Kodak's "Pre-Invented" Lunar Orbiter Camera; Or, the Fate of SAMOS Readout

Aug 21, 2026 08:52 PM - 2 hours ago 1

In 1966 and 1967, NASA sent 5 robotic spacecraft into orbit astir the Moon. Constructed for the superior intent of uncovering landing sites for Apollo, the Lunar Orbiters besides enabled astir broad mapping of the Moon successful stunning detail. The amount and solution of the photographs returned by Lunar Orbiter was unprecedented, acknowledgment to a camera strategy built by the Eastman Kodak institution of Rochester, New York. Their imaging strategy progressive elaborate mechanisms to expose photographic movie successful orbit, create the movie onboard the spacecraft, and remotely transmit images backmost to Earth.

In February of 1967, the Rochester Times-Union published a communicative astir really Kodak had “pre-invented” the Lunar Orbiter camera. Kodak head of R&D Arthur Simmons told the Times-Union that “no 1 walked successful and asked america to create a camera and movie strategy to return closeup photos of the moon…Kodak has, for want of a amended word, a ‘library,’ of hundreds of ‘conceptual ideas’ which we don’t advertise.”1 But the communicative of the camera’s “pre-invention” was much absorbing than Simmons fto on. When Kodak joined Boeing’s bid for the Lunar Orbiter successful 1963, the camera strategy already existed. The institution had primitively developed it for the Air Force successful the 1950s arsenic a portion of the highly classified outer surveillance programme called Weapons System 117L (WS-117L).

The quality of WS-117L and the clandestine origins of the Lunar Orbiter camera strategy were vaguely known by immoderate astatine the time, but the afloat specifications were only revealed to the nationalist done declassification decades later. This article won’t linger connected the elaborate method specifications of the Lunar Orbiter cameras, but will alternatively attraction connected tracing the system’s improvement from conception to its take by NASA. It is the communicative of immoderate of the first attempts by the United States to remotely transmit images from space, and really those aforesaid systems were adapted for lunar exploration.

WS-117L had roots successful RAND studies of outer surveillance concepts going backmost to 1946, and was the first awesome effort to put those ideas into practice. The United States was hoping that satellites could beryllium utilized to show the buildup of atomic weapons and motorboat sites successful the Soviet Union. In 1953, RAND Report 262 laid retired successful afloat the feasibility and inferior of specified systems, and by 1955 the Air Force began soliciting contractors for WS-117L. Eastman Kodak created camera systems for Lockheed’s bid, and the the Air Force awarded their statement successful October of 1956.2

Originally, RAND had chiefly considered utilizing tv systems.3 “Near existent time” imaging was considered by immoderate to beryllium the perfect shape of outer surveillance, truthful tv was a logical choice. But successful a declassified history of the program, Robert Perry explains that the extremity of existent clip imaging quickly became contested wrong the Air Force–it was unclear whether the exertion was fresh to fulfill requirements, and the replacement movie betterment systems showed clear feasibility and reliability early on. Some of these efforts were spun disconnected from WS-117L into the Discoverer-CORONA program, which sent Kodak camera systems into orbit, and returned capsules of exposed movie for aerial retrieval and processing backmost connected Earth.4 Early on, however, a adjacent existent clip strategy was very overmuch a portion of the plan. In their bid for WS-117L, Kodak created a distant transmission strategy that would alert successful what became known arsenic the SAMOS program.

Television systems were still successful information early on, but location were clear technological limitations astatine the time, particularly erstwhile it came to resolution. Kodak’s recently formed Apparatus and Optical Division settled connected a strategy to create movie onboard the spacecraft and “readout” the images to receiving stations connected Earth. Planners envisaged 5 cameras for SAMOS, the first 3 dedicated to testing Kodak’s readout strategy (the others testing advanced betterment stems). The E-1 camera would chiefly beryllium a exertion demonstrator, while the E-2 and E-3 would trial the expertise for their strategy to return images astatine much functional resolutions. All utilized the aforesaid basal architecture.

