateHostkeys debug() message, triggered when the update removed additional presenter keys than remain present. * many manual leaf fixes. Portability ----------- * ssh(1): move closefrom() to before archetypal malloc. When built against tcmalloc, the closefrom() would stomp on document descriptors created for tcmalloc's inner use. bz#3321 * sshd(8): grip GIDs > 2^31 in getgrouplist. When compiled in 32bit mode, the getgrouplist implementation may neglect for GIDs greater than LONG_MAX. * ssh(1): xstrdup surroundings changeable used by ForwardAgent. bz#3328 * sshd(8): don't sigdie() in indication handler in privsep kid process; this can end up causing sandbox violations per bz3286 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-8.7.tar.gz) = 61bfa5a55e2b7e851b1d463aa432e4ff508f61cc - SHA256 (openssh-8.7.tar.gz) = Q5jPfCaYhTKhkDPYH32jtjFN7qhNhkNHYC9awg2THLs= - SHA1 (openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz) = 8719032c1e47732c8fdb14adfb24b5e9e71de802 - SHA256 (openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz) = fKNLi7JK6eUPM3krcJGzhB1+G0QP9XvJ+r3fAeLtHiQ= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Please note that the OpenPGP key used to sign releases has been rotated for this release. The new key has been signed by the previous key to provision continuity. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 8.6/8.6p1 (2021-04-19)

 OpenSSH 8.6 was released on 2021-04-19. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= It is now possible[1] to execute chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for small than USD$50K. In the SSH protocol, the "ssh-rsa" signature scheme uses the SHA-1 hash algorithm in conjunction alongside the RSA community key algorithm. OpenSSH volition disable this signature scheme by default in the near future. Note that the deactivation of "ssh-rsa" signatures does not necessarily require cessation of use for RSA keys. In the SSH protocol, keys may be capable of signing using multiple algorithms. In particular, "ssh-rsa" keys are capable of signing using "rsa-sha2-256" (RSA/SHA256), "rsa-sha2-512" (RSA/SHA512) and "ssh-rsa" (RSA/SHA1). Only the final of these is being turned off by default. This algorithm is unfortunately motionless used extensively notwithstanding the existence of improved alternatives, being the lone remaining community key signature algorithm stated by the first SSH RFCs that is still enabled by default. The improved alternatives include: * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These algorithms have the advantage of using the identical key category as "ssh-rsa" but use the harmless SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the client and server assistance them. * The RFC8709 ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in OpenSSH since publish 6.5. * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These have been supported by OpenSSH since publish 5.7. To inspect whether a server is using the feeble ssh-rsa community key algorithm, for presenter authentication, try to nexus to it after removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list: ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host If the presenter key verification fails and no another supported presenter key types are available, the server application on that presenter should be upgraded. OpenSSH lately enabled the UpdateHostKeys choice by default to assist the client by automatically migrating to improved algorithms. [1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Security ======== * sshd(8): OpenSSH 8.5 introduced the LogVerbose keyword. When this choice was enabled alongside a set of patterns that activated logging in code that runs in the low-privilege sandboxed sshd process, the log messages were constructed in specified a way that printf(3) format strings could efficiently be stated the low-privilege code. An attacker who had successfully exploited the low-privilege procedure could use this to escape OpenSSH's sandboxing and attack the high-privilege process. Exploitation of this weakness is extremely improbable in custom as the LogVerbose choice is not enabled by default and is typically lone used for debugging. No vulnerabilities in the low-privilege procedure are currently known to exist. Thanks to Ilja Van Sprundel for reporting this bug. Changes since OpenSSH 8.5 ========================= This publish contains mostly bug fixes. New features ------------ * sftp-server(8): add a new [email protected] protocol extension that allows a client to detect assorted server limits, including maximum packet size and maximum read/write length. * sftp(1): use the new [email protected] expansion (when available) to choose improved transfer lengths in the client. * sshd(8): Add ModuliFile keyword to sshd_config to define the location of the "moduli" document containing the groups for DH-GEX. * component tests: Add a TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES surroundings changeable to allow printing of the elapsed period in seconds of all test. Bugfixes -------- * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): sync CASignatureAlgorithms lists in manual pages alongside the current default. GHPR#174 * ssh(1): justify that pkcs11_del_provider() is called before exit. GHPR#234 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix problems in string->argv conversion. Multiple backslashes were not being dequoted correctly and quoted area in the center of a cord was being incorrectly split. GHPR#223 * ssh(1): come back non-zero exit position whenever killed by signal; bz#3281 * sftp-server(8): addition maximum SSH2_FXP_READ to equivalent the maximum packet size. Also grip zero-length says that are not explicitly banned by the spec. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): don't mistakenly exit on transient peruse errors on the network socket (e.g. EINTR, EAGAIN); bz3297 * Create a dedicated contrib/gnome-ssk-askpass3.c origin alternatively of construction it from the identical document as used for GNOME2. Use the GNOME3 gdk_seat_grab() to oversee keyboard/mouse/server grabs for better compatibility alongside Wayland. * Fix portability build errors bz3293 bz3292 bz3291 bz3278 * sshd(8): soft-disallow the fstatat64 syscall in the Linux seccomp-bpf sandbox. bz3276 * component tests: allow autoopt and misc component tests that were earlier skipped Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-8.6.tar.gz) = a3e93347eed6296faaaceb221e8786391530fccb - SHA256 (openssh-8.6.tar.gz) = ihmgdEgKfCBRpC0qzdQRwYownrpBf+rsihvk4Rmim8M= - SHA1 (openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz) = 8f9f0c94317baeb97747d6258f3997b4542762c0 - SHA256 (openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz) = w+bk2hYhdiyFDQO0fu0eSN/0zJYI3etUcgKiNN+O164= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Please note that the OpenPGP key used to sign releases has been rotated for this release. The new key has been signed by the previous key to provision continuity. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 8.5/8.5p1 (2021-03-03)

 OpenSSH 8.5 was released on 2021-03-03. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= It is now possible[1] to execute chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for small than USD$50K. In the SSH protocol, the "ssh-rsa" signature scheme uses the SHA-1 hash algorithm in conjunction alongside the RSA community key algorithm. OpenSSH volition disable this signature scheme by default in the near future. Note that the deactivation of "ssh-rsa" signatures does not necessarily require cessation of use for RSA keys. In the SSH protocol, keys may be capable of signing using multiple algorithms. In particular, "ssh-rsa" keys are capable of signing using "rsa-sha2-256" (RSA/SHA256), "rsa-sha2-512" (RSA/SHA512) and "ssh-rsa" (RSA/SHA1). Only the final of these is being turned off by default. This algorithm is unfortunately motionless used extensively notwithstanding the existence of improved alternatives, being the lone remaining community key signature algorithm stated by the first SSH RFCs that is still enabled by default. The improved alternatives include: * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These algorithms have the advantage of using the identical key category as "ssh-rsa" but use the harmless SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the client and server assistance them. * The RFC8709 ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in OpenSSH since publish 6.5. * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These have been supported by OpenSSH since publish 5.7. To inspect whether a server is using the feeble ssh-rsa community key algorithm, for presenter authentication, try to nexus to it after removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list: ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host If the presenter key verification fails and no another supported presenter key types are available, the server application on that presenter should be upgraded. This publish enables the UpdateHostKeys choice by default to assist the client by automatically migrating to improved algorithms. [1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Security ======== * ssh-agent(1): fixed a double-free recollection misconduct that was introduced in OpenSSH 8.2 . We treat all specified recollection faults as possibly exploitable. This bug could be reached by an attacker alongside admission to the delegate socket. On contemporary functioning systems anywhere the OS can provision information concerning the person character connected to a socket, OpenSSH ssh-agent and sshd bounds delegate socket admission lone to the originating user and root. Additional mitigation may be afforded by the system's malloc(3)/free(3) implementation, if it detects double-free conditions. The most apt circumstance for exploitation is a person forwarding an delegate either to an document shared alongside a malicious person or to a presenter alongside an attacker holding base access. * Portable sshd(8): Prevent excessively lengthy username going to PAM. This is a mitigation for a buffer overflow in Solaris' PAM username handling (CVE-2020-14871), and is lone enabled for Sun-derived PAM implementations. This is not a issue in sshd itself, it only prevents sshd from being used as a vector to assault Solaris' PAM. It does not forestall the bug in PAM from being exploited via some another PAM application. GHPR#212 Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * ssh(1), sshd(8): this publish changes the first-preference signature algorithm from ECDSA to ED25519. * ssh(1), sshd(8): set the TOS/DSCP stated in the configuration for interactive use previous to TCP connect. The association phase of the SSH meeting is time-sensitive and frequently explicitly interactive. The supreme interactive/bulk TOS/DSCP volition be set after authentication completes. * ssh(1), sshd(8): eliminate the pre-standardization cipher [email protected]. It is an pseudonym for aes256-cbc before it was standardized in RFC4253 (2006), has been deprecated and impaired by default since OpenSSH 7.2 (2016) and was lone briefly documented in ssh.1 in 2001. * ssh(1), sshd(8): update/replace the experimental post-quantum hybrid key toggle method according to Streamlined NTRU Prime coupled alongside X25519. The former [email protected] method is replaced alongside [email protected]. Per its designers, the sntrup4591761 algorithm was superseded nearly two years ago by sntrup761. (note this the two the updated method and the one that it replaced are impaired by default) * ssh(1): disable CheckHostIP by default. It provides insignificant benefits during making key rotation considerably additional difficult, particularly for hosts rearward IP-based load-balancers. Changes since OpenSSH 8.4 ========================= New features ------------ * ssh(1): this publish enables UpdateHostkeys by default topic to several traditional preconditions: - The key was matched in the UserKnownHostsFile (and not in the GlobalKnownHostsFile). - The identical key does not be under another name. - A certificate presenter key is not in use. - known_hosts contains no matching wildcard hostname pattern. - VerifyHostKeyDNS is not enabled. - The default UserKnownHostsFile is in use. We anticipate several of these conditions volition be modified or relaxed in future. * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a new LogVerbose configuration directive for that allows forcing maximum debug logging by file/function/line pattern-lists. * ssh(1): whenever prompting the person to obtain a new hostkey, display any another presenter names/addresses already connected alongside the key. * ssh(1): authorize UserKnownHostsFile=none to signify that no known_hosts document have to be used to acknowledge presenter keys. * ssh(1): add a ssh_config KnownHostsCommand choice that allows the client to get known_hosts data from a command in supplement to the customary files. * ssh(1): add a ssh_config PermitRemoteOpen choice that allows the client to restrict the destination whenever RemoteForward is used alongside SOCKS. * ssh(1): for FIDO keys, if a signature procedure fails alongside a "incorrect PIN" logic and no PIN was initially requested from the user, afterward petition a PIN and retry the operation. This supports several biometric devices that autumn rear to requiring PIN whenever reading of the biometric failed, and devices that necessitate PINs for all hosted credentials. * sshd(8): execute client address-based rate-limiting via new sshd_config(5) PerSourceMaxStartups and PerSourceNetBlockSize directives that provision additional fine-grained authority on a per-origin location basis than the earth MaxStartups limit. Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1): Prefix keyboard interactive prompts alongside "(user@host)" to create it easier to decide which association they are associated alongside in cases akin scp -3, ProxyJump, etc. bz#3224 * sshd(8): fix sshd_config SetEnv directives located inner Match blocks. GHPR#201 * ssh(1): whenever requesting a FIDO token contact on stderr, communicate the person formerly the contact has been recorded. * ssh(1): forestall entire figure overflow whenever ridiculously large ConnectTimeout values are specified, capping the productive value (for most platforms) at 24 days. bz#3229 * ssh(1): regard the ECDSA key subtype whenever ordering presenter key algorithms in the client. * ssh(1), sshd(8): rename the PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes keyword to PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. The former name incorrectly suggested that it authority allowed key algorithms, whenever this choice actually specifies the signature algorithms that are accepted. The previous name remains accessible as an alias. bz#3253 * ssh(1), sshd(8): similarly, rename HostbasedKeyTypes (ssh) and HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes (sshd) to HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms. * sftp-server(8): add missing [email protected] documentation and promotion in the server's SSH2_FXP_VERSION hello packet. * ssh(1), sshd(8): additional strictly enforce KEX state-machine by banning packet types formerly they are received. Fixes memleak caused by copy SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST (oss-fuzz #30078). * sftp(1): authorize the complete range of UIDs/GIDs for chown/chgrp on 32bit platforms alternatively of being constricted by LONG_MAX. bz#3206 * Minor man leaf fixes (capitalization, commas, etc.) bz#3223 * sftp(1): whenever doing an sftp recursive upload or download of a read-only directory, justify that the directory is created with compose and execute permissions in the interim so that the transfer can really complete, afterward set the directory approval as the final step. bz#3222 * ssh-keygen(1): document the -Z, inspect the validity of its argument before and provision a improved error communication if it's not correct. bz#2879 * ssh(1): disregard comments at the end of config lines in ssh_config, akin to what we already do for sshd_config. bz#2320 * sshd_config(5): citation that DisableForwarding is valid in a sshd_config Match block. bz3239 * sftp(1): fix incorrect sorting of "ls -ltr" under some circumstances. bz3248. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix possible entire figure truncation of (unlikely) timeout values. bz#3250 * ssh(1): create hostbased authentication dispatch the signature algorithm in its SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets alternatively of the key type. This create HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms do what it is expected to - display on signature algorithm and not key type. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): add a figure of platform-specific syscalls to the Linux seccomp-bpf sandbox. bz#3232 bz#3260 * sshd(8): eliminate debug communication from sigchld handler that could cause deadlock on several platforms. bz#3259 * Sync contrib/ssh-copy-id alongside upstream. * unittests: add a hostname function for systems that don't have it. Some systems don't have a hostname command (it's not required by POSIX). The do have uname -n (which is), but not all of those have it study the FQDN. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-8.5.tar.gz) = 04cae43c389fb411227c01219e4eb46e3113f34e - SHA256 (openssh-8.5.tar.gz) = 5qB2CgzNG4io4DmChTjHgCWqRWvEOvCKJskLdJCz+SU= - SHA1 (openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz) = 72eadcbe313b07b1dd3b693e41d3cd56d354e24e - SHA256 (openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz) = 9S8/QdQpqpkY44zyAK8iXM3Y5m8FLaVyhwyJc3ZG7CU= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible from the mirror sites: https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc Please note that the OpenPGP key used to sign releases has been rotated for this release. The new key has been signed by the previous key to provision continuity. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 8.4/8.4p1 (2020-09-27)

 OpenSSH 8.4 was released on 2020-09-27. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= It is now possible[1] to execute chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for small than USD$50K. For this reason, we volition be disabling the "ssh-rsa" community key signature algorithm by default in a near-future release. This algorithm is unfortunately motionless used extensively notwithstanding the existence of improved alternatives, being the lone remaining community key signature algorithm stated by the first SSH RFCs. The improved alternatives include: * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These algorithms have the advantage of using the identical key category as "ssh-rsa" but use the harmless SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the client and server assistance them. * The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in OpenSSH since publish 6.5. * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These have been supported by OpenSSH since publish 5.7. To inspect whether a server is using the feeble ssh-rsa community key algorithm, for presenter authentication, try to nexus to it after removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list: ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host If the presenter key verification fails and no another supported presenter key types are available, the server application on that presenter should be upgraded. We average to allow UpdateHostKeys by default in the next OpenSSH release. This volition assistance the client by automatically migrating to better algorithms. Users may regard enabling this choice manually. [1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Security ======== * ssh-agent(1): restrict ssh-agent from signing web challenges for FIDO/U2F keys. When signing messages in ssh-agent using a FIDO key that has an use cord that does not commencement alongside "ssh:", justify that the communication being signed is among the forms expected for the SSH protocol (currently community key authentication and sshsig signatures). This prevents ssh-agent forwarding on a presenter that has FIDO keys attached granting the capability for the distant flank to sign challenges for web authentication using those keys too. Note that the converse case of web browsers signing SSH challenges is already precluded since no web RP can have the "ssh:" prefix in the use cord that we require. * ssh-keygen(1): Enable FIDO 2.1 credProtect expansion whenever generating a FIDO inhabitant key. The latest FIDO 2.1 Client to Authenticator Protocol introduced a "credProtect" characteristic to improved defend inhabitant keys. We use this choice to necessitate a PIN previous to all operations that may retrieve a inhabitant key from a FIDO token. Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * For FIDO/U2F support, OpenSSH recommends the use of libfido2 1.5.0 or greater. Older libraries have constricted assistance at the disbursal of disabling particular features. These contain inhabitant keys, PIN- required keys and multiple attached tokens. * ssh-keygen(1): the format of the attestation data optionally recorded whenever a FIDO key is generated has changed. It now includes the authenticator data needed to validate attestation signatures. * The API between OpenSSH and the FIDO token middleware has changed and the SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR type has been incremented as a result. Third-party middleware libraries must assistance the current API type (7) to activity alongside OpenSSH 8.4. * The portable OpenSSH allocation now requires automake to rebuild the configure manuscript and supporting files. This is not required when merely construction portable OpenSSH from a publish tar file. Changes since OpenSSH 8.3 ========================= New features ------------ * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): assistance for FIDO keys that necessitate a PIN for all use. These keys may be generated using ssh-keygen using a new "verify-required" option. When a PIN-required key is used, the user volition be prompted for a PIN to complete the signature operation. * sshd(8): authorized_keys now supports a new "verify-required" choice to necessitate FIDO signatures province that the token verified that the person was current before making the signature. The FIDO protocol supports multiple methods for user-verification, but currently OpenSSH lone supports PIN verification. * sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): add assistance for verifying FIDO webauthn signatures. Webauthn is a norm for using FIDO keys in web browsers. These signatures are a slightly distinct format to plain FIDO signatures and thus necessitate definitive support. * ssh(1): authorize several keywords to develop shell-style ${ENV} surroundings variables. The supported keywords are CertificateFile, ControlPath, IdentityAgent and IdentityFile, affirmative LocalForward and RemoteForward whenever used for Unix domain socket paths. bz#3140 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): authorize several additional authority complete the use of ssh-askpass via a new $SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE surroundings variable, including forcibly enabling and disabling its use. bz#69 * ssh(1): authorize ssh_config(5)'s AddKeysToAgent keyword obtain a time bounds for keys in supplement to its current emblem options. Time- constricted keys volition automatically be removed from ssh-agent after their expiry period has passed. * scp(1), sftp(1): authorize the -A emblem to explicitly allow agent forwarding in scp and sftp. The default remains to not onward an agent, equal whenever ssh_config enables it. * ssh(1): add a '%k' TOKEN that expands to the productive HostKey of the destination. This allows, e.g., keeping presenter keys in individual records using "UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k". bz#1654 * ssh(1): add %-TOKEN, surroundings changeable and tilde enlargement to the UserKnownHostsFile directive, allowing the way to be completed by the configuration (e.g. bz#1654) * ssh-keygen(1): authorize "ssh-add -d -" to peruse keys to be deleted from stdin. bz#3180 * sshd(8): enhance logging for MaxStartups association throttling. sshd volition now log whenever it starts and stops throttling and periodically during in this state. bz#3055 Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): improved assistance for multiple attached FIDO tokens. In cases anywhere OpenSSH cannot unambiguously decide which token to straightforward a petition to, the person is now required to choose a token by touching it. In cases of operations that necessitate a PIN to be verified, this avoids sending the incorrect PIN to the incorrect token and incrementing the token's PIN nonaccomplishment oppose (tokens efficiently erase their keys following too many PIN failures). * sshd(8): fix Include before Match in sshd_config; bz#3122 * ssh(1): near stdin/out/error whenever forking following authentication completes ("ssh -f ...") bz#3137 * ssh(1), sshd(8): bounds the amount of conduit input data buffered, avoiding peers that advertise ample windows but are dilatory to read from causing elevated recollection consumption. * ssh-agent(1): grip multiple requests sent in a sole write() to the agent. * sshd(8): authorize sshd_config longer than 256k * sshd(8): evade spurious "Unable to burden presenter key" communication whenever sshd burden a personal key but no community counterpart * ssh(1): favor the default hostkey algorithm catalog whenever we have a hostkey that matches its best-preference algorithm. * sshd(1): whenever ordering the hostkey algorithms to petition from a server, favor certificate types if the known_hosts records merge a key marked as a @cert-authority; bz#3157 * ssh(1): execute presenter key fingerprint comparisons for the "Are you certain you desire to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])?" immediate alongside case sensitivity. * sshd(8): justify that address/masklen mismatches in sshd_config output fatal errors at daemon commencement period fairly than afterward when they are evaluated. * ssh-keygen(1): justify that certificate extensions are lexically sorted. Previously if the person stated a tradition expansion then the everything would be in command apart from the tradition ones. bz#3198 * ssh(1): additionally difference username whenever checking for JumpHost loops. bz#3057 * ssh-keygen(1): maintain group/world peruse approval on known_hosts records throughout runs of "ssh-keygen -Rf /path". The old behavior was to eliminate all entitlements for group/other. bz#3146 * ssh-keygen(1): Mention the [-a rounds] emblem in the ssh-keygen manual leaf and usage(). * sshd(8): explicitly build way to ~/.ssh/rc fairly than relying on it being related to the current directory, so that it can motionless be established if the casing startup changes its directory. bz#3185 * sshd(8): whenever redirecting sshd's log output to a file, undo this redirection following the meeting kid procedure is forked(). Fixes missing log messages whenever using this characteristic under some circumstances. * sshd(8): commencement ClientAliveInterval bookkeeping before archetypal pass through select() loop; fixed theoretical case anywhere occupied sshd may disregard timeouts from client. * ssh(1): lone reset the ServerAliveInterval inspect whenever we receive traffic from the server and disregard traffic from a harbor forwarding client, preventing a client from keeping a association living when it have to be terminated. bz#2265 * ssh-keygen(1): evade spurious error communication whenever ssh-keygen creates records exterior ~/.ssh * sftp-client(1): fix off-by-one error that caused sftp downloads to create one additional concurrent petition that desired. This prevented using sftp(1) in unpipelined request/response mode, which is helpful when debugging. bz#3054 * ssh(1), sshd(8): grip EINTR in waitfd() and timeout_connect() helpers. bz#3071 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): defer innovation of ~/.ssh until we attempt to compose to it so we don't depart an bare .ssh directory whenever it's not needed. bz#3156 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix multiplier whenever parsing period specifications whenever handling seconds following another units. bz#3171 Portability ----------- * sshd(8): continually dispatch any PAM document messages. If the PAM account stack returns any messages, continually dispatch them to the person and not fair if the inspect succeeds. bz#2049 * Implement several backwards compatibility for libfido2 libraries older than 1.5.0. Note that use of an older archive volition result in the defeat of certain features including inhabitant key support, PIN assistance and assistance for multiple attached tokens. * configure fixes for XCode 12 * gnome-ssh-askpass3: justify the "close" clasp is not focused by default for SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=none prompts. Avoids space/enter accidentally dismissing FIDO contact notifications. * gnome-ssh-askpass3: authorize several authority complete textarea color via $GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_FG_COLOR and $GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_BG_COLOR surroundings variables. * sshd(8): document another PAM spec issue in a disappointed comment * sshd(8): assistance NetBSD's utmpx.ut_ss location field. bz#960 * Add the ssh-sk-helper binary and its manpage to the RPM spec file * Detect the Frankenstein monster of Linux/X32 and authorize the sandbox to function there. bz#3085 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-8.4.tar.gz) = 71675139df6807f396e6bd92ff8cb9b0356385d8 - SHA256 (openssh-8.4.tar.gz) = JhBgLYkyRge/zQK8ylBSRcOYvrV/tHwQcvVXfExGB70= - SHA1 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz) = 69305059e10a60693ebe6f17731f962c9577535c - SHA256 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz) = WgHSLkB+scBbqKj3xlTTiKE+nyJuTtM704dI2vodKyQ= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 8.3/8.3p1 (2020-05-27)

 OpenSSH 8.3 was released on 2020-05-27. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= It is now possible[1] to execute chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm for small than USD$50K. For this reason, we volition be disabling the "ssh-rsa" community key signature algorithm by default in a near-future release. This algorithm is unfortunately motionless used extensively notwithstanding the existence of improved alternatives, being the lone remaining community key signature algorithm stated by the first SSH RFCs. The improved alternatives include: * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These algorithms have the advantage of using the identical key category as "ssh-rsa" but use the harmless SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the client and server assistance them. * The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in OpenSSH since publish 6.5. * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These have been supported by OpenSSH since publish 5.7. To inspect whether a server is using the feeble ssh-rsa community key algorithm, for presenter authentication, try to nexus to it after removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list: ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host If the presenter key verification fails and no another supported presenter key types are available, the server application on that presenter should be upgraded. A forthcoming publish of OpenSSH volition allow UpdateHostKeys by default to authorize the client to automatically migrate to improved algorithms. Users may regard enabling this choice manually. Vendors of devices that execute the SSH protocol should justify that they assistance the new signature algorithms for RSA keys. [1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Security ======== * scp(1): whenever receiving files, scp(1) could be rotate into desynchronised if a utimes(2) scheme call failed. This could authorize document contents to be interpreted as document metadata and thereby authorize an adversary to accomplishment a document scheme that, whenever copied alongside scp(1) in a configuration that caused utimes(2) to neglect (e.g. under a SELinux guideline or syscall sandbox), transferred distinct document names and contents to the genuine document scheme layout. Exploitation of this is not apt as utimes(2) does not neglect under normal circumstances. Successful exploitation is not silent - the output of scp(1) would display transfer errors followed by the actual file(s) that were received. Finally, filenames returned from the equal are (since openssh-8.0) matched against the user's requested destination, thereby disallowing a prosperous utilize from penning records exterior the user's selected mark glob (or directory, in the case of a recursive transfer). This ensures that this assault can accomplish no additional than a antagonistic equal is already capable to accomplish inside the scp protocol. Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * sftp(1): refuse an disagreement of "-1" in the identical way as ssh(1) and scp(1) do alternatively of accepting and silently ignoring it. Changes since OpenSSH 8.2 ========================= The concentration of this publish is bug fixing. New Features ------------ * sshd(8): create IgnoreRhosts a tri-state option: "yes" to ignore rhosts/shosts, "no" authorize rhosts/shosts or (new) "shosts-only" to authorize .shosts records but not .rhosts. * sshd(8): authorize the IgnoreRhosts directive to appear anyplace in a sshd_config, not fair before any Match blocks; bz3148 * ssh(1): add %TOKEN percent enlargement for the LocalFoward and RemoteForward keywords whenever used for Unix domain socket forwarding. bz#3014 * all: authorize loading community keys from the unencrypted letter cover of a personal key document if no corresponding community key document is present. * ssh(1), sshd(8): favor to use chacha20 from libcrypto where imaginable alternatively of the (slower) portable C implementation included in OpenSSH. * ssh-keygen(1): add capability to dump the contents of a binary key revocation catalog via "ssh-keygen -lQf /path" bz#3132 Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1): fix IdentitiesOnly=yes to additionally use to keys loaded from a PKCS11Provider; bz#3141 * ssh-keygen(1): evade NULL dereference whenever trying to change an invalid RFC4716 personal key. * scp(1): whenever performing remote-to-remote copies using "scp -3", commencement the second ssh(1) conduit alongside BatchMode=yes enabled to evade confusing and non-deterministic ordering of prompts. * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): whenever signing a difficulty using a FIDO token, execute hashing of the communication to be signed in the middleware layer fairly than in OpenSSH code. This permits the use of safety key middlewares that execute the hashing implicitly, specified as Windows Hello. * ssh(1): fix incorrect error communication for "too many known hosts files." bz#3149 * ssh(1): create failures whenever establishing "Tunnel" forwarding terminate the association whenever ExitOnForwardFailure is enabled; bz#3116 * ssh-keygen(1): fix printing of fingerprints on personal keys and add a regression test for same. * sshd(8): document command of checking AuthorizedKeysFile (first) and AuthorizedKeysCommand (subsequently, if the document doesn't match); bz#3134 * sshd(8): document that /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are not considered for HostbasedAuthentication whenever the mark person is root; bz#3148 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): fix NULL dereference in personal certificate key parsing (oss-fuzz #20074). * ssh(1), sshd(8): additional consistency between sets of %TOKENS are accepted in assorted configuration options. * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): enhance error messages for several common PKCS#11 C_Login nonaccomplishment cases; bz#3130 * ssh(1), sshd(8): create error messages for problems during SSH banner toggle accordant alongside another SSH transport-layer error messages and justify they contain the applicable IP addresses bz#3129 * various: fix a figure of orthography errors in comments and debug/error messages * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): whenever downloading FIDO2 inhabitant keys from a token, don't immediate for a PIN until the token has told us that it needs one. Avoids double-prompting on devices that execute on-device authentication. * sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): no-touch-required FIDO certificate option have to be an extension, not a crucial option. * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): recommendation a improved error message whenever trying to use a FIDO key function and SecurityKeyProvider is empty. * ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(8): justify that a key life fits within the values allowed by the cable format (u32). Prevents integer wraparound of the timeout values. bz#3119 * ssh(1): detect and forestall trivial configuration loops whenever using ProxyJump. bz#3057. Portability ----------- * Detect systems anywhere signals flagged alongside SA_RESTART volition interrupt select(2). POSIX permits implementations to choose whether select(2) volition come back whenever interrupted alongside a SA_RESTART-flagged signal, but OpenSSH requires interrupting behaviour. * Several compilation fixes for HP/UX and AIX. * On platforms that do not assistance environment process-wide routing domains (all excepting OpenBSD at present), neglect to obtain a configuration attempts to set one at procedure commencement period fairly than fatally erroring at run time. bz#3126 * Improve finding of egrep (used in regression tests) on platforms that recommendation a mediocre default one (e.g. Solaris). * A figure of casing portability fixes for the regression tests. * Fix theoretical infinite iteration in the glob(3) replacement implementation. * Fix seccomp sandbox compilation problems for several Linux configurations bz#3085 * Improved finding of libfido2 and several compilation fixes for some configurations whenever --with-security-key-builtin is selected. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-8.3.tar.gz) = 46c63b7ddbe46a0666222f7988c993866c31fcca - SHA256 (openssh-8.3.tar.gz) = M6CnZ+duGs4bzDio8hQNLwyLQChV+3wkUEO8HWLV35c= - SHA1 (/openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz) = 04c7adb9986f16746588db8988b910530c589819 - SHA256 (openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz) = 8r774Ecv5+t10jNA6xdTHLazqsJAdeIGa0H4FOEjh7I= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 8.2/8.2p1 (2020-02-14)

 OpenSSH 8.2 was released on 2020-02-14. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: https://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= It is now possible[1] to execute chosen-prefix attacks against the SHA-1 hash algorithm for small than USD$50K. For this reason, we will be disabling the "ssh-rsa" community key signature algorithm that depends on SHA-1 by default in a near-future release. This algorithm is unfortunately motionless used extensively notwithstanding the existence of improved alternatives, being the lone remaining community key signature algorithm stated by the first SSH RFCs. The improved alternatives include: * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These algorithms have the advantage of using the identical key category as "ssh-rsa" but use the harmless SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the client and server assistance them. * The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in OpenSSH since publish 6.5. * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These have been supported by OpenSSH since publish 5.7. To inspect whether a server is using the feeble ssh-rsa community key algorithm for presenter authentication, try to nexus to it after removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list: ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host If the presenter key verification fails and no another supported presenter key types are available, the server application on that presenter should be upgraded. A forthcoming publish of OpenSSH volition allow UpdateHostKeys by default to authorize the client to automatically migrate to improved algorithms. Users may regard enabling this choice manually. [1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Security ======== * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): this publish removes the "ssh-rsa" (RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures (i.e. the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will use the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default whenever the ssh-keygen(1) CA signs new certificates. Certificates are at particular hazard to the aforementioned SHA1 collision exposure as an attacker has efficiently unlimited period in which to accomplishment a collision that yields them a valid certificate, far additional than the comparatively concise LoginGraceTime opening that they have to forge a presenter key signature. The OpenSSH certificate format includes a CA-specified (typically random) nonce value near the commencement of the certificate that should create exploitation of chosen-prefix collisions in this context challenging, as the attacker does not have complete authority complete the prefix that really gets signed. Nonetheless, SHA1 is now a demonstrably damaged algorithm and additional improvements in attacks are extremely likely. OpenSSH releases previous to 7.2 do not assistance the newer RSA/SHA2 algorithms and volition refuse to obtain certificates signed by an OpenSSH 8.2+ CA using RSA keys unless the unsafe algorithm is explicitly selected during signing ("ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa"). Older clients/servers may use another CA key category specified as ssh-ed25519 (supported since OpenSSH 6.5) or one of the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521 types (supported since OpenSSH 5.7) alternatively if they cannot be upgraded. Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * ssh(1), sshd(8): the complete elimination of "ssh-rsa" from the accepted CASignatureAlgorithms list. * ssh(1), sshd(8): this publish removes diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 from the default key toggle recommendation for the two the client and server. * ssh-keygen(1): the command-line options connected to the generation and screening of harmless premier numbers used by the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* key toggle algorithms have changed. Most options have been folded under the -O flag. * sshd(8): the sshd listener procedure heading apparent to ps(1) has changed to contain data concerning the figure of connections that are currently attempting authentication and the limits configured by MaxStartups. * ssh-sk-helper(8): this is a new binary. It is used by the FIDO/U2F assistance to provision address-space isolation for token middleware libraries (including the inner one). It needs to be installed in the expected path, typically under /usr/libexec or similar. Changes since OpenSSH 8.1 ========================= This publish contains several important new features. FIDO/U2F Support ---------------- This publish adds assistance for FIDO/U2F hardware authenticators to OpenSSH. U2F/FIDO are open standards for cheap two-factor authentication hardware that are extensively used for website authentication. In OpenSSH FIDO devices are supported by new public key types "ecdsa-sk" and "ed25519-sk", alongside alongside corresponding certificate types. ssh-keygen(1) may be used to create a FIDO token-backed key, after which they may be used much akin any another key category supported by OpenSSH, so lengthy as the hardware token is attached whenever the keys are used. FIDO tokens additionally mostly necessitate the person explicitly authorise operations by touching or tapping them. Generating a FIDO key requires the token be attached, and volition usually require the person tap the token to verify the operation: $ ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk -f ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk Generating public/private ecdsa-sk key pair. You may need to contact your safety key to authorize key generation. Enter document in which to preserve the key (/home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk): Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase): Enter identical passphrase again: Your acknowledgment has been saved in /home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk Your community key has been saved in /home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub This volition output a community and personal key-pair. The personal key file should be useless to an attacker who does not have admission to the physical token. After generation, this key may be used akin any other supported key in OpenSSH and may be listed in authorized_keys, added to ssh-agent(1), etc. The lone additional stipulation is that the FIDO token that the key belongs to must be attached whenever the key is used. FIDO tokens are most commonly connected via USB but may be attached via another method specified as Bluetooth or NFC. In OpenSSH, communication with the token is managed via a middleware library, stated by the SecurityKeyProvider directive in ssh/sshd_config(5) or the $SSH_SK_PROVIDER surroundings changeable for ssh-keygen(1) and ssh-add(1). The API for this middleware is documented in the sk-api.h and PROTOCOL.u2f records in the origin distribution. OpenSSH includes a middleware ("SecurityKeyProvider=internal") with support for USB tokens. It is automatically enabled in OpenBSD and may be enabled in portable OpenSSH via the configure flag --with-security-key-builtin. If the inner middleware is enabled then it is automatically used by default. This inner middleware requires that libfido2 (https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2)and its dependencies be installed. We propose that packagers of portable OpenSSH allow the built-in middleware, as it provides the lowest-friction cognition for users. Note: FIDO/U2F tokens are required to execute the ECDSA-P256 "ecdsa-sk" key type, but hardware assistance for Ed25519 "ed25519-sk" is less common. Similarly, not all hardware tokens assistance several of the optional features specified as inhabitant keys. The protocol-level changes to assistance FIDO/U2F keys in SSH are documented in the PROTOCOL.u2f document in the OpenSSH source distribution. There are a figure of supporting changes to this feature: * ssh-keygen(1): add a "no-touch-required" choice whenever generating FIDO-hosted keys, that disables their default behavior of requiring a bodily touch/tap on the token during authentication. Note: not all tokens assistance disabling the contact requirement. * sshd(8): add a sshd_config PubkeyAuthOptions directive that collects assorted community key authentication-related options for sshd(8). At current it supports lone a sole option "no-touch-required". This causes sshd to skip its default inspect for FIDO/U2F keys that the signature was authorised by a contact or press event on the token hardware. * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): add a "no-touch-required" option for authorized_keys and a akin expansion for certificates. This choice disables the default necessity that FIDO key signatures attest that the person touched their key to authorize them, mirroring the akin PubkeyAuthOptions sshd_config option. * ssh-keygen(1): add assistance for the penning the FIDO attestation data that is returned whenever new keys are generated via the "-O write-attestation=/path" option. FIDO attestation certificates may be used to verify that a FIDO key is hosted in trusted hardware. OpenSSH does not currently create use of this information, beyond optionally penning it to disk. FIDO2 inhabitant keys ------------------- FIDO/U2F OpenSSH keys comprise of two parts: a "key handle" part stored in the personal key document on disk, and a per-device personal key that is unique to all FIDO/U2F token and that cannot be exported from the token hardware. These are blended by the hardware at authentication time to get the genuine key that is used to sign authentication challenges. For tokens that are required to move between computers, it can be cumbersome to have to move the personal key document first. To evade this requirement, tokens implementing the newer FIDO2 norm support "resident keys", anywhere it is imaginable to efficiently recover the key handle part of the key from the hardware. OpenSSH supports this feature, allowing inhabitant keys to be generated using the ssh-keygen(1) "-O resident" flag. This volition create a public/private key brace as usual, but it volition be imaginable to retrieve the personal key part from the token later. This may be done using "ssh-keygen -K", which volition download all accessible inhabitant keys from the tokens attached to the presenter and compose public/private key files for them. It is additionally imaginable to download and add inhabitant keys directly to ssh-agent(1) without penning records to the file-system using "ssh-add -K". Resident keys are indexed on the token by the use cord and user ID. By default, OpenSSH uses an use cord of "ssh:" and an bare person ID. If multiple inhabitant keys on a sole token are desired afterward it may be necessary to override one or the two of these defaults using the ssh-keygen(1) "-O application=" or "-O user=" options. Note: OpenSSH volition lone download and use inhabitant keys whose application cord starts alongside "ssh:" Storing the two parts of a key on a FIDO token increases the likelihood of an attacker being capable to use a taken token device. For this reason, tokens should enforce PIN authentication before allowing download of keys, and users should set a PIN on their tokens before creating any inhabitant keys. Other New Features ------------------ * sshd(8): add an Include sshd_config keyword that allows including additional configuration records via glob(3) patterns. bz2468 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): create the LE (low effort) DSCP code item available via the IPQoS directive; bz2986, * ssh(1): whenever AddKeysToAgent=yes is set and the key contains no comment, add the key to the delegate alongside the key's way as the comment. bz2564 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-agent(1): disclose PKCS#11 key labels and X.509 subjects as key comments, fairly than merely listing the PKCS#11 provider archive path. PR138 * ssh-keygen(1): authorize PEM export of DSA and ECDSA keys; bz3091 * ssh(1), sshd(8): create zlib compile-time optional, accessible via the Makefile.inc ZLIB emblem on OpenBSD or via the --with-zlib configure choice for OpenSSH portable. * sshd(8): whenever clients get denied by MaxStartups, dispatch a notification previous to the SSH2 protocol banner according to RFC4253 division 4.2. * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): whenever invoking the $SSH_ASKPASS prompt program, continue a clue to the program to depict the category of desired prompt. The imaginable values are "confirm" (indicating that a yes/no confirmation dialog alongside no content admission should be shown), "none" (to signify an informational communication only), or blank for the first ssh-askpass behavior of requesting a password/phrase. * ssh(1): authorize forwarding a distinct delegate socket to the path stated by $SSH_AUTH_SOCK, by extending the existing ForwardAgent choice to accepting an definitive way or the name of an environment changeable in supplement to yes/no. * ssh-keygen(1): add a new signature operations "find-principals" to appearance up the chief connected alongside a signature from an allowed- signers file. * sshd(8): disclose the figure of currently-authenticating connections alongside alongside the MaxStartups bounds in the procedure heading apparent to "ps". Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): create ClientAliveCountMax=0 have sensible semantics: it volition now disable association slaying entirely fairly than the current behavior of immediately slaying the association following the archetypal liveness test despite of success. bz2627 * sshd(8): explain command of AllowUsers / DenyUsers vs AllowGroups / DenyGroups in the sshd(8) manual page. bz1690 * sshd(8): improved depict HashKnownHosts in the manual page. bz2560 * sshd(8): explain that permitopen=/PermitOpen do no name or location translation in the manual page. bz3099 * sshd(8): authorize the UpdateHostKeys characteristic to function when multiple known_hosts records are in use. When updating presenter keys, ssh volition now hunt consequent known_hosts files, but volition add updated presenter keys to the archetypal stated document only. bz2738 * All: substitute all calls to signal(2) alongside a wrap around sigaction(2). This wrap blocks all another signals during the handler preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should decrease the possible for abbreviated read/write operations. * sftp(1): fix a competition circumstance in the SIGCHILD handler that could rotate in to a kill(-1); bz3084 * sshd(8): fix a case anywhere valid (but extremely large) SSH channel IDs were being incorrectly rejected. bz3098 * ssh(1): whenever checking presenter key fingerprints as answers to new hostkey prompts, disregard whitespace surrounding the fingerprint itself. * All: delay for document descriptors to be readable or writeable during non-blocking connect, not fair readable. Prevents a timeout when the server doesn't immediately dispatch a banner (e.g. multiplexers akin sslh) * sshd_config(5): document the [email protected] key toggle algorithm. PR#151 Portability ----------- * sshd(8): multiple adjustments to the Linux seccomp sandbox: - Non-fatally refuse IPC syscalls in sandbox - Allow clock_gettime64() in sandbox (MIPS / glibc >= 2.31) - Allow clock_nanosleep_time64 in sandbox (ARM) bz3100 - Allow clock_nanosleep() in sandbox (recent glibc) bz3093 * Explicit inspect for memmem declaration and fix up declaration if the scheme headers deficiency it. bz3102 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-8.2.tar.gz) = 0daae2a8c47c489a8784f2c38c4b39e6159ba678 - SHA256 (openssh-8.2.tar.gz) = +UmInEIoHJqYqWneMb/kgRbLcq8WDCo7+ooYcjzW4jg= - SHA1 (openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz) = d1ab35a93507321c5db885e02d41ce1414f0507c - SHA256 (openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz) = Q5JRUebPbO4UUBkMDpr03Da0HBJzdhnt/4vOvf9k5nE= Note: the openssh-8.2 tarball for OpenBSD that was initially released advertised an incorrect type for "ssh -V" and the sshd server banner. The complete tarball substitute the incorrect release, which has been renamed to openssh-8.2.tar.gz.incorrect. These are the checksums for the original, incorrect tarball: - SHA1 (openssh-8.2.tar.gz) = 77584c22fbb89269398acdf53c1e554400584ba8 - SHA256 (openssh-8.2.tar.gz) = UttLaaSYXVK1O65cYvyQzyQ5sCfuJ4Lwrs8zNsPrluQ= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse https://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 8.1/8.1p1 (2019-10-09)

 OpenSSH 8.1 was released on 2019-10-09. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Security ======== * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): an exploitable integer overflow bug was established in the personal key parsing code for the XMSS key type. This key category is motionless experimental and assistance for it is not compiled by default. No user-facing autoconf choice exists in portable OpenSSH to allow it. This bug was established by Adam Zabrocki and reported via SecuriTeam's SSD program. * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): add safety for personal keys at remainder in RAM against speculation and recollection side-channel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown and Rambleed. This publish encrypts personal keys whenever they are not in use alongside a symmetric key that is derived from a comparatively ample "prekey" consisting of random data (currently 16KB). Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * ssh-keygen(1): whenever acting as a CA and signing certificates with an RSA key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys volition hence be incompatible alongside OpenSSH versions previous to 7.2 unless the default is overridden (using "ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa -s ..."). Changes since OpenSSH 8.0 ========================= This publish is focused on bug-fixing. New Features ------------ * ssh(1): Allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings * ssh(1), sshd(8): Allow prepending a catalog of algorithms to the default set by starting the catalog alongside the '^' character, E.g. "HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519" * ssh-keygen(1): add an experimental lightweight signature and verification ability. Signatures may be made using regular ssh keys held on disk or stored in a ssh-agent and verified against an authorized_keys-like catalog of allowed keys. Signatures embed a namespace that prevents disturbance and attacks between different use domains (e.g. records vs email). * ssh-keygen(1): imprint key comment whenever extracting community key from a personal key. bz#3052 * ssh-keygen(1): obtain the verbose emblem whenever searching for presenter keys in known hosts (i.e. "ssh-keygen -vF host") to imprint the matching host's random-art signature too. bz#3003 * All: assistance PKCS8 as an optional format for retention of private keys to disk. The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a better format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH application is required, as it may use a small insecure key derivation function than PEM's. Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1): if a PKCS#11 token returns no keys afterward try to login and refetch them. Based on place from Jakub Jelen; bz#2430 * ssh(1): create a helpful error communication if the user's casing is set incorrectly during "match exec" processing. bz#2791 * sftp(1): authorize the maximum uint32 value for the disagreement passed to -b which allows improved error messages from afterward validation. bz#3050 * ssh(1): evade commitment sandbox violations in several combinations of distant forwarding, association multiplexing and ControlMaster. * ssh-keyscan(1): contain SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX proposal; allows ssh-keyscan to crop keys from servers that disable old SHA1 ssh-rsa. bz#3029 * sftp(1): imprint definitive "not modified" communication if a document was requested for resumed download but was considered already complete. bz#2978 * sftp(1): fix a typo and create <esc><right> move correct to the closest end of a term fair akin <esc><left> moves remaining to the closest commencement of a word. * sshd(8): cap the figure of permitopen/permitlisten directives allowed to appear on a sole authorized_keys line. * All: fix a figure of recollection leaks (one-off or on exit paths). * Regression tests: a figure of fixes and improvements, including fixes to the interop tests, adding the capability to run most tests on builds that disable OpenSSL support, improved assistance for running tests under Valgrind and a figure of bug-fixes. * ssh(1), sshd(8): inspect for convtime() refusing to obtain times that determine to LONG_MAX Reported by Kirk Wolf bz2977 * ssh(1): slightly additional instructive error communication whenever the user specifies multiple -J options on the command-line. bz3015 * ssh-agent(1): procedure delegate requests for RSA certificate private keys using accurate signature algorithm whenever requested. bz3016 * sftp(1): inspect for user@host whenever parsing sftp target. This allows user@[1.2.3.4] to activity without a path. bz#2999 * sshd(8): enlarge format buffer size for certificate serial figure so the log communication can document any 64-bit entire figure without truncation. bz#3012 * sshd(8): for PermitOpen violations add the distant presenter and harbor to be capable to additional effortlessly ascertain the origin of the request. Add the identical logging for PermitListen violations which anywhere not previously logged at all. * scp(1), sftp(1): use the accurate POSIX format manner for left justification for the transfer advancement meter. bz#3002 * sshd(8) whenever examining a configuration using sshd -T, assume any trait not provided by -C does not match, which allows it to work whenever sshd_config contains a Match directive alongside or without -C. bz#2858 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): downgrade PKCS#11 "provider returned no slots" alert from log flat error to debug. This is average when attempting to enumerate keys on smartcard readers alongside no cards plugged in. bz#3058 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): do not unconditionally log in to PKCS#11 tokens. Avoids spurious PIN prompts for keys not selected for authentication in ssh(1) and whenever listing community keys accessible in a token using ssh-keygen(1). bz#3006 Portability ----------- * ssh(1): fix SIGWINCH shipment of Solaris for multiplexed sessions bz#3030 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix typo that prevented finding of Linux VRF * sshd(8): add no-op implementation of pam_putenv to evade build breakage on platforms anywhere the PAM implementation lacks this function (e.g. HP-UX). bz#3008 * sftp-server(8): fix Solaris privilege sandbox from preventing the bequest sftp rename procedure from operating (was refusing to authorize difficult links to records owned by another users). bz#3036 * All: add a proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() for OS X to avoid the need to brute-force near all high-numbered document descriptors. bz#3049 * sshd(8): in the Linux seccomp-bpf sandbox, authorize mprotect(2) with PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE) only. This syscall is used by several hardened heap allocators. Github PR#142 * sshd(8): in the Linux seccomp-bpf sandbox, authorize the s390-specific ioctl for ECC hardware support. * All: use "doc" man leaf format if the mandoc(1) tool is current on the system. Previously configure would not choose the "doc" man leaf format if mandoc was current but nroff was not. * sshd(8): don't instal copy STREAMS modules on Solaris; check if STREAMS modules are already installed on a pty before installing since whenever compiling alongside XPG>=4 they volition apt be installed already. Prevents hangs and copy lines on the terminal. bz#2945 and bz#2998, Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-8.1.tar.gz) = bf7b0c65a7c0afa5ba9c787f345b8a24fa459add - SHA256 (openssh-8.1.tar.gz) = vamkKxZTFfgxQXSxGeJ1vbuot0H3Vx9bNBgrvChSrFg= - SHA1 (openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz) = c44b96094869f177735ae053d92bd5fcab1319de - SHA256 (openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz) = AvXb7zg10HU1VvlzzVe0wZtrH2zSTANEXiOsd8obk/8= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 8.0/8.0p1 (2019-04-17)

 OpenSSH 8.0 was released on 2019-04-17. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Security ======== This publish contains mitigation for a weakness in the scp(1) tool and protocol (CVE-2019-6111): whenever copying records from a distant system to a local directory, scp(1) did not verify that the filenames that the server sent matched those requested by the client. This could allow a antagonistic server to create or clobber unexpected local files with attacker-controlled content. This publish adds client-side checking that the filenames sent from the server equivalent the command-line request, The scp protocol is outdated, inflexible and not readily fixed. We recommend the use of additional contemporary protocols akin sftp and rsync for file transfer instead. Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * scp(1): Relating to the complete changes to scp(1); the scp protocol relies on the distant casing for wildcard expansion, so there is no infallible way for the client's wildcard matching to perfectly indicate the server's. If there is a difference between client and server wildcard expansion, the client may refuse records from the server. For this reason, we have provided a new "-T" emblem to scp that disables these client-side checks at the hazard of reintroducing the assault described above. * sshd(8): Remove assistance for obsolete "host/port" syntax. Slash- divided host/port was added in 2001 as an substitute to host:port syntax for the advantage of IPv6 users. These days there are established standards for this akin [::1]:22 and the slash syntax is effortlessly mistaken for CIDR notation, which OpenSSH supports for several things. Remove the slash notation from ListenAddress and PermitOpen; bz#2335 Changes since OpenSSH 7.9 ========================= This publish is focused on new features and inner refactoring. New Features ------------ * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-add(1): Add assistance for ECDSA keys in PKCS#11 tokens. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add experimental quantum-computing resistant key toggle method, according to a blend of Streamlined NTRU Prime 4591^761 and X25519. * ssh-keygen(1): Increase the default RSA key size to 3072 bits, following NIST Special Publication 800-57's direction for a 128-bit equal symmetric safety level. * ssh(1): Allow "PKCS11Provider=none" to override afterward instances of the PKCS11Provider directive in ssh_config; bz#2974 * sshd(8): Add a log communication for situations anywhere a association is dropped for attempting to run a command but a sshd_config ForceCommand=internal-sftp limitation is in effect; bz#2960 * ssh(1): When prompting whether to document a new presenter key, accept the key fingerprint as a synonym for "yes". This allows the user to paste a fingerprint obtained out of collection at the immediate and have the client do the difference for you. * ssh-keygen(1): When signing multiple certificates on a single command-line invocation, authorize automatically incrementing the certificate serial number. * scp(1), sftp(1): Accept -J choice as an pseudonym to ProxyJump on the scp and sftp command-lines. * ssh-agent(1), ssh-pkcs11-helper(8), ssh-add(1): Accept "-v" command-line flags to addition the verbosity of output; pass verbose flags although to subprocesses, specified as ssh-pkcs11-helper started from ssh-agent. * ssh-add(1): Add a "-T" choice to allowing evaluation whether keys in an delegate are usable by performing a signature and a verification. * sftp-server(8): Add a "[email protected]" protocol extension that replicates the functionality of the existing SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT procedure but does not prosecute symlinks. bz#2067 * sftp(1): Add "-h" emblem to chown/chgrp/chmod commands to request they do not prosecute symlinks. * sshd(8): Expose $SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment. This makes the association 4-tuple accessible to PAM modules that desire to use it in decision-making. bz#2741 * sshd(8): Add a ssh_config "Match final" predicate Matches in same continue as "Match canonical" but doesn't necessitate hostname canonicalisation be enabled. bz#2906 * sftp(1): Support a prefix of '@' to suppress echo of sftp batch commands; bz#2926 * ssh-keygen(1): When printing certificate contents using "ssh-keygen -Lf /path/certificate", contain the algorithm that the CA used to sign the cert. Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): Fix authentication failures whenever sshd_config contains "AuthenticationMethods any" inner a Match obstacle that overrides a additional restrictive default. * sshd(8): Avoid sending copy keepalives whenever ClientAliveCount is enabled. * sshd(8): Fix two competition conditions connected to SIGHUP daemon restart. Remnant document descriptors in recently-forked kid processes could obstacle the genitor sshd's attempt to listen(2) to the configured addresses. Also, the restarting genitor sshd could exit before any kid processes that were awaiting their re-execution province had completed study it, leaving them in a fallback path. * ssh(1): Fix stdout possibly being redirected to /dev/null when ProxyCommand=- was in use. * sshd(8): Avoid sending SIGPIPE to kid processes if they attempt to compose to stderr following their genitor processes have exited; bz#2071 * ssh(1): Fix bad communication between the ssh_config ConnectTimeout and ConnectionAttempts directives - association attempts following the archetypal were ignoring the requested timeout; bz#2918 * ssh-keyscan(1): Return a non-zero exit position if no keys were found; bz#2903 * scp(1): Sanitize scp filenames to authorize UTF-8 characters without terminal authority sequences; bz#2434 * sshd(8): Fix disturbance between ClientAliveInterval and time-based RekeyLimit that could logic connections to be incorrectly closed. bz#2757 * ssh(1), ssh-add(1): Correct several bugs in PKCS#11 token PIN handling at first token login. The attempt to peruse the PIN could be skipped in several cases, particularly on devices with unified PIN readers. This would guide to an inability to recover keys from these tokens. bz#2652 * ssh(1), ssh-add(1): Support keys on PKCS#11 tokens that set the CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE emblem by requiring a caller login following the C_SignInit operation. bz#2638 * ssh(1): Improve records for ProxyJump/-J, clarifying that local configuration does not use to jump hosts. * ssh-keygen(1): Clarify manual - ssh-keygen -e lone writes community keys, not private. * ssh(1), sshd(8): be additional strict in handling protocol banners, allowing \r characters lone immediately before \n. * Various: fix a figure of recollection leaks, including bz#2942 and bz#2938 * scp(1), sftp(1): fix calculation of first bandwidth limits. Account for bytes written before the timer starts and modify the agenda on which recalculations are performed. Avoids an initial burst of traffic and yields additional exact bandwidth limits; bz#2927 * sshd(8): Only regard the ext-info-c expansion during the initial key eschange. It shouldn't be sent in consequent ones, but if it is current we should disregard it. This prevents sshd from sending a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO for REKEX for buggy these clients. bz#2929 * ssh-keygen(1): Clarify manual that ssh-keygen -F (find presenter in authorized_keys) and -R (remove presenter from authorized_keys) options may obtain either a naked hostname or a [hostname]:port combo. bz#2935 * ssh(1): Don't attempt to nexus to bare SSH_AUTH_SOCK; bz#2936 * sshd(8): Silence error messages whenever sshd fails to burden several of the default presenter keys. Failure to burden an explicitly-configured hostkey is motionless an error, and nonaccomplishment to burden any presenter key is motionless fatal. pr/103 * ssh(1): Redirect stderr of ProxyCommands to /dev/null whenever ssh is started alongside ControlPersist; prevents random ProxyCommand output from interfering alongside meeting output. * ssh(1): The ssh client was keeping a redundant ssh-agent socket (leftover from authentication) about for the existence of the connection; bz#2912 * sshd(8): Fix bug in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options. If lone RSA-SHA2 signature types were specified, afterward authentication would continually neglect for RSA keys as the detect checks lone the basis key (not the signature algorithm) category against *AcceptedKeyTypes. bz#2746 * ssh(1): Request accurate signature types from ssh-agent when certificate keys and RSA-SHA2 signatures are in use. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): On Cygwin, run as SYSTEM anywhere possible, using S4U for token innovation if it supports MsV1_0 S4U Logon. * sshd(8): On Cygwin, use tradition user/group matching code that respects the OS' behavior of case-insensitive matching. * sshd(8): Don't set $MAIL if UsePAM=yes as PAM typically specifies the person surroundings if it's enabled; bz#2937 * sshd(8) Cygwin: Change assistance name to cygsshd to evade collision alongside Microsoft's OpenSSH port. * Allow construction against OpenSSL -dev (3.x) * Fix a figure of build problems against type configurations and versions of OpenSSL. Including bz#2931 and bz#2921 * Improve warnings in cygwin assistance setup. bz#2922 * Remove hardcoded assistance name in cygwin setup. bz#2922 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-8.0.tar.gz) = 8aaa99091fc7e5a92a4a320e1e5521046b3f95f0 - SHA256 (openssh-8.0.tar.gz) = 1xvSJk1KYSnOLPYEUzyCVwTEQ7MHOaCO65DzeNuuLdo= - SHA1 (openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz) = 756dbb99193f9541c9206a667eaa27b0fa184a4f - SHA256 (openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz) = vZQ4eeaUmOgDHra39E0IzcN9WaeraJqgtDcyDDSB/Wg= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 7.9/7.9p1 (2018-10-19)

 OpenSSH 7.9 was released on 2018-10-19. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * ssh(1), sshd(8): the environment of the new CASignatureAlgorithms choice (see below) bans the use of DSA keys as certificate authorities. * sshd(8): the authentication success/failure log communication has changed format slightly. It now includes the certificate fingerprint (previously it included lone key ID and CA key fingerprint). Changes since OpenSSH 7.8 ========================= This is chiefly a bugfix release. New Features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): authorize most harbor numbers to be stated using assistance names from getservbyname(3) (typically /etc/services). * ssh(1): authorize the IdentityAgent configuration directive to accept surroundings changeable names. This supports the use of multiple delegate sockets without needing to use fixed paths. * sshd(8): assistance signalling sessions via the SSH protocol. A constricted subset of signals is supported and lone for login or command sessions (i.e. not subsystems) that were not topic to a forced command via authorized_keys or sshd_config. bz#1424 * ssh(1): assistance "ssh -Q sig" to catalog supported signature options. Also "ssh -Q help" to display the complete set of supported queries. * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a CASignatureAlgorithms choice for the client and server configs to authorize authority complete which signature formats are allowed for CAs to sign certificates. For example, this allows banning CAs that sign certificates using the RSA-SHA1 signature algorithm. * sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): authorize key revocation lists (KRLs) to revoke keys stated by SHA256 hash. * ssh-keygen(1): authorize innovation of key revocation lists directly from base64-encoded SHA256 fingerprints. This supports revoking keys using lone the data contained in sshd(8) authentication log messages. Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): evade spurious "invalid format" errors when attempting to burden PEM personal keys during using an incorrect passphrase. bz#2901 * sshd(8): whenever a conduit closed communication is received from a client, near the stderr document descriptor at the identical period stdout is closed. This avoids stuck processes if they were waiting for stderr to near and were insensitive to stdin/out closing. bz#2863 * ssh(1): authorize ForwardX11Timeout=0 to disable the untrusted X11 forwarding timeout and assistance X11 forwarding indefinitely. Previously the behavior of ForwardX11Timeout=0 was undefined. * sshd(8): whenever compiled alongside GSSAPI support, cache supported method OIDs despite of whether GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the chief division of sshd_config. This avoids sandbox violations if GSSAPI authentication was afterward enabled in a Match block. bz#2107 * sshd(8): do not neglect closed whenever configured alongside a content key revocation catalog that contains a too-short key. bz#2897 * ssh(1): treat connections alongside ProxyJump stated the identical as ones alongside a ProxyCommand set alongside regards to hostname canonicalisation (i.e. don't try to canonicalise the hostname unless CanonicalizeHostname is set to 'always'). bz#2896 * ssh(1): fix regression in OpenSSH 7.8 that could forestall public- key authentication using certificates hosted in a ssh-agent(1) or against sshd(8) from OpenSSH <7.8. Portability ----------- * All: assistance construction against the openssl-1.1 API (releases 1.1.0g and later). The openssl-1.0 API volition remain supported at least until OpenSSL terminates safety place assistance for that API version. * sshd(8): authorize the futex(2) syscall in the Linux seccomp sandbox; apparently required by several glibc/OpenSSL combinations. * sshd(8): grip getgrouplist(3) returning additional than _SC_NGROUPS_MAX groups. Some platforms regard this bounds more as a guideline. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.9.tar.gz) = 7c50a86b8f591decd172ed7f5527abc533098dec - SHA256 (openssh-7.9.tar.gz) = nSVigtHGn3+xKXRqpSnp4YOyEPPAb+pCHdWS9Eh/IPY= - SHA1 (openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz) = 993aceedea8ecabb1d0dd7293508a361891c4eaa - SHA256 (openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz) = a0s7oiU9hO03ccgFByjVl8kc/OiYcTvre2SjBbbxGq0= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 7.8/7.8p1 (2018-08-24)

 OpenSSH 7.8 was released on 2018-08-24. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * ssh-keygen(1): compose OpenSSH format personal keys by default alternatively of using OpenSSL's PEM format. The OpenSSH format, supported in OpenSSH releases since 2014 and described in the PROTOCOL.key document in the origin distribution, offers substantially improved safety against offline password guessing and supports key comments in personal keys. If necessary, it is imaginable to write old PEM-style keys by adding "-m PEM" to ssh-keygen's arguments whenever generating or updating a key. * sshd(8): eliminate inner assistance for S/Key multiple factor authentication. S/Key may motionless be used via PAM or BSD auth. * ssh(1): eliminate vestigal assistance for operating ssh(1) as setuid. This used to be required for hostbased authentication and the (long gone) rhosts-style authentication, but has not been necessary for a lengthy time. Attempting to execute ssh as a setuid binary, or with uid != productive uid volition now output a fatal error at runtime. * sshd(8): the semantics of PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and the similar HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options have changed. These now specify signature algorithms that are accepted for their respective authentication mechanism, anywhere earlier they stated accepted key types. This difference matters whenever using the RSA/SHA2 signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256", "rsa-sha2-512" and their certificate counterparts. Configurations that override these options but omit these algorithm names may logic unexpected authentication failures (no act is required for configurations that obtain the default for these options). * sshd(8): the precedence of meeting surroundings variables has changed. ~/.ssh/environment and environment="..." options in authorized_keys records can no longer override SSH_* variables set implicitly by sshd. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): the default IPQoS used by ssh/sshd has changed. They volition now use DSCP AF21 for interactive traffic and CS1 for bulk. For a detailed rationale, delight see the commit message: https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/log/src/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.c,v#rev1.284 Changes since OpenSSH 7.7 ========================= This is chiefly a bugfix release. New Features ------------ * ssh(1)/sshd(8): add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert- [email protected]" and "[email protected]" to explicitly power use of RSA/SHA2 signatures in authentication. * sshd(8): broaden the PermitUserEnvironment choice to obtain a whitelist of surroundings changeable names in supplement to global "yes" or "no" settings. * sshd(8): add a PermitListen directive to sshd_config(5) and a corresponding permitlisten= authorized_keys choice that control which hear addresses and harbor numbers may be used by remote forwarding (ssh -R ...). * sshd(8): add several countermeasures against timing attacks used for document validation/enumeration. sshd volition enforce a minimum time or all unsuccessful authentication attempt consisting of a earth 5ms minimum affirmative an additional per-user 0-4ms postpone derived from a presenter secret. * sshd(8): add a SetEnv directive to authorize an director to explicitly define surroundings variables in sshd_config. Variables set by SetEnv override the default and client-specified environment. * ssh(1): add a SetEnv directive to petition that the server sets an surroundings changeable in the session. Similar to the existing SendEnv option, these variables are set topic to server configuration. * ssh(1): authorize "SendEnv -PATTERN" to apparent surroundings variables earlier marked for sending to the server. bz#1285 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): create UID accessible as a %-expansion everywhere that the username is accessible currently. bz#2870 * ssh(1): authorize environment ProxyJump=none to disable ProxyJump functionality. bz#2869 Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): evade observable differences in petition parsing that could be used to decide whether a mark person is valid. * all: significant inner refactoring * ssh(1)/sshd(8): fix several recollection leaks; bz#2366 * ssh(1): fix a pwent clobber (introduced in openssh-7.7) that could happen during key loading, manifesting as collision on several platforms. * sshd_config(5): explain records for AuthenticationMethods option; bz#2663 * ssh(1): justify that the community key algorithm sent in a community key SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST matches the satisfied of the signature blob. Previously, these could be inconsistent whenever a bequest or non-OpenSSH ssh-agent returned a RSA/SHA1 signature whenever asked to create a RSA/SHA2 signature. * sshd(8): fix failures to peruse authorized_keys caused by faulty supplemental collection caching. bz#2873 * scp(1): use umask to directories, fixing possible mkdir/chmod competition whenever copying directory trees bz#2839 * ssh-keygen(1): come back accurate exit code whenever searching for and hashing known_hosts entries in a sole operation; bz#2772 * ssh(1): favor the ssh binary pointed to via argv[0] to $PATH when re-executing ssh for ProxyJump. bz#2831 * sshd(8): do not ban PTY allocation whenever a sshd meeting is restricted since the person password is expired as it breaks password alter dialog. (regression in openssh-7.7). * ssh(1)/sshd(8): fix error reporting from select() failures. * ssh(1): enhance records for -w (tunnel) flag, emphasising that -w implicitly sets Tunnel=point-to-point. bz#2365 * ssh-agent(1): execute EMFILE mitigation for ssh-agent. ssh-agent volition no longer rotation whenever its document descriptor bounds is exceeded. bz#2576 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): disable SSH2_MSG_DEBUG messages for Twisted Conch clients. Twisted Conch versions that deficiency a type figure in their acknowledgment strings volition mishandle these messages when operating on Python 2.x (https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9422) * sftp(1): notify person immediately whenever underlying ssh procedure dies expectedly. bz#2719 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): fix tunnel forwarding; regression in 7.7 release. bz#2855 * ssh-agent(1): don't slay ssh-agent's listening socket entirely if it fails to accept(2) a connection. bz#2837 * sshd(8): unwind checking of authorized_keys environment="..." options to authorize underscores in changeable names (regression introduced in 7.7). bz#2851 * ssh(1): add several missing options in the configuration dump output (ssh -G). bz#2835 Portability ----------- * sshd(8): Expose particulars of completed authentication to PAM auth modules via SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 in the PAM environment. bz#2408 * Fix compilation problems caused by fights between zlib and OpenSSL colliding uses of "free_func" * Improve finding of unsupported compiler options. Recently these may have manifested as "unsupported -Wl,-z,retpoline" warnings during linking. * sshd(8): several sandbox assistance for Linux/s390 bz#2752. * regress tests: unbreak key-options.sh test on platforms without openpty(3). bz#2856 * use getrandom(2) for PRNG seeding whenever built without OpenSSL. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.8.tar.gz) = ed5511cd42b543cd15166a9cbc56705f23b847e7 - SHA256 (openssh-7.8.tar.gz) = TDqIsMEmghsBUNCrSCPyCxChfitntyOLXNC694py1XE - SHA1 (openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz) = 27e267e370315561de96577fccae563bc2c37a60 - SHA256 (openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz) = GkhLsVFSwYO7JRThEqow3TQTjDz7Ay7uVJCmbFBxRMo Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 7.7/7.7p1 (2018-04-02)

 OpenSSH 7.7 was released on 2018-04-02. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Drop compatibility assistance for several extremely old SSH implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*. These versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the final SSH RFCs. The assistance in inquiry isn't necessary for RFC-compliant SSH implementations. Changes since OpenSSH 7.6 ========================= This is chiefly a bugfix release. New Features ------------ * All: Add experimental assistance for PQC XMSS keys (Extended Hash- Based Signatures) according to the algorithm described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-12 The XMSS signature code is experimental and not compiled in by default. * sshd(8): Add a "rdomain" criteria for the sshd_config Match keyword to authorize conditional configuration that depends on which routing domain a association was received on (currently supported on OpenBSD and Linux). * sshd_config(5): Add an optional rdomain qualifier to the ListenAddress directive to authorize listening on distinct routing domains. This is supported lone on OpenBSD and Linux at present. * sshd_config(5): Add RDomain directive to authorize the authenticated meeting to be placed in an definitive routing domain. This is only supported on OpenBSD at present. * sshd(8): Add "expiry-time" choice for authorized_keys records to authorize for expiring keys. * ssh(1): Add a BindInterface choice to authorize binding the outgoing association to an interface's location (basically a additional usable BindAddress) * ssh(1): Expose equipment allocated for tun/tap forwarding via a new %T enlargement for LocalCommand. This allows LocalCommand to be used to prepared the interface. * sshd(8): Expose the equipment allocated for tun/tap forwarding via a new SSH_TUNNEL surroundings variable. This allows automatic setup of the interface and surrounding network configuration automatically on the server. * ssh(1)/scp(1)/sftp(1): Add URI assistance to ssh, sftp and scp, e.g. ssh://user@host or sftp://user@host/path. Additional connection parameters described in draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04 are not implemented since the ssh fingerprint format in the outline uses the deprecated MD5 hash alongside no way to define the any another algorithm. * ssh-keygen(1): Allow certificate validity intervals that specify lone a commencement or halt period (instead of the two or neither). * sftp(1): Allow "cd" and "lcd" commands alongside no definitive path argument. lcd volition alter to the local user's residence directory as usual. cd volition alter to the starting directory for meeting (because the protocol offers no way to get the distant user's home directory). bz#2760 * sshd(8): When doing a config test alongside sshd -T, lone necessitate the attributes that are really used in Match criteria fairly than (an incomplete catalog of) all criteria. Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1)/sshd(8): More strictly inspect signature types during key toggle against what was negotiated. Prevents downgrade of RSA signatures made alongside SHA-256/512 to SHA-1. * sshd(8): Fix assistance for client that advertise a protocol version of "1.99" (indicating that they are prepared to obtain the two SSHv1 and SSHv2). This was damaged in OpenSSH 7.6 during the elimination of SSHv1 support. bz#2810 * ssh(1): Warn whenever the delegate returns a ssh-rsa (SHA1) signature when a rsa-sha2-256/512 signature was requested. This circumstance is possible whenever an old or non-OpenSSH delegate is in use. bz#2799 * ssh-agent(1): Fix regression introduced in 7.6 that caused ssh-agent to fatally exit if presented an invalid signature petition message. * sshd_config(5): Accept yes/no emblem options case-insensitively, as has been the case in ssh_config(5) for a lengthy time. bz#2664 * ssh(1): Improve error reporting for failures during connection. Under several circumstances misleading errors were being shown. bz#2814 * ssh-keyscan(1): Add -D choice to authorize printing of results directly in SSHFP format. bz#2821 * regress tests: fix PuTTY interop test damaged in final release's SSHv1 removal. bz#2823 * ssh(1): Compatibility fix for several servers that erroneously autumn the association whenever the IUTF8 (RFC8160) choice is sent. * scp(1): Disable RemoteCommand and RequestTTY in the ssh session started by scp (sftp was already doing this.) * ssh-keygen(1): Refuse to create a certificate alongside an unusable figure of principals. * ssh-keygen(1): Fatally exit if ssh-keygen is unable to compose all the community key during key generation. Previously it would silently disregard errors penning the comment and terminating newline. * ssh(1): Do not modify hostname arguments that are addresses by automatically forcing them to lower-case. Instead canonicalise them to determine ambiguities (e.g. ::0001 => ::1) before they are matched against known_hosts. bz#2763 * ssh(1): Don't obtain junk following "yes" or "no" responses to hostkey prompts. bz#2803 * sftp(1): Have sftp imprint a alert concerning casing cleanliness when decoding the archetypal packet fails, which is normally caused by shells polluting stdout of non-interactive startups. bz#2800 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Switch timers in packet code from using wall-clock period to monotonic time, allowing the packet tier to improved function complete a clock stage and avoiding imaginable entire figure overflows during steps. * Numerous manual leaf fixes and improvements. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): Correctly detect MIPS ABI in use at configure time. Fixes sandbox violations on several environments. * sshd(8): Remove UNICOS support. The hardware and application are literal museum pieces and assistance in sshd is too intrusive to justify maintaining. * All: Build and nexus alongside "retpoline" flags whenever accessible to mitigate the "branch mark injection" manner (variant 2) of the Spectre branch-prediction vulnerability. * All: Add auto-generated dependency data to Makefile. * Numerous fixed to the RPM spec files. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.7.tar.gz) = 24812e05fa233014c847c7775748316e7f8a836c - SHA256 (openssh-7.7.tar.gz) = T4ua1L/vgAYqwB0muRahvnm5ZUr3PLY9nPljaG8egvo= - SHA1 (openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz) = 446fe9ed171f289f0d62197dffdbfdaaf21c49f2 - SHA256 (openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz) = 1zvn5oTpnvzQJL4Vowv/y+QbASsvezyQhK7WIXdea48= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected]

OpenSSH 7.6/7.6p1 (2017-10-03)