In a way, this camera strategy was successful truth “pre-invented,” arsenic it was mostly a clever assembly of existing technologies, galore created by Kodak. The institution had decades of acquisition successful aerial photography going backmost to World War I. By the extremity of World War II, they had created precocious aerial films, compact movie retention systems, and image mobility compensation techniques. They had besides worked connected IR explosive sights and proximity sensing for the Navy, which would go useful for processing thermal power materials for the spacecraft.5

Illustrations from 1957 show a unsmooth sketch of their plans for SAMOS readout. Kodak’s 70mm movie would beryllium exposed, processed, and stored earlier readout and transmission. Electronic signals received connected the crushed would beryllium utilized to reconstruct the images.

By 1958, readying documents started detailing 2 of the cardinal technologies that yet made the readout strategy possible. One was what became known arsenic Kodak “Bimat” film, branded successful the illustration beneath arsenic “WEB.”6 This web was coated pinch gelatin containing the basal processing chemicals, enabling “dry” processing. The web was pressed against the exposed film, processing and fixing the images earlier retention and transmission.7

The origins of Bimat movie are somewhat obscure successful the nationalist record. One Kodak-produced history suggests that the exertion started arsenic a laboratory investigation pinch amateur photography successful mind, and was past applied to usage successful aerial photography.8 Considering the timeline, it was either a happy mishap that this research matured conscionable successful clip for WS-117L, aliases Kodak engineers started looking into the method specifically successful consequence to the challenges of movie photography successful space.

A Lockheed improvement scheme from March 1956 describes the processing strategy successful vague terms, stating that it would “not disagree significantly” from existing methodologies for “airborne rapid-processing,” and describing a notional “a roller-applicator type” system. It besides lists “the handling of photographic chemicals” arsenic 1 of the “major difficulties to beryllium overcome.”9 The illustration from 1957 shows the onboard processing measurement without the “WEB,” a item that only shows up successful diagrams for illustration the 1 supra branded 1958.10 Then, a patent for a “web processing method” was revenge successful August 1959 by Kodak researchers, presenting “a one-step method for substantially wholly processing and fixing a photographic image…without immersion successful photographic processing baths.”11 David McDowell, an technologist who joined up pinch Kodak successful precocious 1956 and worked connected some SAMOS and Lunar Orbiter, besides remembers Bimat being developed specifically for the project. “Bimat was started arsenic soon arsenic we started activity connected E-1 and E-2,” he told me, “because we knew we had to process movie successful orbit.”12

The 2nd cardinal exertion was the readout strategy itself, which progressive collaboration pinch the Columbia Broadcasting System Laboratories to create a flying-spot scanner.13 It worked utilizing what McDowell calls an “inside-out CRT,” utilizing a cathode-ray conduit that fired an particle beam done the exposed film. Variations successful the density of the movie changed the strength of the beam, and those variations were recorded by a photomultiplier and translated into physics signals that could beryllium sent backmost to Earth. Teams connected the crushed received those signals, utilized instrumentality to construe them backmost into an image, and recorded that image connected film. Before passing done the film, the beam reflected disconnected a revolving drum (seen successful the sketch below) for thermal management.

In October 1960, the first E-1 camera launched connected an Atlas-Agena, but grounded to inject into orbit. Meanwhile, officials were actively debating the contented of continuing the readout program. Costs were rising, engineering difficulties plagued the program, immoderate of the exertion was opening to look obsolete, and CORONA-like systems were looking for illustration a amended action until much precocious readout techniques could beryllium developed. Despite these issues, location were advocates for readout, and tests continued truthful that immoderate determination could beryllium made based connected tangible results.

In January 1961, the 2nd SAMOS trial launched pinch different E-1 camera and sailed into orbit. In Sunnyvale, California, technicians astatine a readout position received transmissions from the spacecraft, and the consequence was a photograph pinch a 100 ft resolution. The strategy had worked.14

The E-2 camera would beryllium the adjacent step, pinch much precocious aiming systems and a higher resolution. All of the rotating systems wrong the spacecraft created complexities erstwhile it came to achieving these objectives. One cardinal quality betwixt E-1 and E-2, McDowell recalls, was that E-2 utilized a rotating nosecone to thief stabilize and purpose the camera.15