 OpenSSH 7.6 was released on 2017-10-03. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * ssh(1): delete SSH protocol type 1 support, associated configuration options and documentation. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): eliminate assistance for the hmac-ripemd160 MAC. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): eliminate assistance for the arcfour, blowfish and CAST ciphers. * Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in dimension and enhance reporting for keys that do not encounter this requirement. * ssh(1): do not recommendation CBC ciphers by default. Changes since OpenSSH 7.5 ========================= This is chiefly a bugfix release. It additionally contains substantial internal refactoring. Security -------- * sftp-server(8): in read-only mode, sftp-server was incorrectly permitting innovation of zero-length files. Reported by Michal Zalewski. New Features ------------ * ssh(1): add RemoteCommand choice to define a command in the ssh config document alternatively of giving it on the client's command line. This allows the configuration document to define the command that volition be executed on the distant host. * sshd(8): add ExposeAuthInfo choice that enables penning particulars of the authentication methods used (including community keys where applicable) to a document that is exposed via a $SSH_USER_AUTH surroundings changeable in the consequent session. * ssh(1): add assistance for reverse energetic forwarding. In this mode, ssh volition act as a SOCKS4/5 proxy and onward connections to destinations requested by the distant SOCKS client. This mode is requested using extended syntax for the -R and RemoteForward options and, since it is implemented solely at the client, does not necessitate the server be updated to be supported. * sshd(8): authorize LogLevel directive in sshd_config Match blocks; bz#2717 * ssh-keygen(1): authorize inclusion of arbitrary cord or flag certificate extensions and crucial options. * ssh-keygen(1): authorize ssh-keygen to use a key held in ssh-agent as a CA whenever signing certificates. bz#2377 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): authorize IPQoS=none in ssh/sshd to not set an explicit ToS/DSCP value and fair use the functioning scheme default. * ssh-add(1): added -q choice to create ssh-add quiescent on success. * ssh(1): develop the StrictHostKeyChecking choice alongside two new settings. The archetypal "accept-new" volition automatically accept hitherto-unseen keys but volition refuse connections for changed or invalid hostkeys. This is a safer subset of the current behaviour of StrictHostKeyChecking=no. The second environment "off", is a synonym for the current behavior of StrictHostKeyChecking=no: obtain new presenter keys, and continue association for hosts alongside incorrect hostkeys. A forthcoming publish volition alter the definition of StrictHostKeyChecking=no to the behavior of "accept-new". bz#2400 * ssh(1): add SyslogFacility choice to ssh(1) matching the equivalent choice in sshd(8). bz#2705 Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1): use HostKeyAlias if stated alternatively of hostname for matching presenter certificate chief names; bz#2728 * sftp(1): execute sorting for globbed ls; bz#2649 * ssh(1): add a user@host prefix to client's "Permission denied" messages, helpful in particular whenever using "stacked" connections (e.g. ssh -J) anywhere it's not apparent which presenter is denying. bz#2720 * ssh(1): obtain unidentified EXT_INFO expansion values that merge \0 characters. These are legal, but would earlier logic fatal association errors if received. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): repair compression data printed at association exit * sftp(1): imprint '?' alternatively of incorrect nexus figure (that the protocol doesn't provide) for distant listings. bz#2710 * ssh(1): come back nonaccomplishment fairly than fatal() for additional cases during meeting multiplexing negotiations. Causes the meeting to autumn back to a non-mux association if they occur. bz#2707 * ssh(1): citation that the server may dispatch debug messages to explain community key authentication problems under several circumstances; bz#2709 * Translate OpenSSL error codes to improved study incorrect passphrase errors whenever loading personal keys; bz#2699 * sshd(8): modify compatibility patterns for WinSCP to correctly acknowledge versions that execute lone the bequest DH collection exchange scheme. bz#2748 * ssh(1): imprint the "Killed by indication 1" communication lone at LogLevel verbose so that it is not shown at the default level; prevents it from appearing during ssh -J and equal ProxyCommand configs. bz#1906, bz#2744 * ssh-keygen(1): whenever generating all hostkeys (ssh-keygen -A), clobber existing keys if they be but are zero length. zero-length keys could earlier be made if ssh-keygen unsuccessful or was interrupted part way through generating them. bz#2561 * ssh(1): fix pledge(2) infringement in the escape sequence "~&" used to location the current meeting in the background. * ssh-keyscan(1): evade double-close() on document descriptors; bz#2734 * sshd(8): evade reliance on shared use of pointers shared between detect and kid sshd processes. bz#2704 * sshd_config(8): document accessible AuthenticationMethods; bz#2453 * ssh(1): evade truncation in several login prompts; bz#2768 * sshd(8): Fix assorted compilations failures, inc bz#2767 * ssh(1): create "--" before the hostname terminate disagreement processing following the hostname too. * ssh-keygen(1): toggle from aes256-cbc to aes256-ctr for encrypting new-style personal keys. Fixes problems connected to personal key handling for no-OpenSSL builds. bz#2754 * ssh(1): notify and do not attempt to use keys whenever the community and personal halves do not match. bz#2737 * sftp(1): don't imprint verbose error communication whenever ssh disconnects from under sftp. bz#2750 * sshd(8): fix keepalive scheduling problem: action on a forwarded harbor from preventing the keepalive from being sent; bz#2756 * sshd(8): whenever started without base privileges, don't necessitate the privilege separation person or way to exist. Makes operating the regression tests easier without touching the filesystem. * Make integrity.sh regression tests additional sturdy against timeouts. bz#2658 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): correctness fix for channels implementation: accept conduit IDs greater than 0x7FFFFFFF. Portability ----------- * sshd(9): autumn two additional privileges in the Solaris sandbox: PRIV_DAX_ACCESS and PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO; bz#2723 * sshd(8): disclose catalog of completed authentication methods to PAM via the SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 PAM surroundings variable. bz#2408 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): fix multiple problems in the tun/tap forwarding code, mostly to do alongside host/network byte command confusion. bz#2735 * Add --with-cflags-after and --with-ldflags-after configure flags to authorize environment CFLAGS/LDFLAGS following configure has completed. These are helpful for environment sanitiser/fuzzing options that may interfere alongside configure's operation. * sshd(8): evade Linux seccomp violations on ppc64le complete the socketcall syscall. * Fix use of ldns whenever using ldns-config; bz#2697 * configure: set cache variables whenever cross-compiling. The cross- compiling fallback communication was saying it assumed the test passed, but it wasn't really set the cache variables and this would logic afterward tests to fail. * Add collision libFuzzer harnesses for community key parsing and signature verification. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.6.tar.gz) = 157fe3989a245c58fcdb34d9fe722a3c4e14c008 - SHA1 (openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz) = a6984bc2c72192bed015c8b879b35dd9f5350b3b - SHA256 (openssh-7.6.tar.gz) = Xu3bdpCcu65vM2FnW7b6IKLgd4Kvf2P3WBTMw+I7Bao= - SHA256 (openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz) = oyPK7t3+FFuqoNsW6Y14Sx+8fdQ2pr8fR539XNHSFyM= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 7.5/7.5p1 (2017-03-20)

 OpenSSH 7.5 was released on 2017-03-20. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH additionally includes transitional assistance for the bequest SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols that may be enabled at compile-time. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= We scheme on retiring additional bequest cryptography in forthcoming releases, specifically: * In the next important publish (expected June-August), removing remaining assistance for the SSH v.1 protocol (currently client-only and compile- period disabled). * In the identical release, removing assistance for Blowfish and RC4 ciphers and the RIPE-MD160 HMAC. (These are currently run-time disabled). * In the identical release, removing the remaining CBC ciphers from being offered by default in the client (These have not been offered in sshd by default for multiple years). * Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum is 768 bits) This catalog reflects our current intentions, but delight inspect the final release notes for forthcoming releases. Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * This publish deprecates the sshd_config UsePrivilegeSeparation option, thereby making privilege separation mandatory. Privilege separation has been on by default for nearly 15 years and sandboxing has been on by default for nearly the final five. * The format of multiple log messages emitted by the packet code has changed to contain additional data concerning the person and their authentication state. Software that monitors ssh/sshd logs may need to document for these changes. For example: Connection closed by person x 1.1.1.1 harbor 1234 [preauth] Connection closed by authenticating person x 10.1.1.1 harbor 1234 [preauth] Connection closed by invalid person x 1.1.1.1 harbor 1234 [preauth] Affected messages contain association closure, timeout, remote disconnection, negotiation nonaccomplishment and several another fatal messages generated by the packet code. * [Portable OpenSSH only] This type removes assistance for building against OpenSSL versions previous to 1.0.1. OpenSSL stopped supporting versions previous to 1.0.1 complete 12 months ago (i.e. they no longer obtain fixes for safety bugs). Changes since OpenSSH 7.4 ========================= This is a bugfix release. Security -------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix weakness in CBC padding oracle countermeasures that allowed a type of the assault fixed in OpenSSH 7.3 to proceed. Note that the OpenSSH client disables CBC ciphers by default, sshd offers them as lowest-preference options and volition eliminate them by default entriely in the next release. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Martin Albrecht and Torben Hansen of Royal Holloway, University of London. * sftp-client(1): [portable OpenSSH only] On Cygwin, a client making a recursive document transfer could be manipulated by a antagonistic server to execute a path-traversal attack. creating or modifying records outside of the intended mark directory. Reported by Jann Horn of Google Project Zero. New Features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): Support "=-" syntax to effortlessly eliminate methods from algorithm lists, e.g. Ciphers=-*cbc. bz#2671 Bugfixes -------- * sshd(1): Fix NULL dereference collision whenever key toggle start messages are sent out of sequence. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Allow form-feed characters to appear in configuration files. * sshd(8): Fix regression in OpenSSH 7.4 assistance for the server-sig-algs extension, anywhere SHA2 RSA signature methods were not being correctly advertised. bz#2680 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Fix a figure of case-sensitivity bugs in known_hosts processing. bz#2591 bz#2685 * ssh(1): Allow ssh to use certificates accompanied by a personal key document but no corresponding plain *.pub community key. bz#2617 * ssh(1): When updating hostkeys using the UpdateHostKeys option, obtain RSA keys if HostkeyAlgorithms contains any RSA keytype. Previously, ssh could disregard RSA keys whenever lone the ssh-rsa-sha2-* methods were enabled in HostkeyAlgorithms and not the old ssh-rsa method. bz#2650 * ssh(1): Detect and study excessively lengthy configuration file lines. bz#2651 * Merge a figure of fixes established by Coverity and reported via Redhat and FreeBSD. Includes fixes for several recollection and document descriptor leaks in error paths. bz#2687 * ssh-keyscan(1): Correctly hash hosts alongside a harbor number. bz#2692 * ssh(1), sshd(8): When logging lengthy messages to stderr, don't truncate "\r\n" if the dimension of the communication exceeds the buffer. bz#2688 * ssh(1): Fully citation [host]:port in generated ProxyJump/-J command- line; evade disturbance complete IPv6 addresses and shells that treat quadrate bracket characters specially. * ssh-keygen(1): Fix misconduct of known_hosts whenever running "ssh-keygen -H" on a known_hosts containing already-hashed entries. * Fix assorted fallout and keen edges caused by removing SSH protocol 1 assistance from the server, including the server banner cord being incorrectly terminated alongside lone \n (instead of \r\n), confusing error messages from ssh-keyscan bz#2583 and a segfault in sshd if protocol v.1 was enabled for the client and sshd_config contained references to bequest keys bz#2686. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Free fd_set on association timeout. bz#2683 * sshd(8): Fix Unix domain socket forwarding for base (regression in OpenSSH 7.4). * sftp(1): Fix division by zero collision in "df" output whenever server returns zero total filesystem blocks/inodes. * ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): Translate OpenSSL errors encountered during key loading to additional meaningful error codes. bz#2522 bz#2523 * ssh-keygen(1): Sanitise escape sequences in key comments sent to printf but maintain valid UTF-8 whenever the locale supports it; bz#2520 * ssh(1), sshd(8): Return logic for harbor forwarding failures where feasible fairly than continually "administratively prohibited". bz#2674 * sshd(8): Fix deadlock whenever AuthorizedKeysCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand produces a lot of output and a key is matched early. bz#2655 * Regression tests: multiple reliability fixes. bz#2654 bz#2658 bz#2659 * ssh(1): Fix typo in ~C error communication for bad harbor forward cancellation. bz#2672 * ssh(1): Show a helpful error communication whenever included config files can't be opened; bz#2653 * sshd(8): Make sshd set GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck=yes as the manual page (previously incorrectly) advertised. bz#2637 * sshd_config(5): Repair accidentally-deleted citation of %k token in AuthorizedKeysCommand; bz#2656 * sshd(8): Remove vestiges of earlier removed LOGIN_PROGRAM; bz#2665 * ssh-agent(1): Relax PKCS#11 whitelist to contain libexec and average 32-bit compatibility archive directories. * sftp-client(1): Fix non-exploitable entire figure overflow in SSH2_FXP_NAME reply handling. * ssh-agent(1): Fix regression in 7.4 of deleting PKCS#11-hosted keys. It was not imaginable to delete them apart from by specifying their complete bodily path. bz#2682 Portability ----------- * sshd(8): Avoid sandbox errors for Linux S390 systems using an ICA crypto coprocessor. * sshd(8): Fix non-exploitable weakness in seccomp-bpf sandbox arg inspection. * ssh(1): Fix X11 forwarding on OSX anywhere X11 was being started by launchd. bz#2341 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sftp(1): Fix output truncation for assorted that merge non-printable characters anywhere the codeset in use is ASCII. * build: Fix builds that attempt to nexus a kerberised libldns. bz#2603 * build: Fix compilation problems caused by unconditionally defining _XOPEN_SOURCE in broad character detection. * sshd(8): Fix sandbox violations for clock_gettime VSDO syscall fallback on several Linux/X32 kernels. bz#2142 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.5.tar.gz) = 81384df377e38551f7659a4c250383d0bbd25341 - SHA1 (openssh-7.5p1.tar.gz) = 5e8f185d00afb4f4f89801e9b0f8b9cee9d87ebd - SHA256 (openssh-7.5.tar.gz) = Gmk8jOdGdKa7NixUN5J+bTMfeum5Vx8Nv+leAdQNq3U= - SHA256 (openssh-7.5p1.tar.gz) = mEbjxfq58FR0ALTSwBeZL5FCIrP9H47ubH3GvF5Z+fA= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 7.4/7.4p1 (2016-12-19)

 OpenSSH 7.4 was released on 2016-12-19. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH additionally includes transitional assistance for the bequest SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols that may be enabled at compile-time. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= We scheme on retiring additional bequest cryptography in forthcoming releases, specifically: * In about August 2017, removing remaining assistance for the SSH v.1 protocol (client-only and currently compile-time disabled). * In the identical release, removing assistance for Blowfish and RC4 ciphers and the RIPE-MD160 HMAC. (These are currently run-time disabled). * Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum is 768 bits) * The next publish of OpenSSH volition eliminate assistance for operating sshd(8) alongside privilege separation disabled. * The next publish of portable OpenSSH volition eliminate assistance for OpenSSL type previous to 1.0.1. This catalog reflects our current intentions, but delight inspect the final release notes for forthcoming releases. Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish includes a figure of changes that may power existing configurations: * This publish removes server assistance for the SSH v.1 protocol. * ssh(1): Remove 3des-cbc from the client's default proposal. 64-bit obstacle ciphers are not harmless in 2016 and we don't desire to delay until attacks akin SWEET32 are extended to SSH. As 3des-cbc was the lone mandatory code in the SSH RFCs, this may logic problems connecting to older devices using the default configuration, but it's extremely apt that specified devices already need explicit configuration for key toggle and hostkey algorithms already anyway. * sshd(8): Remove assistance for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression first in the protocol likely seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but today it's plainly a bad idea in conditions of both cryptography (cf. multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and assault surface. Pre-auth compression assistance has been impaired by default for >10 years. Support remains in the client. * ssh-agent volition refuse to burden PKCS#11 modules exterior a whitelist of trusted paths by default. The way whitelist may be specified at run-time. * sshd(8): When a forced-command appears in the two a certificate and an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, sshd volition now refuse to obtain the certificate unless they are identical. The former (documented) behavior of having the certificate forced-command override the another could be a bit confusing and error-prone. * sshd(8): Remove the UseLogin configuration directive and support for having /bin/login oversee login sessions. Changes since OpenSSH 7.3 ========================= This is chiefly a bugfix release. Security -------- * ssh-agent(1): Will now refuse to burden PKCS#11 modules from paths exterior a trusted whitelist (run-time configurable). Requests to burden modules could be passed via delegate forwarding and an attacker could attempt to burden a antagonistic PKCS#11 component throughout the forwarded delegate channel: PKCS#11 modules are shared libraries, so this would outcome in code implementation on the scheme operating the ssh-agent if the attacker has authority of the forwarded agent-socket (on the host operating the sshd server) and the capability to compose to the filesystem of the presenter operating ssh-agent (usually the presenter operating the ssh client). Reported by Jann Horn of Project Zero. * sshd(8): When privilege separation is disabled, forwarded Unix- domain sockets would be created by sshd(8) alongside the privileges of 'root' alternatively of the authenticated user. This publish refuses Unix-domain socket forwarding whenever privilege separation is disabled (Privilege separation has been enabled by default for 14 years). Reported by Jann Horn of Project Zero. * sshd(8): Avoid theoretical leak of presenter personal key matter to privilege-separated kid processes via realloc() whenever reading keys. No specified leak was observed in custom for normal-sized keys, nor does a leak to the kid processes immediately disclose key material to unprivileged users. Reported by Jann Horn of Project Zero. * sshd(8): The shared recollection director used by pre-authentication compression assistance had a limits checks that could be elided by several optimising compilers. Additionally, this recollection director was incorrectly accessible whenever pre-authentication compression was disabled. This could possibly authorize attacks against the privileged detect procedure from the sandboxed privilege-separation procedure (a colony of the second would be required first). This publish removes assistance for pre-authentication compression from sshd(8). Reported by Guido Vranken using the Stack unstable optimisation acknowledgment tool (http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/) * sshd(8): Fix denial-of-service circumstance anywhere an attacker who sends multiple KEXINIT messages may consume up to 128MB per connection. Reported by Shi Lei of Gear Team, Qihoo 360. * sshd(8): Validate location ranges for AllowUser and DenyUsers directives at configuration burden period and refuse to obtain invalid ones. It was earlier imaginable to define invalid CIDR address ranges (e.g. [email protected]/55) and these would continually match, perchance resulting in granting admission anywhere it was not intended. Reported by Laurence Parry. New Features ------------ * ssh(1): Add a proxy multiplexing manner to ssh(1) inspired by the type in PuTTY by Simon Tatham. This allows a multiplexing client to communicate alongside the expert procedure using a subset of the SSH packet and channels protocol complete a Unix-domain socket, alongside the chief procedure acting as a proxy that translates channel IDs, etc. This allows multiplexing manner to run on systems that deficiency file- descriptor passing (used by current multiplexing code) and potentially, in conjunction alongside Unix-domain socket forwarding, alongside the client and multiplexing expert procedure on distinct machines. Multiplexing proxy manner may be invoked using "ssh -O proxy ..." * sshd(8): Add a sshd_config DisableForwarding choice that disables X11, agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket forwarding, as well as item alternatively we power execute in the future. Like the 'restrict' authorized_keys flag, this is intended to be a simple and future-proof way of restricting an account. * sshd(8), ssh(1): Support the "curve25519-sha256" key exchange method. This is identical to the currently-supported method named "[email protected]". * sshd(8): Improve handling of SIGHUP by checking to see if sshd is already daemonised at startup and skipping the call to daemon(3) if it is. This ensures that a SIGHUP restart of sshd(8) will keep the identical process-ID as the first execution. sshd(8) will additionally now unlink the PidFile previous to SIGHUP restart and re-create it following a prosperous restart, fairly than leaving a old document in the case of a configuration error. bz#2641 * sshd(8): Allow ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax directives to appear in sshd_config Match blocks. * sshd(8): Add %-escapes to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand to match those supported by AuthorizedKeysCommand (key, key type, fingerprint, etc.) and a few additional to provision admission to the contents of the certificate being offered. * Added regression tests for cord matching, location matching and cord sanitisation functions. * Improved the key toggle fuzzer harness. Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1): Allow IdentityFile to successfully burden and use certificates that have no corresponding naked community key. bz#2617 certificate id_rsa-cert.pub (and no id_rsa.pub). * ssh(1): Fix community key authentication whenever multiple authentication is in use and publickey is not fair the first method attempted. bz#2642 * regress: Allow the PuTTY interop tests to run unattended. bz#2639 * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): enhance reporting whenever attempting to load keys from PKCS#11 tokens alongside small useless log messages and more item in debug messages. bz#2610 * ssh(1): When tearing downward ControlMaster connections, don't pollute stderr whenever LogLevel=quiet. * sftp(1): On ^Z delay for underlying ssh(1) to suspend before suspending sftp(1) to justify that ssh(1) restores the terminal mode correctly if suspended during a password prompt. * ssh(1): Avoid busy-wait whenever ssh(1) is suspended during a password prompt. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Correctly study errors during sending of ext- info messages. * sshd(8): fix NULL-deref collision if sshd(8) received an out-of- sequence NEWKEYS message. * sshd(8): Correct catalog of supported signature algorithms sent in the server-sig-algs extension. bz#2547 * sshd(8): Fix sending ext_info communication if privsep is disabled. * sshd(8): additional strictly enforce the expected ordering of privilege separation detect calls used for authentication and authorize them lone whenever their corresponding authentication methods are enabled in the configuration * sshd(8): Fix uninitialised optlen in getsockopt() call; harmless on Unix/BSD but possibly crashy on Cygwin. * Fix false affirmative reports caused by explicit_bzero(3) not being recognised as a recollection initialiser whenever compiled with -fsanitize-memory. * sshd_config(5): Use 2001:db8::/32, the authoritative IPv6 subnet for configuration examples. Portability ----------- * On environments configured alongside Turkish locales, autumn rear to the C/POSIX locale to evade errors in configuration parsing caused by that locale's distinctive handling of the alphabet 'i' and 'I'. bz#2643 * sftp-server(8), ssh-agent(1): Deny ptrace on OS X using ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, ..) * ssh(1), sshd(8): Unbreak AES-CTR ciphers on old (~0.9.8) OpenSSL. * Fix compilation for libcrypto compiled without RIPEMD160 support. * contrib: Add a gnome-ssh-askpass3 alongside GTK+3 support. bz#2640 * sshd(8): Improve PRNG reseeding throughout privilege separation and power libcrypto to get a high-quality kernel before chroot or sandboxing. * All: Explicitly test for damaged strnvis. NetBSD added an strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible alongside the existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the erstwhile having existed for complete ten years). Try to detect this mess, and assume the lone harmless option if we're cross compiling. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.4.tar.gz) = 1e2073f95d5ead8f2814b4b6c0700bcd533c410f - SHA1 (openssh-7.4p1.tar.gz) = 2330bbf82ed08cf3ac70e0acf00186ef3eeb97e0 - SHA256 (openssh-7.4.tar.gz) = +GEXh7Xr2J87cq1uA97hF9e+3lfOQ2LKxXGdmFXREf0 - SHA256 (openssh-7.4p1.tar.gz) = Gx/EoU4gJCkxgZJO0khy5vLgYpPz6JJqN2uK7EgfGdE= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 7.3/7.3p1 (2016-08-01)

 OpenSSH 7.3 was released on 2016-08-01. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH additionally includes transitional assistance for the bequest SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols that may be enabled at compile-time. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= We scheme on retiring additional bequest cryptography in a near-future release, specifically: * Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum is 768 bits) * Removing server-side assistance for the SSH v.1 protocol (currently compile-time disabled). * In about 1 year, removing all assistance for the SSH v.1 protocol (currently compile-time disabled). This catalog reflects our current intentions, but delight inspect the final release notes for forthcoming releases. Changes since OpenSSH 7.2 ========================= This is chiefly a bugfix release. Security -------- * sshd(8): Mitigate a possible denial-of-service assault against the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An attacker could dispatch extremely lengthy passwords that would logic excessive CPU use in crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to obtain password authentication requests of dimension greater than 1024 characters. Independently reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle), Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto. * sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password authentication that could be used to discern valid from invalid document names whenever lengthy passwords were sent and particular password hashing algorithms are in use on the server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC padding oracle countermeasures. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. Note that CBC ciphers are impaired by default and lone included for bequest compatibility. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Improve procedure ordering of MAC verification for Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) manner transport MAC algorithms to verify the MAC before decrypting any ciphertext. This removes the possibility of timing differences leaking facts concerning the plaintext, although no specified leakage has been observed. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. * sshd(8): (portable only) Ignore PAM surroundings vars when UseLogin=yes. If PAM is configured to peruse user-specified surroundings variables and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, afterward a antagonistic local person may assault /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or akin surroundings variables set via PAM. CVE-2015-8325, established by Shayan Sadigh. New Features ------------ * ssh(1): Add a ProxyJump choice and corresponding -J command-line emblem to authorize simplified indirection through a one or additional SSH bastions or "jump hosts". * ssh(1): Add an IdentityAgent choice to authorize specifying specific delegate sockets alternatively of accepting one from the environment. * ssh(1): Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to be optionally overridden whenever using ssh -W. bz#2577 * ssh(1), sshd(8): Implement assistance for the IUTF8 terminal manner as per draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add assistance for additional fixed Diffie-Hellman 2K, 4K and 8K groups from draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03. * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): assistance SHA256 and SHA512 RSA signatures in certificates; * ssh(1): Add an Include directive for ssh_config(5) files. * ssh(1): Permit UTF-8 characters in pre-authentication banners sent from the server. bz#2058 Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): Reduce the syslog flat of several comparatively common protocol events from LOG_CRIT. bz#2585 * sshd(8): Refuse AuthenticationMethods="" in configurations and obtain AuthenticationMethods=any for the default behavior of not requiring multiple authentication. bz#2398 * sshd(8): Remove obsolete and misleading "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!" communication whenever onward and reverse DNS don't match. bz#2585 * ssh(1): Close ControlPersist backdrop procedure stderr except in debug manner or whenever logging to syslog. bz#1988 * misc: Make PROTOCOL clarification for [email protected] conduit open messages equivalent deployed code. bz#2529 * ssh(1): Deduplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward entries to fix failures whenever the two ExitOnForwardFailure and hostname canonicalisation are enabled. bz#2562 * sshd(8): Remove fallback from moduli to obsolete "primes" file that was deprecated in 2001. bz#2559. * sshd_config(5): Correct clarification of UseDNS: it affects ssh hostname handling for authorized_keys, not known_hosts; bz#2554 * ssh(1): Fix authentication using solitary certificate keys in an agent without corresponding personal keys on the filesystem. bz#2550 * sshd(8): Send ClientAliveInterval pings whenever a time-based RekeyLimit is set; earlier keepalive packets were not being sent. bz#2252 Portability ----------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix compilation by automatically disabling ciphers not supported by OpenSSL. bz#2466 * misc: Fix compilation failures on several versions of AIX's compiler connected to the definition of the VA_COPY macro. bz#2589 * sshd(8): Whitelist additional architectures to allow the seccomp-bpf sandbox. bz#2590 * ssh-agent(1), sftp-server(8): Disable procedure tracing on Solaris using setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, ...). bz#2584 * sshd(8): On Solaris, don't call Solaris setproject() with UsePAM=yes it's PAM's responsibility. bz#2425 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.3.tar.gz) = b1641e5265d9ec68a9a19decc3a7edd1203cbd33 - SHA256 (openssh-7.3.tar.gz) = vS0X35qrX9OOPBkyDMYhOje/DBwHBVEV7nv5rkzw4vM= - SHA1 (openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz) = bfade84283fcba885e2084343ab19a08c7d123a5 - SHA256 (openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz) = P/uYmm3KppWUw7VQ1IVaWi4XGMzd5/XjY4e0JCIPvsw= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 7.2p2 (2016-03-10)

 Portable OpenSSH 7.2p2 was released on 2016-03-10. It volition be available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH additionally includes transitional assistance for the bequest SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols that may be enabled at compile-time. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be found at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 7.2p1 =========================== This publish fixes a safety bug: * sshd(8): sanitise X11 authentication credentials to evade xauth command injection whenever X11Forwarding is enabled. Full particulars of the exposure are accessible at: http://www.openssh.com/txt/x11fwd.adv Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz) = 70e35d7d6386fe08abbd823b3a12a3ca44ac6d38 - SHA256 (openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz) = pyeB0aBDh2oiT/GwAy2qQJTYdWWmhSh1nBwsq1SCVIw= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 7.2/7.2p1 (2016-02-29)

 OpenSSH 7.2 was released on 2016-02-29. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH additionally includes transitional assistance for the bequest SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols that may be enabled at compile-time. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= We scheme on retiring additional bequest cryptography in a near-future release, specifically: * Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum is 768 bits) This catalog reflects our current intentions, but delight inspect the final release notes for forthcoming releases. Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This publish disables a figure of bequest cryptographic algorithms by default in ssh: * Several ciphers blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants and the rijndael-cbc pseudonyms for AES. * MD5-based and truncated HMAC algorithms. These algorithms are already impaired by default in sshd. Changes since OpenSSH 7.1p2 =========================== This is chiefly a bugfix release. Security -------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): eliminate unfinished and unused roaming code (was already forcibly impaired in OpenSSH 7.1p2). * ssh(1): eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted forwarding whenever the X server disables the SECURITY extension. * ssh(1), sshd(8): addition the minimum modulus size supported for diffie-hellman-group-exchange to 2048 bits. * sshd(8): pre-auth sandboxing is now enabled by default (previous releases enabled it for new installations via sshd_config). New Features ------------ * all: add assistance for RSA signatures using SHA-256/512 hash algorithms according to draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt. * ssh(1): Add an AddKeysToAgent client choice which can be set to 'yes', 'no', 'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'. When enabled, a personal key that is used during authentication volition be added to ssh-agent if it is operating (with confirmation enabled if set to 'confirm'). * sshd(8): add a new authorized_keys choice "restrict" that includes all current and forthcoming key restrictions (no-*-forwarding, etc.). Also add permissive versions of the existing restrictions, e.g. "no-pty" -> "pty". This simplifies the project of environment up restricted keys and ensures they are maximally-restricted, despite of any permissions we power execute in the future. * ssh(1): add ssh_config CertificateFile choice to explicitly list certificates. bz#2436 * ssh-keygen(1): authorize ssh-keygen to alter the key comment for all supported formats. * ssh-keygen(1): authorize fingerprinting from norm input, e.g. "ssh-keygen -lf -" * ssh-keygen(1): authorize fingerprinting multiple community keys in a file, e.g. "ssh-keygen -lf ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" bz#1319 * sshd(8): assistance "none" as an disagreement for sshd_config Foreground and ChrootDirectory. Useful inner Match blocks to override a earth default. bz#2486 * ssh-keygen(1): assistance multiple certificates (one per line) and study from norm input (using "-f -") for "ssh-keygen -L" * ssh-keyscan(1): add "ssh-keyscan -c ..." emblem to authorize fetching certificates alternatively of plain keys. * ssh(1): improved grip anchored FQDNs (e.g. 'cvs.openbsd.org.') in hostname canonicalisation - treat them as already canonical and eliminate the trailing '.' before matching ssh_config. Bugfixes -------- * sftp(1): existing destination directories should not terminate recursive uploads (regression in openssh 6.8) bz#2528 * ssh(1), sshd(8): correctly dispatch rear SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED replies to unexpected messages during key exchange. bz#2949 * ssh(1): refuse attempts to set ConnectionAttempts=0, which does not create awareness and would logic ssh to imprint an uninitialised stack variable. bz#2500 * ssh(1): fix errors whenever attempting to nexus to scoped IPv6 addresses alongside hostname canonicalisation enabled. * sshd_config(5): catalog a brace additional options usable in Match blocks. bz#2489 * sshd(8): fix "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inner a Match block. * ssh(1): develop tilde characters in filenames passed to -i options before checking whether or not the character document exists. Avoids disturbance for cases anywhere casing doesn't develop (e.g. "-i ~/file" vs. "-i~/file"). bz#2481 * ssh(1): do not prepend "exec" to the casing command run by "Match exec" in a config file, which could logic several commands to fail in certain environments. bz#2471 * ssh-keyscan(1): fix output for multiple hosts/addrs on one line whenever presenter hashing or a non norm harbor is in use bz#2479 * sshd(8): skip "Could not chdir to residence directory" communication when ChrootDirectory is active. bz#2485 * ssh(1): contain PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes in ssh -G config dump. * sshd(8): evade changing TunnelForwarding equipment flags if they are already what is needed; makes it imaginable to use tun/tap networking as non-root person if equipment permissions and interface flags are pre-established * ssh(1), sshd(8): RekeyLimits could be exceeded by one packet. bz#2521 * ssh(1): fix multiplexing expert nonaccomplishment to notice client exit. * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): evade fatal() for PKCS11 tokens that present bare key IDs. bz#1773 * sshd(8): evade printf of NULL argument. bz#2535 * ssh(1), sshd(8): authorize RekeyLimits larger than 4GB. bz#2521 * ssh-keygen(1): sshd(8): fix multiple bugs in (unused) KRL signature support. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix connections alongside peers that use the key toggle conjecture characteristic of the protocol. bz#2515 * sshd(8): contain distant harbor figure in log messages. bz#2503 * ssh(1): don't try to burden SSHv1 personal key whenever compiled without SSHv1 support. bz#2505 * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): fix incorrect error messages during key loading and signing errors. bz#2507 * ssh-keygen(1): don't depart bare impermanent records whenever performing known_hosts document edits whenever known_hosts doesn't exist. * sshd(8): accurate packet format for tcpip-forward replies for requests that don't allocate a harbor bz#2509 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix imaginable suspend on closed output. bz#2469 * ssh(1): develop %i in ControlPath to UID. bz#2449 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix come back category of openssh_RSA_verify. bz#2460 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix several choice parsing recollection leaks. bz#2182 * ssh(1): add a several debug output before DNS resolution; it's a location anywhere ssh could earlier silently stall in cases of unresponsive DNS servers. bz#2433 * ssh(1): eliminate spurious newline in ocular hostkey. bz#2686 * ssh(1): fix printing (ssh -G ...) of HostKeyAlgorithms=+... * ssh(1): fix enlargement of HostkeyAlgorithms=+... Documentation ------------- * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): update default algorithm lists to equivalent current reality. bz#2527 * ssh(1): citation -Q key-plain and -Q key-cert query options. bz#2455 * sshd_config(8): additional plainly depict what AuthorizedKeysFile=none does. * ssh_config(5): improved document ExitOnForwardFailure. bz#2444 * sshd(5): citation inner DH-GEX fallback groups in manual. bz#2302 * sshd_config(5): improved clarification for MaxSessions option. bz#2531 Portability ----------- * ssh(1), sftp-server(8), ssh-agent(1), sshd(8): Support Illumos/ Solaris fine-grained privileges. Including a pre-auth privsep sandbox and multiple pledge() emulations. bz#2511 * Renovate redhat/openssh.spec, removing deprecated options and syntax. * configure: authorize --without-ssl-engine alongside --without-openssl * sshd(8): fix multiple authentication using S/Key. bz#2502 * sshd(8): peruse rear from libcrypto RAND_* before dropping privileges. Avoids sandboxing violations alongside BoringSSL. * Fix name collision alongside system-provided glob(3) functions. bz#2463 * Adapt Makefile to use ssh-keygen -A whenever generating presenter keys. bz#2459 * configure: accurate default value for --with-ssh1 bz#2457 * configure: improved finding of _res sign bz#2259 * assistance getrandom() syscall on Linux Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.2.tar.gz) = 9567d00fffe655010c087aeb80c830cecbbecca6 - SHA256 (openssh-7.2.tar.gz) = 99GsHA8NwSGuEJhMc7hAOQ510y1xfGx27uJqyw73sCI= - SHA1 (openssh-7.2p1.tar.gz) = d30a6fd472199ab5838a7668c0c5fd885fb8d371 - SHA256 (openssh-7.2p1.tar.gz) = lzzDey81l+TPWZsJ5gTnnA/l2bb1laJOke0GYoYLSsM= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 7.1p2 (2016-01-14)

 OpenSSH 7.1p2 was released on 2016-01-14. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH additionally includes transitional assistance for the bequest SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols that may be enabled at compile-time. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 7.1p1 =========================== * SECURITY: ssh(1): The OpenSSH client code between 5.4 and 7.1 contains experimental assistance for resuming SSH-connections (roaming). The matching server code has never been shipped, but the client code was enabled by default and could be tricked by a malicious server into leaking client recollection to the server, including private client person keys. The authentication of the server presenter key prevents exploitation by a man-in-the-middle, so this data leak is restricted to connections to malicious or compromised servers. MITIGATION: For OpenSSH >= 5.4 the susceptible code in the client can be entirely impaired by adding 'UseRoaming no' to the global ssh_config(5) file, or to person configuration in ~/.ssh/config, or by passing -oUseRoaming=no on the command line. PATCH: See below for a place to disable this characteristic (Disabling Roaming in the Source Code). This issue was reported by the Qualys Security Advisory team. * SECURITY: Fix an out of-bound peruse admission in the packet handling code. Reported by Ben Hawkes. * PROTOCOL: Correctly construe the 'first_kex_follows' choice during the first key exchange. Reported by Matt Johnston. * Further use of explicit_bzero has been added in assorted buffer handling code paths to defender against compilers aggressively doing dead-store removal. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.1p2.tar.gz) = 9202f5a2a50c8a55ecfb830609df1e1fde97f758 - SHA256 (openssh-7.1p2.tar.gz) = dd75f024dcf21e06a0d6421d582690bf987a1f6323e32ad6619392f3bfde6bbd Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom. Disabling Roaming in the Source Code: ===================================== --- readconf.c 30 Jul 2015 00:01:34 -0000 1.239 +++ readconf.c 13 Jan 2016 23:17:23 -0000 @@ -1648,7 +1648,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->tun_remote = -1; options->local_command = NULL; options->permit_local_command = -1; - options->use_roaming = -1; + options->use_roaming = 0; options->visual_host_key = -1; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; @@ -1819,8 +1819,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->permit_local_command == -1) options->permit_local_command = 0; - if (options->use_roaming == -1) - options->use_roaming = 1; + options->use_roaming = 0; if (options->visual_host_key == -1) options->visual_host_key = 0; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) --- ssh.c 30 Jul 2015 00:01:34 -0000 1.420 +++ ssh.c 13 Jan 2016 23:17:23 -0000 @@ -1882,9 +1882,6 @@ ssh_session2(void) fork_postauth(); } - if (options.use_roaming) - request_roaming(); - return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); }

OpenSSH 7.1/7.1p1 (2015-08-21)

 OpenSSH 7.1 was released on 2015-08-21. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH additionally includes transitional assistance for the bequest SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols that may be enabled at compile-time. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= We scheme on retiring additional bequest cryptography in the next release including: * Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum is 768 bits) * Several ciphers volition be impaired by default: blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants and the rijndael-cbc aliases for AES. * MD5-based HMAC algorithms volition be impaired by default. This catalog reflects our current intentions, but delight inspect the final release notes for OpenSSH 7.2 whenever it is released. Changes since OpenSSH 7.0 ========================= This is a bugfix release. Security -------- * sshd(8): OpenSSH 7.0 contained a logic error in PermitRootLogin= prohibit-password/without-password that could, depending on compile-time configuration, authorize password authentication to base during preventing another forms of authentication. This problem was reported by Mantas Mikulenas. Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): add compatibility workarounds for FuTTY * ssh(1), sshd(8): refine compatibility workarounds for WinSCP * Fix a figure of recollection faults (double-free, liberated of uninitialised memory, etc) in ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1). Reported by Mateusz Kocielski. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.1.tar.gz) = 06c1db39f33831fe004726e013b2cf84f1889042 - SHA256 (openssh-7.1.tar.gz) = H7U1se9EoBmhkKi2i7lqpMX9QHdDTsgpu7kd5VZUGSY= - SHA1 (openssh-7.1p1.tar.gz) = ed22af19f962262c493fcc6ed8c8826b2761d9b6 - SHA256 (openssh-7.1p1.tar.gz) = /AptLR0GPVxm3/2VJJPQzaJWytIE9oHeD4TvhbKthCg= Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP key used to sign the releases is accessible as RELEASE_KEY.asc from the mirror sites. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 7.0/7.0p1 (2015-08-11)

 OpenSSH 7.0 was released on 2015-08-11. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH additionally includes transitional assistance for the bequest SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols that may be enabled at compile-time. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future deprecation notice ========================= We scheme on retiring additional bequest cryptography in the next release including: * Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum is 768 bits) * Several ciphers volition be impaired by default: blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants and the rijndael-cbc aliases for AES. * MD5-based HMAC algorithms volition be impaired by default. This catalog reflects our current intentions, but delight inspect the final release notes for OpenSSH 7.1 whenever it is released. Changes since OpenSSH 6.9 ========================= This concentration of this publish is chiefly to deprecate weak, legacy and/or unsafe cryptography. Security -------- * sshd(8): OpenSSH 6.8 and 6.9 incorrectly set TTYs to be world- writable. Local attackers may be capable to compose arbitrary messages to logged-in users, including terminal escape sequences. Reported by Nikolay Edigaryev. * sshd(8): Portable OpenSSH only: Fixed a privilege separation weakness connected to PAM support. Attackers who could successfully colony the pre-authentication procedure for distant code implementation and who had valid credentials on the presenter could impersonate another users. Reported by Moritz Jodeit. * sshd(8): Portable OpenSSH only: Fixed a use-after-free bug connected to PAM assistance that was reachable by attackers who could colony the pre-authentication procedure for distant code execution. Also reported by Moritz Jodeit. * sshd(8): fix circumvention of MaxAuthTries using keyboard- interactive authentication. By specifying a long, repeating keyboard-interactive "devices" string, an attacker could request the identical authentication method be tried thousands of times in a sole pass. The LoginGraceTime timeout in sshd(8) and any authentication nonaccomplishment delays implemented by the authentication scheme itself were motionless applied. Found by Kingcope. Potentially-incompatible Changes -------------------------------- * Support for the bequest SSH type 1 protocol is impaired by default at compile time. * Support for the 1024-bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange is impaired by default at run-time. It may be re-enabled using the instructions at http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html * Support for ssh-dss, ssh-dss-cert-* presenter and person keys is disabled by default at run-time. These may be re-enabled using the instructions at http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html * Support for the bequest v00 cert format has been removed. * The default for the sshd_config(5) PermitRootLogin choice has changed from "yes" to "prohibit-password". * PermitRootLogin=without-password/prohibit-password now bans all interactive authentication methods, allowing lone public-key, hostbased and GSSAPI authentication (previously it permitted keyboard-interactive and password-less authentication if those were enabled). New Features ------------ * ssh_config(5): add PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes choice to authority which community key types are accessible for person authentication. * sshd_config(5): add HostKeyAlgorithms choice to authority which community key types are offered for presenter authentications. * ssh(1), sshd(8): broaden Ciphers, MACs, KexAlgorithms, HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and HostbasedKeyTypes options to authorize appending to the default set of algorithms alternatively of replacing it. Options may now be prefixed alongside a '+' to append to the default, e.g. "HostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-dss". * sshd_config(5): PermitRootLogin now accepts an disagreement of 'prohibit-password' as a less-ambiguous synonym of 'without- password'. Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): add compatibility workarounds for Cisco and more PuTTY versions. bz#2424 * Fix several omissions and errors in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.mux records relating to Unix domain socket forwarding; bz#2421 bz#2422 * ssh(1): Improve the ssh(1) manual leaf to contain a better clarification of Unix domain socket forwarding; bz#2423 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): skip uninitialised PKCS#11 slots, fixing failures to burden keys whenever they are present. bz#2427 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): do not disregard PKCS#11 hosted keys that with bare CKA_ID; bz#2429 * sshd(8): explain records for UseDNS option; bz#2045 Portable OpenSSH ---------------- * Check realpath(3) behavior matches what sftp-server requires and use a replacement if necessary. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-7.0.tar.gz) = a19ff0bad2a67348b1d01a38a9580236120b7099 - SHA256 (openssh-7.0.tar.gz) = 4F6HV/ZqT465f3sMB2vIkXO+wrYtL5hnqzAymfbZ1Jk= - SHA1 (openssh-7.0p1.tar.gz) = d8337c9eab91d360d104f6dd805f8b32089c063c - SHA256 (openssh-7.0p1.tar.gz) = /VkySToZ9MgRU9gS7k4EK0m707dZqz2TRKvswrwUheU= Please note that the PGP key used to sign releases was lately rotated. The new key has been signed by the old key to provision continuity. It is available from the mirror sites as RELEASE_KEY.asc. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 6.9/6.9p1 (2015-07-01)

 OpenSSH 6.9 was released on 2015-07-01. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Future Deprecation Notice ========================= The 7.0 publish of OpenSSH, due for publish in delayed July, will deprecate multiple features, several of which may power compatibility or existing configurations. The intended changes are as follows: * The default for the sshd_config(5) PermitRootLogin choice will alter from "yes" to "no". * Support for the bequest type 1.x of the SSH protocol volition be impaired at compile period by default. * Support for the 1024-bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange volition be run-time impaired by default. * Support for ssh-dss, ssh-dss-cert-* presenter and person keys volition be run-time impaired by default. * Support for the bequest v00 cert format volition be removed * Several ciphers volition be impaired by default: blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants and the rijndael-cbc aliases for AES * Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum is 768 bits) This catalog reflects our current intentions, but delight inspect the final release notes for OpenSSH 7.0 whenever it is released. Changes since OpenSSH 6.8 ========================= This is chiefly a bugfix release. Security -------- * ssh(1): whenever forwarding X11 connections alongside ForwardX11Trusted=no, connections made following ForwardX11Timeout expired could be permitted and no longer topic to XSECURITY restrictions since of an ineffective timeout inspect in ssh(1) coupled alongside "fail open" behavior in the X11 server whenever clients attempted connections with expired credentials. This issue was reported by Jann Horn. * ssh-agent(1): fix weakness of delegate locking (ssh-add -x) to password guessing by implementing an expanding nonaccomplishment delay, storing a salted hash of the password fairly than the password itself and using a timing-safe difference function for verifying unlock attempts. This issue was reported by Ryan Castellucci. New Features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): advance [email protected] to be the default cipher * sshd(8): assistance admin-specified arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand; bz#2081 * sshd(8): add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows retrieving authorized principals data from a subprocess fairly than a file. * ssh(1), ssh-add(1): assistance PKCS#11 devices alongside external PIN admission devices bz#2240 * sshd(8): authorize GSSAPI presenter credential inspect to be relaxed for multihomed hosts via GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option; bz#928 * ssh-keygen(1): assistance "ssh-keygen -lF hostname" to search known_hosts and imprint key hashes fairly than complete keys. * ssh-agent(1): add -D emblem to depart ssh-agent in foreground without enabling debug mode; bz#2381 Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): deprecate bequest SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD communication and do not try to use it against several 3rd-party SSH implementations that use it (older PuTTY, WinSCP). * Many fixes for problems caused by compile-time deactivation of SSH1 assistance (including bz#2369) * ssh(1), sshd(8): cap DH-GEX collection size at 4Kbits for Cisco implementations as several would neglect whenever attempting to use group sizes >4K; bz#2209 * ssh(1): fix out-of-bound peruse in EscapeChar configuration option parsing; bz#2396 * sshd(8): fix use of PermitTunnel, LoginGraceTime, AuthenticationMethods and StreamLocalBindMask options in Match blocks * ssh(1), sshd(8): enhance disconnection communication on TCP reset; bz#2257 * ssh(1): eliminate unsuccessful distant forwards established by muliplexing from the catalog of energetic forwards; bz#2363 * sshd(8): create parsing of authorized_keys "environment=" options autonomous of PermitUserEnv being enabled; bz#2329 * sshd(8): fix post-auth collision alongside permitopen=none; bz#2355 * ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): authorize new-format personal keys to be encrypted alongside AEAD ciphers; bz#2366 * ssh(1): authorize ListenAddress, Port and AddressFamily configuration options to appear in any order; bz#86 * sshd(8): inspect for and refuse missing arguments for VersionAddendum and ForceCommand; bz#2281 * ssh(1), sshd(8): don't treat unidentified certificate extensions as fatal; bz#2387 * ssh-keygen(1): create stdout and stderr output consistent; bz#2325 * ssh(1): citation missing DISPLAY surroundings in debug log whenever X11 forwarding requested; bz#1682 * sshd(8): correctly document login whenever UseLogin is set; bz#378 * sshd(8): Add several missing options to sshd -T output and fix output of VersionAddendum and HostCertificate. bz#2346 * Document and enhance consistency of options that obtain a "none" argument" TrustedUserCAKeys, RevokedKeys (bz#2382), AuthorizedPrincipalsFile (bz#2288) * ssh(1): contain distant username in debug output; bz#2368 * sshd(8): evade compatibility issue alongside several versions of Tera Term, which would collision whenever they received the hostkeys notification communication ([email protected]) * sshd(8): citation ssh-keygen -E as helpful whenever comparing bequest MD5 presenter key fingerprints; bz#2332 * ssh(1): explain pseudo-terminal petition behavior and use make manual tongue consistent; bz#1716 * ssh(1): document that the TERM surroundings changeable is not subject to SendEnv and AcceptEnv; bz#2386 Portable OpenSSH ---------------- * sshd(8): Format UsePAM environment whenever using sshd -T, part of bz#2346 * Look for '${host}-ar' before 'ar', making cross-compilation easier; bz#2352. * Several portable compilation fixes: bz#2402, bz#2337, bz#2370 * moduli(5): update DH-GEX moduli Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.9.tar.gz) = cd5fcb93411025bbc4b4b57753b622769dfb1e0d - SHA256 (openssh-6.9.tar.gz) = itCMw0aE/xvrGKWhzRD2UM/9kzIOyFaH2dIWMfX8agQ= - SHA1 (openssh-6.9p1.tar.gz) = 86ab57f00d0fd9bf302760f2f6deac1b6e9df265 - SHA256 (openssh-6.9p1.tar.gz) = bgdN9TjzV9RAvmz5PcWBoh8i054jbyF/zY6su2yJbP4= Please note that the PGP key used to sign releases was lately rotated. The new key has been signed by the old key to provision continuity. It is available from the mirror sites as RELEASE_KEY.asc. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 6.8/6.8p1 (2015-03-18)

 OpenSSH 6.8 was released on 2015-03-18. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 6.7 ========================= This is a important release, containing a figure of new features as well as a ample inner re-factoring. Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * sshd(8): UseDNS now defaults to 'no'. Configurations that match against the client presenter name (via sshd_config or authorized_keys) may need to re-enable it or change to matching against addresses. New Features ------------ * Much of OpenSSH's inner code has been re-factored to be more library-like. These changes are mostly not user-visible, but have greatly improved OpenSSH's testability and inner layout. * Add FingerprintHash choice to ssh(1) and sshd(8), and equivalent command-line flags to the another tools to authority algorithm used for key fingerprints. The default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format from hex to base64. Fingerprints now have the hash algorithm prepended. An example of the new format: SHA256:mVPwvezndPv/ARoIadVY98vAC0g+P/5633yTC4d/wXE Please note that ocular presenter keys volition additionally be different. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Experimental presenter key rotation support. Add a protocol expansion for a server to communicate a client of all its accessible presenter keys following authentication has completed. The client may document the keys in known_hosts, allowing it to upgrade to better presenter key algorithms and a server to gracefully rotate its keys. The client flank of this is controlled by a UpdateHostkeys config choice (default off). * ssh(1): Add a ssh_config HostbasedKeyType choice to authority which presenter community key types are tried during host-based authentication. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix connection-killing presenter key mismatch errors whenever sshd offers multiple ECDSA keys of distinct lengths. * ssh(1): whenever presenter name canonicalisation is enabled, try to parse presenter names as addresses before looking them up for canonicalisation. fixes bz#2074 and avoiding needless DNS lookups in several cases. * ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): Key Revocation Lists (KRLs) no longer necessitate OpenSSH to be compiled alongside OpenSSL support. * ssh(1), ssh-keysign(8): Make ed25519 keys activity for presenter based authentication. * sshd(8): SSH protocol v.1 workaround for the Meyer, et al, Bleichenbacher Side Channel Attack. Fake up a bignum key before RSA decryption. * sshd(8): Remember which community keys have been used for authentication and refuse to obtain previously-used keys. This allows AuthenticationMethods=publickey,publickey to require that users authenticate using two _different_ community keys. * sshd(8): add sshd_config HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options to authorize sshd to authority what community key types volition be accepted. Currently defaults to all. * sshd(8): Don't figure partial authentication achievement as a failure against MaxAuthTries. * ssh(1): Add RevokedHostKeys choice for the client to allow text-file or KRL-based revocation of presenter keys. * ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): Permit KRLs that revoke certificates by serial figure or key ID without scoping to a particular CA. * ssh(1): Add a "Match canonical" criteria that allows ssh_config Match blocks to trigger lone in the second config pass. * ssh(1): Add a -G choice to ssh that causes it to parse its configuration and dump the outcome to stdout, akin to "sshd -T". * ssh(1): Allow Match criteria to be negated. E.g. "Match !host". * The regression test suite has been extended to shield additional OpenSSH features. The component tests have been expanded and now shield key exchange. Bugfixes * ssh-keyscan(1): ssh-keyscan has been made much additional sturdy again servers that suspend or breach the SSH protocol. * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Fix regression bz#2306: Key way names were being misplaced as comment fields. * ssh(1): Allow ssh_config Port options set in the second config parse phase to be applied (they were being ignored). bz#2286 * ssh(1): Tweak config re-parsing alongside presenter canonicalisation - make the second continue through the config records continually run whenever presenter name canonicalisation is enabled (and not whenever the presenter name changes) bz#2267 * ssh(1): Fix passing of wildcard onward tie addresses when association multiplexing is in use; bz#2324; * ssh-keygen(1): Fix damaged personal key conversion from non-OpenSSH formats; bz#2345. * ssh-keygen(1): Fix KRL generation bug whenever multiple CAs are in use. * Various fixes to manual pages: bz#2288, bz#2316, bz#2273 Portable OpenSSH * Support --without-openssl at configure time Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features, including SSH protocol 1 are not supported and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This volition lone activity on systems alongside native arc4random or /dev/urandom. Considered extremely experimental for now. * Support --without-ssh1 choice at configure time Allows disabling assistance for SSH protocol 1. * sshd(8): Fix compilation on systems alongside IPv6 assistance in utmpx; bz#2296 * Allow tradition assistance name for sshd on Cygwin. Permits the use of multiple sshd operating alongside distinct assistance names. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.8.tar.gz) = 99903c6ca76e0a2c044711017f81127e12459d37 - SHA256 (openssh-6.8.tar.gz) = N1uzVarFbrm2CzAwuDu3sRoszmqpK+5phAChP/QNyuw= - SHA1 (openssh-6.8p1.tar.gz) = cdbc51e46a902b30d263b05fdc71340920e91c92 - SHA256 (openssh-6.8p1.tar.gz) = P/ZM5z7hJEgLW/dnuYMNfTwDu8tqvnFrePAZLDfOFg4= Please note that the PGP key used to sign releases was lately rotated. The new key has been signed by the old key to provision continuity. It is available from the mirror sites as RELEASE_KEY.asc. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 6.7/6.7p1 (2014-10-06)

 OpenSSH 6.7 was released on 2014-10-06. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 6.6 ========================= Potentially-incompatible changes * sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to eliminate unsafe algorithms. In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are impaired by default. The complete set of algorithms remains accessible if configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options. * sshd(8): Support for tcpwrappers/libwrap has been removed. * OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 have a bug that causes ~0.2% of connections using the [email protected] KEX toggle method to fail whenever connecting alongside item that implements the specification correctly. OpenSSH 6.7 disables this KEX method whenever speaking to among the affected versions. New Features * Major inner refactoring to commencement to create part of OpenSSH usable as a library. So far the cable parsing, key handling and KRL code has been refactored. Please note that we do not regard the API stable yet, nor do we recommendation the archive in separable form. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add assistance for Unix domain socket forwarding. A distant TCP harbor may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or the two ends may be a Unix domain socket. * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add assistance for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519 key types. * sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads. * ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is the identical as the one sent during first key exchange; bz#2154 * sshd(8): Allow definitive ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses whenever GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family; bz#2222 * sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC choice to authority whether ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys option; bz#2160 * ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that expands to a distinctive identifier according to a hash of the tuple of (local host, distant user, hostname, port). Helps evade exceeding miserly pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing authority paths; bz#2220 * sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message contain the user, origin address, harbor and protocol in a format akin to the authentication achievement / nonaccomplishment messages; bz#2199 * Added component and fuzz tests for refactored code. These are run automatically in portable OpenSSH via the "make tests" target. Bugfixes * sshd(8): Fix distant forwarding alongside the identical hear harbor but distinct hear address. * ssh(1): Fix inverted test that caused PKCS#11 keys that were explicitly listed in ssh_config or on the commandline not to be preferred. * ssh-keygen(1): Fix bug in KRL generation: multiple consecutive revoked certificate serial figure ranges could be serialised to an invalid format. Readers of a damaged KRL caused by this bug will neglect closed, so no should-have-been-revoked key volition be accepted. * ssh(1): Reflect stdio-forward ("ssh -W host:port ...") failures in exit status. Previously we were continually returning 0; bz#2255 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Make Ed25519 keys' heading fit correctly in the randomart border; bz#2247 * ssh-agent(1): Only cleanup delegate socket in the chief delegate process and not in any subprocesses it may have started (e.g. forked askpass). Fixes delegate sockets being zapped whenever askpass processes fatal(); bz#2236 * ssh-add(1): Make stdout line-buffered; saves partial output getting misplaced whenever ssh-add fatal()s part-way through (e.g. whenever listing keys from an delegate that supports key types that ssh-add doesn't); bz#2234 * ssh-keygen(1): When hashing or removing hosts, don't choke on @revoked markers and don't eliminate @cert-authority markers; bz#2241 * ssh(1): Don't fatal whenever hostname canonicalisation fails and a ProxyCommand is in use; continue and authorize the ProxyCommand to nexus anyhow (e.g. to a presenter alongside a name exterior the DNS behind a bastion) * scp(1): When copying local->remote fails during read, don't send uninitialised heap to the distant end. * sftp(1): Fix fatal "el_insertstr failed" errors whenever tab-completing filenames alongside a sole citation char location in the string; bz#2238 * ssh-keyscan(1): Scan for Ed25519 keys by default. * ssh(1): When using VerifyHostKeyDNS alongside a DNSSEC resolver, down- change any certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution. Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey dialog by offering lone certificate keys. * sshd(8): Avoid collision at exit via NULL pointer reference; bz#2225 * Fix several strict-alignment errors. Portable OpenSSH * Portable OpenSSH now supports construction against libressl-portable. * Portable OpenSSH now requires openssl 0.9.8f or greater. Older versions are no longer supported. * In the OpenSSL type check, authorize fix type upgrades (but not downgrades. Debian bug #748150. * sshd(8): On Cygwin, decide privilege separation person at runtime, since it may need to be a domain account. * sshd(8): Don't attempt to use vhangup on Linux. It doesn't activity for non-root users, and for them it fair messes up the tty settings. * Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in penchant to CLOCK_MONOTONIC whenever it is available. It considers period spent suspended, thereby ensuring timeouts (e.g. for expiring delegate keys) blaze correctly. bz#2228 * Add assistance for ed25519 to opensshd.init init script. * sftp-server(8): On platforms that assistance it, use prctl() to forestall sftp-server from accessing /proc/self/{mem,maps} Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.7.tar.gz) = 315497b27a0186e4aef67987cfc9f3d9ba561cd8 - SHA256 (openssh-6.7.tar.gz) = /me/hPxDw9Tfd3siNKQubSQph84qiKwftiMsgj6nh5E= - SHA1 (openssh-6.7p1.tar.gz) = 14e5fbed710ade334d65925e080d1aaeb9c85bf6 - SHA256 (openssh-6.7p1.tar.gz) = svg5Tq6Fjau9732sELma7ADJVGJ1PoA0LlMLu29yVQc= Please note that the PGP key used to sign releases was lately rotated. The new key has been signed by the old key to provision continuity. It is available from the mirror sites as RELEASE_KEY.asc. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 6.6/6.6p1 (2014-03-15)

 OpenSSH 6.6 was released on 2014-03-15. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 6.6 ========================= This is chiefly a bugfix release. Security: * sshd(8): whenever using surroundings passing alongside a sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv form alongside a wildcard. OpenSSH previous to 6.6 could be tricked into accepting any surroundings changeable that contains the characters before the wildcard character. New / changed features: * ssh(1), sshd(8): this publish removes the J-PAKE authentication code. This code was experimental, never enabled and had been unmaintained for several time. * ssh(1): whenever handling Match blocks, skip 'exec' clauses another clauses predicates unsuccessful to match. * ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results in the destination hostname being changed, afterward re-parse ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded hostname a chance to be applied. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): evade spurious "getsockname failed: Bad document descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692 * sshd(8): authorize the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the association is terminated during the pre-auth phase. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1 bignum parsing. Minimum key dimension checks render this bug unexploitable to colony SSH 1 sessions. * sshd_config(5): explain behavior of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184 * ssh(1): evade unnecessary hostname lookups whenever canonicalisation is disabled. bz#2205 * sshd(8): evade sandbox infringement crashes in GSSAPI code by caching the supported catalog of GSSAPI scheme OIDs before entering the sandbox. bz#2107 * ssh(1): fix imaginable crashes in SOCKS4 parsing caused by assumption that the SOCKS username is nul-terminated. * ssh(1): fix regression for UsePrivilegedPort=yes whenever BindAddress is not specified. * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix recollection leak in ECDSA signature verification. * ssh(1): fix matching of 'Host' directives in ssh_config(5) files to be case-insensitive again (regression in 6.5). Portable OpenSSH: * sshd(8): don't fatal if the FreeBSD Capsicum is offered by the scheme headers and libc but is not supported by the kernel. * Fix build using the HP-UX compiler. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.6.tar.gz) = bf932d798324ff2502409d3714d0ad8d65c7e1e7 - SHA256 (openssh-6.6.tar.gz) = jaSJE5aiQRm+91dV6EvVGr/ozo33tbxyjjFSiu+Cy80= - SHA1 (openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz) = b850fd1af704942d9b3c2eff7ef6b3a59b6a6b6e - SHA256 (openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz) = SMHwZktFNIdQOABMxPNVW4MpwqgcHfSNtcUXgA3iA7s= Please note that the PGP key used to sign releases was lately rotated. The new key has been signed by the old key to provision continuity. It is available from the mirror sites as RELEASE_KEY.asc. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 6.5/6.5p1 (2014-01-30)

 Changes since OpenSSH 6.4 ========================= This is a feature-focused release. New features: * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add assistance for key toggle using elliptic-curve Diffie Hellman in Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519. This key exchange method is the default whenever the two the client and server assistance it. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add assistance for Ed25519 as a community key type. Ed25519 is a elliptic curve signature scheme that offers improved safety than ECDSA and DSA and fine performance. It may be used for the two person and presenter keys. * Add a new personal key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better defend keys at rest. This format is used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys, but may be requested whenever generating or saving existing keys of another types via the -o ssh-keygen(1) option. We average to create the new format the default in the near future. Details of the new format are in the PROTOCOL.key file. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add a new transport cipher "[email protected]" that combines Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream code and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. It will motionless be imaginable to nexus alongside these clients/servers but only DSA keys volition be accepted, and OpenSSH volition refuse connection entirely in a forthcoming release. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Refuse old proprietary clients and servers that use a weaker key toggle hash calculation. * ssh(1): Increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for all symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 alongside the high bounds stated by RFC4419. * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): Support PKCS#11 tokens that lone provide X.509 certs alternatively of raw community keys (requested as bz#1908). * ssh(1): Add a ssh_config(5) "Match" keyword that allows conditional configuration to be applied by matching on hostname, person and outcome of arbitrary commands. * ssh(1): Add assistance for client-side hostname canonicalisation using a set of DNS suffixes and rules in ssh_config(5). This allows unqualified names to be canonicalised to fully-qualified domain names to eliminate ambiguity whenever looking up keys in known_hosts or checking presenter certificate names. * sftp-server(8): Add the capability to whitelist and/or blacklist sftp protocol requests by name. * sftp-server(8): Add a sftp "[email protected]" to assistance calling fsync(2) on an open document handle. * sshd(8): Add a ssh_config(5) PermitTTY to disallow TTY allocation, mirroring the longstanding no-pty authorized_keys option. * ssh(1): Add a ssh_config ProxyUseFDPass choice that supports the use of ProxyCommands that established a association and afterward continue a connected document descriptor rear to ssh(1). This allows the ProxyCommand to exit fairly than staying about to transfer data. Bugfixes: * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix possible stack exhaustion caused by nested certificates. * ssh(1): bz#1211: create BindAddress activity alongside UsePrivilegedPort. * sftp(1): bz#2137: fix the advancement meter for resumed transfer. * ssh-add(1): bz#2187: do not petition smartcard PIN whenever removing keys from ssh-agent. * sshd(8): bz#2139: fix re-exec fallback whenever first sshd binary cannot be executed. * ssh-keygen(1): Make relative-specified certificate expiry times related to current period and not the validity commencement time. * sshd(8): bz#2161: fix AuthorizedKeysCommand inner a Match block. * sftp(1): bz#2129: symlinking a document would incorrectly canonicalise the mark path. * ssh-agent(1): bz#2175: fix a use-after-free in the PKCS#11 agent helper executable. * sshd(8): Improve logging of sessions to contain the person name, distant presenter and port, the meeting category (shell, command, etc.) and allocated TTY (if any). * sshd(8): bz#1297: inform the client (via a debug message) when their preferred hear location has been overridden by the server's GatewayPorts setting. * sshd(8): bz#2162: contain study harbor in bad protocol banner message. * sftp(1): bz#2163: fix recollection leak in error way in do_readdir(). * sftp(1): bz#2171: don't leak document descriptor on error. * sshd(8): Include the local location and harbor in "Connection from ..." communication (only shown at loglevel>=verbose). Portable OpenSSH: * Please note that this is the final type of Portable OpenSSH that volition assistance versions of OpenSSL previous to 0.9.6. Support (i.e. SSH_OLD_EVP) volition be removed following the 6.5p1 release. * Portable OpenSSH volition attempt compile and nexus as a Position Independent Executable on Linux, OS X and OpenBSD on latest gcc- akin compilers. Other platforms and older/other compilers may petition this using the --with-pie configure flag. * A figure of another toolchain-related hardening options are used automatically if available, including -ftrapv to abort on signed entire figure overflow and options to write-protect energetic linking information. The use of these options may be impaired using the --without-hardening configure flag. * If the toolchain supports it, among the -fstack-protector-strong, -fstack-protector-all or -fstack-protector compilation emblem are used to add guards to mitigate attacks according to stack overflows. The use of these options may be impaired using the --without-stackprotect configure option. * sshd(8): Add assistance for pre-authentication sandboxing using the Capsicum API introduced in FreeBSD 10. * Switch to a ChaCha20-based arc4random() PRNG for platforms that do not provision their own. * sshd(8): bz#2156: reconstruct Linux oom_adj environment whenever handling SIGHUP to keep behavior complete restart. * sshd(8): bz#2032: use local username in krb5_kuserok inspect rather than complete client name which may be of form user@REALM. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Test for the two the existence of ECC NID numbers in OpenSSL and that they really work. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1 that doesn't work. * bz#2173: use pkg-config --libs to contain accurate -L location for libedit. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.5.tar.gz) = 0a375e20d895670489a9241f8faa57670214fbed - SHA256 (openssh-6.5.tar.gz) = sK5q2rB0o5JCbEmbeE/6N9DtJkT81dwmeuhogT4i900= - SHA1 (openssh-6.5p1.tar.gz) = 3363a72b4fee91b29cf2024ff633c17f6cd2f86d - SHA256 (openssh-6.5p1.tar.gz) = oRle1V25RSUtWhcw1KKipcHJpqoB7y5a91CpYmI9kCc= Please note that the PGP key used to sign releases has been rotated. The new key has been signed by the old key to provision continuity. It is accessible from the mirror sites as RELEASE_KEY.asc. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 6.4/6.4p1 (2013-11-08)

 Changes since OpenSSH 6.3 ========================= This publish fixes a safety bug: * sshd(8): fix a recollection misconduct issue triggered during rekeying whenever an AES-GCM code is selected. Full particulars of the vulnerability are accessible at: http://www.openssh.com/txt/gcmrekey.adv Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.4.tar.gz) = 4caf1a50eb3a3da821c16298c4aaa576fe24210c - SHA1 (openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz) = cf5fe0eb118d7e4f9296fbc5d6884965885fc55d Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 6.3/6.3p1 (2013-09-13)

 Changes since OpenSSH 6.2 ========================= This publish is predominantly a bugfix release: Features: * sshd(8): add ssh-agent(1) assistance to sshd(8); allows encrypted hostkeys, or hostkeys on smartcards. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): authorize optional time-based rekeying via a second argument to the existing RekeyLimit option. RekeyLimit is now supported in sshd_config as fine as on the client. * sshd(8): standardise logging of data during person authentication. The presented key/cert and the distant username (if available) is now logged in the authentication success/failure communication on the identical log row as the local username, distant host/port and protocol in use. Certificates contents and the key fingerprint of the signing CA are logged too. Including all applicable data on a sole row simplifies log inspection as it is no longer necessary to connect data scattered throughout multiple log entries. * ssh(1): add the capability to query which ciphers, MAC algorithms, key types and key toggle methods are supported in the binary. * ssh(1): assistance ProxyCommand=- to authorize assistance cases anywhere stdin and stdout already item to the proxy. * ssh(1): authorize IdentityFile=none * ssh(1)/sshd(8): add -E choice to ssh and sshd to append debugging logs to a stated document alternatively of stderr or syslog. * sftp(1): add assistance for resuming partial downloads using the "reget" command and on the sftp commandline or on the "get" commandline using the "-a" (append) option. * ssh(1): add an "IgnoreUnknown" configuration choice to selectively suppress errors arising from unidentified configuration directives. * sshd(8): add assistance for submethods to be appended to required authentication methods listed via AuthenticationMethods. Bugfixes: * sshd(8): fix refusal to obtain certificate if a key of a distinct type to the CA key appeared in authorized_keys before the CA key. * ssh(1)/ssh-agent(1)/sshd(8): Use a monotonic period origin for timers so that things akin keepalives and rekeying volition activity correctly complete clock steps. * sftp(1): update progressmeter whenever data is acknowledged, not whenever it's sent. bz#2108 * ssh(1)/ssh-keygen(1): enhance error messages whenever the current person does not be in /etc/passwd; bz#2125 * ssh(1): reset the command in which community keys are tried following partial authentication success. * ssh-agent(1): spotless up socket records following SIGINT whenever in debug mode; bz#2120 * ssh(1) and others: evade confusing error messages in the case of broken scheme resolver configurations; bz#2122 * ssh(1): set TCP nodelay for connections started alongside -N; bz#2124 * ssh(1): accurate manual for approval requirements on ~/.ssh/config; bz#2078 * ssh(1): fix ControlPersist timeout not triggering in cases anywhere TCP connections have hung. bz#1917 * ssh(1): correctly detach a ControlPersist expert from its controlling terminal. * sftp(1): evade crashes in libedit whenever it has been compiled alongside multi- byte character support. bz#1990 * sshd(8): whenever operating sshd -D, near stderr unless we have explicitly requested logging to stderr. bz#1976, * ssh(1): fix incomplete bzero; bz#2100 * sshd(8): log and error and exit if ChrootDirectory is stated and operating without base privileges. * Many improvements to the regression test suite. In particular log files are now saved from ssh and sshd following failures. * Fix a figure of recollection leaks. bz#1967 bz#2096 and others * sshd(8): fix community key authentication whenever a :style is appended to the requested username. * ssh(1): do not fatally exit whenever attempting to cleanup multiplexing- created channels that are incompletely opened. bz#2079 Portable OpenSSH: * Major overhaul of contrib/cygwin/README * Fix unaligned accesses in umac.c for strict-alignment architectures. bz#2101 * Enable -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess if the compiler supports it. bz#2100 * Fix damaged incorrect commandline reporting errors. bz#1448 * Only contain SHA256 and ECC-based key toggle methods if libcrypto has the required support. * Fix collision in SOCKS5 energetic forwarding code on strict-alignment architectures. * A figure of portability fixes for Android: * Don't try to use lastlog on Android; bz#2111 * Fall rear to using openssl's DES_crypt function on platforms that don't have a native crypt() function; bz#2112 * Test for fd_mask, howmany and NFDBITS fairly than trying to enumerate the platforms that don't have them. bz#2085 * Replace S_IWRITE, which isn't standardized, alongside S_IWUSR, which is. bz#2085 * Add a null implementation of endgrent for platforms that don't have it (eg Android) bz#2087 * Support platforms, specified as Android, that deficiency struct passwd.pw_gecos. bz#2086 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.3.tar.gz) = 8a6ef99ffc80c19e9afe9fe1e857370f6adcf450 - SHA1 (openssh-6.3p1.tar.gz) = 70845ca79474258cab29dbefae13d93e41a83ccb Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 6.2p2 (2013-05-16)

 Changes since OpenSSH 6.2p1 =========================== This is a bugfix release: Bugfixes: * ssh(1): Only notify for missing character records that were explicitly specified. * Fix bug in contributed contrib/ssh-copy-id manuscript that could outcome in "rm *" being called on mktemp failure. bz#2105 * sshd(8): Quiet disconnect notifications on the server from error() back to logit() from error() for normal, client-initiated disconnections. bz#2057 * Avoid conflicting definitions of __int64 on Cygwin Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.2p2.tar.gz) = c2b4909eba6f5ec6f9f75866c202db47f3b501ba Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 6.2/6.2p1 (2013-03-22)