The first effort to motorboat an E-2 ended 2 seconds aft liftoff, erstwhile the Atlas fell instantly backmost to the crushed and exploded. After the E-2 motorboat failure, readout was mostly abandoned successful favour of betterment programs. According to Perry, Air Force Colonel W.G. King believed that almost without exception, “everything a readout strategy could do a betterment strategy could do better.”16 Among different problems, readout systems required agelong lives, necessitating higher orbits that sacrificed solution and created greater powerfulness requirements.17 Kodak engineers, including McDowell, retrieve 1 of the superior constraints being the bandwidth required to transmit the images, and the truth that they were only utilizing a azygous crushed station.18

No different E-2 cameras were flown, but it wasn’t the extremity of the communicative for the camera system. After the Air Force canceled further launches, E-1 and E-2 hardware was near scattered astir the country, pinch 1 trial exemplary remaining successful Eastman Kodak accommodation successful Rochester.

Perry reports that officials astatine NASA knew astir the E-1 strategy and inquired astir the cameras arsenic early arsenic April of 1961, and that the Air Force gave them support to get specifications from contractors. The movie readout strategy was akin to the method employed by the Soviet Luna 3 spacecraft to return the first images of the acold broadside of the Moon successful 1959, and NASA was willing successful utilizing the E-1 for akin purposes. Perry quotes Colonel King saying that NASA officials “did [not] look to understand overmuch astir the problems of taking pictures from a abstraction vehicle.” He did not judge the strategy would beryllium usable for lunar exploration, but the thought didn’t spell away.19

At that time, the champion campaigner for utilizing specified a camera strategy would apt person been for the Surveyor program’s planned orbiter, which was encountering its ain problems. NASA historiographer Bruce Byers writes that respective factors converged that led to dropping the Surveyor orbiter successful favour of a standalone project. JPL was dealing pinch failures of the first Ranger probes, which delayed its activity connected Surveyor, and the improvement of the Centaur precocious shape planned for Surveyor was besides moving into trouble.

Meanwhile, Apollo readying was underway. NASA officials decided to deprioritize orbiter data, because landing information was much adjuvant for hardware development, which had apical priority. The orbital imagery would beryllium chiefly adjuvant for landing tract selection, which could travel later. JPL was to attraction connected getting Surveyor landers ready, while the Office of Space Sciences (OSS) began processing replacement plans for an orbiter.20

Oran Nicks put Lee Scherer connected the occupation of processing a spacecraft that could alert connected Agena. He primitively looked into adapting Ranger aliases Able 5 to the task. After they handed the programme disconnected to the Langley investigation center, nevertheless Byers writes that Langley head Floyd Thompson opted for a competitory bid.21 But this title whitethorn person been, if not a complete smokescreen, weighted heavy successful the favour of 1 peculiar bid. Correlating the Lunar Orbiter programme pinch the timeline presented successful Vance G. Mitchell’s declassified history of NASA/DOD relations paints a fascinating picture.

In 1962, arsenic the Surveyor orbiter was nether study, NASA Associate Administrator Robert Seamans met pinch DOD investigation charismatic John Rubel to talk lunar reconnaissance. Then, successful May 1963, small much than a period aft Langely submitted Lunar Orbiter’s Project Approval Document to Seamans, a overmuch larger gathering took spot betwixt NASA and DOD officials. They straight discussed the usage of NRO instrumentality for some unmanned vehicles and the Apollo program. Immediately pursuing this meeting, NASA administrator James Webb and Seamans started moving pinch DOD officials connected really to put this into practice, and specifically connected really NASA could create unclassified contracts for specified arrangements. Despite reservations, Rubel’s successor, Eugene Fubini, had the NRO look into NASA’s request.22

In mid July, an statement was drafted betwixt NASA and the DOD giving NASA support to usage NRO instrumentality for “both unmanned and parented lunar reconnaissance operations,” nether definite stipulations. It included the pursuing scheme of action:

“…it will beryllium the work of the NRO to prime a contractor, mostly from among those engaged successful the coming covert reconnaissance programs, to create instrumentality gathering these specifications successful a unafraid and protected, aliases ‘black’, fashion. Concurrently, NASA will assistance the aforesaid contractor an overt aliases ‘white’ reconnaissance statement which will service arsenic a technically plausible screen for the improvement of the formation hardware really to beryllium employed, during that magnitude of clip successful which the formation hardware must beryllium regarded arsenic highly delicate because of its relevance to the on-going covert reconnaissance operations.”23