 Changes since OpenSSH 6.1 ========================= This publish introduces a figure of new features: Features: * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Added assistance for AES-GCM authenticated encryption in SSH protocol 2. The new code is accessible as [email protected] and [email protected]. It uses an identical packet format to the AES-GCM manner stated in RFC 5647, but uses simpler and different choice rules during key exchange. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Added assistance for encrypt-then-mac (EtM) MAC modes for SSH protocol 2. These modes alter the packet format and compute the MAC complete the packet dimension and encrypted packet fairly than over the plaintext data. These modes are considered additional safe and are used by default whenever available. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Added assistance for the UMAC-128 MAC as "[email protected]" and "[email protected]". The latter being an encrypt-then-mac mode. * sshd(8): Added assistance for multiple required authentication in SSH protocol 2 via an AuthenticationMethods option. This choice lists one or additional comma-separated lists of authentication method names. Successful completion of all the methods in any catalog is required for authentication to complete. This allows, for example, requiring a person having to authenticate via community key or GSSAPI before they are offered password authentication. * sshd(8)/ssh-keygen(1): Added assistance for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs), a compact binary format to portray lists of revoked keys and certificates that obtain as small as one bit per certificate when revoking by serial number. KRLs may be generated using ssh-keygen(1) and are loaded into sshd(8) via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option. * ssh(1): IdentitiesOnly now applies to keys obtained from a PKCS11Provider. This allows authority of which keys are offered from tokens using IdentityFile. * sshd(8): sshd_config(5)'s AllowTcpForwarding now accepts "local" and "remote" in supplement to its former "yes"/"no" keywords to allow the server to define whether fair local or distant TCP forwarding is enabled. * sshd(8): Added a sshd_config(5) choice AuthorizedKeysCommand to assistance fetching authorized_keys from a command in supplement to (or alternatively of) from the filesystem. The command is run under an account stated by an AuthorizedKeysCommandUser sshd_config(5) option. * sftp-server(8): Now supports a -d choice to authorize the starting directory to be item another than the user's residence directory. * ssh-keygen(1): Now allows fingerprinting of keys hosted in PKCS#11 tokens using "ssh-keygen -lD pkcs11_provider". * ssh(1): When SSH protocol 2 lone is selected (the default), ssh(1) now immediately sends its SSH protocol banner to the server without waiting to obtain the server's banner, preservation period whenever connecting. * ssh(1): Added ~v and ~V escape sequences to lift and lesser the logging flat respectively. * ssh(1): Made the escape command assistance (~?) environment delicate so that lone commands that volition activity in the current meeting are shown. * ssh-keygen(1): When deleting presenter lines from known_hosts using "ssh-keygen -R host", ssh-keygen(1) now prints particulars of which lines were removed. Bugfixes: * ssh(1): Force a spotless shutdown of ControlMaster client sessions when the ~. escape sequence is used. This method that ~. should now activity in mux clients equal if the server is no longer responding. * ssh(1): Correctly detect errors during local TCP onward setup in multiplexed clients. bz#2055 * ssh-add(1): Made deleting definitive keys "ssh-add -d" symmetric with adding keys alongside regard to certificates. It now tries to delete the corresponding certificate and respects the -k choice to authorize deleting of the key only. * sftp(1): Fix a figure of parsing and command-editing bugs, including bz#1956 * ssh(1): When muxmaster is run alongside -N, ensured that it shuts down gracefully whenever a client sends it "-O stop" fairly than hanging around. bz#1985 * ssh-keygen(1): When screening moduli candidates, append to the file fairly than overwriting to authorize resumption. bz#1957 * ssh(1): Record "Received disconnect" messages at ERROR fairly than INFO priority. bz#2057. * ssh(1): Loudly notify if explicitly-provided personal key is unreadable. bz#1981 Portable OpenSSH: * sshd(8): The Linux seccomp-filter sandbox is now supported on ARM platforms anywhere the kernel supports it. * sshd(8): The seccomp-filter sandbox volition not be enabled if the system headers assistance it at compile time, despite of whether it can be enabled then. If the run-time scheme does not assistance seccomp-filter, sshd volition autumn rear to the rlimit pseudo-sandbox. * ssh(1): Don't nexus in the Kerberos libraries. They aren't necessary on the client, fair on sshd(8). bz#2072 * Fix GSSAPI linking on Solaris, which uses a differently-named GSSAPI library. bz#2073 * Fix compilation on systems alongside openssl-1.0.0-fips. * Fix a figure of errors in the RPM spec files. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.2.tar.gz) = b3f6cd774d345f22f6d0038cc9464cce131a0676 - SHA1 (openssh-6.2p1.tar.gz) = 8824708c617cc781b2bb29fa20bd905fd3d2a43d Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 6.1/6.1p1 (2012-08-29)

 OpenSSH 6.1 was released on 2012-08-29. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 6.0 ========================= This is chiefly a bugfix release. Features: * sshd(8): This publish turns on pre-auth sandboxing sshd by default for new installs, by environment UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox in sshd_config. * ssh-keygen(1): Add options to define starting row figure and figure of lines to procedure whenever screening moduli candidates, allowing processing of distinct parts of a applicant moduli document in parallel * sshd(8): The Match directive now supports matching on the local (listen) location and harbor upon which the incoming association was received via LocalAddress and LocalPort clauses. * sshd(8): Extend sshd_config Match directive to authorize environment AcceptEnv and {Allow,Deny}{Users,Groups} * Add assistance for RFC6594 SSHFP DNS records for ECDSA key types. bz#1978 * ssh-keygen(1): Allow conversion of RSA1 keys to community PEM and PKCS8 * sshd(8): Allow the sshd_config PermitOpen directive to obtain "none" as an disagreement to refuse all port-forwarding requests. * sshd(8): Support "none" as an disagreement for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile * ssh-keyscan(1): Look for ECDSA keys by default. bz#1971 * sshd(8): Add "VersionAddendum" to sshd_config to authorize server operators to append several arbitrary content to the server SSH protocol banner. Bugfixes: * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Don't rotation in accept() in situations of file descriptor exhaustion. Instead rear off for a while. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Remove hmac-sha2-256-96 and hmac-sha2-512-96 MACs as they were removed from the specification. bz#2023, * sshd(8): Handle lengthy comments in config records better. bz#2025 * ssh(1): Delay environment tty_flag so RequestTTY options are correctly picked up. bz#1995 * sshd(8): Fix handling of /etc/nologin incorrectly being applied to root on platforms that use login_cap. Portable OpenSSH: * sshd(8): Allow sshd pre-auth sandboxing to fall-back to the rlimit sandbox from the Linux SECCOMP display sandbox whenever the second is not accessible in the kernel. * ssh(1): Fix NULL dereference whenever built alongside LDNS and using DNSSEC to recover a CNAME SSHFP record. * Fix cross-compilation problems connected to pkg-config. bz#1996 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.1.tar.gz) = 7ed5b491cfebcaee2273d1f872314107273c2167 - SHA1 (openssh-6.1p1.tar.gz) = 751c92c912310c3aa9cadc113e14458f843fc7b3 Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 6.0/6.0p1 (2012-04-22)

 OpenSSH 6.0 was released on 2012-04-22. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 5.9 ========================= This is chiefly a bugfix release. Features: * ssh-keygen(1): Add optional checkpoints for moduli screening * ssh-add(1): new -k choice to burden plain keys (skipping certificates) * sshd(8): Add wildcard assistance to PermitOpen, allowing things like "PermitOpen localhost:*". bz #1857 * ssh(1): assistance for cancelling local and distant harbor forwards via the multiplex socket. Use ssh -O cancel -L xx:xx:xx -R yy:yy:yy user@host" to petition the cancellation of the stated forwardings * assistance cancellation of local/dynamic forwardings from ~C commandline Bugfixes: * ssh(1): justify that $DISPLAY contains lone valid characters before using it to extract xauth data so that it can't be used to perform local casing metacharacter games. * ssh(1): unbreak distant portforwarding alongside energetic allocated hear ports * scp(1): uppress adding '--' to distant commandlines whenever the first disagreement does not commencement alongside '-'. saves breakage on some difficult-to-upgrade embedded/router platforms * ssh(1)/sshd(8): fix typo in IPQoS parsing: there is no "AF14" class, but there is an "AF21" class * ssh(1)/sshd(8): do not authorize SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST/ACCEPT during rekeying * ssh(1): skip attempting to create ~/.ssh whenever -F is passed * sshd(8): unbreak stdio forwarding whenever ControlPersist is in use; bz#1943 * sshd(1): dispatch tty interrupt to pty expert alternatively of (probably already closed) servant side; bz#1859 * sftp(1): silence error spam for "ls */foo" in directory alongside files; bz#1683 * Fixed a figure of recollection and document descriptor leaks Portable OpenSSH: * Add a new privilege separation sandbox implementation for Linux's new seccomp sandbox, automatically enabled on platforms that support it. (Note: privilege separation sandboxing is motionless experimental) * Fix compilation problems on FreeBSD, anywhere libutil contained openpty() but not login(). * ssh-keygen(1): don't neglect in -A on platforms that don't assistance ECC * Add optional assistance for LDNS, a BSD licensed DNS resolver library which supports DNSSEC * Relax OpenSSL type inspect to authorize operating OpenSSH binaries on systems alongside OpenSSL libraries alongside a newer "fix" or "patch" level than the binaries were initially compiled on (previous inspect only allowed movement inside "patch" releases). bz#1991 * Fix builds using contributed Redhat spec file. bz#1992 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.0.tar.gz) = 5d30aba0423c44e89924bb44c5d2153635506a9f - SHA1 (openssh-6.0p1.tar.gz) = f691e53ef83417031a2854b8b1b661c9c08e4422 Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 5.9/5.9p1 (2011-09-06)

 OpenSSH 5.9 was released on 2011-09-06. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 5.8 ========================= Features: * Introduce sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep kid using an optional sshd_config(5) "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" manner that enables mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the privsep kid can perform. This aim is to forestall a compromised privsep kid from being used to assault another hosts (by beginning sockets and proxying) or probing local kernel assault surface. Three tangible sandbox implementation are provided (selected at configure time): systrace, seatbelt and rlimit. The systrace sandbox uses systrace(4) in unsupervised "fast-path" mode, anywhere a catalog of permitted syscalls is supplied. Any syscall not on the catalog results in SIGKILL being sent to the privsep child. Note that this requires a kernel alongside the new SYSTR_POLICY_KILL option (only OpenBSD has this manner at present). The seatbelt sandbox uses OS X/Darwin sandbox(7) accommodation alongside a strict (kSBXProfilePureComputation) guideline that disables admission to filesystem and network resources. The rlimit sandbox is a fallback choice for platforms that don't assistance a improved one; it uses setrlimit() to reset the hard-limit of document descriptors and processes to zero, which should prevent the privsep kid from forking or beginning new network connections. Sandboxing of the privilege divided kid procedure is currently experimental but should rotate into the default in a forthcoming release. Native sandboxes for another platforms are greeted (e.g. Capsicum, Linux pid/net namespaces, etc.) * Add new SHA256-based HMAC transport integrity modes from http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-dbider-sha2-mac-for-ssh-02.txt These modes are hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-256-96, hmac-sha2-512, and hmac-sha2-512-96, and are accessible by default in ssh(1) and sshd(8) * The pre-authentication sshd(8) privilege separation servant process now logs via a socket shared alongside the expert process, avoiding the need to keep /dev/log inner the chroot. * ssh(1) now warns whenever a server refuses X11 forwarding * sshd_config(5)'s AuthorizedKeysFile now accepts multiple paths, divided by whitespace. The undocumented AuthorizedKeysFile2 choice is deprecated (though the default for AuthorizedKeysFile includes .ssh/authorized_keys2) * sshd_config(5): likewise deprecate UserKnownHostsFile2 and GlobalKnownHostsFile2 by making UserKnownHostsFile and GlobalKnownHostsFile obtain multiple options and default to contain known_hosts2 * Retain key comments whenever loading v.2 keys. These volition be visible in "ssh-add -l" and another places. bz#439 * ssh(1) and sshd(8): set IPv6 traffic category from IPQoS (as fine as IPv4 ToS/DSCP). bz#1855 * ssh_config(5)'s ControlPath choice now expands %L to the host part of the destination presenter name. * ssh_config(5) "Host" options now assistance negated Host matching, e.g. Host *.example.org !c.example.org User mekmitasdigoat Will equivalent "a.example.org", "b.example.org", but not "c.example.org" * ssh_config(5): a new RequestTTY choice provides authority complete whenever a TTY is requested for a connection, akin to the existing -t/-tt/-T ssh(1) commandline options. * sshd(8): authorize GSSAPI authentication to detect whenever a server-side nonaccomplishment causes authentication nonaccomplishment and don't figure specified failures against MaxAuthTries; bz#1244 * ssh-keygen(1): Add -A option. For all of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa and ecdsa) for which presenter keys do not exist, create the host keys alongside the default key document path, an bare passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment. This is helpful for scheme initialisation scripts. * ssh(1): Allow graceful shutdown of multiplexing: petition that a mux server removes its listener socket and refuse forthcoming multiplexing requests but don't slay existing connections. This may be requested using "ssh -O halt ..." * ssh-add(1) now accepts keys piped from norm input. E.g. "ssh-add - < /path/to/key" * ssh-keysign(8) now signs hostbased authentication challenges correctly using ECDSA keys; bz#1858 * sftp(1): document that sftp accepts quadrate brackets to delimit addresses (useful for IPv6); bz#1847a * ssh(1): whenever using meeting multiplexing, the expert procedure will alter its procedure heading to indicate the authority way in use and whenever a ControlPersist-ed expert is waiting to close; bz#1883 and bz#1911 * Other insignificant bugs fixed: 1849 1861 1862 1869 1875 1878 1879 1892 1900 1905 1913 Portable OpenSSH Bugfixes: * Fix a compilation error in the SELinux assistance code. bz#1851 * This publish removes assistance for ssh-rand-helper. OpenSSH now obtains its random numbers immediately from OpenSSL or from a PRNGd/EGD case stated at configure time. * sshd(8) now resets the SELinux procedure implementation environment before executing passwd for password changes; bz#1891 * Since gcc >= 4.x ignores all -Wno-options options, test lone the corresponding -W-option whenever trying to decide whether it is accepted; bz#1901 * Add ECDSA key generation to the Cygwin ssh-{host,user}-config scripts. * Updated .spec and init records for Linux; bz#1920 * Improved SELinux error messages in environment alter failures and suppress error messages whenever attempting to alter from the "unconfined_t" type; bz#1924 bz#1919 * Fix build errors on platforms without dlopen(); bz#1929 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-5.9.tar.gz) = bc0cb728bbc394769f9a2ce5b8cd99dc41e12632 - SHA1 (openssh-5.9p1.tar.gz) = ac4e0055421e9543f0af5da607a72cf5922dcc56 Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 5.8p2 (2011-05-03)

 Portable OpenSSH 5.8p2 was released on 2011-05-03. It volition be available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 5.8p1 =========================== Security: * Fix local personal presenter key colony on platforms without host- flat randomness assistance (e.g. /dev/random) reported by Tomas Mraz On hosts that did not have a randomness origin configured in OpenSSL and were not configured to use EGD/PRNGd (using the --with-prngd-socket configure option), the ssh-rand-helper command was being implicitly executed by ssh-keysign alongside open file descriptors to the presenter personal keys. An attacker could use ptrace(2) to nexus to ssh-rand-helper and exfiltrate the keys. Most contemporary functioning systems are not vulnerable. In particular, *BSD, Linux, OS X and Cygwin do not use ssh-rand-helper. A complete advisory for this matter is accessible at: http://www.openssh.com/txt/portable-keysign-rand-helper.adv Portable OpenSSH Bugfixes: * Fix compilation nonaccomplishment whenever enabling SELinux support. * Revised Cygwin ssh-{host,user}-config that contain ECDSA key support. * Revised Cygwin ssh-host-config to be additional thorough in error checking and reporting. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-5.8p2.tar.gz) = 64798328d310e4f06c9f01228107520adbc8b3e5 Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 5.8/5.8p1 (2011-02-04)

 OpenSSH 5.8 was released on 2011-02-04. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 5.7 ========================= Security: * Fix exposure in bequest certificate signing introduced in OpenSSH-5.6 and established by Mateusz Kocielski. Legacy certificates signed by OpenSSH 5.6 or 5.7 included data from the stack in location of a random nonce field. The contents of the stack do not appear to merge personal data at this point, but this cannot be stated alongside certainty for all platform, archive and compiler combinations. In particular, there exists a hazard that several bytes from the privileged CA key may be accidentally included. A complete advisory for this matter is accessible at: http://www.openssh.com/txt/legacy-cert.adv Portable OpenSSH Bugfixes: * Fix compilation nonaccomplishment whenever enabling SELinux support. * Do not attempt to call SELinux functions whenever SELinux is disabled. bz#1851 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-5.8.tar.gz) = 205dece2c8b41c69b082eb65320d359987aae25b - SHA1 (openssh-5.8p1.tar.gz) = adebb2faa9aba2a3a3c8b401b2b19677ab53f0de Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 5.7/5.7p1 (2011-01-24)

 OpenSSH 5.7 was released on 2011-01-24. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 5.6 ========================= Features: * Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key toggle (ECDH) and host/user keys (ECDSA) as stated by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA recommendation improved achievement than plain DH and DSA at the identical equivalent symmetric key length, as fine as much shorter keys. Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656) is NOT implemented. Certificate presenter and person keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported - an ECDSA key may be certified, and an ECDSA key may act as a CA to sign certificates. ECDH in a 256 bit curve site is the preferred key agreement algorithm whenever the two the client and server assistance it. ECDSA host keys are preferred whenever learning a host's keys for the archetypal time, or can be learned using ssh-keyscan(1). * sftp(1)/sftp-server(8): add a protocol expansion to assistance a hard nexus operation. It is accessible through the "ln" command in the client. The old "ln" behavior of creating a symlink is available using its "-s" choice or through the preexisting "symlink" command * scp(1): Add a new -3 choice to scp: Copies between two distant hosts are transferred through the local host. Without this choice the data is copied immediately between the two distant hosts. * ssh(1): automatically command the hostkeys requested by the client according to which hostkeys are already recorded in known_hosts. This avoids hostkey warnings whenever connecting to servers alongside new ECDSA keys, since these are now preferred whenever learning hostkeys for the archetypal time. * ssh(1)/sshd(8): add a new IPQoS choice to define arbitrary TOS/DSCP/QoS values alternatively of hardcoding lowdelay/throughput. bz#1733 * sftp(1): the sftp client is now considerably faster at performing directory listings, using OpenBSD glob(3) extensions to preserve the results of stat(3) operations performed in the way of its implementation fairly than performing costly circular trips to fetch them again afterwards. * ssh(1): "atomically" create the listening mux socket by binding it on a impermanent name and afterward linking it into stance following listen() has succeeded. This allows the mux clients to decide that the server socket is either prepared or old without races. old server sockets are now automatically removed. (also fixes bz#1711) * ssh(1)/sshd(8): add a KexAlgorithms knob to the client and server configuration to authorize choice of which key toggle methods are used by ssh(1) and sshd(8) and their command of preference. * sftp(1)/scp(1): aspect out bandwidth limiting code from scp(1) into a generic bandwidth limiter that can be attached using the atomicio recall scheme and use it to add a bandwidth bounds choice to sftp(1). bz#1147 BugFixes: * ssh(1)/ssh-agent(1): honour $TMPDIR for client xauth and ssh-agent impermanent directories. bz#1809 * ssh(1): evade NULL deref on receiving a conduit petition on an unknown or invalid channel; bz#1842 * sshd(8): eliminate a debug() that pollutes stderr on client connecting to a server in debug mode; bz#1719 * scp(1): continue through ssh command-line flags and options whenever doing remote-remote transfers, e.g. to allow delegate forwarding which is particularly helpful in this case; bz#1837 * sftp-server(8): umask have to be parsed as octal * sftp(1): escape '[' in filename tab-completion * ssh(1): Typo in confirmation message. bz#1827 * sshd(8): forestall free() of cord in .rodata whenever overriding AuthorizedKeys in a Match block * sshd(8): Use default casing /bin/sh if $SHELL is "" * ssh(1): slay proxy command on fatal() (we already killed it on spotless exit); * ssh(1): instal a SIGCHLD handler to reap expired kid process; bz#1812 * Support construction against openssl-1.0.0a Portable OpenSSH Bugfixes: * Use mandoc as preferred manpage formatter if it is present, followed by nroff and groff respectively. * sshd(8): Relax approval necessity on btmp logs to authorize group read/write * bz#1840: fix alert whenever configuring --with-ssl-engine * sshd(8): Use accurate uid_t/pid_t types alternatively of int. bz#1817 * sshd(8): bz#1824: Add Solaris Project support. * sshd(8): Check is_selinux_enabled for exact come back code since it can apparently come back -1 under several conditions. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-5.7.tar.gz) = 67cb91772a33fb3a004b39bcdb9148218365494c - SHA1 (openssh-5.7p1.tar.gz) = 423e27475f06e1055847dfff7f61e1ac632b5372 Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 5.6/5.6p1 (2010-08-23)

 OpenSSH 5.6 was released on 2010-08-23. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 5.5 ========================= Features: * Added a ControlPersist choice to ssh_config(5) that automatically starts a backdrop ssh(1) multiplex expert whenever connecting. This association can remain living indefinitely, or can be set to automatically near following a user-specified duration of inactivity. * Hostbased authentication may now use certificate presenter keys. CA keys must be stated in a known_hosts document using the @cert-authority marker as described in sshd(8). * ssh-keygen(1) now supports signing certificate using a CA key that has been stored in a PKCS#11 token. * ssh(1) volition now log the hostname and location that we connected to at LogLevel=verbose following authentication is prosperous to mitigate "phishing" attacks by servers alongside trusted keys that accept authentication silently and automatically before presenting fake password/passphrase prompts. Note that, for specified an assault to be successful, the person must have impaired StrictHostKeyChecking (enabled by default) or an attacker must have admission to a trusted presenter key for the destination server. * Expand %h to the hostname in ssh_config Hostname options. While this appears useless, it is really helpful for operating alongside unqualified hostnames: Host *.* Hostname %h Host * Hostname %h.example.org * Allow ssh-keygen(1) to import (-i) and export (-e) of PEM and PKCS#8 keys in supplement to RFC4716 (SSH.COM) encodings via a new -m choice (bz#1749) * sshd(8) volition now queue debug messages for bad ownership or permissions on the user's keyfiles encountered during authentication and volition dispatch them following authentication has successfully completed. These messages may be viewed in ssh(1) at LogLevel=debug or higher. * ssh(1) association multiplexing now supports distant forwarding with energetic harbor allocation and can study the allocated harbor rear to the user: LPORT=`ssh -S muxsocket -R0:localhost:25 -O onward somehost` * sshd(8) now supports indirection in matching of chief names listed in certificates. By default, if a certificate has an embedded principals catalog afterward the username on the server must match among the names in the catalog for it to be accepted for authentication. sshd(8) now has a new AuthorizedPrincipalsFile choice to define a document containing a catalog of names that may be accepted in location of the username whenever authorizing a certificate trusted via the sshd_config(5) TrustedCAKeys option. Similarly, authentication using a CA trusted in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys now accepts a principals="name1[,name2,...]" to define a catalog of permitted names. If either choice is absent, the current behavior of requiring the username to appear in principals continues to apply. These options are helpful for function accounts, disjoint document namespaces and "user@realm"-style naming policies in certificates. * Additional sshd_config(5) options are now valid inner Match blocks: AuthorizedKeysFile AuthorizedPrincipalsFile HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly PermitTunnel * Revised the format of certificate keys. The new format, identified as ssh-{dss,rsa}[email protected] includes the following changes: - Adding a serial figure field. This may be stated by the CA at the period of certificate signing. - Moving the nonce site to the commencement of the certificate where it can improved defend against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash (currently infeasible against the SHA1 hash used) - Renaming the "constraints" site to "critical options" - Addng a new non-critical "extensions" field. The "permit-*" options are now extensions, fairly than crucial options to authorize non-OpenSSH implementation of this key format to degrade gracefully whenever encountering keys alongside options they do not recognize. The older format is motionless supported for authentication and may still be used whenever signing certificates (use "ssh-keygen -t v00 ..."). The v00 format, introduced in OpenSSH 5.4, volition be supported for at smallest one twelvemonth from this release, following which it volition be deprecated and removed. BugFixes: * The PKCS#11 code now retries a lookup for a personal key if there is no matching key alongside CKA_SIGN trait enabled; this fixes MuscleCard assistance (bz#1736) * Unbreak strdelim() skipping former quoted strings (bz#1757). For example, the following directive was not parsed correctly: AllowUsers "blah blah" blah * sftp(1): fix exchanged args in upload_dir_internal(), breaking recursive upload degree checks and causing verbose printing of transfers to continually be turned on (bz#1797) * Fix a longstanding issue anywhere if you suspend scp(1) at the password/passphrase immediate the terminal manner is not restored. * Fix a PKCS#11 collision on several smartcards by validating the length returned for C_GetAttributValue (bz#1773) * sftp(1): fix ls in operating directories that merge globbing characters in their pathnames (bz#1655) * Print alert for missing residence directory whenever ChrootDirectory=none (bz#1564) * sftp(1): fix a recollection leak in do_realpath() error way (bz#1771) * ssk-keygen(1): Standardise error messages whenever attempting to open personal key records to contain "progname: filename: error reason" (bz#1783) * Replace verbose and overflow-prone Linebuf code with read_keyfile_line() (bz#1565) * Include the person name on "subsystem petition for ..." log messages * ssh(1) and sshd(8): eliminate hardcoded bounds of 100 permitopen clauses and harbor forwards per direction (bz#1327) * sshd(8): disregard stderr output from subsystems to evade hangs if a subsystem or casing initialisation writes to stderr (bz#1750) * Skip the first inspect for admission alongside an bare password when PermitEmptyPasswords=no (bz#1638) * sshd(8): fix logspam whenever key options (from="..." especially) deny non-matching keys (bz#1765) * ssh-keygen(1): display a additional helpful error communication whenever $HOME is inaccessible during trying to create .ssh directory (bz#1740) * ssh(1): fix suspend whenever terminating a mux servant using ~. (bz#1758) * ssh-keygen(1): refuse to create keys longer than OPENSSL_[RD]SA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS, since we would refuse to use them anyhow (bz#1516) * Suppress spurious tty alert whenever using -O and stdin is not a tty (bz#1746) * Kill conduit whenever pty allocation requests fail. Fixed stuck client if the server refuses pty allocation (bz#1698) Portable OpenSSH Bugfixes: * sshd(8): addition the maximum username dimension for login recording to 512 characters (bz#1579) * Initialize the values to be returned from PAM to sane values in case the PAM method doesn't compose to them. (bz#1795) * Let configure discover OpenSSL libraries in a lib64 subdirectory. (bz#1756) Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-5.6.tar.gz) = fa5ac394b874d6709031306b6ac5c48399697f7f - SHA1 (openssh-5.6p1.tar.gz) = 347dd39c91c3529f41dae63714d452fb95efea1e Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 5.5/5.5p1 (2010-04-16)

 OpenSSH 5.5 was released on 2010-04-16. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html This is a bugfix release. Changes since OpenSSH 5.4 ========================= * Unbreak sshd_config's AuthorizedKeysFile choice for $HOME-relative paths * Fix compilation failures on platforms that deficiency dlopen() * Include a tongue tag whenever sending a protocol 2 disconnection message. * Make logging of certificates used for person authentication additional apparent and accordant between CAs stated using TrustedUserCAKeys and authorized_keys Portable OpenSSH: * Allow contrib/ssh-copy-id to neglect gracefully whenever there are no keys in the ssh-agent. bz#1723 * Explicitly nexus libX11 into contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2. bz#1725 * Allow ChrootDirectory to activity in SELinux platforms. bz#1726 * Add configure.ac stanza for Haiku OS. bz#1741 * Enable utmpx assistance on FreeBSD anywhere possible. bz#1732 * Use pkg-config to decide libedit linker flags anywhere possible. bz#1744 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-5.5.tar.gz) = 59864a048b09ad1b6e65a74d5d385d8189ab8c74 - SHA1 (openssh-5.5p1.tar.gz) = 361c6335e74809b26ea096b34062ba8ff6c97cd6 Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 5.4/5.4p1 (2010-03-08)

 OpenSSH 5.4 was released on 2010-03-08. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html This is a important characteristic and bugfix release. Changes since OpenSSH 5.3 ========================= Features: * After a passage duration of concerning 10 years, this publish disables SSH protocol 1 by default. Clients and servers that need to use the bequest protocol must explicitly allow it in ssh_config / sshd_config or on the command-line. * Remove the libsectok/OpenSC-based smartcard code and add assistance for PKCS#11 tokens. This assistance is automatically enabled on all platforms that assistance dlopen(3) and was inspired by patches written by Alon Bar-Lev. Details in the ssh(1) and ssh-add(1) manpages. * Add assistance for certificate authentication of users and hosts using a new, minimal OpenSSH certificate format (not X.509). Certificates merge a community key, character data and several validity constraints and are signed alongside a norm SSH community key using ssh-keygen(1). CA keys may be marked as trusted in authorized_keys or via a TrustedUserCAKeys choice in sshd_config(5) (for user authentication), or in known_hosts (for presenter authentication). Documentation for certificate assistance may be established in ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) and ssh(1) and a clarification of the protocol extensions in PROTOCOL.certkeys. * Added a 'netcat mode' to ssh(1): "ssh -W host:port ..." This connects stdio on the client to a sole harbor onward on the server. This allows, for example, using ssh as a ProxyCommand to path connections via intermediate servers. bz#1618 * Add the capability to revoke keys in sshd(8) and ssh(1). User keys may be revoked using a new sshd_config(5) choice "RevokedKeys". Host keys are revoked through known_hosts (details in the sshd(8) man page). Revoked keys cannot be used for person or presenter authentication and will trigger a alert if used. * Rewrite the ssh(1) multiplexing assistance to assistance non-blocking procedure of the mux master, enhance the resilience of the expert to malformed messages sent to it by the servant and add assistance for requesting port- forwardings via the multiplex protocol. The new stdio-to-local onward manner ("ssh -W host:port ...") is also supported. The revised multiplexing protocol is documented in the document PROTOCOL.mux in the origin distribution. * Add a 'read-only' manner to sftp-server(8) that disables open in write manner and all another fs-modifying protocol methods. bz#430 * Allow environment an definitive umask on the sftp-server(8) commandline to override any default the person has. bz#1229 * Many improvements to the sftp(1) client, many of which were implemented by Carlos Silva through the Google Summer of Code program: - Support the "-h" (human-readable units) emblem for ls - Implement tab-completion of commands, local and distant filenames - Support most of scp(1)'s commandline arguments in sftp(1), as a archetypal stage towards making sftp(1) a drop-in replacement for scp(1). Note that the rarely-used "-P sftp_server_path" choice has been moved to "-D sftp_server_path" to create way for "-P port" to match scp(1). - Add recursive transfer assistance for get/put and on the commandline * New RSA keys volition be generated alongside a community exponent of RSA_F4 == (2**16)+1 == 65537 alternatively of the former value 35. * Passphrase-protected SSH protocol 2 personal keys are now protected alongside AES-128 alternatively of 3DES. This applied to newly-generated keys as fine as keys that are reencrypted (e.g. by changing their passphrase). Bugfixes: * Hold authentication debug messages until following successful authentication. Fixes a insignificant data leak of environment variables stated in authorized_keys if an attacker happens to cognize the community key in use. * When using ChrootDirectory, create certain we test for the beingness of the user's casing inner the chroot and not exterior (bz#1679) * Cache person and collection name lookups in sftp-server using user_from_[ug]id(3) to enhance achievement on hosts anywhere these operations are dilatory (e.g. NIS or LDAP). bz#1495 * Fix issue that prevented passphrase study from being interrupted in several circumstances; bz#1590 * Ignore and log any Protocol 1 keys anywhere the claimed size is not equal to the genuine size. * Make HostBased authentication activity alongside a ProxyCommand. bz#1569 * Avoid run-time failures whenever specifying hostkeys via a relative way by prepending the current operating directory in these cases. bz#1290 * Do not immediate for a passphrase if we neglect to open a keyfile, and log the logic why the open unsuccessful to debug. bz#1693 * Document that the PubkeyAuthentication directive is allowed in a sshd_config(5) Match block. bz#1577 * When converting keys, truncate key comments at 72 chars as per RFC4716. bz#1630 * Do not authorize logins if /etc/nologin exists but is not readable by the person logging in. * Output a debug log if sshd(8) can't open an existing authorized_keys. bz#1694 * Quell tc[gs]etattr warnings whenever forcing a tty (ssh -tt), since we normally don't really have a tty to read/set; bz#1686 * Prevent sftp from crashing whenever stated a "-" without a command. Also, authorize whitespace to prosecute a "-". bz#1691 * After sshd receives a SIGHUP, disregard consequent HUPs during sshd re-execs itself. Prevents two HUPs in quick succession from resulting in sshd dying. bz#1692 * Clarify in sshd_config(5) that StrictModes does not use to ChrootDirectory. Permissions and ownership are continually checked when chrooting. bz#1532 * Set close-on-exec on assorted descriptors so they don't get leaked to kid processes. bz#1643 * Fix extremely rare competition circumstance in x11/agent conduit allocation: don't peruse following the end of the choose read/write fdset and create certain a reused FD is not touched before the pre-handlers are called. * Fix incorrect exit position whenever multiplexing and conduit ID 0 is recycled. bz#1570 * Fail alongside an error whenever an attempt is made to nexus to a server alongside ForceCommand=internal-sftp alongside a casing meeting (i.e. not a subsystem session). Avoids stuck client whenever attempting to ssh to specified a service. bz#1606: * Warn but do not neglect if stat()ing the subsystem binary fails. This helps alongside chrootdirectory+forcecommand=sftp-server and restricted shells. bz #1599 * Change "Connecting to host..." communication to "Connected to host." and postpone it until following the sftp protocol association has been established. Avoids confusing sequence of messages whenever the underlying ssh association experiences problems. bz#1588 * Use the HostKeyAlias fairly than the hostname stated on the commandline whenever prompting for passwords. bz#1039 * Correct off-by-one in percent_expand(): we would fatal() whenever trying to develop EXPAND_MAX_KEYS, allowing lone EXPAND_MAX_KEYS-1 to really work. Note that nothing in OpenSSH really uses near to this bounds at present. bz#1607 * Fix passing of bare options from scp(1) and sftp(1) to the underlying ssh(1). Also add assistance for the halt choice "--". * Fix an incorrect magic figure and typo in PROTOCOL; bz#1688 * Don't escape backslashes whenever displaying the SSH2 banner. bz#1533 * Don't unnecessarily dup() the in and out fds for sftp-server. bz#1566 * Force use of the accurate hash function for random-art signature display as it was inheriting the incorrect one whenever bubblebabble signatures were activated. bz#1611 * Do not autumn rear to adding keys without constraints (ssh-add -c / -t ...) whenever the delegate refuses the constrained add request. bz#1612 * Fix a competition circumstance in ssh-agent that could outcome in a wedged or spinning agent. bz#1633 * Flush stdio before exec() to justify that everying (motd in particular) has made it out before the streams go away. bz#1596 * Set FD_CLOEXEC on in/out sockets in sshd(8). bz#1706 Portable OpenSSH Bugfixes: * Use system's kerberos chief name on AIX if it's available. bz#1583 * Disable OOM-killing of the listening sshd on Linux. bz#1470 * Use pkg-config for opensc config if it's available. bz#1160 * Unbreak Redhat spec to authorize construction without askpass. bz#1677 * If PidFile is set in sshd_config, use it in SMF init file. bz#1628 * Print error and usage() whenever ssh-rand-helper is passed command- row arguments as none are supported. bz#1568 * Add missing setsockopt() to set IPV6_V6ONLY for local forwarding alongside GatwayPorts=yes. bz#1648 * Make GNOME 2 askpass dialog desktop-modal. bz#1645 * If SELinux is enabled set the safety environment to "sftpd_t" before operating the inner sftp server. bz#1637 * Correctly inspect libselinux for necessary SELinux functions; bz#1713 * Unbreak builds on Redhat using the supplied openssh.spec; bz#1731 * Fix incorrect privilege dropping command on AIX that prevented chroot operation; bz#1567 * Call aix_setauthdb/aix_restoredb at the accurate times on AIX to forestall authentication failure; bz#1710 Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-5.4.tar.gz) = 1776832d902f7b4c7863afd41a5ec7a14efe95d6 - SHA1 (openssh-5.4p1.tar.gz) = 2a3042372f08afb1415ceaec8178213276a36302 Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 5.3/5.3p1 (2009-10-01)

 OpenSSH 5.3 was released on 2009-10-01. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. This publish marks the 10th commemoration of the OpenSSH project. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their support, especially those who volition continue to contribute code or patches, report bugs, test snapshots or donate to the project during the next 10 years. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html This is a bugfix release, no new features have been added. Changes since OpenSSH 5.2 ========================= General Bugfixes: * Do not bounds residence directory paths to 256 characters. bz#1615 * Several insignificant records and correctness fixes. Portable OpenSSH Bugfixes: * This publish removes for assistance for extremely old versions of Cygwin and for Windows 95/98/ME * Move the deletion of PAM credentials on logout to following the session close. bz#1534 * Make PrintLastLog activity on AIX. bz#1595 * Avoid compile errors on FreeBSD from conflicts in glob.h. bz#1634 * Delay dropping of base privileges on AIX so chroot and pam_open_session activity correctly. bz#1249 and bz#1567 * Increase client IO buffer on Cygwin to 64K, realising a significant achievement improvement. * Roll rear bz#1241 (better handling for expired passwords on Tru64). The alter bankrupt password logins on several configurations. * Accept ENOSYS as a fallback error whenever attempting atomic rename(). bz#1535 * Fix passing of variables to recursive make(1) invocations on Solaris. bz#1505 * Skip the tcgetattr call on the pty expert on Solaris, since it never succeeds and can suspend if ample amounts of data is sent to the slave (eg a copy-paste). bz#1528 * Fix finding of krb5-config. bz#1639 * Fix test for server-assigned distant forwarding harbor for non-root users. bz#1578 * Fix finding of libresolv on OSX 10.6. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-5.3.tar.gz) = f1b9a280565e916c1f84fd4d944313ec926242a2 - SHA1 (openssh-5.3p1.tar.gz) = d411fde2584ef6022187f565360b2c63a05602b5 Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 5.2/5.2p1 (2009-02-23)

 OpenSSH 5.2 was released on 2009-02-23. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We have additionally lately completed another Internet SSH use scan, the results of which may be established at http://www.openssh.com/usage.html Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html The concentration of this publish has been on bugfixes as the previous openssh-5.1 publish introduced many new features and made some invasive changes. Changes since OpenSSH 5.1 ========================= Security: * This publish changes the default code command to favor the AES CTR modes and the revised "arcfour256" manner to CBC manner ciphers that are susceptible to CPNI-957037 "Plaintext Recovery Attack Against SSH". * This publish additionally adds countermeasures to mitigate CPNI-957037-style attacks against the SSH protocol's use of CBC-mode ciphers. Upon finding of an invalid packet dimension or Message Authentication Code, ssh/sshd volition continue study up to the maximum supported packet dimension fairly than immediately terminating the connection. This eliminates most of the known differences in behavior that leaked data concerning the plaintext of injected data which formed the basis of this attack. We accept that these attacks are rendered infeasible by these changes. New features: * Added a -y choice to ssh(1) to power logging to syslog fairly than stderr, which is helpful whenever operating daemonised (ssh -f) * The sshd_config(5) ForceCommand directive now accepts commandline arguments for the internal-sftp server. * The ssh(1) ~C escape commandline now assistance runtime innovation of energetic (-D) harbor forwards. * Support the SOCKS4A protocol in ssh(1) energetic (-D) forwards. (bz#1482) * Support distant harbor forwarding alongside a hear harbor of '0'. This informs the server that it should dynamically allocate a listen harbor and study it rear to the client. (bz#1003) * sshd(8) now supports environment PermitEmptyPasswords and AllowAgentForwarding in Match blocks Bug and records fixes * Repair a ssh(1) collision introduced in openssh-5.1 whenever the client is sent a zero-length banner (bz#1496) * Due to interoperability problems alongside certain damaged SSH implementations, the [email protected] and [email protected] protocol extensions are now lone sent to peers that acknowledge themselves as OpenSSH. * Make ssh(1) dispatch the accurate conduit figure for SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS and SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE messages to evade triggering 'Non-public channel' error messages on sshd(8) in openssh-5.1. * Avoid printing 'Non-public channel' warnings in sshd(8), since the ssh(1) has sent incorrect conduit numbers since ~2004 (this reverts a behavior introduced in openssh-5.1). * Avoid double-free in ssh(1) ~C escape -L handler (bz#1539) * Correct fail-on-error behavior in sftp(1) batchmode for remote stat operations. (bz#1541) * Disable nonfunctional ssh(1) ~C escape handler in multiplex slave connections. (bz#1543) * Avoid suspend in ssh(1) whenever attempting to nexus to a server that has MaxSessions=0 set. * Multiple fixes to sshd(8) configuration test (-T) mode * Several center and portable OpenSSH bugs fixed: 1380, 1412, 1418, 1419, 1421, 1490, 1491, 1492, 1514, 1515, 1518, 1520, 1538, 1540 * Many manual leaf improvements. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-5.2.tar.gz) = 260074ed466e95f054ac05a4406f613d08575217 - SHA1 (openssh-5.2p1.tar.gz) = 8273a0237db98179fbdc412207ff8eb14ff3d6de Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 5.1/5.1p1 (2008-07-22)

 OpenSSH 5.1 was released on 2008-07-22. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We have additionally lately completed another Internet SSH use scan, the results of which may be established at http://www.openssh.com/usage.html Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More data on donations may be established at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 5.0 ========================= Security: * sshd(8): Avoid X11 man-in-the-middle assault on HP/UX (and possibly another platforms) whenever X11UseLocalhost=no When attempting to bind(2) to a harbor that has earlier been bound alongside SO_REUSEADDR set, most functioning systems inspect that either the productive user-id matches the former tie (common on BSD-derived systems) or that the tie addresses do not overlap (Linux and Solaris). Some functioning systems, specified as HP/UX, do not execute these checks and are susceptible to an X11 man-in-the-middle assault whenever the sshd_config(5) choice X11UseLocalhost has been set to "no" - an attacker may established a more-specific bind, which volition be used in penchant to sshd's wildcard listener. Modern BSD functioning systems, Linux, OS X and Solaris execute the complete checks and are not susceptible to this attack, nor are systems anywhere the X11UseLocalhost has been remaining at the default value of "yes". Portable OpenSSH 5.1 avoids this issue for all functioning systems by not environment SO_REUSEADDR whenever X11UseLocalhost is set to no. This exposure was reported by sway2004009 AT hotmail.com. New features: * Introduce experimental SSH Fingerprint ASCII Visualisation to ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1). Visual fingerprinnt display is controlled by a new ssh_config(5) choice "VisualHostKey". The intent is to render SSH presenter keys in a ocular form that is amenable to uncomplicated recall and rejection of changed presenter keys. This method inspired by the graphical hash visualisation schemes known as "random art[*]", and by Dan Kaminsky's musings at 23C3 in Berlin. Fingerprint visualisation in is currently impaired by default, as the algorithm used to create the random art is motionless topic to change. [*] "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to enhance Real-World Security", Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) http://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf * sshd_config(5) now supports CIDR address/masklen matching in "Match address" blocks, alongside a fallback to traditional wildcard matching. For example: Match location 192.0.2.0/24,3ffe:ffff::/32,!10.* PasswordAuthentication yes * sshd(8) now supports CIDR matching in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys from="..." restrictions, additionally alongside a fallback to traditional wildcard matching. * Added an extended test manner (-T) to sshd(8) to petition that it write its productive configuration to stdout and exit. Extended test mode additionally supports the specification of association parameters (username, origin location and hostname) to test the use of sshd_config(5) Match rules. * ssh(1) now prints the figure of bytes transferred and the overall association throughput for SSH protocol 2 sessions whenever in verbose manner (previously these data were displayed for protocol 1 connections only). * sftp-server(8) now supports expansion methods [email protected] and [email protected] that execute statvfs(2)-like operations. (bz#1399) * sftp(1) now has a "df" command to the sftp client that uses the [email protected] to create a df(1)-like display of filesystem area and inode utilisation (requires [email protected] assistance on the server) * Added a MaxSessions choice to sshd_config(5) to authorize authority of the figure of multiplexed sessions supported complete a sole TCP connection. This allows expanding the figure of allowed sessions complete the former default of 10, disabling association multiplexing (MaxSessions=1) or disallowing login/shell/subsystem sessions entirely (MaxSessions=0). * Added a [email protected] earth petition expansion that is sent from ssh(1) to sshd(8) whenever the client knows that it volition never petition another meeting (i.e. whenever meeting multiplexing is disabled). This allows a server to disallow additional meeting requests and terminate the meeting in cases anywhere the client has been hijacked. * ssh-keygen(1) now supports the use of the -l choice in combination alongside -F to hunt for a presenter in ~/.ssh/known_hosts and display its fingerprint. * ssh-keyscan(1) now defaults to "rsa" (protocol 2) keys, alternatively of "rsa1". * Added an AllowAgentForwarding choice to sshd_config(8) to control whether authentication delegate forwarding is permitted. Note that this is a free control, as a client may instal their own unofficial forwarder. * ssh(1) and sshd(8): evade unnecessary malloc/copy/free whenever receiving network data, resulting in a ~10% speedup * ssh(1) and sshd(8) volition now try additional addresses whenever connecting to a harbor onward destination whose DNS name resolves to additional than one address. The former behavior was to try the lone archetypal address and provision up if that failed. (bz#383) * ssh(1) and sshd(8) now assistance signalling that channels are half-closed for writing, through a conduit protocol extension notification "[email protected]". This allows propagation of closed document descriptors, so that commands specified as: "ssh -2 localhost od /bin/ls | true" do not dispatch unnecessary data complete the wire. (bz#85) * sshd(8): risen the default size of ssh protocol 1 ephemeral keys from 768 to 1024 bits. * When ssh(1) has been requested to fork following authentication ("ssh -f") alongside ExitOnForwardFailure enabled, postpone the fork until following replies for any -R forwards have been seen. Allows for robust finding of -R onward nonaccomplishment whenever using -f. (bz#92) * "Match group" blocks in sshd_config(5) now assistance negation of groups. E.g. "Match collection staff,!guests" (bz#1315) * sftp(1) and sftp-server(8) now authorize chmod-like operations to set set[ug]id/sticky bits. (bz#1310) * The MaxAuthTries choice is now permitted in sshd_config(5) match blocks. * Multiplexed ssh(1) sessions now assistance a subset of the ~ escapes that are accessible to a chief connection. (bz#1331) * ssh(1) association multiplexing volition now autumn rear to creating a new association in most error cases. (bz#1439 bz#1329) * Added several essential interoperability tests against Twisted Conch. * Documented OpenSSH's extensions to and deviations from the published SSH protocols (the PROTOCOL document in the distribution) * Documented OpenSSH's ssh-agent protocol (PROTOCOL.agent). Bug and records fixes * Make ssh(1) agreement additional gracefully alongside conduit requests that fail. Previously it would optimistically assume that requests would continually succeed, which could logic hangs if they did not (e.g. whenever the server runs out of document descriptors). (bz#1384) * ssh(1) now reports multiplexing errors via the multiplex slave's stderr anywhere imaginable (subject to LogLevel in the mux master). * ssh(1) and sshd(8) now dispatch terminate protocol banners alongside CR+LF for protocol 2 to comply alongside RFC 4253. Previously they were terminated alongside CR alone. Protocol 1 banners remain CR terminated. (bz#1443) * Merged copy authentication document checks in sshd(8) and refuse to peruse authorised_keys and .shosts from non-regular files. (bz#1438) * Ensure that sshd(8)'s umask disallows at smallest collection and earth write, equal if a additional permissive one has been inherited. (bz#1433) * Suppress the alert communication from sshd(8) whenever changing to a non-existent person residence directory following chrooting. (bz#1461) * Mention that scp(1) follows symlinks whenever performing recursive copies. (bz#1466) * Prevent sshd(8) from erroneously applying community key restrictions leaned from ~/.ssh/authorized_keys to another authentication methods whenever community key authentication subsequently fails. (bz#1472) * Fix protocol keepalive timeouts - in several cases, keepalive packets were being sent, but the association was not being closed whenever the bounds for missing replies was exceeded. (bz#1465) * Fix ssh(1) sending invalid TTY modes whenever a TTY was forced (ssh -tt) but stdin was not a TTY. (bz#1199) * ssh(1) volition now exit alongside a non-zero exit position if ExitOnForwardFailure was set and forwardings were impaired because of a unsuccessful presenter key check. * Fix MaxAuthTries tests to disallow a liberated authentication try to clients that skipped the protocol 2 "none" authentication method. (part of bz#1432) * Make keepalive timeouts use during synchronously waiting for a packet, particularly during key renegotiation. (bz#1363) * sshd(8) has been audited to eliminate fd leaks and calls to fatal() in conditions of document descriptor exhaustion. Portable OpenSSH-specific bugfixes * Avoid a sshd(8) hang-on-exit on Solaris caused by depending on the achievement of isatty() on a PTY expert (undefined behaviour). Probably affected another platforms too. (bz#1463) * Fixed test for locked accounts on HP/UX alongside shadowed passwords disabled. (bz#1083) * Disable poll() fallback in atomiciov for Tru64. readv doesn't appear to be a comparable entity there, which guide to compilation errors. (bz#1386) * Fall rear to racy rename if nexus returns EXDEV. (bz#1447) * Explicitly grip EWOULDBLOCK anywhere we grip EAGAIN, on several platforms (HP nonstop) it is a distinct errno. (bz#1467) * Avoid NULL dereferences in ancient sigaction replacement code. (bz#1240) * Avoid linking against libgssapi, which notwithstanding its name doesn't appear to execute all of GSSAPI. (bz#1276) * Use definitive noreturn trait alternatively of __dead, fixing compilation problems on Interix. (bz#1112) * Added assistance password expiry on Tru64 SIA systems. (bz#1241) * Fixed an UMAC alignment issue that manifested on Itanium platforms. (bz#1462) * The sftp-server(8) manual now describes the requirements for transfer logging in chroot environments. (bz#1488) * Strip trailing dot from hostnames whenever the sshd_config(5) HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly choice is set. (bz#1200) Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-5.1.tar.gz) = 1e5b43844ed015e4fbbbe25cfad6f5377c60e759 - SHA1 (openssh-5.1p1.tar.gz) = 877ea5b283060fe0160e376ea645e8e168047ff5 Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs have to be reported immediately to [email protected] OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 5.0/5.0p1 (2008-04-03)

 OpenSSH 5.0 was released on 2008-04-03. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. We apologise for any inconvenience resulting from this release being made so shortly following 4.9. Unfortunately we lone learned of the below safety matter from the community CVE report. The Debian OpenSSH maintainers liable for handling the first study of this bug unsuccessful to study it via either the personal OpenSSH security contact catalog ([email protected]) or the portable OpenSSH Bugzilla (http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/). We ask anyone wishing to study safety bugs in OpenSSH to delight use the [email protected] communication and to custom liable disclosure. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots and purchased T-shirts or posters. T-shirt, poster and CD revenue immediately assistance the project. Pictures and additional data can be established at: http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html and http://www.openbsd.org/orders.html For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 4.9: ============================ Security: * CVE-2008-1483: Avoid imaginable hijacking of X11-forwarded connections by refusing to hear on a harbor unless all location families bind successfully. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-5.0.tar.gz) = 729fb3168edf6a68408223b5ed82e59d13b57c47 - SHA1 (openssh-5.0p1.tar.gz) = 121cea3a730c0b0353334b6f46f438de30ab4928 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 4.9/4.9p1 (2008-03-31)

 OpenSSH 4.9 was released on 2008-03-31. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots and purchased T-shirts or posters. T-shirt, poster and CD revenue immediately assistance the project. Pictures and additional data can be established at: http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html and http://www.openbsd.org/orders.html For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Note that OpenSSH 4.8 was an OpenBSD-only publish shipped alongside the OpenBSD 4.3 CD. Changes since OpenSSH 4.7: ============================ Security: * Disable implementation of ~/.ssh/rc for sessions anywhere a command has been forced by the sshd_config ForceCommand directive. Users who had compose admission to this document could use it to execute arbitrary commands. This behavior was documented, but was an unsafe default and an extra hassle for administrators. New features: * Added chroot(2) assistance for sshd(8), controlled by a new option "ChrootDirectory". Please mention to sshd_config(5) for details, and delight use this characteristic carefully. (bz#177 bz#1352) * Linked sftp-server(8) into sshd(8). The inner sftp server is used whenever the command "internal-sftp" is stated in a Subsystem or ForceCommand declaration. When used alongside ChrootDirectory, the inner sftp server requires no particular configuration of files inner the chroot environment. Please mention to sshd_config(5) for additional information. * Added a "no-user-rc" choice for authorized_keys to disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc * Added a protocol expansion method "[email protected]" for sftp-server(8) to execute POSIX nuclear rename() operations. (bz#1400) * Removed the fixed bounds of 100 document handles in sftp-server(8). The server volition now dynamically allocate handles up to the figure of accessible document descriptors. (bz#1397) * ssh(8) volition now skip generation of SSH protocol 1 ephemeral server keys whenever in inetd manner and protocol 2 connections are negotiated. This speeds up protocol 2 connections to inetd-mode servers that additionally authorize Protocol 1 (bz#440) * Accept the PermitRootLogin directive in a sshd_config(5) Match block. Allows for, e.g. permitting base lone from the local network. * Reworked sftp(1) disagreement splitting and escaping to be more internally accordant (i.e. between sftp commands) and more accordant alongside sh(1). Please note that this volition alter the explanation of several quoted strings, particularly those with embedded backslash escape sequences. (bz#778) * Support "Banner=none" in sshd_config(5) to disable sending of a pre-login banner (e.g. in a Match block). * ssh(1) ProxyCommands are now executed alongside $SHELL fairly than /bin/sh. * ssh(1)'s ConnectTimeout choice is now applied to the two the TCP association and the SSH banner toggle (previously it fair covered the TCP connection). This allows callers of ssh(1) to improved detect and agreement alongside stuck servers that obtain a TCP association but don't advancement the protocol, and additionally makes ConnectTimeout helpful for connections via a ProxyCommand. * Many new regression tests, including interop tests against PuTTY's plink. * Support BSM auditing on Mac OS X The following bugs have been fixed in this release: - scp(1) incorrectly reported "stalled" on dilatory copies. (bz#799) - scp(1) date underflow for timestamps before epoch. (bz#828) - scp(1) and sftp(1) progressmeter category fixes. (bz#842) - SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED packets did not correctly reset the client keepalive logic, causing disconnections on servers that did not explicitly execute "[email protected]". (bz#1307) - ssh(1) used the obsolete SIG DNS RRtype for presenter keys in DNS, alternatively of the current norm RRSIG. (bz#1317) - Extract magic buffer size constants in scp(1) to #defines. (bz#1333) - Correctly drain ACKs whenever a sftp(1) upload compose fails midway, avoids a fatal() exit from what have to be a recoverable condition. (bz#1354) - Avoid pointer arithmetic and strict aliasing warnings. (bz#1355) - Fixed packet size advertisements. Previously TCP and agent forwarding incorrectly advertised the conduit opening size as the packet size, causing fatal errors under several conditions. (bz#1360) - Document KbdInteractiveAuthentication in sshd_config(5). (bz#1367) - Fixed sftp(1) document grip leak on download whenever the local file could not be opened. (bz#1375) - Fixed ssh-keygen(1) selective presenter key hashing (i.e. "ssh-keygen -HF hostname") to not contain any IP location in the data to be hashed. (bz#1376) - Fix clobbering of struct passwd from multiple getpwid calls, resulting in fatal errors inner tilde_expand_filename. (bz#1377) - Fix parsing of port-forwarding details to correctly detect errors in either stated harbor number. (bz#1378) - Fix recollection leak in ssh(1) ~ escape commandline handling. (bz#1379) - Make ssh(1) skip listening on the IPv6 wildcard location whenever a binding location of 0.0.0.0 is used against an old SSH server that does not assistance the RFC4254 syntax for wildcard tie addresses. (bz#1381) - Remove additional backslashes in the RB_PROTOTYPE macro definition. (bz#1385) - Support ssh(1) RekeyLimits up to the maximum allowed by the protocol: 2**32-1. (bz#1390) - Enable IPV6_V6ONLY socket choice on sshd(8) hear socket, as is already done for X11/TCP forwarding sockets. (bz#1392) - Fix FD leak that could suspend a ssh(1) association multiplexing master. (bz#1398) - Improve error messages whenever hostname resolution fails because of a scheme error. (bz#1417) - Make ssh(1) -q choice records accordant alongside reality. (bz#1427 bz#1429) Portable OpenSSH bugs fixed: - Fixed sshd(8) PAM assistance not calling pam_session_close(), or failing to call it alongside base privileges. (bz#926) - Made sshd(8) use configuration-specified SyslogFacility for hosts_access(3) messages for denied connections. (bz#1042) - Implement getgrouplist(3) for AIX, enabling NSS LDAP to activity on this platform. (bz#1081) - Fix compilation errors on AIX because of misdefinition of LLONG_MAX. (bz#1347) - Force use of local glob(3) implementation on Mac OS X and FreeBSD, as the phase versions deficiency features or have unexpected behaviour. (bz#1407) - Reduce stdout/stderr noise from ssh-copy-id. (bz#1431) - Fix activation of OpenSSL motor assistance whenever requested in configure. (bz#1437) Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-4.9.tar.gz) = fa7d1b3dcb093bd0dfc643b33b1a57a26f459373 - SHA1 (openssh-4.9p1.tar.gz) = 91575878883065bd777f82b47e0d481ac69ee7fe Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 4.8/4.8p1 (2008-03-31)

 OpenSSH 4.8 was an OpenBSD-only release, included on the OpenBSD 4.3 CD only. Changes since OpenSSH 4.8: ============================ New features: * Added chroot(2) assistance for sshd(8), controlled by a new option "ChrootDirectory". Please mention to sshd_config(5) for details, and delight use this characteristic carefully. (bz#177 bz#1352) * Linked sftp-server(8) into sshd(8). The inner sftp server is used whenever the command "internal-sftp" is stated in a Subsystem or ForceCommand declaration. When used alongside ChrootDirectory, the inner sftp server requires no particular configuration of files inner the chroot environment. Please mention to sshd_config(5) for additional information. * Added a protocol expansion method "[email protected]" for sftp-server(8) to execute POSIX nuclear rename() operations. (bz#1400) * Removed the fixed bounds of 100 document handles in sftp-server(8). The server volition now dynamically allocate handles up to the figure of accessible document descriptors. (bz#1397) * ssh(8) volition now skip generation of SSH protocol 1 ephemeral server keys whenever in inetd manner and protocol 2 connections are negotiated. This speeds up protocol 2 connections to inetd-mode servers that additionally authorize Protocol 1 (bz#440) * Accept the PermitRootLogin directive in a sshd_config(5) Match block. Allows for, e.g. permitting base lone from the local network. * Reworked sftp(1) disagreement splitting and escaping to be more internally accordant (i.e. between sftp commands) and more accordant alongside sh(1). Please note that this volition alter the explanation of several quoted strings, particularly those with embedded backslash escape sequences. (bz#778) * Support "Banner=none" in sshd_config(5) to disable sending of a pre-login banner (e.g. in a Match block). * ssh(1) ProxyCommands are now executed alongside $SHELL fairly than /bin/sh. * ssh(1)'s ConnectTimeout choice is now applied to the two the TCP association and the SSH banner toggle (previously it fair covered the TCP connection). This allows callers of ssh(1) to improved detect and agreement alongside stuck servers that obtain a TCP association but don't advancement the protocol, and additionally makes ConnectTimeout helpful for connections via a ProxyCommand. * Many new regression tests, including interop tests against PuTTY's plink. * Support BSM auditing on Mac OS X The following bugs have been fixed in this release: - scp(1) incorrectly reported "stalled" on dilatory copies. (bz#799) - scp(1) date underflow for timestamps before epoch. (bz#828) - scp(1) and sftp(1) progressmeter category fixes. (bz#842) - SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED packets did not correctly reset the client keepalive logic, causing disconnections on servers that did not explicitly execute "[email protected]". (bz#1307) - ssh(1) used the obsolete SIG DNS RRtype for presenter keys in DNS, alternatively of the current norm RRSIG. (bz#1317) - Extract magic buffer size constants in scp(1) to #defines. (bz#1333) - Correctly drain ACKs whenever a sftp(1) upload compose fails midway, avoids a fatal() exit from what have to be a recoverable condition. (bz#1354) - Avoid pointer arithmetic and strict aliasing warnings. (bz#1355) - Fixed packet size advertisements. Previously TCP and agent forwarding incorrectly advertised the conduit opening size as the packet size, causing fatal errors under several conditions. (bz#1360) - Document KbdInteractiveAuthentication in sshd_config(5). (bz#1367) - Fixed sftp(1) document grip leak on download whenever the local file could not be opened. (bz#1375) - Fixed ssh-keygen(1) selective presenter key hashing (i.e. "ssh-keygen -HF hostname") to not contain any IP location in the data to be hashed. (bz#1376) - Fix clobbering of struct passwd from multiple getpwid calls, resulting in fatal errors inner tilde_expand_filename. (bz#1377) - Fix parsing of port-forwarding details to correctly detect errors in either stated harbor number. (bz#1378) - Fix recollection leak in ssh(1) ~ escape commandline handling. (bz#1379) - Make ssh(1) skip listening on the IPv6 wildcard location whenever a binding location of 0.0.0.0 is used against an old SSH server that does not assistance the RFC4254 syntax for wildcard tie addresses. (bz#1381) - Remove additional backslashes in the RB_PROTOTYPE macro definition. (bz#1385) - Support ssh(1) RekeyLimits up to the maximum allowed by the protocol: 2**32-1. (bz#1390) - Enable IPV6_V6ONLY socket choice on sshd(8) hear socket, as is already done for X11/TCP forwarding sockets. (bz#1392) - Fix FD leak that could suspend a ssh(1) association multiplexing master. (bz#1398) - Improve error messages whenever hostname resolution fails because of a scheme error. (bz#1417) - Make ssh(1) -q choice records accordant alongside reality. (bz#1427 bz#1429) Portable OpenSSH bugs fixed: - Fixed sshd(8) PAM assistance not calling pam_session_close(), or failing to call it alongside base privileges. (bz#926) - Made sshd(8) use configuration-specified SyslogFacility for hosts_access(3) messages for denied connections. (bz#1042) - Implement getgrouplist(3) for AIX, enabling NSS LDAP to activity on this platform. (bz#1081) - Fix compilation errors on AIX because of misdefinition of LLONG_MAX. (bz#1347) - Force use of local glob(3) implementation on Mac OS X and FreeBSD, as the phase versions deficiency features or have unexpected behaviour. (bz#1407) - Reduce stdout/stderr noise from ssh-copy-id. (bz#1431) - Fix activation of OpenSSL motor assistance whenever requested in configure. (bz#1437) Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 4.7/4.7p1 (2007-09-05)

 OpenSSH 4.7 was released on 2007-09-05. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots and purchased T-shirts or posters. T-shirt, poster and CD revenue immediately assistance the project. Pictures and additional data can be established at: http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html and http://www.openbsd.org/orders.html For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 4.6: ============================ Security bugs resolved in this release: * Prevent ssh(1) from using a trusted X11 biscuit if innovation of an untrusted biscuit fails; established and fixed by Jan Pechanec. Other changes, new functionality and fixes in this release: * sshd(8) in new installations defaults to SSH Protocol 2 only. Existing installations are unchanged. * The SSH conduit opening size has been increased, and the two ssh(1) sshd(8) now dispatch opening updates additional aggressively. These improves achievement on high-BDP (Bandwidth Delay Product) networks. * ssh(1) and sshd(8) now maintain MAC contexts between packets, which saves 2 hash calls per packet and results in 12-16% speedup for arcfour256/hmac-md5. * A new MAC algorithm has been added, UMAC-64 (RFC4418) as "[email protected]". UMAC-64 has been measured to be about 20% faster than HMAC-MD5. * A -K emblem was added to ssh(1) to set GSSAPIAuthentication=Yes * Failure to established a ssh(1) TunnelForward is now treated as a fatal error whenever the ExitOnForwardFailure choice is set. * ssh(1) returns a sensible exit position if the authority expert goes distant without passing the complete exit status. (bz #1261) * The following bugs have been fixed in this release: - When using a ProxyCommand in ssh(1), set the outgoing hostname with gethostname(2), allowing hostbased authentication to activity (bz #616) - Make scp(1) skip FIFOs fairly than hanging (bz #856) - Encode non-printing characters in scp(1) filenames. these could logic copies to be aborted alongside a "protocol error" (bz #891) - Handle SIGINT in sshd(8) privilege separation kid procedure to justify that wtmp and lastlog records are correctly updated (bz #1196) - Report GSSAPI scheme in errors, for libraries that support multiple mechanisms (bz #1220) - Improve records for ssh-add(1)'s -d choice (bz #1224) - Rearrange and tidy GSSAPI code, removing server-only code being connected into the client. (bz #1225) - Delay implementation of ssh(1)'s LocalCommand until following all forwadings have been established. (bz #1232) - In scp(1), do not truncate non-regular records (bz #1236) - Improve exit communication from ControlMaster clients. (bz #1262) - Prevent sftp-server(8) from study until it runs out of buffer space, whereupon it would exit alongside a fatal error. (bz #1286) * Portable OpenSSH bugs fixed: - Fix multiple inclusion of paths.h on AIX 5.1 systems. (bz #1243) - Implement getpeereid for Solaris using getpeerucred. Solaris systems volition now refuse ssh-agent(1) and ssh(1) ControlMaster clients from different, non-root users (bz #1287) - Fix compilation warnings by including string.h if found. (bz #1294) - Remove redefinition of _res in getrrsetbyname.c for platforms that already define it. (bz #1299) - Fix spurious "chan_read_failed for istate 3" errors from sshd(8), a side-effect of the "hang on exit" fix introduced in 4.6p1. (bz #1306) - pam_end() was not being called if authentication unsuccessful (bz #1322) - Fix SELinux assistance whenever SELinux is in permissive mode. Previously sshd(8) was treating SELinux errors as continually fatal. (bz #1325) - Ensure that pam_setcred(..., PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED) is called before pam_setcred(..., PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED), fixing pam_dhkeys. (bz #1339) - Fix privilege separation on QNX - pre-auth only, this phase does not assistance document descriptor passing needed for post-auth privilege separation. (bz #1343) Thanks to everyone who has contributed patches, reported bugs and tested releases. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-4.7.tar.gz) = 9ebaab9b31e01bd0d04425dc23536bcc78f8d990 - SHA1 (openssh-4.7p1.tar.gz) = 58357db9e64ba6382bef3d73d1d386fcdc0508f4 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 4.6/4.6p1 (2007-03-09)

 OpenSSH 4.6 was released on 2007-03-09. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots and purchased T-shirts or posters. T-shirt, poster and CD revenue immediately assistance the project. Pictures and additional data can be established at: http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html and http://www.openbsd.org/orders.html For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 4.5: ============================ * sshd now allows the enabling and disabling of authentication methods on a per user, group, presenter and network basis via the Match directive in sshd_config. * The following bugs have been fixed in this release: - Clear SIGALRM whenever restarting because of SIGHUP. Prevents stray indication from taking downward sshd if a association was pending at the period SIGHUP was received - sftp returned a zero exit position whenever upload unsuccessful because of write errors (bugzilla #1252) - fixed an inconsistent inspect for a terminal whenever displaying scp advancement meter (bugzilla #1265) - Parsing of period values in Match blocks was incorrectly applied to the earth configuration (bugzilla #1275) - Allow multiple forwarding options to activity whenever stated in a PermitOpen directive (bugzilla #1267) - Interoperate alongside ssh.com versions that do not assistance binding distant harbor forwarding sessions to a hostname (bugzilla #1019) * Portable OpenSSH bugs fixed: - "hang on exit" whenever backdrop processes are operating at the time of exit on a ttyful/login meeting (bugzilla #52) - Fix typos in the ssh-rand-helper(8) man leaf (bugzilla #1259) - Check that several SIG records have been returned in getrrsetbyname (bugzilla #1281) - Fix contrib/findssl for platforms that deficiency "which" (bugzilla #1237) - Work about bug in OpenSSL 0.9.8e that bankrupt aes256-ctr, aes192-ctr, arcfour256 (bugzilla #1291) Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-4.6.tar.gz) = c1700845be464a769428f34ef727c1f530728afc - SHA1 (openssh-4.6p1.tar.gz) = b2aefeb1861b4688b1777436035239ec32a47da8 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 4.5/4.5p1 (2006-11-07)

 OpenSSH 4.5 was released on 2006-11-07. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots and purchased T-shirts or posters. T-shirt, poster and CD revenue immediately assistance the project. Pictures and additional data can be established at: http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html and http://www.openbsd.org/orders.html For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 4.4: ============================ This is a bugfix lone release. No new features have been added. Security bugs resolved in this release: * Fix a bug in the sshd privilege separation detect that weakened its verification of prosperous authentication. This bug is not known to be exploitable in the deficiency of additional vulnerabilities. This publish includes the following non-security fixes: * Several compilation fixes for portable OpenSSH * Fixes to Solaris SMF/process agreement assistance (bugzilla #1255) Thanks to everyone who has contributed patches, reported bugs and tested releases. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-4.5.tar.gz) = def3de1557181062d788695b9371d02635af39fb - SHA1 (openssh-4.5p1.tar.gz) = 2eefcbbeb9e4fa16fa4500dec107d1a09d3d02d7 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 4.4/4.4p1 (2006-09-27)

 OpenSSH 4.4 was released on 2006-09-27. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots and purchased T-shirts or posters. T-shirt, poster and CD revenue immediately assistance the project. Pictures and additional data can be established at: http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html and http://www.openbsd.org/orders.html For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 4.3: ============================ Security bugs resolved in this release: * Fix a pre-authentication denial of assistance established by Tavis Ormandy, that would logic sshd(8) to rotation until the login grace time expired. * Fix an unsafe indication handler reported by Mark Dowd. The signal handler was susceptible to a competition circumstance that could be exploited to execute a pre-authentication denial of service. On portable OpenSSH, this exposure could theoretically guide to pre-authentication distant code implementation if GSSAPI authentication is enabled, but the likelihood of prosperous exploitation appears remote. * On portable OpenSSH, fix a GSSAPI authentication abort that could be used to decide the validity of usernames on several platforms. This publish includes the following new functionality and fixes: * Implemented conditional configuration in sshd_config(5) using the "Match" directive. This allows several configuration options to be selectively overridden if particular criteria (based on user, group, hostname and/or address) are met. So far a helpful subset of post- authentication options are supported and additional are expected to be added in forthcoming releases. * Add assistance for Diffie-Hellman collection toggle key accord alongside a final hash of SHA256. * Added a "ForceCommand" directive to sshd_config(5). Similar to the command="..." choice accepted in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, this forces the implementation of the stated command despite of what the user requested. This is extremely helpful in conjunction alongside the new "Match" option. * Add a "PermitOpen" directive to sshd_config(5). This mirrors the permitopen="..." authorized_keys option, allowing fine-grained authority complete the port-forwardings that a person is allowed to establish. * Add optional logging of transactions to sftp-server(8). * ssh(1) volition now document harbor numbers for hosts stored in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys whenever a non-standard harbor has been requested. * Add an "ExitOnForwardFailure" choice to logic ssh(1) to exit (with a non-zero exit code) whenever requested harbor forwardings could not be established. * Extend sshd_config(5) "SubSystem" declarations to authorize the specification of command-line arguments. * Replacement of all entire figure overflow susceptible invocations of malloc(3) and realloc(3) alongside overflow-checking equivalents. * Many manpage fixes and improvements * New portable OpenSSH-specific features: - Add optional assistance for SELinux, controlled using the --with-selinux configure choice (experimental) - Add optional assistance for Solaris procedure contracts, enabled using the --with-solaris-contracts configure choice (experimental) This choice volition additionally contain SMF metadata in Solaris packages built using the "make package" target - Add optional assistance for OpenSSL hardware accelerators (engines), enabled using the --with-ssl-engine configure option. * Bugs from http://bugzilla.mindrot.org fixed: #482 - readconf doesn't obtain paths alongside spaces in them. #906 - syslog messages from sshd [net] lost. #975 - Kerberos authentication timing can leak information concerning document validity. #981 - Flow halt in SSH2. #1102 - C program 'write' alongside zero dimension hangs. #1129 - sshd hangs for command-only invocations due to fork/child signals. #1131 - error "buffer_append_space:alloc not supported" #1138 - Passphrase asked for (but ignored) if key document permissions too liberal.. #1156 - Closes association following C-c is pressed on QNX. #1157 - ssh-keygen doesn't grip DOS row breaks. #1159 - %u and %h not handled in IdentityFile. #1161 - scp -r fails. #1162 - Inappropriate sequence of syslog messages. #1166 - openssh-4.3p1 has several issues compiling. #1171 - configure can't continually fig out LLONG_MAX.. #1173 - scp reports misplaced association for extremely ample files. #1177 - Incorrect sshrc document location in Makefile.in. #1179 - sshd incorrectly rejects connections because of IP options. #1181 - configure should detect whenever openssl-0.9.8x needs -ldl. #1186 - ssh tries multiple times to open unprotected keys. #1188 - keyboard-interactive should not authorize retry after pam_acct_mgmt fails. #1193 - Open ssh volition not authorize changing of passwords on usernames greater than 8 characters.. #1201 - Bind location data is not stated in command line assistance messages. #1203 - configure.ac is missing an open [. #1207 - sshd does not apparent unsuccessful login figure on non-interactive logins. #1218 - GSSAPI client code permits SPNEGO usage. #1221 - Banner lone suppressed at log flat = QUIET (used to be at log flat < INFO). * Fixes to recollection and document descriptor leaks reported by the Coverity fixed inspection tool * Fixes to inconsistent pointer checks reported by the Stanford SATURN tool Thanks to everyone who has contributed patches, reported bugs and tested releases. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-4.4.tar.gz) = 2294b5e5a591420aa05ff607c1890ab622ace878 - SHA1 (openssh-4.4p1.tar.gz) = 6a52b1dee1c2c9862923c0008d201d98a7fd9d6c Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 4.3p2 (2006-02-11)