Mitchell recounts 1 lawsuit of very nonstop interaction betwixt the willing parties during this period. “On 24 July 1963,” he writes, “NASA, NRO, and CIA representatives met pinch Fredrick C.E. Oder, a retired Air Force colonel progressive pinch Samos successful the 1950s, and now an Eastman Kodak executive.” The group straight discussed adapting the E-1 and E-2 cameras for lunar exploration, consulting Kodak engineers who thought it would beryllium feasible.24

On August 28, the DOD/CIA/NASA statement was signed by James Webb and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.25 On August 30, Seamans reviewed Langley’s Request For Proposals document, and NASA released it to contractors.26 The Boeing/Kodak bid was approved by Seamans and Webb successful December. “Although the disposable archiving does not opportunity so,” Mitchell argues, “the NRO, by kindness of the provisions of the 28 August statement and its knowledge of reconnaissance camera systems must person played a domiciled successful the action process.”27

This each whitethorn thief explicate the truth that astatine slightest successful its early stages, Lunar Orbiter was kept nether tight information measures astatine Kodak. McDowell remembers that astatine the time, activity connected Lunar Orbiter was kept “in the aforesaid level of secrecy that the [SAMOS] projects were.” Work was highly siloed–engineers building individual components did not ever cognize precisely what they would beryllium utilized for. McDowell says that this was a beautiful modular believe for Kodak astatine the time, but that the truth that they were utilizing the E-2 astir apt had thing to do pinch it.28

Regardless of whether the result of the title was predetermined, the Kodak strategy did person existent advantages complete the different bids for Lunar Orbiter. It promised accrued flexibility, the capacity of taking images simultaneously successful aggregate resolutions, and the expertise to execute impressively precocious resolutions.

Kodak’s last Lunar Orbiter camera strategy utilized a process mostly identical to their E-2 cameras.29 They moreover look to person borrowed immoderate of the illustrations from SAMOS presentations for Lunar Orbiter documentation.

The superior modifications that Kodak engineers made were to the lenses and shutter systems. They sought to meet very strict NASA requirements regarding solution of the images. Compared to the E-1 and E-2, which had 100-foot and 20-foot solution respectively, NASA’s goals for Apollo readying stated a astir 3-foot solution (closer to the never-realized plans for the SAMOS E-3). They besides moved from a azygous crushed position to three. Kodak’s last strategy was tin of achieving that solution fixed the correct orbit.

Through Lunar Orbiter documentation, we get a person look astatine the reconstruction process. Transmitted images were displayed pinch a kinescope and captured connected 35mm film, which was sent to Rochester for reassembly. Strips of 35mm movie were assembled to shape a afloat frame, which was successful move captured connected movie and sent disconnected to NASA. This meant that the images themselves traveled crossed respective different rolls of movie earlier yet being put to use.

The photographs brought backmost by Lunar Orbiter played an integral domiciled successful Apollo tract selection, and brought a wealthiness of caller accusation to cartographers and scientists. The camera strategy performed admirably, though engineers did brushwood a fistful of difficulties complete the people of the 5 flights. Some of these difficulties had to do pinch the Bimat movie itself, which operated somewhat inconsistently. The movie could “stick,” acquisition dryout, aliases spot droplet formation, leaving artifacts connected the film.30 The continuing issues pinch the movie into 1966 and 1967 whitethorn hint astatine immoderate of the circumstantial engineering and reliability issues that contributed to the extremity of SAMOS readout.

Because of its spin-off from Surveyor during the push for Apollo, Lunar Orbiter was arguably the very first spacecraft designed to behaviour reconnaissance specifically for quality spaceflight. The modification of subject hardware for the purposes of exploration has a agelong contented successful the history of exploration, and this is simply a peculiarly fascinating illustration successful that tradition. It is the communicative of a unsocial camera strategy straddling technological eras that ended up playing 2 very different roles successful the geopolitical title of the Cold War.