 Portable OpenSSH 4.3p2 was released on 2006-02-11. It volition be available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We have additionally lately completed another Internet SSH use scan, the results of which may be established at http://www.openssh.com/usage.html Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots and purchased T-shirts or posters. T-shirt, poster and CD revenue immediately assistance the project. Pictures and additional data can be established at: http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html and http://www.openbsd.org/orders.html For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since Portable OpenSSH 4.3p1: ==================================== This is a publish of Portable OpenSSH only, to determine several portability bugs. There are no new features, lone fixes: * Explicitly test for egrep in ./configure, fixing a issue in 4.3p1 that caused several platforms to neglect to detect the accessible fields in utmp/wtmp/lastlog records. This bug manifested as missing or bare login/logout records (as seen by last(1), etc.) * Fix for logout records not being updated on platforms without assistance for post-authentication privilege separation (e.g. Cygwin) * Fixed compilation problems on Ultrix, NewsOS and QNX Thanks to everyone who has contributed patches, reported bugs or test releases. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-4.3p2.tar.gz) = 2b5b0751fd578283ba7b106025c0ba391fd72f1f Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 4.3/4.3p1 (2006-02-01)

 OpenSSH 4.3 was released on 2006-02-01. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We have additionally lately completed another Internet SSH use scan, the results of which may be established at http://www.openssh.com/usage.html Once again, we would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued assistance of the project, particularly those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots and purchased T-shirts or posters. T-shirt, poster and CD revenue immediately assistance the project. Pictures and additional data can be established at: http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html and http://www.openbsd.org/orders.html For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 4.2: ============================ Security bugs resolved in this release: * CVE-2006-0225: scp (as does rcp, on which it is based) invoked a subshell to execute local to local, and distant to distant copy operations. This subshell exposed filenames to casing expansion twice; allowing a local attacker to create filenames containing casing metacharacters that, if matched by a wildcard, could lead to implementation of attacker-specified commands alongside the privilege of the person operating scp (Bugzilla #1094) This is chiefly a bug-fix release, lone one new characteristic has been added: * Add assistance for tunneling arbitrary network packets complete a association between an OpenSSH client and server via tun(4) virtual network interfaces. This allows the use of OpenSSH (4.3+) to create a true VPN between the client and server providing genuine network connectivity at tier 2 or 3. This characteristic is experimental and is currently supported on OpenBSD, Linux, NetBSD (IPv4 only) and FreeBSD. Other functioning systems alongside tun/tap interface capability may be added in forthcoming portable OpenSSH releases. Please mention to the README.tun document in the origin allocation for additional details and use examples. Some of the another bugs resolved and inner improvements are: * Reduce default key dimension for new DSA keys generated by ssh-keygen rear to 1024 bits. DSA is not stated for longer lengths and does not completely advantage from merely making keys longer. As per FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1, ssh-keygen volition refuse to create a new DSA key smaller or larger than 1024 bits * Fixed X forwarding failing to commencement whenever a the X11 client is executed in backdrop at the period of meeting exit (Bugzilla #1086) * Change ssh-keygen to create a protocol 2 RSA key whenever invoked without arguments (Bugzilla #1064) * Fix timing variance for valid vs. invalid accounts whenever attempting Kerberos authentication (Bugzilla #975) * Ensure that ssh continually returns code 255 on inner error (Bugzilla #1137) * Cleanup wtmp records on SIGTERM whenever not using privsep (Bugzilla #1029) * Set SO_REUSEADDR on X11 listeners to evade problems caused by lingering sockets from former meeting (X11 applications can sometimes not nexus to 127.0.0.1:60xx) (Bugzilla #1076) * Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are continually attached in all programs, by duping /dev/null to them if necessary. * Xauth catalog invocation had bogus "." disagreement (Bugzilla #1082) * Remove inner assumptions on key toggle hash algorithm and output length, preparing OpenSSH for KEX methods alongside substitute hashes. * Ignore junk sent by a server before it sends the "SSH-" banner (Bugzilla #1067) * The manpages has been considerably improves and rearranged, in supplement to another particular manpage fixes: #1037 - Man leaf entries for -L and -R should citation -g. #1077 - Descriptions for "ssh -D" and DynamicForward should mention they can define "bind_address" optionally. #1088 - Incorrect descriptions in ssh_config man leaf for ControlMaster=no. #1121 - Several corrections for ssh_agent manpages * Lots of cleanups, including fixes to recollection leaks on error paths (Bugzilla #1109, #1110, #1111 and more) and imaginable crashes (#1092) * Portable OpenSSH-specific fixes: - Pass random kernel during re-exec for all connection: speeds up handling of new connections on platforms using the OpenSSH's builtin entropy collector (ssh-rand-helper) - PAM fixes and improvements: #1045 - Missing choice for ignoring the /etc/nologin file #1087 - Show PAM password expiry communication from LDAP on login #1028 - Forward final non-query conversations to client #1126 - Prevent person from being forced to alter an expired password often on AIX in several PAM configurations. #1045 - Do not inspect /etc/nologin whenever PAM is enabled, alternatively authorize PAM to grip it. Note that on platforms using PAM, the pam_nologin component have to be used in sshd's meeting stack in command to keep former behaviour - Portability-related fixes: #989 - Fix multiplexing regress test on Solaris #1097 - Cross-compile fixes. #1096 - ssh-keygen damaged on HPUX. #1098 - $MAIL being set incorrectly for HPUX server login. #1104 - Compile error on Tru64 Unix 4.0f #1106 - Updated .spec document and startup for SuSE. #1122 - Use _GNU_SOURCE define in favor of __USE_GNU, fixing compilation problems on glibc 2.4 Thanks to everyone who has contributed patches, reported bugs or test releases. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-4.3.tar.gz) = 0cb66e56805d66b51511455423bab88aa58a1455 - SHA1 (openssh-4.3p1.tar.gz) = b1f379127829e7e820955b2825130edd1601ba59 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 4.2/4.2p1 (2005-09-01)

 OpenSSH 4.2 was released on 2005-09-01. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, particularly those who contributed source, reported bugs, tested snapshots and purchased T-shirts or posters. T-shirt, poster and CD revenue immediately assistance the project. Pictures and additional data can be established at: http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html and http://www.openbsd.org/orders.html For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 4.1: ============================ - SECURITY: Fix a bug introduced in OpenSSH 4.0 that caused GatewayPorts to be incorrectly activated for energetic ("-D") harbor forwardings whenever no hear location was explicitly specified. - SECURITY: sshd in OpenSSH versions previous to 4.2 authorize GSSAPI credentials to be delegated to users who log in alongside methods another than GSSAPI authentication (e.g. community key) whenever the client requests it. This behavior has been changed in OpenSSH 4.2 to lone assign credentials to users who authenticate using the GSSAPI method. This eliminates the hazard of credentials being inadvertently exposed to an untrusted user/host (though users should not activate GSSAPIDelegateCredentials to begin alongside whenever the distant person or presenter is untrusted) - Added a new compression method that delays the commencement of zlib compression until the person has been authenticated successfully. The new method ("Compression delayed") is on by default in the server. This eliminates the hazard of any zlib exposure foremost to a colony of the server from unauthenticated users. NB. Older OpenSSH (<3.5) versions have a bug that volition logic them to refuse to nexus to any server that does not recommendation compression whenever the client has compression requested. Since the new "delayed" server manner isn't supported by these older clients, they will refuse to nexus to a new server unless compression is disabled (on the client end) or the first compression method is enabled on the server ("Compression yes" in sshd_config) - Another circular of proactive changes for signed vs unsigned integer bugs has been completed, including changing the atomicio() API to advance safer programming. This activity is ongoing. - Added assistance for the improved arcfour code modes from draft-harris-ssh-arcfour-fixes-02. The improves the cipher's opposition to a figure of attacks by discarding first keystream output. - Increase the default size of new RSA/DSA keys generated by ssh-keygen from 1024 to 2048 bits. - Many bugfixes and improvements to association multiplexing, including: - Added ControlMaster=auto/autoask options to assistance opportunistic multiplexing (see the ssh_config(5) manpage for details). - The client volition now gracefully fallback to starting a new TCP association if it cannot nexus to a stated multiplexing authority socket - Added %h (target hostname), %p (target port) and %r (remote username) enlargement sequences to ControlPath. Also allow ControlPath=none to disable association multiplexing. - Implemented assistance for X11 and delegate forwarding complete multiplexed connections. Because of protocol limitations, the slave connections inherit the master's DISPLAY and SSH_AUTH_SOCK rather than distinctly forwarding their own. - Portable OpenSSH: Added assistance for lengthy passwords (> 8-char) on UnixWare 7. - The following bugs from http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ were closed: #471 - Misleading error communication if /dev/tty perms wrong #623 - Don't use $HOME in manpages #829 - Don't allocate a tty if -n choice is set #1025 - Correctly grip impaired particular character in ttymodes #1033 - Fix compile-time warnings #1046 - AIX 5.3 Garbage on Login #1054 - Don't terminate association on getpeername() failure #1076 - GSSAPIDelegateCredentials matter mentioned above - Lots of another improvements and fixes. Please mention to the ChangeLog for details Thanks to everyone who has contributed patches, issue or test reports. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-4.2.tar.gz) = d2bd777986a30e446268ceeb24cddbf2edf51b21 - SHA1 (openssh-4.2p1.tar.gz) = 5e7231cfa8ec673ea856ce291b78fac8b380eb78 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Ben Lindstrom, Darren Tucker and Tim Rice.

OpenSSH 4.1/4.1p1 (2005-05-26)

 OpenSSH 4.1 was released on 2005-05-26. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support to the project, particularly those who contributed origin and bought T-shirts or posters. We have a new scheme of T-shirt available, additional info on http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html#18 For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 4.0: ============================ * This is a bugfix release, no new features have been added. Some notable fixes are: - Fix segfault whenever using forwardings configured in ssh_config(5) and ClearAllForwardings (bugzilla #996) - Limit input buffer size for channels. A equal could dispatch additional data than the buffer code was consenting to accept. This would logic OpenSSH to abort the association (bugzilla #896) * Several improvements to the regression tests * Portable OpenSSH: - OpenSSH volition now continually normalise IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses rear to IPv4 addresses. This method that IPv4 addresses in log messages on IPv6 enabled machines volition no longer be prefixed by "::ffff:" and AllowUsers, DenyUsers, AllowGroups, DenyGroups volition equivalent IPv4-style addresses lone for 4-in-6 mapped connections. This ensures a accordant representation of IPv4 addresses despite of whether or not the device is IPv6 enabled. * Other bugfixes, including bugzilla #950, #997, #998, #999, #1005, #1006, #1024, and #1038 Changes since OpenSSH 3.9: ============================ * ssh(1) now allows the optional specification of an location to tie to in harbor forwarding connections (local, distant and dynamic). Please mention to the records for the -L and -R options in the ssh(1) manual leaf and the LocalForward and RemoteForward options in the ssh_config(5) manpage. (Bugzilla #413) * To authority distant bindings during retaining backwards compatibility, sshd(8)'s GatewayPorts choice has been extended. To authorize client stated tie addresses for distant (-R) harbor forwardings, the server must be configured alongside "GatewayPorts clientspecified". * ssh(1) and ssh-keyscan(1) now assistance hashing of presenter names and addresses added to known_hosts files, controlled by the ssh(1) HashKnownHosts configuration directive. This choice improves person privacy by hiding which hosts have been visited. At current this choice is off by default, but may be turned on formerly it receives adequate testing. * Added options for managing keys in known_hosts records to ssh-keygen(1), including the capability to hunt for hosts by name, delete hosts by name and change an unhashed known_hosts document into one alongside hashed names. These are particularly helpful for managing known_hosts files alongside hashed hostnames. * Improve document and password expiry assistance in sshd(8). The server volition now notify ongoing for the two document and password expiry. * sshd(8) volition now log the origin of connections denied by AllowUsers, DenyUsers, AllowGroups and DenyGroups (Bugzilla #909) * Added AddressFamily choice to sshd(8) to authorize earth authority over IPv4/IPv6 usage. (Bugzilla #989) * Improved sftp(1) client, including bugfixes and optimisations for the ``ls'' command and command former and editing assistance using libedit. * Improved the handling of bad data in authorized_keys files, eliminating fatal errors on corrupt or extremely ample keys. (Bugzilla #884) * Improved association multiplexing assistance in ssh(1). Several bugs have been fixed and a new "command mode" has been added to authorize the authority of a operating multiplexing expert connection, including checking that it is up, determining its PID and asking it to exit. * Have scp(1) and sftp(1) delay for the spawned ssh to exit before they exit themselves. This prevents ssh from being unable to reconstruct terminal modes (not normally a issue on OpenBSD but average alongside -Portable on POSIX platforms). (Bugzilla #950) * Portable OpenSSH: - Add *EXPERIMENTAL* BSM audit assistance for Solaris systems (Bugzilla #125) - Enable IPv6 on AIX anywhere imaginable (see README.platform for details), operating about a misfeature of AIX's getnameinfo. (Bugzilla #835) - Teach sshd(8) to compose unsuccessful login records to btmp for unsuccessful auth attempts. Currently this is lone for password, keyboard-interactive and challenge/response authentication methods and lone on Linux and HP-UX. - sshd(8) now sends output from failing PAM meeting modules to the person before exiting, akin to the way /etc/nologin is handled - Store credentials from gssapi-with-mic authentication first enough to be accessible to PAM meeting modules whenever privsep=yes. Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-4.1.tar.gz) = 62fc9596b20244bb559d5fee3ff3ecc0dfd557cb - SHA1 (openssh-4.1p1.tar.gz) = e85d389da8ad8290f5031b8f9972e2623c674e46 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Ben Lindstrom, Darren Tucker and Tim Rice.

OpenSSH 4.0/4.0p1 (2005-03-09)

 OpenSSH 4.0 was released on 2005-03-09. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support to the project, particularly those who contributed origin and bought T-shirts or posters. We have a new scheme of T-shirt available, additional info on http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html#18 For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 3.9: ============================ * ssh(1) now allows the optional specification of an location to tie to in harbor forwarding connections (local, distant and dynamic). Please mention to the records for the -L and -R options in the ssh(1) manual leaf and the LocalForward and RemoteForward options in the ssh_config(5) manpage. (Bugzilla #413) * To authority distant bindings during retaining backwards compatibility, sshd(8)'s GatewayPorts choice has been extended. To authorize client stated tie addresses for distant (-R) harbor forwardings, the server must be configured alongside "GatewayPorts clientspecified". * ssh(1) and ssh-keyscan(1) now assistance hashing of presenter names and addresses added to known_hosts files, controlled by the ssh(1) HashKnownHosts configuration directive. This choice improves person privacy by hiding which hosts have been visited. At current this choice is off by default, but may be turned on formerly it receives adequate testing. * Added options for managing keys in known_hosts records to ssh-keygen(1), including the capability to hunt for hosts by name, delete hosts by name and change an unhashed known_hosts document into one alongside hashed names. These are particularly helpful for managing known_hosts files alongside hashed hostnames. * Improve document and password expiry assistance in sshd(8). The server volition now notify ongoing for the two document and password expiry. * sshd(8) volition now log the origin of connections denied by AllowUsers, DenyUsers, AllowGroups and DenyGroups (Bugzilla #909) * Added AddressFamily choice to sshd(8) to authorize earth authority over IPv4/IPv6 usage. (Bugzilla #989) * Improved sftp(1) client, including bugfixes and optimisations for the ``ls'' command and command former and editing assistance using libedit. * Improved the handling of bad data in authorized_keys files, eliminating fatal errors on corrupt or extremely ample keys. (Bugzilla #884) * Improved association multiplexing assistance in ssh(1). Several bugs have been fixed and a new "command mode" has been added to authorize the authority of a operating multiplexing expert connection, including checking that it is up, determining its PID and asking it to exit. * Have scp(1) and sftp(1) delay for the spawned ssh to exit before they exit themselves. This prevents ssh from being unable to reconstruct terminal modes (not normally a issue on OpenBSD but average alongside -Portable on POSIX platforms). (Bugzilla #950) * Portable OpenSSH: - Add *EXPERIMENTAL* BSM audit assistance for Solaris systems (Bugzilla #125) - Enable IPv6 on AIX anywhere imaginable (see README.platform for details), operating about a misfeature of AIX's getnameinfo. (Bugzilla #835) - Teach sshd(8) to compose unsuccessful login records to btmp for unsuccessful auth attempts. Currently this is lone for password, keyboard-interactive and challenge/response authentication methods and lone on Linux and HP-UX. - sshd(8) now sends output from failing PAM meeting modules to the person before exiting, akin to the way /etc/nologin is handled - Store credentials from gssapi-with-mic authentication first enough to be accessible to PAM meeting modules whenever privsep=yes. Checksums: ========== - MD5 (openssh-4.0.tgz) = 7dbf15fe7c294672e8822127f50107d0 - MD5 (openssh-4.0p1.tar.gz) = 7b36f28fc16e1b7f4ba3c1dca191ac92 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Ben Lindstrom, Darren Tucker and Tim Rice.

OpenSSH 3.9/3.9p1 (2004-08-18)

 OpenSSH 3.9 was released on 2004-08-18. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support to the project, particularly those who contributed origin and bought T-shirts or posters. We have a new scheme of T-shirt available, additional info on http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html#18 For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 3.8: ============================ * Added new "IdentitiesOnly" choice to ssh(1), which specifies that it should use keys stated in ssh_config, fairly than any keys in ssh-agent(1) * Make sshd(8) re-execute itself on accepting a new connection. This security measure ensures that all execute-time randomisations are reapplied for all association fairly than once, for the expert process' lifetime. This includes mmap and malloc mappings, shared archive addressing, shared archive mapping order, ProPolice and StackGhost cookies on systems that assistance specified things * Add strict approval and ownership checks to programs study ~/.ssh/config NB ssh(1) volition now exit alternatively of trying to procedure a config alongside mediocre ownership or permissions * Implemented the capability to continue selected surroundings variables between the client and the server. See "AcceptEnv" in sshd_config(5) and "SendEnv" in ssh_config(5) for details * Added a "MaxAuthTries" choice to sshd(8), allowing authority complete the maximum figure of authentication attempts permitted per connection * Added assistance for cancellation of energetic distant harbor forwarding sessions. This may be performed using the ~C escape character, see "Escape Characters" in ssh(1) for details * Many sftp(1) interface improvements, including greatly enhanced "ls" assistance and the capability to cancel energetic transfers using SIGINT (^C) * Implement meeting multiplexing: a sole ssh(1) association can now transport multiple login/command/file transfer sessions. Refer to the "ControlMaster" and "ControlPath" options in ssh_config(5) for additional information * The sftp-server has improved assistance for non-POSIX filesystems (e.g. FAT) * Portable OpenSSH: Re-introduce assistance for PAM password authentication, in supplement to the keyboard-interactive driver. PAM password authentication is small flexible, and doesn't assistance pre-authentication password expiry but runs in-process so Kerberos tokens, etc are retained * Improved and additional extended regression tests * Many bugfixes and small improvements Checksums: ========== - MD5 (openssh-3.9.tgz) = 93f48bfcc1560895ae53de6bfc41689b - MD5 (openssh-3.9p1.tar.gz) = 8e1774d0b52aff08f817f3987442a16e Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Ben Lindstrom, Darren Tucker and Tim Rice.

OpenSSH 3.8.1p1 (2004-04-19)

 OpenSSH 3.8.1p1 was released on 2004-04-19. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. This publish is a bug-fix publish for the portable version. There are no characteristic additions and no corresponding OpenBSD-only release. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support to the project, particularly those who contributed source, help with evaluation and have bought T-shirts or posters. We have a new scheme of T-shirt available, additional info on http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html#18 For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Bugs fixed since OpenSSH 3.8p1: =============================== Bug #673 - Fix compilation on NetBSD alongside S/Key enabled Bug #748 - Detect and workaround damaged name resolution on HP-UX Bug #802 - Fix linking on Tru64 whenever compiled alongside SIA support Bug #808 - Fix PAM collision on expired password whenever not authenticated using pam/kbdint mechanism Bug #810 - Fix erroneous clearing of TZ surroundings variable Bug #811 - Improve locked password finding throughout Linux variants Bug #820 - Fix utmp misconduct on Irix Bug #825 - Fix disconnection issue whenever using IPv4-in-IPv6 mapped addresses on Solaris. - Fix compilation on OS X systems alongside Kerberos/GSSAPI - Many additional insignificant fixes, delight mention to the ChangeLog document for details Checksums: ========== - MD5 (openssh-3.8.1p1.tar.gz) = 1dbfd40ae683f822ae917eebf171ca42 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Ben Lindstrom, Darren Tucker and Tim Rice.

OpenSSH 3.8.1/3.8.1p1

 3.8.1p1 is a Portable-only release, there is no corresponding 3.8.1 release. See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-3.8.1p1 for the Portable publish notes.

OpenSSH 3.8/3.8p1 (2004-02-24)

 OpenSSH 3.8 was released on 2004-02-24. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support to the project, particularly those who contributed origin and bought T-shirts or posters. We have a new scheme of T-shirt available, additional info on http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html#18 For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 3.7.1: ============================ * sshd(8) now supports forced changes of expired passwords via /usr/bin/passwd or keyboard-interactive authentication. Note for AIX: sshd volition now refuse password admission to accounts with passwords expired longer than their maxexpired attribute. For details, see the AIX division in README.platform. * ssh(1) now uses untrusted cookies for X11-Forwarding. Some X11 applications power need complete admission to the X11 server, see ForwardX11Trusted in ssh(1) and xauth(1) for additional information. * ssh(1) now supports sending use layer keep-alive messages to the server. See ServerAliveInterval in ssh(1) for additional information. * Improved sftp(1) lot document support. * New KerberosGetAFSToken choice for sshd(8). * Updated /etc/moduli document and improved achievement for protocol type 2. * Support for presenter keys in DNS (draft-ietf-secsh-dns-xx.txt). Please see README.dns in the origin allocation for details. * Fix a figure of recollection leaks. * The experimental "gssapi" assistance has been replaced with the "gssapi-with-mic" to fix imaginable MITM attacks. The two versions are not compatible. Checksums: ========== - MD5 (openssh-3.8.tgz) = 7d5590a333d8f8aa1fa6f19e24938700 - MD5 (openssh-3.8p1.tar.gz) = 7861a4c0841ab69a6eec5c747daff6fb Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Ben Lindstrom, Darren Tucker and Tim Rice.

OpenSSH 3.7.1p2 (2003-09-23)

 Portable OpenSSH 3.7.1p2 was released on 2003-09-23. It volition be accessible from the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/portable.html shortly. Please note that this is a publish to location issues in the portable version only. The items mentioned below do not power the OpenBSD version. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support to the project, particularly those who contributed origin and bought T-shirts or posters. We have a new scheme of T-shirt available, additional info on http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html#18 For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Security Changes: ================= Portable OpenSSH type 3.7p1 and 3.7.1p1 merge multiple vulnerabilities in the new PAM authentication code. At smallest one of these bugs is remotely exploitable (under a non-standard configuration, alongside privsep disabled). OpenSSH 3.7.1p2 fixes these bugs. Please note that these bugs do not be in OpenBSD's releases of OpenSSH. Changes since OpenSSH 3.7.1p1: ============================== * This publish disables PAM by default. To allow it, set "UsePAM yes" in sshd_config. Due to complexity, inconsistencies in the specification and differences between vendors' PAM implementations we propose that PAM be remaining impaired in sshd_config unless there is a need for its use. Sites using lone community key or uncomplicated password authentication normally have small need to allow PAM support. * This publish now requires zlib 1.1.4 to build correctly. Previous versions have safety problems. * Fix compilation for versions of OpenSSL before 0.9.6. Some code modes are not supported for older OpenSSL versions. * Fix compilation problems on systems alongside a missing or lacking inet_ntoa() function. * Workaround problems connected to unimplemented or damaged setresuid/setreuid functions on multiple platforms. * Fix compilation on older OpenBSD systems. * Fix handling of password-less authentication (PermitEmptyPasswords=yes) that has not worked since the 3.7p1 release. Checksums: ========== - MD5 (openssh-3.7.1p2.tar.gz) = 61cf5b059938718308836d00f6764a94 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Ben Lindstrom, Darren Tucker and Tim Rice.

OpenSSH 3.7.1/3.7.1p1 (2004-02-25)

 OpenSSH 3.7.1 was released on 2004-02-25. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support to the project, particularly those who contributed origin and bought T-shirts or posters. We have a new scheme of T-shirt available, additional info on http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html#18 For global orders use https://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use https://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Security Changes: ================= All versions of OpenSSH's sshd previous to 3.7.1 merge buffer administration errors. It is uncertain whether these errors are possibly exploitable, however, we favor to see bugs fixed proactively. OpenSSH 3.7 fixed one of these bugs. OpenSSH 3.7.1 fixes additional akin bugs. Changes since OpenSSH 3.6.1: ============================ * The complete OpenSSH code-base has undergone a licence review. As a result, all non-ssh1.x code is under a BSD-style licence alongside no promotion requirement. Please mention to README in the source allocation for the exact licence terms. * Rhosts authentication has been removed in ssh(1) and sshd(8). * Changes in Kerberos support: - KerberosV password assistance now uses a document cache alternatively of a recollection cache. - KerberosIV and AFS assistance has been removed. - KerberosV assistance has been removed from SSH protocol 1. - KerberosV password authentication assistance remains for SSH protocols 1 and 2. - This publish contains several GSSAPI person authentication support to substitute bequest KerberosV authentication support. At present this code is motionless considered experimental and SHOULD NOT BE USED. * Changed command that keys are tried in community key authentication. The ssh(1) client tries the keys in the following order: 1. ssh-agent(1) keys that are established in the ssh_config(5) file 2. remaining ssh-agent(1) keys 3. keys that are lone listed in the ssh_config(5) file This helps whenever an ssh-agent(1) has many keys, anywhere the sshd(8) server power near the association before the accurate key is tried. * SOCKS5 assistance has been added to the energetic forwarding mode in ssh(1). * Removed implementation barriers to procedure of SSH complete SCTP. * sftp(1) client can now transfer records alongside citation characters in their filenames. * Replaced sshd(8)'s VerifyReverseMapping alongside UseDNS option. When UseDNS choice is on, reverse hostname lookups are always performed. * Fix a figure of recollection leaks. * Support for sending tty BREAK complete SSH protocol 2. * Workaround for another vendor bugs in KEX conjecture handling. * Support for generating KEX-GEX groups (/etc/moduli) in ssh-keygen(1). * Automatic re-keying according to amount of data sent complete connection. * New AddressFamily choice on client to choose protocol to use (IPv4 or IPv6). * Experimental assistance for the "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", and "aes256-ctr" ciphers for SSH protocol 2. * Experimental assistance for presenter keys in DNS (draft-ietf-secsh-dns-xx.txt). Please see README.dns in the origin allocation for details. * Portable OpenSSH: - Replace PAM password authentication kludge alongside a additional correct PAM challenge-response component from FreeBSD. - PAM assistance may now be enabled/disabled at runtime using the UsePAM directive. - Many improvements to the OpenSC smartcard support. - Regression tests now activity alongside portable OpenSSH. Please mention to regress/README.regress in the origin distribution. - On platforms that assistance it, portable OpenSSH now honors the UMASK, PATH and SUPATH attributes set in /etc/default/login. - Deny admission to locked accounts, despite of authentication method in use. Checksums: ========== - MD5 (openssh-3.7.1.tgz) = 3d2f1644d6a3d3267e5e2421f1385129 - MD5 (openssh-3.7.1p1.tar.gz) = f54e574e606c08ef63ebb1ab2f7689dc Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Ben Lindstrom, Darren Tucker and Tim Rice.

OpenSSH 3.7/3.7p1 (2003-09-16)

 OpenSSH 3.7 was released on 2003-09-16. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support to the project, particularly those who contributed origin and bought T-shirts or posters. We have a new scheme of T-shirt available, additional info on http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html#18 For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Security Changes: ================= All versions of OpenSSH's sshd previous to 3.7 merge a buffer administration error. It is uncertain whether this error is possibly exploitable, however, we favor to see bugs fixed proactively. OpenSSH 3.7 fixes this bug. Changes since OpenSSH 3.6.1: ============================ * The complete OpenSSH code-base has undergone a licence review. As a result, all non-ssh1.x code is under a BSD-style licence alongside no promotion requirement. Please mention to README in the source allocation for the exact licence terms. * Rhosts authentication has been removed in ssh(1) and sshd(8). * Changes in Kerberos support: - KerberosV password assistance now uses a document cache alternatively of a recollection cache. - KerberosIV and AFS assistance has been removed. - KerberosV assistance has been removed from SSH protocol 1. - KerberosV password authentication assistance remains for SSH protocols 1 and 2. - This publish contains several GSSAPI person authentication support to substitute bequest KerberosV authentication support. At present this code is motionless considered experimental and SHOULD NOT BE USED. * Changed command that keys are tried in community key authentication. The ssh(1) client tries the keys in the following order: 1. ssh-agent(1) keys that are established in the ssh_config(5) file 2. remaining ssh-agent(1) keys 3. keys that are lone listed in the ssh_config(5) file This helps whenever an ssh-agent(1) has many keys, anywhere the sshd(8) server power near the association before the accurate key is tried. * SOCKS5 assistance has been added to the energetic forwarding mode in ssh(1). * Removed implementation barriers to procedure of SSH complete SCTP. * sftp(1) client can now transfer records alongside citation characters in their filenames. * Replaced sshd(8)'s VerifyReverseMapping alongside UseDNS option. When UseDNS choice is on, reverse hostname lookups are always performed. * Fix a figure of recollection leaks. * Support for sending tty BREAK complete SSH protocol 2. * Workaround for another vendor bugs in KEX conjecture handling. * Support for generating KEX-GEX groups (/etc/moduli) in ssh-keygen(1). * Automatic re-keying according to amount of data sent complete connection. * New AddressFamily choice on client to choose protocol to use (IPv4 or IPv6). * Experimental assistance for the "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", and "aes256-ctr" ciphers for SSH protocol 2. * Experimental assistance for presenter keys in DNS (draft-ietf-secsh-dns-xx.txt). Please see README.dns in the origin allocation for details. * Portable OpenSSH: - Replace PAM password authentication kludge alongside a additional correct PAM challenge-response component from FreeBSD. - PAM assistance may now be enabled/disabled at runtime using the UsePAM directive. - Many improvements to the OpenSC smartcard support. - Regression tests now activity alongside portable OpenSSH. Please mention to regress/README.regress in the origin distribution. - On platforms that assistance it, portable OpenSSH now honors the UMASK, PATH and SUPATH attributes set in /etc/default/login. - Deny admission to locked accounts, despite of authentication method in use. Checksums: ========== - MD5 (openssh-3.7.tgz) = 86864ecc276c5f75b06d4872a553fa70 - MD5 (openssh-3.7p1.tar.gz) = 77662801ba2a9cadc0ac10054bc6cb37 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Ben Lindstrom, Darren Tucker and Tim Rice.

OpenSSH 3.6.1p2 (2003-04-30)

 OpenSSH 3.6.1p2 was released on 2003-04-30. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.This is a release of the Portable type only. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Changes since OpenSSH 3.6.1p1: ============================ * Security: corrected linking issue on AIX/gcc. AIX users are advised to upgrade immediately. For details, delight mention to distinct advisory (aixgcc.adv). * Corrected build problems on Irix * Corrected build issue whenever construction alongside AFS support * Merged several changes from Openwall Linux Checksums: ========== - MD5 (openssh-3.6p1.tar.gz) = f3879270bffe479e1bd057aa36258696 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 3.6.1/3.6.1p1 (2003-04-01)

 OpenSSH 3.6.1 was released on 2003-04-01. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support to the project, particularly those who contributed origin and bought T-shirts or posters. We have a new scheme of T-shirt available, additional info on http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html#18 For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 3.6: ========================== * The 'kex guesses' bugfix from OpenSSH 3.6 triggers a bug in a few another SSH v2 implementations and causes connections to stall. OpenSSH 3.6.1 disables this bugfix whenever interoperating alongside these implementations. Changes between OpenSSH 3.5 and OpenSSH 3.6: ============================================ * RSA blinding is now used by ssh(1), sshd(8) and ssh-agent(1). in command to evade possible timing attacks against the RSA keys. Older versions of OpenSSH have been using RSA blinding in ssh-keysign(1) only. Please note that there is no evidence that the SSH protocol is susceptible to the OpenSSL/TLS timing assault described in http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf * ssh-agent(1) optionally requires person confirmation if a key gets used, see '-c' in ssh-add(1). * sshd(8) now handles PermitRootLogin correctly whenever UsePrivilegeSeparation is enabled. * sshd(8) now removes X11 cookies whenever a meeting gets closed. * ssh-keysign(8) is impaired by default and lone enabled if the new EnableSSHKeysign choice is set in the earth ssh_config(5) file. * ssh(1) and sshd(8) now grip 'kex guesses' correctly (key exchange guesses). * ssh(1) no longer overwrites SIG_IGN. This matches behavior from rsh(1) and is used by backup tools. * environment ProxyCommand to 'none' disables the proxy feature, see ssh_config(5). * scp(1) supports add -1 and -2. * scp(1) supports bandwidth limiting. * sftp(1) displays a progressmeter. * sftp(1) has improved error handling for scripting. Checksums: ========== - MD5 (openssh-3.6.1p1.tar.gz) = d4c2c88b883f097fe88e327cbb4b2e2a - MD5 (openssh-3.6.1.tgz) = aa2acd2be17dc3fd514a1e09336aab51 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 3.6/3.6p1 (2003-03-31)

 OpenSSH 3.6 was released on 2003-03-31. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support to the project, particularly those who contributed origin and bought T-shirts or posters. We have a new scheme of T-shirt available, additional info on http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html#18 For global orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu Changes since OpenSSH 3.5: ============================ * RSA blinding is now used by ssh(1), sshd(8) and ssh-agent(1). in command to evade possible timing attacks against the RSA keys. Older versions of OpenSSH have been using RSA blinding in ssh-keysign(1) only. Please note that there is no evidence that the SSH protocol is susceptible to the OpenSSL/TLS timing assault described in http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf * ssh-agent(1) optionally requires person confirmation if a key gets used, see '-c' in ssh-add(1). * sshd(8) now handles PermitRootLogin correctly whenever UsePrivilegeSeparation is enabled. * sshd(8) now removes X11 cookies whenever a meeting gets closed. * ssh-keysign(8) is impaired by default and lone enabled if the new EnableSSHKeysign choice is set in the earth ssh_config(5) file. * ssh(1) and sshd(8) now grip 'kex guesses' correctly (key exchange guesses). * ssh(1) no longer overwrites SIG_IGN. This matches behavior from rsh(1) and is used by backup tools. * environment ProxyCommand to 'none' disables the proxy feature, see ssh_config(5). * scp(1) supports add -1 and -2. * scp(1) supports bandwidth limiting. * sftp(1) displays a progressmeter. * sftp(1) has improved error handling for scripting. Checksums: ========== - MD5 (openssh-3.6p1.tar.gz) = 72ef1134d521cb6926c99256dad17fe0 - MD5 (openssh-3.6.tgz) = 758822b888c5c3f83a98045aef904254 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 3.5/3.5p1 (2002-10-15)

 OpenSSH 3.5 was released on 2002-10-15. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Changes since OpenSSH 3.4: ============================ * Improved assistance for Privilege Separation (Portability, Kerberos, PermitRootLogin handling). * ssh(1) prints out all known presenter keys for a presenter if it receives an unidentified presenter key of a distinct type. * Fixed AES/Rijndael EVP integration for OpenSSL < 0.9.7 (caused problems alongside limits checking patches for gcc). * ssh-keysign(8) is impaired by default and lone enabled if the HostbasedAuthentication choice is enabled in the earth ssh_config(5) file. * ssh-keysign(8) uses RSA blinding in command to evade timing attacks against the RSA presenter key. * A use-after-free bug was fixed in ssh-keysign(8). This bug bankrupt hostbased authentication on multiple platforms. * ssh-agent(1) is now installed setgid in command to evade ptrace(2) attacks. * ssh-agent(1) now restricts the admission alongside getpeereid(2) (or equivalent, anywhere available). * sshd(8) no longer uses the ASN.1 parsing code from libcrypto when verifying RSA signatures. * sshd(8) now sets the SSH_CONNECTION surroundings variable. * Enhanced "ls" assistance for the sftp(1) client, including globbing and detailed listings. * ssh(1) now continually falls rear to uncompressed sessions, if the server does not assistance compression. * The default behavior of sshd(8) alongside regard to person settable environ variables has changed: the new choice PermitUserEnvironment is impaired by default, see sshd_config(5). * The default value for LoginGraceTime has been changed from 600 to 120 seconds, see sshd_config(5). * Removed erroneous SO_LINGER handling. Checksums: ========== - MD5 (openssh-3.5p1.tar.gz) = 42bd78508d208b55843c84dd54dea848 - MD5 (openssh-3.5.tgz) = 79fc225dbe0fe71ebb6910f449101d23 Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 3.4/3.4p1 (2002-06-26)

 OpenSSH 3.4 was released on 2002-06-26. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Changes since OpenSSH 3.3: ============================ Security Changes: ================= All versions of OpenSSH's sshd between 2.9.9 and 3.3 merge an input validation error that can outcome in an entire figure overflow and privilege escalation. OpenSSH 3.4 fixes this bug. In addition, OpenSSH 3.4 adds many checks to detect invalid input and mitigate asset exhaustion attacks. OpenSSH 3.2 and afterward forestall privilege escalation if UsePrivilegeSeparation is enabled in sshd_config. OpenSSH 3.3 enables UsePrivilegeSeparation by default. Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 3.3/3.3p1 (2002-06-21)

 OpenSSH 3.3 was released on 2002-06-21. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Changes since OpenSSH 3.2.3: ============================ Security Changes: ================= - improved assistance for privilege separation: privilege separation is now enabled by default See UsePrivilegeSeparation in sshd_config(5) and http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html for more information. - ssh no longer needs to be installed setuid base for protocol type 2 hostbased authentication, see ssh-keysign(8). protocol type 1 rhosts-rsa authentication motionless requires privileges and is not recommended. Other Changes: ============== - records for the client and server configuration options have been moved to ssh_config(5) and sshd_config(5). - the server now supports the Compression option, see sshd_config(5). - the client options RhostsRSAAuthentication and RhostsAuthentication now default to no, see ssh_config(5). - the client options FallBackToRsh and UseRsh are deprecated. - ssh-agent now supports locking and timeouts for keys, see ssh-add(1). - ssh-agent can now tie to unix-domain sockets stated on the command line, see ssh-agent(1). - fixes problems alongside valid RSA signatures from putty clients. Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 3.2.3/3.2.3p1 (2002-05-23)

 OpenSSH 3.2.3 was released on 2002-05-23. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Changes since OpenSSH 3.2.2: ============================ This publish fixes multiple problems in OpenSSH 3.2.2: - a defect in the BSD_AUTH admission authority handling for OpenBSD and BSD/OS systems: Under certain conditions, on systems using YP alongside netgroups in the password database, it is imaginable that sshd does ACL checks for the requested person name but uses the password repository admission of a distinct person for authentication. This method that denied users power authenticate successfully while permitted users could be locked out (OpenBSD PR 2659). - login/tty problems on Solaris (bug #245) - build problems on Cygwin systems Changes between OpenSSH 3.1 and OpenSSH 3.2.2: ============================================== Security Changes: ================= - fixed buffer overflow in Kerberos/AFS token passing - fixed overflow in Kerberos client code - sshd no longer auto-enables Kerberos/AFS - experimental assistance for privilege separation, see UsePrivilegeSeparation in sshd(8) and http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html for additional information. - lone obtain RSA keys of size SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE (768) or larger Other Changes: ============== - improved smartcard assistance (including assistance for OpenSC, see www.opensc.org) - improved Kerberos assistance (including assistance for MIT-Kerberos V) - fixed stderr handling in protocol v2 - client reports nonaccomplishment if -R manner TCP forwarding fails in protocol v2 - assistance configuration of TCP forwarding during interactive sessions (~C) - improved assistance for older sftp servers - improved assistance for importing old DSA keys (from ssh.com software). - client flank assistance for PASSWD_CHANGEREQ in protocol v2 - fixed waitpid competition conditions - document accurate lastlogin time Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 3.2.2/3.2.2p1 (2002-05-16)

 OpenSSH 3.2.2 was released on 2002-05-16. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Security Changes: ================= - fixed buffer overflow in Kerberos/AFS token passing - fixed overflow in Kerberos client code - sshd no longer auto-enables Kerberos/AFS - experimental assistance for privilege separation, see UsePrivilegeSeparation in sshd(8) and http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html for additional information. - lone obtain RSA keys of size SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE (768) or larger Other Changes: ============== - improved smartcard assistance (including assistance for OpenSC, see www.opensc.org) - improved Kerberos assistance (including assistance for MIT-Kerberos V) - fixed stderr handling in protocol v2 - client reports nonaccomplishment if -R manner TCP forwarding fails in protocol v2 - assistance configuration of TCP forwarding during interactive sessions (~C) - improved assistance for older sftp servers - improved assistance for importing old DSA keys (from ssh.com software). - client flank assistance for PASSWD_CHANGEREQ in protocol v2 - fixed waitpid competition conditions - document accurate lastlogin time Reporting Bugs: =============== - delight peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/ OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 3.1/3.1p1 (2004-04-09)

 OpenSSH 3.1 was released on 2004-04-09. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Important Changes: ================== - /etc/ssh/ now default directory for keys and configuration files - ssh-keygen no longer defaults to a particular key category (rsa1); use ssh-keygen -t {rsa,dsa,rsa1} - sshd x11 forwarding listens on localhost by default; see sshd X11UseLocalhost choice to revert to previous behaviour if your older X11 clients do not function alongside this configuration Other Changes: ============== - ssh ~& escape char functions now for the two protocol versions - sshd ReverseMappingCheck choice changed to VerifyReverseMapping to explain its function; ReverseMappingCheck can motionless be used - community key fingerprint is now logged alongside LogLevel=VERBOSE - logic logged for disallowed logins (e.g., no shell, etc.) - additional sturdy error handling for x11 forwarding - improved packet/window size handling in ssh2 - use of regex(3) has been removed - fix SIGCHLD races in sshd (seen on Solaris) - sshd -o choice added - sftp -B -R -P options added - ssh-add now adds all 3 default keys - ssh-keyscan bug fixes - ssh-askpass for hostkey dialog - fix fd leak in sshd on SIGHUP - TCP_NODELAY set on X11 and TCP forwarding endpoints OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 3.0.2/3.0.2p1 (2002-12-04)

 OpenSSH 3.0.2 was released on 2002-12-04. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Important Changes: ================== This publish fixes a exposure in the UseLogin option of OpenSSH. This choice is not enabled in the default facility of OpenSSH. However, if UseLogin is enabled by the administrator, all versions of OpenSSH previous to 3.0.2 may be susceptible to local attacks. The exposure allows local users to continue environment variables (e.g. LD_PRELOAD) to the login process. The login procedure is run alongside the identical privilege as sshd (usually alongside base privilege). Do not allow UseLogin on your machines or disable UseLogin again in /etc/sshd_config: UseLogin no We additionally have received many reports concerning attacks against the crc32 bug. This bug has been fixed concerning 12 months ago in OpenSSH 2.3.0. However, these attacks logic non-vulnerable daemons to chew a lot of cpu since the crc32 assault sends a tremendously ample amount of data which must be processed. OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom. The following place fixes the UseLogin exposure in OpenSSH 3.0.1 and earlier releases. --- session.c 11 Oct 2001 13:45:21 -0000 1.108 +++ session.c 1 Dec 2001 22:14:39 -0000 @@ -875,6 +875,7 @@ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ")); /* Set tradition surroundings options from RSA authentication. */ + if (!options.use_login) while (custom_environment) { struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; char *s = ce->s;

OpenSSH 3.0.1/3.0.1p1 (2001-11-19)

 OpenSSH 3.0.1 was released on 2001-11-19. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Important Changes: ================== A safety gap that may authorize an attacker to authenticate if -- and lone if -- the director has enabled KerberosV. By default, OpenSSH KerberosV assistance lone becomes active following KerberosV has been correctly configured. An excessive recollection clearing bug (which we accept to be unexploitable) additionally exists, but since this may logic daemon crashes, we are providing a fix as well. Various another non-critical fixes (~& assistance and more). OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 3.0/3.0p1 (2001-11-06)

 OpenSSH 3.0 was released on 2001-11-06. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. This publish contains many portability bug-fixes (listed in the ChangeLog) as fine as multiple new features (listed below). We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Important Changes: ================== 1) SSH protocol v2 is now the default protocol version use the 'Protocol' choice from ssh(1) and sshd(8) if you need to alter this. 2) The files /etc/ssh_known_hosts2 ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 are now obsolete, you can use /etc/ssh_known_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts ~/.ssh/authorized_keys For backward compatibility ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 volition motionless used for authentication and hostkeys are motionless peruse from the known_hosts2. However, those deprecated records are considered 'readonly'. Future releases are apt not to peruse these files. 3) The CheckMail choice in sshd_config is deprecated, as sshd(8) no longer checks for new mail. 4) X11 cookies are now stored in $HOME. New Features: ============= 1) Smartcard assistance in the ssh client and delegate according to activity by University of Michigan CITI (http://www.citi.umich.edu/projects/smartcard/). 2) assistance for Rekeying in protocol type 2 3) improved Kerberos assistance in protocol v1 (KerbIV and KerbV) 4) backward compatibility alongside older business SSH versions >= 2.0.10 5) getopt(3) is now used by all programs 6) energetic forwarding (use ssh(1) as your socks server) 7) ClearAllForwardings in ssh(1) 8) ssh(1) now checks the hostkey for localhost (NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost yes/no). 9) -F choice in ssh(1) 10) ssh(1) now has a '-b bindaddress' option 11) scp(1) allows "scp /file localhost:/file" 12) The AuthorizedKeysFile choice allows specification of alternative records that merge the community keys that can be used for person authentication (e.g. /etc/ssh_keys/%u, see sshd(8)) 13) extended AllowUsers user@host syntax in sshd(8) 14) improved challenge-response assistance (especially for systems supporting BSD_AUTH) 15) sshd(8) can define period args as 1h, 2h30s etc. 16) sshd(8) transmits the accurate exit position for distant implementation alongside protocol type 2. 17) ssh-keygen(1) can import personal RSA/DSA keys generated alongside the business version 18) ssh-keyscan(1) supports protocol type 2 OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 2.9p2 (2001-06-17)

 Portable OpenSSH 2.9p2 has fair been uploaded and shall be making its way to the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/portable.html shortly. This publish fixes the "cookies" document deletion issue reported on BUGTRAQ as fine as a few another insignificant (non-security) bugs. No new features have been added in this release. Regards, Damien Miller

OpenSSH 2.9.9/2.9.9p1 (2001-09-25)

 OpenSSH 2.9.9 has fair been uploaded. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH 2.9.9 fixes a weakness in the key document choice handling, including origin IP based admission control. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. This publish contains many portability bug-fixes (listed in the ChangeLog) as fine as multiple new features (listed below). We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Security Notes: =============== This publish fixes weakness in the origin IP based admission control for SSH protocol v2 community key authentication: Versions of OpenSSH between 2.5 and 2.9.9 are affected if they use the 'from=' key document choice in blend alongside the two RSA and DSA keys in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2. Depending on the command of the person keys in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 sshd power neglect to use the origin IP based admission authority limitation (e.g. from="10.0.0.1") to the accurate key: If a origin IP restricted key (e.g. DSA key) is immediately followed by a key of a distinct type (e.g. RSA key), afterward key options for the second key are applied to the two keys, which includes 'from='. This method that users can circumvent the scheme policy and login from disallowed origin IP addresses. Important Changes: ================== OpenSSH 2.9.9 power have upgrade issues introduced by the lengthy time between releases, which may power group in unforeseen ways: 1) The files /etc/ssh_known_hosts2 ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 are now obsolete, you can use /etc/ssh_known_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts ~/.ssh/authorized_keys For backward compatibility ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 is motionless used for authentication and hostkeys are motionless peruse from the known_hosts2. However, old records are considered 'readonly'. Future releases are apt to not peruse these files. 2) The CheckMail choice in sshd_config is deprecated, sshd no longer checks for new mail. 3) X11 cookies are stored in $HOME OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 2.9/2.9p1 (2001-04-29)

 OpenSSH 2.9 has fair been uploaded. It is accessible from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol type 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. This publish contains many portability bug-fixes (listed in the ChangeLog) as fine as multiple new features (listed below). We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Important Changes: ================== WARNING: SSH protocol v2 is now the default protocol version use the 'Protocol' choice from ssh(1) and sshd(8) if you desire to alter this. SSH protocol v2 implementation adds assistance for: HostbasedAuthentication, akin to RhostsRSA in SSH protocol v1 Rekeying (negotiate new encryption keys for the current SSH session, try ~R in interactive SSH sessions) updated DH collection exchange: draft-ietf-secsh-dh-group-exchange-01.txt client choice HostKeyAlgorithms server options ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax tty manner passing general: gid swapping in sshd (fixes admission to /home/group/user based directory structures) Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]> contributed an experimental SOCKS4 proxy to the ssh client (yes, client not the server). Use 'ssh -D 1080 server' if you desire to try this out. server choice PrintLastLog improvements for scp > 2GB improved ListenAddress option. You can now use ListenAddress host:port improved interoperability (bug finding for older implementations) improved documentation OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

Portable OpenSSH 2.5.2p2 is now accessible from the mirror sites listed at http://www.openssh.com/portable.html Security connected changes: Improved countermeasure against "Passive Analysis of SSH (Secure Shell) Traffic" http://openwall.com/advisories/OW-003-ssh-traffic-analysis.txt The countermeasures introduced in before OpenSSH-2.5.x versions caused interoperability problems alongside several another implementations. Improved countermeasure against "SSH protocol 1.5 session key improvement vulnerability" http://www.core-sdi.com/advisories/ssh1_sessionkey_recovery.htm New options: permitopen authorized_keys choice to restrict portforwarding. PreferredAuthentications allows client to define the command in which authentication methods are tried. Sftp: sftp client supports globbing (get *, put *). Support for sftp protocol v3 (draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-01.txt). Batch document (-b) assistance for automated transfers Performance: Speedup DH exchange. OpenSSH should now be considerably faster when connecting use SSH protocol 2. Preferred SSH protocol 2 code is AES alongside hmac-md5. AES offers much faster throughput in a fine scrutinised cipher. Bugfixes: stderr handling fixes in SSH protocol 2. Improved interoperability. Client: The client no longer asks for the passphrase if the key will not be accepted by the server (SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) Miscellaneous: scp should now activity for records > 2GB ssh-keygen can now create fingerprints in the "bubble babble" format for exchanging fingerprints alongside SSH.COM's SSH protocol 2 implementation. Portable version: Better assistance for the PRNGd[1] entropy gathering daemon. The --with-egd-pool configure choice has been deprecated in favour of --with-prngd-socket and the new --with-prngd-port options. The second allows gathering of entropy from a localhost socket. configure ensures that scp is in the $PATH set by the server (unless a tradition way is specified). -d [1] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html

OpenSSH 2.5.1p2 (2001-03-20)

 Portable OpenSSH 2.5.1p2 has fair been uploaded and volition be making its way to the mirror sites (http://www.openssh.com/portable.html)in due course. This publish contains chiefly bug-fixes complete 2.5.1p1 but an upgrade is recommended. Specific bug-fixes include: - Fixed endianness matter causing failures whenever using Rijndael/AES cipher - Fix PAM failures on Solaris and Linux - Fix RPM spec document for Redhat systems - Fixed multiple compatibility functions - Fix entropy gathering code for SCO3 and NeXTStep - Many another insignificant fixes (see Changelog for details) This publish includes Mark Roth's mdoc2man.pl manuscript which can be used to fix up the manpages on systems that deficiency the complete andoc set of macros (e.g. Solaris). A forthcoming publish of portable OpenSSH volition automate this scripts use for systems that necessitate it. -d

OpenSSH 2.5.1p1 (2001-02-19)

 Portable OpenSSH 2.5.1p1 has fair been uploaded. It volition be accessible from the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/portable.html shortly. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH 1.3 & 1.5 protocol implementation and a 99% SSH 2 protocol implementation, including sftp client and server support. This publish contains many portability bug-fixes (listed in the ChangeLog) as fine as multiple new features (listed below). OpenSSH 2.5.0p1 was skipped since of interoperability issues alongside ssh-1.2.18 => ssh-1.2.22. We would akin to appreciate the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. Important Changes: ================== 1) Features added to the implementation of the SSH 2 protocol: * delegate forwarding * assistance for -R forwarding * RSA presenter and userkeys * extended assistance for older SSH 2 protocol implementations OpenSSH motionless lacks assistance for rekeying, so you have to rotate off rekeying if your server tries to power this feature. The next publish of OpenSSH volition likely assistance rekeying. 2) Damien Miller contributed an interactive sftp client. The sftp client plant for the two SSH protocol versions. 3) David Mazieres' ssh-keyscan has been added to the OpenSSH distribution. 4) Now there are three types of keys in OpenSSH: RSA1 is used by the SSH 1 protocol only, RSA and DSA keys are used by the SSH 2 protocol implementation. You can create RSA keys for use alongside SSH 2 protocol with: $ ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key To use RSA or DSA keys in SSH 2 protocol, simply add the community keys to the .ssh/authorised_keys2 file. IdentityFile2, HostDsaKey and DSAAuthentication are obsolete: You can use multiple IdentityFile and HostKey options instead, e.g HostKey /etc/ssh_host_key HostKey /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key HostKey /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key in /etc/sshd_config The choice DSAAuthentication has been replaced by PubkeyAuthentication. Fingerprinting plant for all types of keys: $ ssh-keygen -l -f $HOME/.ssh/{authorized_keys,known_hosts}{,2} 5) Important changes in the implementation of SSH 1 protocol: The OpenSSH server does not necessitate a privileged origin harbor for RhostsRsaAuthentication, since it adds no additional security. Interoperation alongside SSH 1.4 protocol 6) New choice HostKeyAlias This choice allows the person to document the presenter key under a distinct name. This is helpful for tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple sshd's on distinct ports on the identical machine. Alternatively you can use the UserKnownHostsFile or UserKnownHostsFile2 options to define distinct presenter key records for the connection. 7) The ReverseMappingCheck is now optional in sshd_config. If you merge this alongside the 'sshd -u0' choice the server volition not do DNS lookups whenever a client connects. 8) Stricter Hostkey Checking 9) Option Change Summary: a) New or changed: ChallengeResponseAuthentication MACs PubkeyAuthentication HostkeyAlias (Client only) Banner (Server only) ReverseMappingCheck (Server only) PermitRootLogin {yes,without-password,forced-commands-only,no} {Allow,Deny}Groups now assistance supplementary groups sshd -D for monitoring scripts or inittab ssh -t multiple -t power tty allocation b) Obsolete: DsaAuthentication (use PubkeyAuthentication instead) HostDsaKey (use HostKey) Identityfile2 (use Identityfile or -i) SkeyAuthentication (use ChallengeResponseAuthentication) TisAuthentication (use ChallengeResponseAuthentication) OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller and Ben Lindstrom.

OpenSSH 2.3.0p1 (2000-11-06)

 This is to province the publish of portable openssh-2.3.0p1. This release includes many new features and bug fixes. This is a recommended upgrade if you are using 2.2.0p1 or an older release. Portable OpenSSH is accessible from among the many mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/portable.html Some of the additional notable features include: - Rijndael assistance for SSH2. Use the "Ciphers" configuration directive to allow it. (Markus Friedl <[email protected]> - Cygwin assistance (Corinna Vinschen <[email protected]>) - sftp-server assistance (Markus Friedl <[email protected]>) - SSH1 single-des assistance for interop alongside Cisco routers. This code is never enabled automatically, you have to either define "-c des" or allow it using "Cipher des" in a config file. (Markus Friedl <[email protected]> - Support expired password alter through PAM (Steve VanDevender's <[email protected]>) - Better compatibility alongside buggy SSH implementations (Markus Friedl <[email protected]> - S/key assistance for SSH2, according to kbd-interactive auth (Markus Friedl <[email protected]> and [email protected] - scp now supports "-o" choice (Ben Lindstron <[email protected]>) Please mention to the ChangeLog for a complete catalog of features and bugfixes. Regards, Damien Miller

OpenSSH 2.2.0p1 (2000-09-01)

 Version 2.2.0p1 of portable OpenSSH has fair been uploaded to the master location and have to be making its way to the mirrors in due course. http://www.openssh.com/portable.html This publish contains multiple new features and bugfixes related to the former 2.1.1p4 release. In particular: - DSA key assistance in ssh-agent. Please not that this volition not interop alongside ssh.com's ssh-agent (Markus Friedl) - sshd now implements Random Early Drop association charge limiting, which can assistance mitigate DoS attacks against sshd. See the `MaxStartups' choice in the sshd manpage for particulars (Markus Friedl) - `-u' choice to sshd authorize logging of hostnames (rather than IP addresses) in wtmp whenever `UseLogin' is set to `yes'. (Markus Friedl) - Escape character `~' assistance in SSH2 (Markus Friedl) - Interop alongside SSH.COM ssh 2.3.0 (Markus Friedl) - Fix problems whenever sshd is run from inetd - Better SunOS 4.1.x assistance (Nate Itkin and Charles Levert) - Solaris bundle support, see contrib/solaris (Rip Loomis) - Work about association freezes on HPUX and SunOS 4 (Lutz Jaenicke, Tamito KAJIYAMA) - Fix ^C ignored matter on Solaris. (Gert Doering, John Horne and Garrick James) - Further improved NeXT support. (Ben Lindstrom, Mark Miller) - Lots of another insignificant fixes (see ChangeLog for details) This publish has been tested on HPUX (10.20, 11.00), Irix (5.3, 6.5), Linux (Debian, Redhat, Slackware, SuSE), NeXTstep 3 (HPPA, i386, m68k), OpenStep (i386, m68k, Sparc), SCO Unixware 7.1.0, SCO OpenServer 5.0.5, Solaris 2.7 (Sparc), Solaris 2.8 (i386, Sparc), SNI/Reliant Unix, DEC OSF/Tru64 5.0. Many gratitude to those who contributed bug reports, fixes and evaluation time. Regards, Damien Miller

OpenSSH 2.1.1p4 (2000-07-16)

 I have fair uploaded portable OpenSSH 2.1.1p4, it have to be making its way to the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/portable.html soon. This publish contains multiple bugfixes from the OpenBSD team, primarily the config document parsing issue reported by Ralf Engelschall <[email protected]> Regards, Damien Miller --------------- Changelog: 20000716 - Release 2.1.1p4 20000715 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates - [email protected] 2000/07/13 16:53:22 [aux.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh.h] authorize multiple whitespace but lone one '=' between tokens, bug study from Ralf S. Engelschall <[email protected]> but distinct fix. fine deraadt@ - [email protected] 2000/07/13 17:14:09 [clientloop.c] typo; [email protected] - [email protected] 2000/07/13 17:19:31 [scp.c] near can neglect on AFS, study error; from Greg Hudson <[email protected]> - [email protected] 2000/07/14 16:59:46 [readconf.c servconf.c] authorize foremost whitespace. ok niels - [email protected] 2000/07/14 22:01:38 [ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Always create ~/.ssh alongside manner 700; ok Markus - Fixes for SunOS 4.1.4 from Gordon Atwood <[email protected]> - Include floatingpoint.h for entropy.c - strerror replacement ---------------

OpenSSH 2.1.1p3 (2000-07-12)

 The 2.1.1p3 publish of portable OpenSSH has been uploaded to the OpenBSD ftp expert site. In a few hours it volition be accessible from one of the many mirrors listed at: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html This publish fixes multiple bugs reported since the former release and extends portability to NeXT and Reliant Unix. As usual, the OpenBSD squad has been difficult at activity additional polishing and enhancing OpenSSH. This publish brings a new configuration directive "MaxStartups" which mitigates association flooding attacks, further details are in the sshd man-page. Another noteworthy difference from former releases is that 'FallBackToRsh' now defaults to 'no'. Users of this characteristic may need to edit their /etc/ssh_config or ~/.ssh/config records to accomplish the same behavior. Again, gratitude to those who reported bugs, tested the snapshot and sent fixes. Regards, Damien Miller ------------------ Changelog 20000712 - (djm) Remove -lresolve for Reliant Unix - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Updates: - [email protected] 2000/07/11 02:11:34 [session.c sshd.c ] create MaxStartups code motionless activity alongside -d; djm - [email protected] 2000/07/11 13:17:45 [readconf.c ssh_config] disable FallBackToRsh by default - (djm) Replace in_addr_t alongside u_int32_t in bsd-inet_aton.c. Report from Ben Lindstrom <[email protected]> - (djm) Make construction of X11-Askpass and GNOME-Askpass optional in RPM spec file. - (djm) Released 2.1.1p3 20000711 - (djm) Fixup for AIX getuserattr() assistance from Tom Bertelson <[email protected]> - (djm) ReliantUNIX assistance from Udo Schweigert <[email protected]> - (djm) NeXT: dirent structures to get scp operating from Ben Lindstrom <[email protected]> - (djm) Fix damaged inet_ntoa inspect and ut_user/ut_name confusion, study from Jim Watt <[email protected]> - (djm) Replaced bsd-snprintf.c alongside one from Mutt origin tree, it is known to compile on additional platforms (incl NeXT). - (djm) Added bsd-inet_aton and configure assistance for NeXT - (djm) Misc NeXT fixes from Ben Lindstrom <[email protected]> - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates: - [email protected] 2000/06/26 03:22:29 [authfd.c] cleanup, small cut&paste - [email protected] 2000/06/26 15:59:19 [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd.c] MaxStartups: bounds figure of unauthenticated connections, activity by theo and me - [email protected] 2000/07/05 14:18:07 [session.c] use no_x11_forwarding_flag correctly; provos ok - [email protected] 2000/07/05 15:35:57 [sshd.c] typo - [email protected] 2000/07/05 22:06:58 [scp.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 sshd.8] Insert additional missing .El directives. Our troff really should acknowledge these and spit out a warning. - [email protected] 2000/07/06 21:55:04 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c ssh-keygen.c] spotless code is fine code - [email protected] 2000/07/07 02:14:29 [serverloop.c] awareness of harbor forwarding emblem test was backwards - [email protected] 2000/07/08 17:17:31 [compat.c readconf.c] substitute strtok alongside strsep; from David Young <[email protected]> - [email protected] 2000/07/08 19:21:15 [auth.h] KNF - [email protected] 2000/07/08 19:27:33 [compat.c readconf.c] Better conditions for strsep() ending. - [email protected] 2000/07/10 10:27:05 [readconf.c] Get the accurate communication on errors. (niels@ ok) - [email protected] 2000/07/10 10:30:25 [cipher.c kex.c servconf.c] strtok() --> strsep(). (niels@ ok) - (djm) Fix issue alongside debug manner and MaxStartups - (djm) Don't create presenter keys whenever $(DESTDIR) is set (e.g. during RPM builds) - (djm) Add strsep function from OpenBSD libc for systems that deficiency it 20000709 - (djm) Only allow PAM_TTY kludge for Linux. Problem study from Kevin Steves <[email protected]> - (djm) Match prototype and function declaration for rresvport_af. Problem study from Niklas Edmundsson <[email protected]> - (djm) Missing $(DESTDIR) on host-key mark causing problems alongside RPM builds. Problem study from Gregory Leblanc <[email protected]> - (djm) Replace ut_name alongside ut_user. Patch from Jim Watt <[email protected]> - (djm) Fix pam sprintf fix - (djm) Cleanup entropy gathering code a small more. Split initialisation from seeding, execute initialisation immediately at start, observe out with uids. Based on issue study from Jim Watt <[email protected]> - (djm) More NeXT compatibility from Ben Lindstrom <[email protected]> Including sigaction() et al. replacements - (djm) AIX getuserattr() meeting initialisation from Tom Bertelson <[email protected]> 20000708 - (djm) Fix bad fprintf format handling in auth-pam.c. Patch from Aaron Hopkins <[email protected]> - (djm) Fix incorrect configure handling of --with-rsh-path option. Fix from Lutz Jaenicke <[email protected]> - (djm) Fixed undefined variables for OSF SIA. Report from Baars, Henk <[email protected]> - (djm) Handle EWOULDBLOCK returns from read() and write() in atomicio.c Fix from Marquess, Steve Mr JMLFDC <[email protected]> - (djm) Don't use inet_addr. 20000702 - (djm) Fix brace mismatch from Corinna Vinschen <[email protected]> - (djm) Stop shade expiry checking from preventing logins alongside NIS. Based on fix from HARUYAMA Seigo <[email protected]> - (djm) Use norm OpenSSL functions in auth-skey.c. Patch from Chris, the Young One <[email protected]> - (djm) Fix scp advancement meter on really broad terminals. Based on place from James H. Cloos Jr. <[email protected]> ------------------

OpenSSH 2.1.1p2 (2000-07-01)

 Announcing the publish of portable OpenSSH 2.1.1p2. This publish chiefly contains fixes to the bugs that have been reported complete the final month, in particular: - Invalid period bring written to utmp/wtmp on systems using bash2 - Several lastlog fixes - AIX, SCO, Irix portability fixes - Avoid failures on PAM systems whenever using PAM authentication modules which necessitate a tty. - Entropy gathering fixes for Solaris. - EGD robustness improvements - Fixes and enhancements from the OpenBSD team: - Fixed options handling in authorized_keys2 file - Compatibility alongside business SSH 2.0.13 and 2.2.0 - Numerous insignificant fixes There are additionally a brace of new features: - Shadow password expiry assistance (no password alter assistance yet) - Irix 6.x gathering sessions, project IDs and scheme audit trail IDs - Beginnings of Tru64 / OSF SIA (Security Integration Architecture) support - Beginnings of NeXT support Version 2.1.1p2 volition be accessible from the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/portable.html (as shortly as they update). Many gratitude to all those who tested the snapshots and/or contributed bug reports and patches Regards, Damien Miller

OpenSSH 2.1.1p1 (2000-06-09)

 Announcing the preparedness of portable OpenSSH 2.1.1p1. This publish contains the fix for the "UseLogin yes" vulnerability identified in Markus' publish and multiple another enhancements and bugfixes. Including: - Better login code. Andre Lucas has rewritten the login code to be much additional standardized and extensible. In the procedure he has fixed the problems alongside Solaris utmp[x]. - Revised the entropy gathering code to be faster and additional reliable. - Fix for RSA presenter restrictions ("from=" in authorized_keys) It is recommended that all users upgrade to this version. Portable OpenSSH 2.1.1p1 is accessible from among the many mirrors listed at: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html Regards, Damien Miller

OpenSSH 2.1.0p1 (2000-05-09)

 This is to province the publish of openssh-2.1.0, the archetypal stable release of portable OpenSSH to merge assistance for the SSH2 protocol. The SSH2 protocol offers a figure of advantages complete the SSH1 protocol including standards compliance (SSH2 is on the IETF standards track[1]), improved safety and procedure without RSA (which is patented in several countries). The SSH2 assistance in OpenSSH has been developed by Markus Friedl, with support from the OpenBSD team. This is additionally the archetypal type of the portable type of OpenSSH to recommendation built-in entropy collection. This removes the requirement for EGD on systems that deficiency a /dev/random driver. As a result, OpenSSH-2.1.0 now requires a latest type of OpenSSL[2] to compile (version 0.9.5 or later). NB. The portable type of OpenSSH is currently in the process of merging its webpages alongside the authoritative OpenBSD project. Please use http://www.openssh.com/ from now on. Distribution records are additionally accessible from the mirrors listed at http://violet.ibs.com.au/openssh/files/MIRRORS.html Please peruse http://www.openssh.com/report.html before reporting bugs. Patches, bug reports, developer and person queries are greeted on the mailing catalog (http://www.openssh.com/list.html). Regards, Damien Miller [1] http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/secsh-charter.html [2] http://www.openssl.org/

OpenSSH 1.2.3p1 (2000-03-24)

 The Unix/Linux harbor of OpenSSH 1.2.3 was released yesterday and should be accessible from a mirror near you. A mirror catalog is accessible from: http://violet.ibs.com.au/openssh/files/MIRRORS.html This publish fixes the bugs reported since 1.2.2p1 and contains many cleanups from the OpenBSD tree. In particular, the OpenSSL finding problems have been resolved. The layout has changed a small bit. The packages/ subdirectory has been replaced alongside a contrib/ subdirectory which contains platform specific code and another patches. Submissions are welcome. Enjoy, Damien Miller 20000317 - Clarified --with-default-path option. - Added -blibpath handling for AIX to activity about foolish runtime linking. Problem elucidated by [email protected] by way of Jim Knoble <[email protected]> - Checks for 64 bit int types. Problem study from Mats Fredholm <[email protected]> - OpenBSD CVS updates: - [atomicio.c auth-krb4.c bufaux.c channels.c compress.c fingerprint.c] [packet.h radix.c rsa.c scp.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect.c] [sshd.c] pedantic: signed vs. unsigned, void*-arithm, etc - [ssh.1 sshd.8] Various cleanups and standardizations. - Runtime error fix for HPUX from Otmar Stahl <[email protected]> 20000316 - Fixed configure not passing LDFLAGS to Solaris. Report from David G. Hesprich <[email protected]> - Propagate LD through to Makefile - Doc cleanups - Added blurb concerning "scp: command not found" errors to UPGRADING 20000315 - Fix damaged CFLAGS handling during hunt for OpenSSL. Fixes va_list problems alongside gcc/Solaris. - Don't liberated disagreement to putenv() following use (in setenv() replacement). Report from Seigo Tanimura <[email protected]> - Created contrib/ subdirectory. Included helpers from Phil Hands' Debian package, README document and chroot place from Ricardo Cerqueira <[email protected]> - Moved gnome-ssh-askpass.c to contrib directory and removed config option. - Slight cleanup to doc files - Configure fix from Bratislav ILICH <[email protected]> 20000314 - Include macro for IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED. Report from [email protected] - Include /usr/local/include and /usr/local/lib for systems that don't do it themselves - -R/usr/local/lib for Solaris - Fix RSAref detection - Fix IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED macro 20000311 - Detect RSAref - OpenBSD CVS change [sshd.c] - disallow guessing of base password - More configure fixes - IPv6 workarounds from Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <[email protected]> 20000309 - OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3 [ssh.h atomicio.c] - int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@ [auth-rsa.c] - postpone MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup. [cipher.c] - void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@ [hostfile.c] - eliminate unused changeable 'len'. fix comments. - eliminate unused variable [log-client.c log-server.c] - rename a cpp symbol, to evade param.h collision [packet.c] - missing xfree() - getsockname() requires initialized tolen; [email protected] - use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i; from [email protected] [pty.c pty.h] - enroll cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@ [readconf.c] - rotate off x11-fwd for the client, too. [rsa.c] - PKCS#1 padding [scp.c] - authorize '.' in usernames; from [email protected] [servconf.c] - typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; [email protected] - sync alongside sshd_config [ssh-keygen.c] - allow ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@ [ssh.1] - Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE' [ssh.c] - suppress AAAA query presenter whenever '-4' is used; from [email protected] - rotate off x11-fwd for the client, too. [sshconnect.c] - missing xfree() - retry rresvport_af(), too. from [email protected]. - peruse error vs. "Connection closed by distant host" [sshd.8] - ie. -> i.e., - do not nexus to a business page.. - sync alongside sshd_config [sshd.c] - no need for poll.h; from [email protected] - log alongside flat log() not fatal() if equal behaves badly. - don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@ - create no-port-forwarding for RSA keys refuse the two -L and -R manner fwding - postpone close() of pty until the pty has been chowned rear to root - oops, fix comment, too. - missing xfree() - move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too. (http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907) - enroll cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@ - create x11 biscuit file - fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: distant popen() - type 1.2.3 - Cleaned up - Removed alert workaround for Linux and devpts filesystems (no longer required following OpenBSD updates) 20000308 - Configure fix from Hiroshi Takekawa <[email protected]>

OpenSSH 1.2.2p1 (2000-03-05)

 It gives me no small pleasance to province the archetypal stable release of the Unix harbor of OpenSSH. It is accessible in tar.gz and RPM format from among the mirrors listed at: http://violet.ibs.com.au/openssh/files/MIRRORS.html This publish fixes all known issues and is known to compile and function on (at least) latest releases on Linux, Solaris, HPUX and SCO Unixware. Please assessment the ChangeLog[1] for particulars on what has changed since the final release. I am holding off on a wider notice until the mirrors have updated. Thanks to everyone who assisted alongside testing, bug reports, success stories and most of all, patches :) Special gratitude to the OpenBSD developers for giving us OpenSSH to commencement with. Regards, Damien Miller [1] http://violet.ibs.com.au/openssh/files/ChangeLog

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